Maadui wa Akili – Kwa Nini Ukafiri (Uatheism) Si wa Busara - Uhalisia wa Kimungu

Maadui wa Akili – Kwa Nini Ukafiri (Uatheism) Si wa Busara - Uhalisia wa Kimungu | Quran Course

Kabla sijakueleza kwa nini madereva wa teksi katika hadithi hii ni mifano ya kutokuamini Mungu (atheism) na imani ya Kiislamu (Islamic theism), nataka kukupa taarifa muhimu za msingi kwanza. Waislamu na wasioamini Mungu wote wanadhani kwamba wana uwezo wa kufikiri kwa akili. Hii ina maana kwamba tunaweza kuunda maarifa ya kiakili au ya kimantiki. Tunaona njia yetu kufikia hitimisho akilini mwetu. Akili zetu huchukua dhana au kauli na "kuziendesha" kuelekea lengo la kiakili; kwa maneno mengine, hitimisho la kimantiki. Hii ni sifa muhimu ya akili yenye busara. Kwa hiyo kwa nini kutokuamini Mungu ni kama dereva wa teksi aliyefunikwa macho? Aina nyingi za kutokuamini Mungu zinamaanisha naturalism ya kifalsafa, ambayo inadai kwamba akili (na kila kitu kingine) lazima zielezwe tu kupitia michakato ya kimwili isiyo na macho wala busara. Hata hivyo, kama vile huwezi kuwapeleka abiria ofisini kwao ukiwa umefunika macho, michakato ya kimwili isiyoona haiwezi kamwe "kuendesha" dhana zilizo akilini mwetu kuelekea lengo la kiakili. Kwa maneno mengine, haiwezi kuunda wala kutambua uhusiano wa kimantiki kati ya dhana za hoja. Kwa hiyo, kutokuamini Mungu kwa kweli ni sawa na kukataa akili yenyewe, kwa sababu kinabatilisha dhana yake yenyewe. Uwezo wetu wa kufikiri hauendani kabisa na mtazamo wa kinaturali wa dunia, kwa sababu busara haiwezi kutokana na michakato ya kimwili isiyo na busara na isiyoona. Kudai kwamba inaweza ni sawa na kuamini kwamba kitu kinaweza kutokana na kisichokuwepo. Kwa mtazamo huu, kutokuamini Mungu si jambo la busara. Kutokuamini Mungu kunabatilisha kitu ambacho kinadai kutumia kukataa uwepo wa Mungu: akili. Kwa hiyo, kwa nini imani ya Kiislamu ni kama dereva wa teksi anayeona? Uwezo wetu wa kuunda maarifa ya kiakili unaendana na imani ya Kiislamu kwa sababu uwezo huu unaleta maana (yaani, unaelezeka vya kutosha), kwa kuwa ulitolewa kwetu na Muumba Mwenye kuona yote, Mwenye kujua yote na Mwenye hekima. Kitu hakiwezi kuzaa kitu kingine ikiwa hakina ndani yake, au ikiwa hakina uwezo (au uwezekano) wa kukizaa. Kwa maneno mengine, busara inaweza kutokana tu na busara. Ndiyo maana uwezo wetu wa kuunda maarifa ya kiakili unaweza kutokana na Muumba. Hoja katika sura hii inasisitiza kwamba uwezo wetu wa kufikiri kimantiki unadhaniwa na wasioamini Mungu na pia na wanaoamini Mungu. Dhana hii, hata hivyo, inaendana vizuri na uteuzi wa Kiislamu (Uislamu wa kiteolojia) na haiendani wala haina maana chini ya kutokuamini Mungu. Kwa hiyo, itakuwa busara tu kukubali uteuzi wa Kiislamu kuliko kutokuamini Mungu. Sura hii itachunguza madai haya kwa undani. Hata hivyo, kabla sijafafanua zaidi, mazungumzo yafuatayo ni muhtasari wa yale yatakayojadiliwa katika sura hii:

Before I explain why the taxi-drivers in this story are analogies of atheism and Islamic theism, let me provide you with some essential background information. Both Muslims and atheists assume that they have the ability to reason. This means that we are able to form mental or rational insights. We “see” our way to a conclusion in our minds. Our minds take premises or statements and “drive” them to a mental destination; in other words, a logical conclusion. This is a key feature of a rational mind. So why is atheism like a taxi-driver with a blindfold on? Most forms of atheism imply philosophical naturalism, which demands that reason (and everything else) must only be explained via blind, non-rational physical processes. However, just as you cannot drive passengers to their office with a blindfold on, physical processes that are blind can never “drive” any premises in our minds to a mental destination. In other words, they cannot create and recognise the logical relations between the premises of an argument. Therefore, atheism is in effect equivalent to rejecting reason itself, because it invalidates its own assumption. Our ability to reason simply does not fit within the naturalistic worldview, because rationality cannot come from blind, non-rational physical processes. To maintain that it can is the same as believing that something can come from nothing. From this perspective, atheism is irrational. Atheism invalidates the thing that it claims to use to deny God: reason. So why is Islamic theism like a taxi-driver who can see? Our ability to form mental insights fits within Islamic theism because this ability makes sense (i.e. is explained adequately), as it was given to us by the Creator Who is All-Seeing, The-Knowing and The-Wise. A thing cannot give rise to something if it does not contain it, or if it does not have the ability (or the potential) to give rise to it. In other words, rationality can only come from rationality. This is why our ability to form mental insights can come from the Creator. The argument in this chapter asserts that our ability to reason is assumed by both atheists and theists. This assumption, however, fits nicely within Islamic theism and does not fit or make sense under atheism. Therefore, it would only be rational to accept Islamic theism over atheism. This chapter will examine these assertions in detail. However, before I elaborate, the dialogue below is a summary of what will be discussed in this chapter:

Kwa muktadha wa hoja hii, neno "akili" (sababu) linamaanisha ukweli kwamba sisi tunayo uwezo wa kufikiri kwa busara. Tunaweza kupata ukweli, tuna hamu ya kugundua, na tunaweza kufanya hitimisho, kuchukua kwa ujumla na kukata kwa mantiki. Sehemu muhimu ya uwezo wetu wa kufikiri ni uwezo wa kufikia hitimisho lenye uhalali wa kimantiki. Tunapofikiri kwa mantiki, hitimisho letu litatokana na ufahamu wetu wa kiakili unaojitokeza akilini mwetu; tunaona kwamba hitimisho linafuata. Kitaalamu, hitimisho tunalofikia linatokana na uhusiano wa kimantiki kati ya majengo ya hoja ya kimantiki. Tunaona kwamba hitimisho linafuata kutokana na uhusiano huu. "Kuona" huku hakuwezi kufafanuliwa kimwili. Hakuna kitu katika ulimwengu wa kimwili kinachoweza kueleza kwa nini na jinsi majengo haya yanavyounganishwa na hitimisho. Kwa muhtasari, tunapofikiri kwa mantiki tuna ufahamu wa kiakili kwamba hitimisho linafuata kimantiki; limeunganishwa kimantiki na majengo yake yaliyotangulia. Hoja za kukata (deductive) ni mfano mzuri wa kueleza ufahamu wetu wa kiakili. Hoja za kukata ni zile ambazo majengo yake yanahakikisha ukweli wa hitimisho. Hoja ya kukata ni halali (valid) ikiwa hitimisho lake linafuata kwa lazima kutokana na majengo yake. Ni sahihi (sound) ikiwa ni halali na majengo yake ni kweli au yanakubalika kwa busara. Fikiria hoja ifuatayo ya kukata: 1. Wanaume wote waseja ni wanaume wasio na ndoa. 2. Yohana ni mseja.

In the context of this argument, reason refers to the fact that we have rational faculties. We can acquire truth, we desire to discover, and we can infer, induce and deduce. A significant aspect of our rational faculties is the ability to come to a logically valid conclusion. When we reason logically, our conclusions will be based on our rational insight that is occurring in our minds; we see that the conclusion follows. Technically speaking, the conclusions we make are based on the logical relations between the premises of a logical argument. We see that the conclusion follows based on these relations. This “seeing” cannot be explained physically. Nothing in physical world can explain why and how these premises are connected to the conclusion. In summary, when we reason logically we have a mental insight that the conclusion follows logically; it is logically connected to its previous premises. Deductive arguments are a good example to explain our rational insights. Deductive arguments are where the premises guarantee the truth of the conclusion. A deductive argument is valid if its conclusion follows necessarily from its premises. It is sound if it is valid and its premises are true or rationally acceptable. Consider the following deductive argument: 1. All bachelors are unmarried men. 2. John is a bachelor.

