Fikiria unatoka nje ya nyumba yako na barabarani unakuta safu ya domino inayoenea mbali zaidi ya macho yako yanavyoweza kuona. Unaanza kusikia kelele inayozidi kuwa kubwa kidogo kadiri muda unavyopita. Kelele hii inakufahamika, kwa sababu ulipokuwa mtoto ulikuwa ukicheza na domino; ni sauti ya domino zikianguka. Hatimaye unaona onyesho hili la ajabu la domino zinazoanguka likikukaribia. Unavutiwa sana na jinsi sheria za msingi za fizikia zinavyoweza kuzaa tukio la kustaajabisha kama hili; lakini pia unahuzunika kwa sababu domino ya mwisho imeshaanguka umbali wa inchi chache tu kutoka miguuni pako. Bado umesisimka kwa yaliyotokea, unaamua kutembea barabarani hadi mahali domino ya kwanza ilipo, ukitumaini kukutana na mtu aliyesababisha tukio hili zuri.

Imagine you walk out of your house and on your street you find a row of dominoes that stretch far beyond what your eyes can see. You start to hear a noise that gets slightly louder as time passes. This noise is familiar to you, as you used to play with dominoes as a child; it is the sound of them falling. Eventually, you see this amazing display of falling dominoes approaching you. You greatly admire how the basic laws of physics can produce such a remarkable spectacle; however, you are also saddened because the last domino has now fallen a few inches away from your feet. Still excited about what has just happened, you decide to walk down the street to find the first domino, hoping to meet the person responsible for producing this wonderful experience.

Kwa kuzingatia hali iliyoelezwa hapo juu, ningependa kukuuliza maswali machache. Unapotembea barabarani kwako, je, utafikia hatimaye mahali ambapo mnyororo wa dominoes ulianzia? Au utaendelea kutembea milele? Jibu la wazi ni kwamba hatimaye utapata domino ya kwanza. Lakini nataka uulize kwa nini. Sababu unayojua kwamba utapata domino ya kwanza ni kwamba unaelewa kuwa kama mnyororo wa dominoes ungeendelea milele, domino ya mwisho iliyoanguka karibu na miguu yako isingewahi kuanguka. Dominoes zisizo na kikomo zingelazimika kuanguka kabla domino ya mwisho haijaanguka. Lakini dominoes zisizo na kikomo zinazoanguka zingechukua muda usio na kikomo kuanguka. Kwa maneno mengine, domino ya mwisho isingewahi kuanguka. Kwa maneno rahisi, unajua kwamba ili domino ya mwisho ianguke, domino iliyo nyuma yake lazima ianguke kwanza, na ili hiyo ianguke, domino iliyo nyuma yake lazima ianguke kwanza. Kama hili lingeendelea milele, domino ya mwisho isingewahi kuanguka. Nikiendelea na mfano huu, nina swali lingine. Tuseme, unapotembea barabarani, hatimaye unakutana na domino ya kwanza iliyosababisha mnyororo mzima kuanguka. Je, mawazo yako yangekuwaje kuhusu domino hiyo ya kwanza? Je, ungefikiri domino hiyo ilianguka 'yenyewe'? Kwa maneno mengine, je, unafikiri kuanguka kwa domino ya kwanza kunaweza kuelezwa bila kurejelea kitu chochote cha nje yake? Wazi kabisa hapana; hilo linapingana na hisia zetu za msingi kuhusu uhalisia. Hakuna kinachotokea chenyewe. Kila kitu kinahitaji maelezo ya aina fulani. Kwa hiyo kuanguka kwa domino ya kwanza lazima kulisababishwa na kitu kingine—mtu, upepo, au kitu kinachoipiga, n.k. Chochote hiki 'kitu kingine' ni, lazima kiwe sehemu ya maelezo yetu ya dominoes zinazoanguka.

Keeping the above scenario in mind, I want to ask you a few questions. As you walk down your street, will you eventually reach where the chain of dominoes began? Or will you keep on walking forever? The obvious response is that you will eventually find the first domino. However, I want you to ask why. The reason you know that you will find the first domino is because you understand that if the domino chain went on forever, the last domino that fell by your feet would never have fallen. An infinite number of dominoes would have to fall before the last domino could fall. Yet an infinite amount of falling dominoes would take an infinite amount of time to fall. In other words, the last domino would never fall. Putting this in simple terms, you know that in order for the last domino to fall, the domino behind must fall prior to it, and for that domino to fall, the domino behind it must fall prior to it. If this went on forever, the last domino would never fall. Sticking with the analogy, I want to ask you another question. Let’s say, walking down the street, you finally come across the first domino which led to the falling of the entire chain. What would your thoughts be about the first domino? Would you think this domino fell ‘by itself’? In other words, do you think the falling of the first domino can somehow be explained without referring to anything external to it? Clearly not; that runs against the grain of our basic intuition about reality. Nothing really happens on its own. Everything requires an explanation of some sort. So the first domino’s fall had to have been triggered by something else—a person, the wind or a thing hitting it, etc. Whatever this ‘something else’ is, it has to form a part of our explanation of falling dominoes.

