Wolf-Dieter Hütteroth and Kamal Abdulfattah’s (1977) seminal work on the Historical Geography of Palestine, Transjordan and Southern Syria in the Late 16th Century, based on a detailed Ottoman register (mufassal defter), describes these regions as ‘frontier zones’ under Ottoman rule. In 18th century Palestine, the pashalik of Safad (province of Safad) and Galilee as a whole were a case of ‘frontier province’ and a power base for a rising Palestinian local power under nominal Ottoman rule.

Appearing first under the Mamluks, the Iltizam taxation system was institutionalised by the Ottomans in the 15th century and was carried out by the farming of public tax revenues. The Ottoman state would outsource tax collection by auctioning taxation rights to the highest bidder (multazim), who would then profit, often profligately, from collecting the taxes locally, make payments to the state in fixed instalments, while keeping the profit. This outsourcing of the Iltizam tax system included the farming of land taxes and urban taxes, the production of certain goods such as wine and salt, and even the provision of certain public services. The outsourcing of the land Iltizam tax under the Ottomans, which resembled the iqta’a system under the Fatimids, gave rise to rich local elites and powerful local chieftains in Palestine and throughout the region. Formally abolished in the course of the reforms (Tanzimat) of 1856, but, in reality, continuing until the end of Ottoman rule in Palestine (Yazbak 1998: 72‒73), the ltizam system was very profitable and highly exploitative and was for many centuries of great benefit to powerful local elites under the Mamluks and Ottomans (Abdul Rahmam and Nagata 1977).

Certain aspects of the impact of the Ottoman tax farming system, with the growth of local autonomy and rise of powerful chiefs in Palestine especially within the context of ‘frontier provinces’, can also be seen in the previous rise of the Ghassanid Arab federate kings (supreme phylarchs)

of the ‘frontier provinces’ of Palaestina Secunda and Palaestina Tertia in the 6th and early 7th centuries and in the rise of the Jarrah leaders of the Bedouin tribes of Banu Tayy under the Fatimids, until their military defeat by Anushtakin al-Dizbari, the Military Governor of Palestine, in 1029 AD.

The spectacular rise of Dhaher al-ʿUmar in Galilee in the 18th century is also a case in point. His ability to collect taxes efficiently, raise and command an army effectively, forge alliances successfully and enforce law and order, within the context of the ‘frontier province’ of the Galilee, were all part of the mix which explains his rise to power in 18th century Palestine.

The closest Palestine got to early modern independent statehood was a result of both commercial dynamism of Palestine and its legendary leader Dhaher al-ʿUmar and the continued neglect of the Ottomans. The Zaydani clan (hamulah) of Dhaher al-ʿUmar emerged from the Palestinian countryside and periphery of the country, from the pashalik of Safad, a ‘frontier province’ under both the Mamluks and Ottomans, not from the traditional major urban centres of the country or the generally pro-Ottoman urban social elites of Palestine. Born in the village of ‘Arrabah in central Galilee, al-ʿUmar did not come from the traditional urban landowning aristocracy of Palestine and, unlike the local notables (‘ayan), he did not owe his legitimacy to the central Ottoman authorities. Al-ʿUmar’s family members had served as local multazims (tax collectors) in the provincial towns of Tiberias and Safad in the pashalik of Safad and he himself had begun his career as a trader and tax farmer under the Ottoman Iltizam system (Krämer 2011:

60). But the Ottoman Iltizam land tax system in Palestine had been highly exploitative and oppressive towards the peasantry and, as we shall see below, al-ʿUmar’s new taxation system and his socially enlightened regime were evidently popular among the Palestinian peasantry. He substantially reduced the power of the urban notables and ‘predatory classes’ that had fed upon vulnerable social groups, especially the peasants. Al-ʿUmar had received some formal education but he appears to have been largely selftaught and his early career, financial competence and practical experience as an efficient tax farmer were of critical value. But it was his political, military, economic, diplomatic and taxation skills which made him perhaps the most powerful leader in modern Palestinian history. His rise to power began in the Galilee countryside and his first headquarters was Tiberias in Eastern Galilee, not the traditional urban centres of the country: Nablus, Jerusalem and Gaza. After rebelling successfully against the Ottoman state and consolidating his regime, al-ʿUmar became effectively the sovereign ruler of much of Palestine. Following his military victory at Marj ibn ‘Amer in 1735, thousands of local people, including many residents of Nazareth, joined his forces. Apparently among his Galilee supporters were many local Christians, including Christian women from Nazareth who provided his troops with food and water (Joudah 1987: 28‒31). ‘Over the next three decades Zahir al-Umar’s stature became such that he found it possible to forge temporary alliances with the Russian government and to cooperate with the Mamluks in Egypt’ (Doumani 1995: 42).