Huu ni hoja halali; hitimisho linafuata kwa lazima kutokana na majengo. John ameona modifu 5 za manjano, hivyo ni lazima ifuate kwamba angalau baadhi ya modifu ziwe za manjano. Kutokana na majengo (1) na (2), (3) lazima ifuate. Hata hivyo, kwa nini tunakubali kwamba hitimisho (3) linafuata kwa lazima kutokana na majengo haya? Kwa nini tunaamini uhalali wa kimantiki wa hitimisho, ingawa hatujui modifu ni nini? (Kwa njia, mimi mwenyewe nimelibuni neno hilo.) Ni kwa sababu mtiririko wa kimantiki wa hoja hutokea akilini mwetu bila kujali maana ya majengo na hitimisho lolote la kibinafsi tunaloweza kuwa tumelifikia kutokana na uzoefu wetu. Kuna uhusiano kati ya mahusiano ya majengo na hitimisho. Tumefikia ufahamu wa hitimisho (3) bila data yoyote ya nje, ya kimaada au ya kimaana. Tumefikia ufahamu wa jambo ambalo halitegemei uzoefu wetu (hatujui modifu ni nini). Kwa kweli, kama neno "manjano" lingebadilishwa kuwa "zanjano" (neno lingine la kubuni), hitimisho bado lingefuata kwa lazima; baadhi ya modifu (angalau 5) lazima ziwe zanjano. Akili zetu hazijafikia hitimisho lisilotegemea ushahidi wowote wa nje tu; pia zimeanzisha mahusiano kati ya majengo. Mahusiano haya hayawezi kuelezwa kwa kutumia ushahidi wa kimwili au wa kimajaribio. Akili zetu zimeongoza na kuelekeza ufahamu wetu (kwa maneno mengine, kuanzisha mahusiano haya ya kimantiki) kuhitimisha kwamba (3) lazima ifuate kutokana na (1) na (2). Akili zetu zimechukua majengo (1) na (2) na kuelekeza au kuongoza ufahamu wetu kufikia hitimisho (3).

This is a valid argument; the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. John has observed 5 yellow modifus, so it necessarily follows that at least some modifus must be yellow. Given premises (1) and (2), (3) must follow. However, why do we agree that the conclusion (3) necessarily follows from these premises? Why do we believe in the logical validity of the conclusion, although we have no idea what a modifu is? (By the way, I have made the word up). It is because the logical flow of the argument occurs in our minds regardless of the meaning of the premises and any personal inferences we might ever have formed from our own experiences. There is a connection between the relations of the premises and the conclusion. We have achieved an insight into conclusion (3) without any external, material and semantic data. We have achieved an insight into something that is not based on our experience (we do not know what a modifu is). In actual fact, if the word “yellow” was replaced with “zellow” (another made-up word), the conclusion would still necessarily follow; some modifus (at least 5) must be zellow. Not only have our minds come to a conclusion that is not based on any external evidence; our minds have also established relations between the premises. These relations cannot be explained using physical or empirical evidence. Our minds have directed and driven our insight (in other words, established these logical relations) to conclude that (3) must follow from (1) and (2). Our minds have taken premises (1) and (2) and driven or directed our insight to conclude (3).

Hii inamaanisha kwamba hatuwezi kutumia michakato ya kimwili kueleza uwezo wetu wa kupata ufahamu wa hitimisho. Sababu: dhana ya sayansi. Akili ya binadamu ina sifa ya kipekee; tunaweza kutofautisha kati ya haki na batili, ukweli na uongo, uzuri na ubaya. Hili linatutenganisha wazi na wanyama. Uwezo wetu wa kiakili umetuwezesha kuendelea na kupiga hatua. Kwa kweli, lazima tuiamini nafsi yetu ya kufikiri kabla hata ya kuanza kufanya sayansi. Mojawapo ya dhana kuu za sayansi ni kwamba akili zetu zina uwezo wa kufikiri. Bila dhana kama hiyo, tusingeweza kutumia maneno kama ushahidi, ukweli, kweli na uthibitisho. Mazoezi ya kisayansi ya binadamu yanategemea dhana kwamba tunaweza kufikiri. Hii inamaanisha kwamba uwepo wa akili hauwezi kuelezwa kikamilifu na aina yoyote ya maelezo ya kisayansi. Kwa mfano, mwanasayansi anapojaribu kushughulikia dhana inayoweza kujaribiwa au swali linaloweza kujibiwa, kuna dhana kwamba matokeo yanaweza kufanyiwa uchambuzi wa kimantiki. Wanasayansi pia wanakubali kwamba wana uwezo wa kutathmini uhalali wa kimantiki wa maelezo ya kisayansi. Hili kwa wazi linadhani kwamba mwanasayansi anaweza kutumia akili yake kabla ya kufanya sayansi yoyote. Hii haimaanishi kwamba sayansi haiwezi kutoa maelezo yoyote ya sehemu kuhusu uwezo wetu wa kufikiri. Hata hivyo, haiwezi kuhalalisha akili kutoka mtazamo wa msingi. Kujaribu kuonyesha jinsi akili ilivyojitokeza kupitia mchakato fulani wa kimwili hakufafanui hata kidogo kipimo chake cha kiroho usiyoweza kufikiwa na hisia. Hii inajumuisha uwezo wa kufikia hitimisho lenye mantiki sahihi linaloamuliwa na ufahamu katika akili ya mtu. Ndiyo maana kutegemea maelezo ya kisayansi peke yake haitoshi: linashindwa kueleza ukweli kwamba tunaona hitimisho katika akili zetu. Tuna uwezo wa kufikia hitimisho lenye mantiki kulingana na uhusiano kati ya hoja za msingi. Tunaweza pia kufanya hivyo bila maneno muhimu katika hoja hizo kutegemea chochote tunachoweza kukielewa au kuthibitisha kwa majaribio. Sayansi inaweza tu kushughulikia yale ambayo yanaweza kuzingatiwa kwa namna fulani; uhusiano wa kimantiki kati ya majengo hauwezi kuzingatiwa. Kwa kuwa sayansi inahitaji akili ili kuanza kueleza akili, kudai kwamba inaweza kwa namna fulani kuhalalisha uwezo wetu wa kufikiri kungekuwa sawa na kuhoji kwa mduara. Sayansi ni chombo chenye manufaa cha kutusaidia kuelewa ulimwengu, lakini ina mipaka mingi (ona Sura ya 12). Katika hatua hii mtu anaweza kusema kwamba dhana hazihitaji kufafanuliwa au kuelezewa, kwa sababu baadhi ya dhana (au kanuni za msingi) huchukuliwa kuwa kweli bila ushahidi. Hoja hii ni ya msingi.

This means that we cannot use physical processes to account for our ability to achieve an insight into a conclusion. Reason: an assumption of science The human mind has a distinctive quality; we can distinguish between right and wrong, truth and falsehood, beauty and vileness. This clearly separates us from animals. Our mental abilities have enabled us to progress and advance. In fact, we must trust our rational faculties before we can even begin to conduct science. One of science’s key assumptions is that our minds have the ability to reason. Without such an assumption, we could never use words such as evidence, fact, truth and proof. The human practice of science rests on the assumption that we can reason. This means that the existence of reason cannot be fully accounted for by any type of scientific explanation. For example, when a scientist attempts to address a testable hypothesis or an answerable question, there is an assumption that the results can be rationalised. Scientists also accept that they have the ability to assess the logical validity of a scientific explanation. This obviously assumes that the scientist can use her reason before she performs any science. This does not mean that science cannot provide any partial explanation at all for our ability to reason. However, it is unable to justify reason from a foundational point of view. Attempting to demonstrate how reason emerged via some physical process does nothing to explain its transcendent dimension. This includes the ability to come to a logically valid conclusion that is determined by an insight in one’s mind. This is why relying solely on a scientific explanation is inadequate: it fails to account for the fact that we see the conclusion in our minds. We have the ability to make a logical conclusion based on the relations between premises. We can also do this without the key words in the premises being based on anything we can understand or verify empirically. Science can only deal with what can be observed in some way; logical relations between premises cannot be observed. Since science requires reason in order to begin to explain reason, to argue that it can somehow justify our ability to reason would be tantamount to arguing in a circle. Science is a useful tool to help us understand the world, but it has many limitations (see Chapter 12). At this point one might argue that assumptions do not need to be explained or accounted for, because some assumptions (or first principles) are taken to be true without evidence. This is a valid point.