Kwa muhtasari wa tafakari zetu hadi sasa: mnyororo wa domino hauwezi kuwa na idadi isiyo na mwisho ya vitu, wala domino ya kwanza haiwezi kuanza kuanguka bila sababu yoyote kabisa.174

So to sum up our reflections thus far: neither could the chain of dominoes contain an infinite number of items, nor could the first domino start falling for no reason whatsoever.174

Hoja hii hapo juu ni muhtasari wa hoja ya utegemezi. Ulimwengu ni kama safu ya domino. Ulimwengu na kila kilichomo ndani yake ni tegemezi. Haviwezi kutegemea kitu kingine, ambacho nacho kinategemea kitu kingine, milele. Maelezo pekee yanayoonekana kuwa ya kweli ni kwamba ulimwengu, pamoja na kila kilichomo ndani yake, lazima utegemee mtu au kitu ambacho kuwepo kwake kwa namna fulani ni huru kutoka kwenye ulimwengu (na kutoka kwa kitu kingine chochote pia). Kwa maneno mengine, kiumbe hiki hakipaswi kuwa 'tegemezi' kwa namna ambayo ulimwengu ulivyo, kwa sababu hilo lingeongeza domino moja zaidi kwenye mnyororo, ambayo nayo ingehitaji maelezo. Kwa hiyo, lazima kuwepo na Kiumbe huru na cha milele ambacho kila kitu kinakitegemea. Ingawa hili linaonekana rahisi, ili kuelewa hoja hii itanilazimu kufafanua nina maana gani kwa 'tegemezi'.

This above analogy is a summary of the argument from dependency. The universe is somewhat like a row of dominoes. The universe and everything within it is dependent. They cannot depend on something else, which in turn depends on something else, forever. The only plausible explanation is that the universe, and everything within it, has to depend on someone or something whose existence is in some ways independent from the universe (and anything else for that matter). Put differently, this thing must not be ‘dependent’ the way the universe is, because that would just add one more domino to the chain, which would then require an explanation. Therefore, there must be an independent and eternal Being that everything depends upon. Simple as this sounds, in order to understand this argument, I will have to define what I mean by ‘dependent’.

Ina maana gani tunaposema kitu ni tegemezi?

What does it mean when we say something is dependent?.

Kwanza, jambo hilo si la lazima. Neno 'lazima' lina maana maalum na ya kitaalamu katika falsafa.

1. Firstly, it is something that is not necessary. The word ‘necessary’ has a specific, technical meaning in philosophy.

Kinyume na matumizi ya kawaida, neno hilo halimaanishi kitu unachohitaji. Badala yake, wanafalsafa wanapousema kwamba kitu fulani ni cha lazima, wanamaanisha kwamba ilikuwa haiwezekani, haiwezekani kufikiriwa, kwa kitu hicho kutokuwepo. Naelewa kwa nini dhana hii inaweza kuonekana kuwa ngumu kuelewa. Hii ni kwa sababu hakuna kitu katika uzoefu wetu wa kimajaribio ambacho ni cha lazima. Hata hivyo, tunaweza kupata ufahamu wa kutosha wa maana ya 'kuwa cha lazima' kwa kufikiria kinyume chake. Kitu kisicho cha lazima kinamaanisha kwamba hakilazimiki kuwepo. Kwa maneno mengine, ikiwa inawezekana kufikiria kwamba kitu kingeweza kisiwepo, basi hakina lazima. Kiti unachokalia, inavyoonekana, wazi kabisa si cha lazima; tunaweza kuwaza hali elfu moja tofauti ambamo kisingekuwepo. Huenda usingechagua kukinunua, mtengenezaji asingechagua kukitengeneza, au muuzaji asingechagua kukiuza. Ni dhahiri kwamba kiti chako kingeweza kwa urahisi kisiwepo. Sasa, uwezekano huu wa 'kutokuwepo-hapo' ni sifa muhimu ya vitu tegemezi.