Wengi wa wanaoamini kuwa hakuna Mungu ni wanaturalisti wa kifalsafa; naturalism inadai kuwa hakuna kitu cha kiroho zaidi ya maumbile, na kwamba michakato ya kimwili inaweza kueleza kila jambo. Kulingana na naturalism, tukichunguza ngazi za msingi kabisa za uhalisia, tunaona kuwa kila kitu ni matokeo ya michakato ya kimwili isiyo na akili, ya kubahatisha na isiyo ya kimantiki; chembe ndogo ndogo, atomu na molekuli zinazunguka bila mwelekeo, mwongozo wala lengo lililokusudiwa. Vitu vya kimwili havina kusudi; hakuna kitu kinachoongoza kwa makusudi michakato hii ya kimwili. Ikiwa hali ni hii, basi tunawezaje kudai kuwa akili zetu zina uwezo wa kupata maarifa ya kiakili? Tunawezaje kudai uwezo wa kufikia hitimisho? Sehemu muhimu ya uwezo wa kufikiri ni kuwa na maarifa ya kimantiki, yaani kuona akilini mwetu kuwa jambo fulani hufuata kutoka kwa jambo jingine kutokana na uhusiano wa kimantiki kati ya hoja za msingi. Hapa ndipo naturalism inaposhindwa, kwa kuwa inadai kuwa matukio yote yanategemea michakato ya kimwili ya kubahatisha na isiyo ya kimantiki.

Most atheists are philosophical naturalists; naturalism asserts that there is no supernatural, and that physical processes can explain all phenomena. According to naturalism, if we probe the most basic levels of reality, we see that everything is the result of blind, random, non-rational physical processes; subatomic particles, atoms and molecules are whizzing around without any direction, guidance or intended outcome. Physical stuff has no purpose; nothing is intentionally driving these physical processes. If this is the case, though, how can we claim our minds have the ability to achieve mental insights? How can we claim the ability to reach a conclusion? A key part of being able to reason is to have rational insights, to see in one’s mind that something logically follows from something else based on the logical relations between premises. This is where naturalism fails, as it asserts that all phenomena are based on random, non-rational physical processes.

Likewise, if physical processes do not contain rationality, then how do they give rise to it? Physical processes by definition do not contain rationality, and they do not have "insight". They cannot see the conclusion that follows from an argument. Physical processes are not purposefully or intentionally driven or directed. Therefore, to even suggest that rationality can come from non-rational physical processes is exactly the same as believing that something can come from nothing. Consider the following example. Similar to the story at the beginning of this chapter, imagine there are two bus-drivers. The first has good eyesight and is an experienced driver. The second bus-driver is blind and inexperienced. The first driver starts his journey and picks up two people called "Premise 1" and "Premise 2". Their final destination is "Conclusion". He sees the destination on his map and as the journey is coming to an end he clearly observes the final stop. The second driver is escorted to his bus at the bus station. Waiting on the bus are "Premise 1" and "Premise 2". Their destination is the same as in the first scenario. The driver manages to start the bus. However, do you think he will reach the destination? Just like the taxi-driver with the blindfold, he will never reach the final destination. Physical processes suffer the same problem. They are blind. They cannot explain reason because a feature of rationality is the ability to derive insight or reach a conclusion, and one cannot obtain insight from something that is blind. To assert such a thing is the equivalent of saying something can arise from nothing. From this perspective, atheism, because of its naturalistic perspective, is not only irrational but an adversary of reason. It invalidates the thing that is required to make any claim about God: --- Swahili translation: Vivyo hivyo, ikiwa michakato ya kimwili haina mantiki ndani yake, basi inawezekanaje kuizalisha? Kwa maana yake, michakato ya kimwili haina mantiki, na haina "ufahamu". Haiwezi kuona hitimisho linalofuata kutoka katika hoja. Michakato ya kimwili haiongozwi wala kuelekezwa kwa kusudi au kwa makusudi. Kwa hiyo, hata kupendekeza kwamba mantiki inaweza kutokana na michakato ya kimwili isiyo ya kimantiki ni sawa kabisa na kuamini kwamba kitu kinaweza kutokana na hakuna kitu. Zingatia mfano ufuatao. Kama ilivyo katika hadithi iliyoanza sura hii, fikiria kuna madereva wawili wa basi. Wa kwanza ana macho mazuri na ni dereva mwenye uzoefu. Dereva wa pili ni kipofu na hana uzoefu. Dereva wa kwanza anaanza safari yake na kuwachukua watu wawili waitwao "Premise 1" na "Premise 2". Kituo chao cha mwisho ni "Conclusion". Anaiona lengo kwenye ramani yake, na safari inapokaribia mwisho anaona kwa uwazi kituo cha mwisho. Dereva wa pili anapelekwa kwenye basi lake kituoni. Ndani ya basi wanamngoja "Premise 1" na "Premise 2". Kituo chao ni kile kile kama katika hali ya kwanza. Dereva anafanikiwa kuliwasha basi. Lakini je, unafikiri atafika kituo kilichokusudiwa? Kama dereva wa teksi mwenye kitambaa machoni, hatafika kamwe kituo cha mwisho. Michakato ya kimwili inakabiliwa na tatizo hilohilo. Ni vipofu. Haziwezi kueleza sababu kwa sababu sifa ya mantiki ni uwezo wa kupata ufahamu au kufikia hitimisho, na haiwezekani kupata ufahamu kutoka kwa kitu kisichoona. Kudai jambo kama hilo ni sawa na kusema kwamba kitu kinaweza kutokea kutokana na hakuna kitu. Kwa mtazamo huu, ukana Mungu, kwa sababu ya mtazamo wake wa kinaturali, si tu hauna mantiki bali ni adui wa akili. Unabatilisha kitu ambacho kinahitajika ili kutoa dai lolote kuhusu Mungu:

Likewise, if physical processes do not contain rationality, then how do they give rise to it? Physical processes by definition do not contain rationality, and they do not have “insight”. They cannot see the conclusion that follows from an argument. Physical processes are not purposefully or intentionally driven or directed. Therefore, to even suggest that rationality can come from non-rational physical processes, is exactly the same as believing that something can come from nothing. Consider the following example. Similar to the story at the beginning of this chapter, imagine there are two bus-drivers. The first has good eyesight and is an experienced driver. The second bus-driver is blind and inexperienced. The first driver starts his journey and picks up two people called “Premise 1” and “Premise 2”. Their final destination is “Conclusion”. He sees the destination on his map and as the journey is coming to an end he clearly observes the final stop. The second driver is escorted to his bus at the bus station. Waiting on the bus are “Premise 1” and “Premise 2”. Their destination is the same as in the first scenario. The driver manages to start the bus. However, do you think he will reach the destination? Just like the taxi-driver with the blindfold, he will never reach the final destination. Physical processes suffer the same problem. They are blind. They cannot explain reason because a feature of rationality is the ability to derive insight or reach a conclusion, and one cannot obtain insight from something that is blind. To assert such a thing is the equivalent of saying something can arise from nothing. From this perspective, atheism—because of its naturalistic perspective—is not only irrational, but an adversary of reason. It invalidates the thing that is required to make any claim about God:

sababu ya akili yenyewe. Kwa kuwa akili haiwezi kutokana na kutokuwa na akili, inafuata kwamba naturalism haiwezi kueleza uwezo wetu wa kufikiri. Licha ya hoja hii, kuna pingamizi kadhaa zinazowezekana. Hizi zitajadiliwa mwishoni mwa sura hii. Hata hivyo, pingamizi moja kuu linadai kwamba programu za kompyuta zina uwezo wa kufikiri kwa njia ya kupunguza (deduction): programu za kompyuta zimeundwa kwa vitu vya kimwili; kwa hiyo, michakato ya kimwili inaweza kueleza akili. Hoja hii itashughulikiwa kwa kina mwishoni mwa sura hii. Hata hivyo, hoja kuu ni kwamba programu za kompyuta hazina "maarifa" ya kweli; hasa, hazina maarifa yenye maana. Akili ya binadamu inahusisha uwezo wa kufikia hitimisho lenye maana. Ukweli kwamba tunaweza kuhoji maana au matokeo ya hitimisho (hata kama hatujui maana yake, kama ilivyo kwa modifus hapo juu) unaonyesha kwamba akili ya binadamu inahusisha maarifa yenye maana. Programu za kompyuta hazina maarifa haya yenye maana. Kwa kweli, mfumo wa kompyuta unategemea kanuni za kisintaksia (upangaji wa alama), si semantiki (maana). Hili litaelezwa zaidi baadaye.

reason itself. Since rationality cannot come from non-rationality, it follows that naturalism cannot explain our ability to reason. Despite this argument, there are a few possible objections. These will be discussed at the end of this chapter. However, one key objection argues that computer programmes have the ability to reason deductively: computer programmes are made up of physical stuff; therefore, physical processes can explain rationality. This contention will be addressed in detail at the end of this chapter. However, the main point is that computer programmes do not have “insights”; in particular, they do not have meaningful insights. Human rationality involves the ability to establish meaningful conclusions. The very fact that we can question the implications or the meaning of a conclusion (even if we do not know its meaning, as in the case of the modifus above) indicates that human rationality involves meaningful insights. Computer programmes do not have these meaningful insights. In actual fact, a computer system is based on syntactical rules (the manipulation of symbols), not on semantics (meaning). This will be explained further later.

Kulingana na wanaturalisti, akili zetu zimebadilika kuwa za kiakili. Wanaturalisti wanasema kwamba ilikuwa na manufaa kwa mababu zetu kujua ukweli kuhusu mazingira yao. Uwezo wa kutofautisha kati ya kweli na uongo ulikuwa wa lazima kwa maisha yao. Ingawa naturalism inabatilisha dhana kwamba tuna uwezo wa kufikiri, mageuzi ya Darwin yanaonekana kuwa maelezo yanayokubalika juu juu. Hata hivyo, tukichimba kidogo zaidi, tunakutana na matatizo mengi. Hata Charles Darwin mwenyewe alikuwa na shaka kuhusu jambo hili. Alielewa kwamba uwezo wetu wa kupata ukweli haungeweza kueleweka iwapo ulitokana tu na viumbe vya hali ya chini. Aliandika katika barua mwaka 1881: "Lakini kwangu shaka hiyo ya kutisha daima hujitokeza, kama imani za akili ya mwanadamu, ambayo imekua kutoka akili ya wanyama wa hali ya chini, zina thamani yoyote au zinaaminika hata kidogo. Je, kuna mtu yeyote angeamini imani za akili ya nyani, kama zipo imani zozote katika akili kama hiyo?"68 Sasa tuone kama mageuzi ya kiasili yanaweza kutoa jaketi la kuokoa ambalo kwalo akili ya binadamu inaweza kuokolewa. Tunapotumia neno mageuzi ya kiasili, tunamaanisha wazo kwamba mchakato wa mageuzi hauna uingiliaji wa Mungu; kwa mujibu wa wazo hili, akili zetu zimebadilika kuwa za kiakili kwa sababu uwezo wetu wa kufikiri na kupata imani za kweli ni wa lazima kwa kuishi. Kuna matatizo kadhaa katika dai hili. Kwanza, uwezo wetu wa kutofautisha kati ya kweli na uongo si sharti la kuishi. Pili, kupata maarifa ya kiakili pia si sharti la kuendelea kuwepo kwetu. Mageuzi yanahusu uwezo wa kuishi, si uwezo wa kufanya hitimisho sahihi kimantiki. Mwisho, uwezo wetu na hamu yetu ya kugundua—sifa ya lazima ya akili yenye busara—mara nyingi huwa hatari kwa maisha yetu. Mojawapo ya sifa kuu za akili zetu zenye busara ni uwezo wao wa kupata ukweli na kutupilia mbali yaliyo ya uongo. Tunao pia uwezo wa kiakili, na uwezo wa kuona hitimisho kulingana na hoja zilizotangulia. Hizi ndizo hasa taratibu tunazozitumia tunapojihusisha na sayansi. Sasa swali la kuuliza ni: Je, mageuzi ya kinaturalisti yanaweza kueleza uwezo huu? Jibu ni hapana. Ili kuthibitisha kuwa wazo hili si sahihi, tunahitaji tu kuonyesha kwamba imani zisizo za kweli zinaweza kusababisha kuishi. Ikiwa hivyo, hakuna haja kwamba mchakato wa mageuzi uzae uwezo wa kufikiri kwa akili. Je, imani zisizo za kweli zinaweza kusababisha kuishi? Haichukui muda mrefu kugundua kwamba imani nyingi zisizo za kweli zinasababisha hilo. Mtu anayeamini kwamba wadudu wote wenye alama nyekundu kwenye miili yao ni sumu ataepuka wadudu wote wenye alama nyekundu na hivyo ataishi. Hata hivyo, imani hii si ya kweli, kwani wadudu wengi wenye rangi nyekundu mwilini mwao hawana madhara, huku kunguni wa kawaida (ladybird) akiwa mfano dhahiri zaidi. Mtu mwingine anaweza kuepuka uyoga wote kwa sababu anaamini kwamba ni sumu, na kwa kufanya hivyo akaishi. Hata hivyo, tunajua kwamba baadhi ya uyoga, kama uyoga wa kitufe (button mushrooms), ni salama kabisa na una lishe kuliwa. Profesa wa Falsafa Anthony O’Hear anatoa mfano unaofanana ili kuonyesha kwamba mageuzi yanaweza kuzaa imani zisizo za kweli badala ya za kweli, hivyo kuonyesha kwamba imani zisizo za kimantiki zinaweza kusababisha kuishi: “Ndege anaweza kuepuka viwavi wenye rangi fulani kwa sababu ni sumu; lakini pia ataepuka viwavi wasio na sumu wenye rangi zinazofanana, na anaweza kuhesabiwa kuwa na imani isiyo ya kweli kuhusu sumu ya kiwavi asiye na madhara. Bila shaka, nafasi ya ndege kuishi huongezeka kwa kuepuka aina ya kiwavi ambayo inajumuisha viwavi wenye sumu na wasio na madhara. Kuwa na imani isiyo ya kweli kuhusu kiwavi fulani, basi, ni matokeo ya mwelekeo unaozalisha kuishi.” Kwa kuwa viwavi wasio na madhara wamebadilika kwa kuiga wale wenye sumu, tuna hapa maelezo ya kibiolojia ya mabadiliko ya uongo, yakiimarisha hoja ya jumla kwamba hakuna njia ya moja kwa moja ya kutoka katika michakato ya mageuzi hadi kwenye ukweli.69

According to naturalists our minds have evolved to be rational. Naturalists argue that it was advantageous for our ancestors to have known the truth about their environments. Having an ability to distinguish between truth and falsehood was necessary for their survival. Despite the fact that naturalism invalidates the assumption that we have the ability to reason, Darwinian evolution seems a plausible explanation on the surface. However, when we scratch a little deeper we run into a myriad of problems. Even Charles Darwin himself had his doubts about this matter. He understood that our ability to acquire truth could not be accounted for if it had only evolved from lower life-forms. He wrote in a letter in 1881: “But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would anyone trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?”68 Now let’s see whether naturalistic evolution can provide a lifejacket with which to rescue human rationality. When we use the term naturalistic evolution, we are referring to the idea that the evolutionary process is free from Divine intervention; according to this idea, our minds evolved to be rational because our ability to reason and attain true beliefs is necessary for survival. There are several problems with this claim. Firstly, our ability to distinguish between truth and falsehood is not a requirement for survival. Secondly, achieving mental insights is also not a requirement for our continual existence. Evolution is about the ability to survive, not about the ability to make logically valid conclusions. Finally, our ability and desire to discover—a necessary feature of a rational mind—is often detrimental to our survival. One of the key features of our rational minds is their ability to attain truth and discard what is false. We also have mental insights, and the ability to see a conclusion based on previous premises. These are the very processes we use when we engage in science. Now the question to ask is: Can naturalistic evolution account for these abilities? The answer is no. All we need to do in order to disprove this idea is show that false beliefs can lead to survival. In that case, there is no need for the evolutionary process to result in rational faculties. So can false beliefs result in survival? It does not take long to work out that countless false beliefs do. An individual who believes that all insects with red markings on their bodies are poisonous will avoid all insects with red markings and survive. However, this belief is false, as many insects with red on their bodies are harmless, the common ladybird being the most obvious example. Someone else might avoid all fungi because he or she believes they are poisonous, and by doing so survive. However, we know that some fungi, like button mushrooms, are completely healthy and nutritious to eat. Professor of Philosophy Anthony O’Hear provides a similar example to show that evolution can produce false, rather than true beliefs, thereby showing that non-rational beliefs can lead to survival: “A bird may avoid caterpillars with certain types of colouring because they are poisonous; but it will also avoid non-poisonous caterpillars with similar colours, and may be credited with a false belief about the poisonousness of the harmless caterpillar. Of course, the survival chances of the bird are increased by its avoidance of the caterpillar type which includes both noxious and harmless caterpillars. Having a false belief, then, about a particular caterpillar will be a by-product of a survival-producing disposition. Given that the harmless caterpillars have evolved through mimicry of the poisonous ones, we have here an evolutionary explanation of falsehood, reinforcing the general point that there is no direct way of moving from evolutionary workings to truth.”69

Zaidi, mantiki ya kwamba imani zisizo sahihi zinaweza kusaidia kuishi inaleta swali jingine gumu kwa naturalism: Kwa nini tuamini akili zetu? Kwa kuwa hakuna uhusiano wa lazima kati ya ukweli na kuishi, na kwa kuwa imani zisizo sahihi pia zinaweza kusaidia kuishi, basi tunawezaje kuamini uwezo wetu wa kufikiri ikiwa ungeweza kujengeka kupitia mchakato wa mabadiliko unaoongozwa na imani zisizo sahihi? Hamu yetu ya kugundua pia inaleta tatizo kwa mageuzi. Hakuna sababu kwa mageuzi kuzaa uwezo unaotuwezesha kuelewa sheria za fizikia au kushiriki katika hisabati. Haina maana kwamba tungeishia na akili zenye uwezo wa kuelewa ulimwengu. Mende na wadudu aina ya beetle wanaishi vizuri sana, na wamefanya hivyo kwa mamilioni ya miaka, lakini hatuwaoni wakiketi juu ya kahawa wakijadili maana ya kuwepo na mantiki ya kutokuamini Mungu (au jambo lingine lolote). Fikiria kwa dakika moja: fikiria roketi iliyobeba kilo 500,000 za mafuta, inayokaribia kurushwa angani kwa kasi ya maili 17,500 kwa saa. Ni nini kinachomsukuma mwanaanga kupanda chombo hiki, bila kujua kama atarudi au hata kama atafika angani? Je, hamu hii ya kuchunguza na kugundua inachangia kuishi kwake? Ni nini kinachomsukuma mpandaji kupanda Mlima Everest, akivumilia baridi kali na hali ngumu, bila kujua kama atafika kileleni? Je, hakuumbwa kuweka kuishi kwake mbele? Ni nini kinachomsukuma mtawa kujitenga, kubaki bila kuoa na kujitoa kutafuta amani ya ndani? Je, hili halipingani kabisa na kuishi na kuzaliana? Kwa hakika, hamu ya kugundua ina nguvu sana kwa binadamu na mara nyingi huzidi hamu ya kuishi. Tunaona watu wengi wakijitenga na mambo yale yale yanayochangia kuishi kwao, na kwa kufanya hivyo wanapata furaha na amani ya kweli. Basi, tunawezaje kueleza hamu yetu ya kugundua, inayozaa shughuli zenye madhara kwa kuishi? Jibu ni kwamba hatuwezi. Hamu hizi hazina maana iwapo mtu atakubali mageuzi ya kinaturalisti. Kwa kumalizia, viwango vyetu vya juu vya akili na hamu ya kujifunza mara nyingi hutufanya tutumie muda katika shughuli za "ziada" ambazo hazisaidii kuishi wala kuzaliana, kama vile sanaa, roho, falsafa au kubuni mbinu mpya za kuzuia mimba. Uteuzi asilia ungepaswa kuwa umeondoa yote haya, kwa sababu tabia kama hizo hazina faida yoyote ya kubadilika. Kwa kuwa mfumo wa mageuzi wa Darwin unaeleza "kuishi na kuzaliana" pekee, hauwezi kueleza uwezo wetu wa kufikiri, wala sifa yake inayoonekana zaidi: hamu ya kugundua. Kutokana na matatizo haya mawili, ni wazi kwamba nadharia ya mageuzi ya Darwin, ambayo imelenga kuishi, si ukweli, ni maelezo yasiyotosha ya uwezo wetu wa kufikiri na hamu yetu ya kugundua. Wasomi wametambua matatizo haya na wametoa kauli za kushangaza. Mwanabiolojia John Gray anasema: "Ikiwa akili ya binadamu imebadilika kwa kufuata mahitaji ya kuishi, kuna sababu gani ya kuamini kwamba inaweza kupata maarifa ya uhalisia, wakati yote yanayohitajika ili kuzaliana kwa spishi ni kwamba makosa na udanganyifu wake usiwe mbaya?" Falsafa ya kinaturalisti pekee haiwezi kueleza maarifa ambayo tunaamini tunayo.70 Mgunduzi wa DNA Francis Crick alisema, "Ubongo wetu ulioendelezwa sana, baada ya yote, haukubadilika chini ya shinikizo la kugundua ukweli wa kisayansi, bali ili tuwe werevu wa kutosha kuishi na kuacha wazao." 71 Mwanasayansi wa utambuzi Steven Pinker aliandika, "Ubongo wetu uliundwa kwa ajili ya kufaa, si kwa ajili ya ukweli. Wakati mwingine ukweli una faida, lakini wakati mwingine si hivyo." 72 Ingawa Sam Harris, mwanasayansi wa neva na mpinzani wa wazi wa imani ya Mungu, anaamini kwamba sayansi itatupatia majibu hatimaye, anakiri kwamba "…intuitions zetu za kimantiki, kihisabati na kimwili hazikubuniwa na uteuzi asilia ili kufuatilia Ukweli." 73 Kwa muhtasari, pale wanaoamini kwamba hakuna Mungu wanapodai kwamba wametumia uwezo wao wa kufikiri kuthibitisha kwamba Mungu hayupo, hiyo ni aina ya unafiki wa kiakili. Ili kuhesabu ukweli kwamba wana akili ya busara, wanapaswa kukataa kutokuamini Mungu au kukataa busara yenyewe. Kejeli ya kiakili ni kwamba uwezo wao wa kufikiri kwa busara unaelezeka vizuri zaidi kwa kuwepo kwa Mungu. Dokezo kuhusu Uaminifu wa Mageuzi (Evolutionary Reliabilism) Wanaturalisti wengi wanakiri kwamba hakuna uhusiano wa lazima kati ya kuishi na ukweli. Wanashikilia kwamba kuna uwezekano mkubwa kwamba zilikuwepo hali na shinikizo za kibiolojia zilizozaa uwezo wa kiakili unaotegemeka, unaozalisha imani za kweli. Uwezo huu lazima ulisaidia kuongeza uwezo wa kuishi kibiolojia (fitness), na baadaye uchaguzi asilia uliupendelea. Mtazamo kwamba mageuzi ya Darwin yanaweza kueleza uwezo wetu wa kiakili unaotegemeka kwa ukweli unajulikana kama evolutionary reliabilism. Ili evolutionary reliabilism iwe na msingi wa kuaminika, uwezekano wa uchaguzi asilia kupendelea uwezo wa kiakili unaotegemeka kwa ukweli lazima uwe mkubwa kuliko uwezekano wa kupendelea uwezo usiotegemeka unaozalisha imani za uongo. Dhana kuu ya hoja hii ni kwamba uwezo wa kiakili unaotegemeka kwa ukweli ulikuwa wenye kuongeza uwezo wa kuishi zaidi (wenye kuchangia kuishi na kuzaliana) kuliko uwezo usiotegemeka uliozalisha imani za uongo. Hata hivyo, kwa kuzingatia mjadala wetu hadi sasa, dhana hii inadhoofishwa. Kuna sababu nyingine kwa nini dhana hii haina msingi wa kutosha; baadhi yake zimejadiliwa hapa chini.

The fact that false beliefs can lead to survival raises another difficult question for naturalism: Why should we trust our minds? Since there is no necessary link between truth and survival—and that false beliefs can also lead to survival—then how can we trust our rational faculties if they could have been based on an evolutionary process driven by false beliefs? Our desire to discover also poses a problem for evolution. There is no need for evolution to result in abilities that allow us to understand the laws of physics or engage in mathematics. It just does not make sense that we should end up with minds that have the ability to understand the universe. Cockroaches and beetles survive extremely well, and have done so for millions of years, yet we do not see them sitting over coffee discussing the existential and logical implications of atheism (or anything else). Think about this for a moment: Imagine a rocket containing 500,000 kilogrammes of fuel, about to be blasted into space at 17,500 miles per hour. What drives an astronaut to board this shuttle, unknowing of whether or not he will return or even reach space? Is this desire to explore and discover conducive to his survival? What drives a climber to ascend Mount Everest, enduring cold and harsh conditions, not knowing if he will reach the summit? Isn’t he designed to put his survival first? What drives a monk to isolate himself, remain celibate and devote himself to discovering inner peace? Does not this go completely against survival and reproduction? Indeed, the desire to discover is powerful in humans and in many cases overrides our desire to survive. We see many cases of people cutting themselves off from the very things that are conducive to their survival, and in doing so achieve true happiness and peace. So, how can we explain our desire to discover, resulting in activities that are detrimental to survival? The answer is we cannot. These desires do not make sense if one adopts naturalistic evolution. In conclusion, our higher levels of rationality and desire to learn often lead us to spend time in ‘superfluous’ activities which do not aid survival and reproduction, such as art, spirituality, philosophy or designing novel contraceptive techniques. Natural selection should have eliminated all of these, because such behaviours have no adaptive benefits. Because the Darwinian evolutionary mechanism explains only “survival and reproduction”, it cannot account for our ability to reason, or for its most conspicuous characteristic: the desire to discover. It should be clear from these two problems that the Darwinian theory of evolution, which is geared towards survival, not truth, is an inadequate explanation of our ability to reason and desire to discover. Academics have recognised these problems and have made some startling remarks. Biologist John Gray states: “If the human mind has evolved in obedience to the imperatives of survival, what reason is there for thinking that it can acquire knowledge of reality, when all that is required in order to reproduce the species is that its errors and illusions are not fatal? A purely naturalistic philosophy cannot account for the knowledge that we believe we possess.”70 DNA discoverer Francis Crick said, “Our highly developed brains, after all, were not evolved under the pressure of discovering scientific truths, but only to enable us to be clever enough to survive and leave descendants.”71 Cognitive scientist Steven Pinker wrote, “Our brains were shaped for fitness, not for truth. Sometimes the truth is adaptive, but sometimes it is not.”72 Although Sam Harris, outspoken atheist and neuroscientist, believes that science will eventually give us answers, he admits that “…our logical, mathematical, and physical intuitions have not been designed by natural selection to track the Truth.”73 In summary, when atheists claim to have used their rational faculties to prove that God does not exist, it is a form of intellectual hypocrisy. To account for the fact that they have a rational mind, they have to deny atheism or deny reason itself. The intellectual irony is that their ability to reason is best explained by the existence of God. A Note on Evolutionary Reliabilism Many naturalists admit that there is no necessary link between survival and truth. They maintain that it is highly likely that there were biological conditions and pressures that gave rise to reliable cognitive faculties that produce true beliefs. These faculties must have been conducive to biological fitness and were subsequently preferred by natural selection. The view that Darwinian evolution can explain our truth-reliable cognitive faculties is referred to as evolutionary reliabilism. In order for evolutionary reliabilism to be justified the probability of natural selection favouring truth-reliable cognitive faculties must be greater than the probability of favouring unreliable cognitive faculties that produce false beliefs. The main premise for this argument is that truth-reliable cognitive faculties were more fitness enhancing (conducive to our survival and reproduction) than unreliable cognitive faculties that produced false beliefs. However, based on our discussion so far, this premise is undermined. There are additional reasons why this premise is unwarranted; some of these are discussed below.

Siwezi kukupa mkate ikiwa sikuwa nao hapo awali, wala ikiwa sikuwa na uwezo wa kuupata au kuutengeneza. Hii inatokana na kanuni ya kimantiki: kitu hakiwezi kuzaa kitu kingine ikiwa hakina ndani yake, au ikiwa hakina uwezo wa kukizalisha. Kwa mfano, nguvu zisizo za kimantiki haziwezi kuzaa mantiki, kwa sababu hazina mantiki ndani yake tangu mwanzo. Michakato ya kimaumbile haina mantiki kwa sababu haina "ufahamu". Haiwezi kuona hitimisho likitokana na hoja zilizotangulia. Mwenyezi Mungu ndiye anayeelezea ukweli kwamba tuna akili za kimantiki, kwa sababu mantiki inaweza kutoka kwa Muumba Mwenye kuona yote, Mwenye kujua yote na Mwenye hekima. Ikiwa mwanzoni mwa ulimwengu kulikuwa na jambo la kimaumbile tu, lisilo la kimantiki, lisilo na macho, la kubahatisha, basi kwa jinsi yoyote lingepangwa, lisingeweza kuzaa mantiki. Lakini ikiwa mwanzoni kulikuwa na Muumba mwenye majina na sifa zilizotajwa hapo juu, basi inafuata kwamba ulimwengu unaweza kuwa na viumbe wenye fahamu na uwezo wa kufikiri. Kwa mtazamo huu, wanaoamini kuwa hakuna Mungu wanamhitaji Mungu ili kueleza uwezo wao wa kimantiki. Kwa hiyo, kuwepo kwa Muumba Mwenye kuona yote, Mwenye kujua yote na Mwenye hekima ndiko maelezo bora ya ulimwengu wenye viumbe hai wenye fahamu wanaoweza kufikiri. Mtazamo wa Uislamu kuhusu Uungu unatoa jibu zuri na rahisi kwa maswali makuu yaliyoulizwa katika sura hii. Mwenyezi Mungu alituumba na kutupa akili za kimantiki zenye hamu ya kugundua, ili kutusaidia kutimiza kusudi letu. Mojawapo ya njia ambazo Mwenyezi Mungu hufanya hivi ni kutuelekeza kwenye uumbaji wake, ambamo zimo ishara zake (yaani, dalili, vidokezo, viashiria). Kwa kutafakari na kuzingatia ishara hizi, tunaweza kuthamini utukufu wake na uwezo wake wa kuumba, na kuthamini na kukiri huko kunatupelekea kwa kawaida kumwabudu (ona Sura ya 15). Mungu, kwa ujuzi wake, uwezo wake na mapenzi yake, aliumba ulimwengu na akili zetu, hivyo kueleza uwezo wetu wa kufikiri na kugundua kanuni zinazounganisha ulimwengu. Hili linanikumbusha aya nzuri ya Qur'ani: Mungu anasema, "Tutawaonyesha ishara zetu katika upeo wa dunia na ndani ya nafsi zao wenyewe mpaka iwadhihirikie kwamba hii ni haki. Je, haitoshi kuhusu Mola wako kwamba yeye ni shahidi juu ya kila kitu?"79. Mungu anatuhimiza daima kutafakari, kutumia akili zetu: "Basi hawalitafakari Qur'ani, au kuna kufuli juu ya mioyo yao?"80. "Je, basi, hamtafakari?"81. Aya hizi zinaonyesha kwamba tuna uwezo wa kufikiri na kutafakari juu ya ulimwengu wa asili ili kufikia ukweli. Mungu pia anasema katika Qur'ani: "Hakika katika kuumbwa mbingu na ardhi, na kubadilishana kwa usiku na mchana, zimo ishara kwa watu wenye akili."82

I could not give you a loaf of bread if I did not have one in the first place or if I did not have the ability to obtain or make one. This is based on the following rational principle: A thing cannot give rise to something else if it does not contain it, or if it does not have the ability to give rise to it. For instance, non-rational forces cannot give rise to rationality, as they do not contain it in the first place. Physical processes are non-rational because they do not have any “insight”. They cannot see a conclusion following from previous premises. God makes sense of the fact that we have rational minds, because rationality can come from the Creator Who is All-Seeing, The-Knowing and The-Wise. If in the beginning of the universe there had been only non-rational, blind, random, physical matter and processes, then no matter how they were arranged they could not give rise to rationality. However, if in the beginning there was a creator with the names and attributes mentioned above, it follows that the universe can contain conscious beings with the ability to reason. From this perspective, atheists actually need God to account for their rational faculties. Therefore, the existence of a Creator Who is All-Seeing, The-Knowing and The-Wise is the best explanation for a universe with conscious organisms that have the ability to reason. Islamic theism provides a beautiful and simple answer to the main questions raised in this chapter. God created us and gave us rational minds with a desire to discover, in order to aid us in fulfilling our purpose. One way God does this is by directing us towards His creation, wherein lie His signs (i.e. clues, hints, indications). By pondering and reflecting over these signs, we can appreciate His majesty and creative power, for which appreciation and acknowledgement then naturally lead us to worship Him (see Chapter 15). God via His knowledge, power and will created the universe and our minds, hence explaining our ability to reason and discover the interconnecting principles of the cosmos. This brings to mind a beautiful verse of the Qur’an: God says, “We will show them Our signs in the horizons and within their own selves until it becomes clear to them that it is the truth. But is it not sufficient concerning your Lord that He is over all things a Witness?”79. God continuously encourages us to ponder, to use our minds: “Then do they not reflect upon the Qur’an, or are there locks upon [their] hearts?”80. “So will you not reason?”81. These verses signify that we have the ability to reason and ponder on the natural world to attain truth. God also says in the Qur’an: “Indeed, in the creation of the heavens and the Earth and in the alternation of the night and the day are signs for the people of understanding.”82

Presuppositionalism ni aina ya hoja inayodai kwamba hatuwezi kueleza akili (sababu) bila mtazamo wa Kikristo kuhusu ulimwengu. Dai hilo linashikilia kwamba huwezi kutumia akili ikiwa haijaelezwa. Hata hivyo, mtu asiyeamini Mungu anaweza, na kwa haki anafanya hivyo, kurudisha hoja hiyo kwa Mkristo. Mtu huyo anaweza kuuliza kwa nini Mkristo anaamini kwamba amekwisha kueleza uwezo wake wa kufikiri. Ikiwa Mkristo atajibu kwamba mtazamo wa Kikristo ndio unaoeleza uwezo wake wa kufikiri, basi asiyeamini Mungu ana haki ya kuuliza jinsi gani, na mjadala unaweza kuzunguka bila mwisho. Hoja iliyo katika sura hii si ya kipresupositional. Inakubali dhana kwamba tuna uwezo wa kufikiri, wala haidai kwamba kabla ya kutumia akili yetu ni lazima kwanza tueleze uwezo huo. Hoja inajibu swali hili: Ikiwa tunakubali kwamba tunaweza kufikiri, ni mtazamo gani wa ulimwengu unaoeleza vizuri uwezo huo? Inasema kwamba njia bora ya kueleza uwezo wetu wa kufikiri ni kwa kuwepo kwa Mungu, na kwamba naturalism, na kwa kuongezea atheism, hubatilisha dhana kwamba tuna uwezo wa kufikiri. Kwa hiyo, atheism inapaswa kukataliwa. Akili inaweza kuibuka kutokana na ugumu wa mifumo (complexity).

Presuppositionalism is a form of argument that asserts that we cannot account for reason without the Christian worldview. The assertion maintains that you cannot use reason if it is unaccounted for. However, the atheist can—and rightly does—throw the argument back at the Christian. The atheist can ask why the Christian believes he has accounted for his ability to reason. If the Christian replies that the Christian worldview accounts for his ability to reason, then the atheist is within his right to ask how, and the argument can go around in circles. The argument in this chapter is not a presuppositional one. It accepts the assumption that we have the ability to reason, and it does not argue that before you use your reason you need to account for your ability to reason. The argument answers the question: Given that we accept the fact that we can reason, what worldview best explains our ability to do so? It argues that the best way to explain our ability to reason is by God’s existence, and that naturalism—and by extension, atheism—invalidates the assumption that we have the ability to reason. Therefore, atheism must be rejected. Rationality can arise out of complexity.

Materialistes wa kuibuka (emergent materialists) wanasema kwamba mfumo wa michakato tata ya kimwili, unaoingiliana kwa njia tata, unaweza kuzaa sifa au matukio ambayo hayapo katika vipengele binafsi vinavyounda mfumo huo. Materialisti huyo wa kuibuka hutoa mfano wa historia ya sayansi: pale jambo lilipoonekana kuwa la ajabu au "la fumbo", baadaye lilifumbuliwa mara michakato tata iliyokuwa chini yake ilipoeleweka. Kwa hiyo, materialisti wa kuibuka hujibu hoja ya akili (argument from reason) kwa kudai kwamba uwezo wetu wa kufikiri, hasa uwezo wa kupata ufahamu wa hitimisho, unatokana na michakato tata katika ubongo. Mara michakato hii itakapoeleweka, uwezo wetu wa kufikiri utakuwa umeelezwa. Mfano wa kawaida ambao materialisti wa kuibuka hutaja ni maji, H2O. Maji yanaundwa na hidrojeni na oksijeni, ambazo ni gesi, lakini zikiunganishwa kikemikali huunda kimiminika kinachohimili uhai. Maji yana sifa ambazo hidrojeni na oksijeni hazina. Mifano kama hii inampa materialisti wa kuibuka ujasiri wa kusema kwamba sifa inaweza kutokea kutoka mfumo wa michakato tata, ingawa sifa hiyo haipo katika vipengele vya mfumo huo. Hata hivyo, mfano huu hauhusiani vizuri, kwa sababu hoja iliyoelezwa katika sura hii si kisa cha kitu cha kimwili kuleta kitu kingine cha kimwili (kama gesi hidrojeni na oksijeni zinavyozaa sifa za kimwili za maji). Kinyume chake, kinachohitaji maelezo ni sifa isiyo ya kimwili (kuwa na ufahamu wa kiakili wa hitimisho) inayotokana na sifa za kimwili (michakato ya kimwili isiyo na akili). Kama michakato tata inayosimamia shughuli za ubongo ingeeleweka, na miunganiko yake yote ya kisababishi ikachorwa, hilo lingeelezaje uwezo wetu wa kufikiri? Bado lisingejibu swali hili: Tunawezaje kupata ukweli kwa kutumia uwezo wetu wa kupata ufahamu kwa akili ambazo, kwa dhana, zinatokana na michakato ya kimwili isiyo na mpangilio wala akili iliyotangulia? Kusema tu kwamba jambo ni changamano hakueleze chochote, na ni sawa na kusema "linatokea tu." Kwangu mimi, uhalisia-jumla unaojitokeza ni jaribio dhaifu la kuziba pengo lililoachwa na mtazamo wa kinaturali wa ulimwengu (Sura ya 7 inaeleza jinsi uhalisia-jumla unaojitokeza usivyoweza kueleza uzoefu wa fahamu wa kibinafsi). Tatizo jingine la mfano wa H2O ni kwamba maarifa ya kimantiki, yanayotegemea uhusiano kati ya hoja za awali, yanaonekana kuwa tofauti sana na michakato ya kimwili, katika kesi hii shughuli ya neva. Mfano wa H2O unadhania kwamba maarifa ya kimantiki na michakato ya kimwili ni kitu kimoja. Profesa Raymond Tallis anasema kwamba "maji yanayong'aa na molekuli za H2O zote zinahitaji kufichuliwa kuwa moja au nyingine. Zinalingana na njia mbili tofauti za uchunguzi… Vipengele viwili vya maji ni maonekano mawili, njia mbili za kuyapitia, na hili halitumiki sana kwa shughuli ya neva kama shughuli ya kikemikali-umeme na kama uzoefu."83

Emergent materialists argue that a system of complex physical processes, undergoing complex interactions, can give rise to properties or phenomena that do not exist in the individual components that comprise the system. The emergent materialist will cite the history of science: when something was deemed ‘mysterious’, it was later demystified when the underlying complex processes were understood. Therefore, the emergent materialist responds to the argument from reason, by postulating that our ability to reason—more specifically, the ability to achieve an insight into a conclusion—is based on complex processes in the brain. Once these processes are understood, our ability to reason will have been explained. A common example that emergent materialists cite is water, H20. Water is made up of hydrogen and oxygen, which are gases, yet when combined chemically they form the life-sustaining liquid. Water has properties that hydrogen and oxygen do not. Examples like these provide the emergent materialist with the confidence to argue that a property can arise from a system of complex processes, even though it is not present in the components of that system. Nevertheless, this example is misplaced because the argument articulated in this chapter is not a case of a physical thing bringing into existence another physical thing (like gases hydrogen and oxygen giving rise to water’s physical properties). On the contrary, what requires explaining is a nonphysical property (having a mental insight into a conclusion) arising from physical ones (blind physical processes). If the complex processes that underpin brain-activity were understood, and all of their causal interactions were mapped out, how would that explain our ability to reason? It would still not answer the question: How can we acquire truth using our ability to form insights with minds allegedly based on prior blind, random physical processes? To simply refer to complexity does not explain anything, and it is tantamount to saying, “it just happens”. It seems to me that emergent materialism is a weak attempt to fill the gap created by a naturalistic worldview (Chapter 7 explains how emergent materialism cannot explain subjective conscious experiences). Another problem with the H20 example is that rational insights— based on relations between premises—seem to be very different to physical processes, in this case neural activity. The H20 example assumes that rational insights and physical processes are the same. Professor Raymond Tallis argues that “both shiny water and H20 molecules need to be revealed as one or the other. They correspond to two different modes of observation… The two aspects of water are two appearances, two modes of experiencing it, and this hardly applies to neural activity as electrochemical activity and as experience.”83

Moja ya pingamizi za kawaida dhidi ya hoja kwamba busara haiwezi kutokana na michakato ya kimwili ni madai kwamba programu za kompyuta zina uwezo wa kufikiri kwa njia ya kupunguza (deductive reasoning). Sifa muhimu ya busara ni kwamba, katika hoja ya kupunguza iliyo halali, hitimisho hufuata kwa lazima. Kwa kuwa programu za kompyuta zinategemea michakato ya kimwili na zinaonyesha sifa muhimu ya busara, michakato ya kimwili inaweza kueleza uwezo wetu wa kufikiri, hoja hiyo inasema. Hili pia ni dai lisilo sahihi. Kama ilivyoangaziwa katika sura hii, kufikiri kwa binadamu kunategemea kuwa na maarifa ya kiakili yanayotokana na uhusiano wa kimantiki kati ya hoja za msingi. Programu za kompyuta haziwezi "kuona" chochote. Binadamu si tu wana maarifa ya kiakili; maarifa yetu pia yana maana. Tuna uwezo wa kuelewa na kuhoji maana ya hitimisho tunalofikia. Programu za kompyuta hazielezwi kuwa na maarifa yenye maana. Programu za kompyuta zinategemea kanuni za kisintaksia (upangaji wa alama), si semantiki (maana). Ili kuelewa tofauti kati ya semantiki na sintaksia, zingatia sentensi zifuatazo:

A common objection to the argument that rationality cannot arise from physical processes is the alleged ability of computer programmes to engage in deductive reasoning. A key feature of rationality is that, in a valid deductive argument, the conclusion necessarily follows. Since computer programmes are based on physical processes and exhibit a key feature of rationality, physical processes can account for our ability to reason, the argument goes. This is another misplaced contention. As highlighted in this chapter, human reasoning is based on having mental insights based on the logical relations between premises. Computer programmes cannot “see” anything. Humans not only have insights; our insights are also meaningful. We have the ability to understand and question the meaning of the conclusions we come to. Computer programmes are not characterised as having meaningful insights. Computer programmes are based on syntactical rules (the manipulation of symbols), not semantics (meaning). To understand the difference between semantics and syntax, consider the following sentences:

“Fikiria kwamba umefungiwa katika chumba, na ndani ya chumba hiki kuna vikapu kadhaa vilivyojaa alama za Kichina. Fikiria kwamba wewe (kama mimi) hufahamu neno hata moja la Kichina, lakini umepewa kitabu cha kanuni kwa Kiingereza cha kudhibiti alama hizo za Kichina. Kanuni hizo zinaeleza udhibiti wa alama kwa namna rasmi tu, kwa kuzingatia muundo wake (sintaksia), si maana yake (semantiki). Kwa hiyo kanuni inaweza kusema: ‘Chukua alama moja yenye mistari-mistari kutoka kikapu namba moja na uiweke karibu na alama nyingine ya mistari-mistari kutoka kikapu namba mbili.’ Sasa dhania kwamba alama nyingine za Kichina zinaingizwa chumbani, na umepewa kanuni zaidi za kutoa nje alama za Kichina. Dhania kwamba, bila wewe kujua, alama zinazoingizwa chumbani zinaitwa ‘maswali’ na watu walio nje ya chumba, na alama unazotoa nje ya chumba zinaitwa ‘majibu ya maswali.’ Dhania zaidi kwamba watengenezaji wa programu ni wazuri sana katika kubuni programu, na wewe ni mzuri sana katika kudhibiti alama, hivi kwamba hivi karibuni majibu yako hayatofautiani na yale ya mzungumzaji asilia wa Kichina. Hapo upo umefungiwa chumbani ukichanganya alama zako za Kichina na kutoa alama za Kichina kujibu alama za Kichina zinazoingia… Sasa hoja ya hadithi hii ni rahisi tu: kwa kutekeleza programu rasmi ya kompyuta kwa mtazamo wa mwangalizi wa nje, unatenda kabisa kana kwamba unaelewa Kichina, lakini hata hivyo hufahamu neno lolote la Kichina.”86

“Imagine that you are locked in a room, and in this room are several baskets full of Chinese symbols. Imagine that you (like me) do not understand a word of Chinese, but that you are given a rule book in English for manipulating the Chinese symbols. The rules specify the manipulation of symbols purely formally, in terms of their syntax, not their semantics. So the rule might say: ‘Take a squiggle-squiggle out of basket number one and put it next to a squiggle-squiggle sign from basket number two.’ Now suppose that some other Chinese symbols are passed into the room, and that you are given further rules for passing back Chinese symbols out of the room. Suppose that unknown to you the symbols passed into the room are called ‘questions’ by the people outside the room, and the symbols you pass back out of the room are called ‘answers to questions.’ Suppose furthermore, that the programmers are so good at designing the programs and that you are so good at manipulating the symbols, that very soon your answers are indistinguishable from those of a native Chinese speaker. There you are locked in your room shuffling your Chinese symbols and passing out Chinese symbols in response to incoming Chinese symbols… Now the point of the story is simply this: by virtue of implementing a formal computer program from the point of view of an outside observer, you behave exactly as if you understood Chinese, but all the same you do not understand a word of Chinese.”86

Uatheist hauwezi kudai kumiliki sababu peke yake—na hawezi kufanya hivyo. Ni jambo la kusikitisha kwamba kuna mtazamo unaoongezeka kwamba wasioamini Mungu ni watu wenye busara, na kwamba kutokuamini Mungu kumejengwa juu ya sababu. Hakuna kilicho mbali na ukweli kama hicho. Michakato ya kimwili isiyo na akili wala mpangilio haiwezi kueleza uwezo wetu wa kufikiri. Ndiyo maana kutokuamini Mungu kunabatilisha kile kile ambacho kinadai kutumia kukataa Uungu. Lakini kulingana na uthiyo wa Kiislamu, tunaishi katika ulimwengu wenye mpangilio wa kimantiki, ulioumbwa na Muumba Mwenye kuona yote, Mwenye hekima na Mjuzi, aliyetupa uwezo wa kufikiri. Hili ni thabiti na linaeleza kikamilifu uwezo wetu wa kiakili; hakuna kingine kitakachofanya hivyo (kwa hakika, hakuna kingine kinachoweza). Kushikilia kwamba michakato ya kimwili isiyo na akili wala mpangilio inaweza kueleza uwezo wetu wa kuona, kufikiri na kujifunza ni jambo lisilo la kimantiki. Wale wanaoendelea kufikiri hivyo kwa kweli ni maadui wa sababu. Hawatofautiani na dereva wa teksi anayefunga kitambaa machoni na kusisitiza kwamba anaweza kuwapeleka abiria wake mahali pao.

Atheism does not—and cannot—have a monopoly on reason. It is a shame that there is a growing perception that atheists are rational, and that atheism is based on reason. Nothing could be further from the truth. Blind, random physical processes cannot account for our ability to reason. This is why atheism invalidates the very thing it claims to use to reject the Divine. However, according to Islamic theism, we live in a rational universe created by the All-Seeing, The-Wise and The-Knowing Creator, who gave us the ability to reason. This is coherent and accounts fully for our rational faculties; nothing else will (indeed, nothing else can). Maintaining that blind, random physical processes can make sense of our ability to see, think and learn is irrational. Those who persist in this thinking are in fact adversaries of reason. They are no different from a taxi-driver putting on a blindfold and insisting that he can drive his passengers to their destination.