Contrary to popular use, it does not indicate something you need. Rather, when philosophers say something is necessary, they mean that it was impossible, inconceivable for it to not have existed.175 I understand why this may be a bit of a difficult concept to grasp. This is because nothing in our empirical experience is ever necessary. We can, however, get an adequate understanding of what ‘being necessary’ means by thinking about the opposite. A thing or object not being necessary implies that it does not have to exist. In other words, if it is conceivable that a thing could have not existed, it is not necessary. The chair you are presumably sitting on is clearly not necessary—we can imagine a thousand different scenarios where it might not have existed. You may not have chosen to buy it, the manufacturer may not have chosen to make it, or the dealer may not have chosen to sell it. Clearly, your chair very easily could not have existed. Now this possibility of ‘not-having-been-there’ is a key feature of dependent things.

Kitu chenye sifa hii kinahitaji maelezo ya kuwepo kwake. Hii ni kwa sababu kwa kitu ambacho huenda kisingekuwepo, unaweza kuuliza kwa urahisi: Kwa nini kitu hiki kipo? Swali hilo halali kabisa linahitaji maelezo. Haiwezekani kwamba kitu kipo chenyewe, kwa sababu hakuna chochote cha lazima katika kuwepo kwake. Kusema kwamba kitu hicho kinajieleza chenyewe kungekuwa ni kukataa sifa ya utegemezi tuliyoijadili hivi punde. Kwa hiyo, maelezo lazima yawe kitu cha nje yake. Maelezo katika muktadha huu yanamaanisha seti ya mambo ya nje yanayotoa sababu ya kwa nini kitu kipo.

Something that has this feature requires an explanation for its existence. This is because for something that might not have existed, you can easily ask: Why does this thing exist? That perfectly legitimate question calls for an explanation. It cannot be that the thing exists on its own, because there is nothing necessary about its existence. To say that the thing somehow explains itself would be to deny the property of dependence we just discussed. Thus, the explanation must be something external to it. An explanation in this context means an external set of factors that provide a reason for why something exists.

Tukirudi kwenye mfano wetu wa kiti, mkusanyiko wa mambo kadhaa—kwa mfano, mtengenezaji aliyekitengeneza, muuzaji aliyekiuza, na wewe uliyekinunua—ndio unaoeleza kuwepo kwa kiti hicho. Kwa hiyo, ikiwa kitu kinahitaji seti ya mambo ya nje ili kuwepo, maana yake ni kwamba kinategemea kitu kingine zaidi ya chenyewe. Kwa sababu hiyo, kuwepo kwake kunategemea kitu cha nje. Huu ni mfumo wa hoja wa msingi, wa angavu na wa kimantiki. Hii ni kwa sababu kuuliza kuhusu kitu kilichopo ambacho hakingeweza kuwepo ni alama ya akili yenye mantiki.

Going back to our chair analogy, the collection of a number of factors—e.g., the manufacturer making it, the dealer selling it, and you buying it—form the explanation for the chair’s existence. Therefore, if something requires an external set of factors, it means that it is dependent on something other than itself. Consequently, its existence is dependent on something external. This is a basic, intuitive and rational form of reasoning. This is because questioning something that exists that could not have existed, is the mark of a rational mind.

Fikiria wanasayansi wanavyofanya kazi. Wanaelekeza macho yao kwenye vipengele tofauti vya uhalisia na kuuliza: kwa nini ua hili ni la namna fulani? Kwa nini bakteria hiyo husababisha ugonjwa huu? Kwa nini ulimwengu unapanuka kwa kasi ilivyo? Kinachotoa uhalali kwa maswali haya ni ukweli kwamba hakuna hata moja kati yao lililo la lazima; yote yangeweza yasiwe jinsi yalivyo. Ili kusaidia kuelewa dhana hii vizuri zaidi, zingatia mfano ufuatao:

Think about what scientists do. They point to different features of reality and ask—why is this flower a certain way? Why does that bacteria cause this disease? Why is the universe expanding at the rate that it is? What gives these questions legitimacy is the fact that none of them are necessary; all of them might not have been the way that they are. To facilitate a greater understanding of this concept, consider the following example:

Unapoamka asubuhi, unashuka ngazi na kuingia jikoni. Unafungua friji na juu ya boksi la mayai unaona kalamu. Bila shaka hufungi mlango wa friji, na unahitimisha kwamba kuwepo kwa kalamu hiyo kunahitaji maelezo. Hufikirii kwamba kalamu iliyo kwenye friji imefika huko yenyewe. Unajiuliza kwa nini kalamu iko juu ya boksi la mayai. Unauliza swali hili kwa sababu kuwepo kwa kalamu juu ya boksi la mayai si jambo la lazima. Kuwepo kwake na jinsi ilivyo kunahitaji maelezo. Maelezo haya yanaweza kutofautiana, lakini ukweli kwamba maelezo yanahitajika unaonyesha kwamba kalamu ni tegemezi. Kalamu inahitaji seti ya mambo ya nje yanayotoa sababu ya kuwekwa kwake kwenye friji, na ya kwa nini ilivyo hivyo. Kwa mfano: ukweli kwamba kalamu ilitengenezwa, na mwanao alinunua kalamu hiyo kwenye duka la vifaa vya ofisi, kisha akaiweka kwenye friji, ni seti ya mambo ya nje yanayohusika na kuwepo kwa kalamu. Kalamu hiyo kwa hiyo inategemea mambo haya ya nje, na mambo haya ndiyo yanayoeleza kuwepo kwake.

Waking up in the morning, you go down the stairs and walk into the kitchen. You open the fridge and on top of the egg box you find a pen. You obviously do not close the fridge door and conclude that the pen’s existence is necessary. You do not think that the pen in the fridge got there by itself. You question why the pen is on top of the egg box. The reason you ask this question is because the pen’s existence on the egg box is not necessary. It requires an explanation for its existence and for the way that it is. The explanations can vary, but the fact that an explanation is needed means that the pen is dependent. The pen requires an external set of factors to provide a reason for why it is placed in the fridge, and why it is the way that it is. For instance: the fact that the pen was made, and your son bought the pen from a stationary shop, and then put the pen in the fridge provides the external set of factors responsible for the pen. The pen is therefore dependent on these external factors, and these factors explain the pen’s existence.

2. Pili, kitu fulani ni tegemezi ikiwa vipengele vyake au vizuizi vyake vya msingi vingeweza kupangwa kwa namna nyingine. Hii ni kwa sababu lazima kuwe na kitu cha nje ya kitu hicho kilichoamua mpangilio wake maalum.176 Niruhusu nifafanue kwa mfano:

2. Secondly, something is dependent if its components or basic building blocks could have been arranged in a different way. This is because there must have been something external to that thing which determined its specific arrangement.176 Let me elaborate with an example:

Unapopita kwenye kiplanga cha magari, unaona kundi la maua lililopangwa kwa maneno matatu: ‘I love you’. Unaweza kuhitimisha kwamba hakuna kitu cha lazima katika mpangilio wa maua hayo. Yangeweza kupangwa kwa njia nyingine—kwa mfano, badala ya ‘I love you’ yangeweza kutumika maneno ‘I adore you’. Vinginevyo, maua yangeweza kutopangwa kabisa—yangeweza kutawanywa bila mpangilio. Kwa kuwa maua yangeweza kuwekwa kwa namna tofauti, lazima kuna nguvu ya nje yake iliyoamua mpangilio wake. Katika kesi hii, huenda ikawa ni mtunza bustani wa eneo hilo au matokeo ya mradi wa serikali ya mtaa. Hoja hii ina ukweli kwa karibu kila kitu unachokiona. Vipengele vya kila kitu, iwe ni atomi, kompyuta ndogo au kiumbe hai, vimeundwa kwa namna maalum. Zaidi ya hayo, kila kijenzi cha msingi hakipo kwa lazima. Vipengele vya msingi vya kitu chochote haviwezi kujielezea vyenyewe, na kwa hiyo vinahitaji maelezo (ona ufafanuzi wa kwanza hapo juu).

You are driving home and you pass a roundabout. You see a bunch of flowers arranged in the following three words: ‘I love you’. You can conclude that there is nothing necessary about the arrangement of the flowers. They could have been arranged in another way—for example, the words ‘I adore you’ instead of ‘I love you’ could have been used. Alternatively, the flowers could have not been arranged at all—they might have been randomly scattered. Since the flowers could have been set in a different way, some force external to them must have determined their arrangement. In this case, it could have been the local gardener or the result of a local government project. This point holds true for pretty much everything you observe. The components of everything, be it an atom or a laptop or an organism, are composed in a specific way. Furthermore, each basic building block does not exist necessarily. The basic components of something cannot explain themselves and therefore require an explanation (see the first definition above).

3. Tatu, kitu ni tegemezi iwapo kinategemea kitu kilicho nje yake kwa ajili ya kuwepo kwake. Hii ni maana ya kawaida ya neno hili. Njia nyingine ya kueleza kwamba kitu ni tegemezi ni kwa kusema kwamba hakijitegemei. Mfano mmoja ni paka wa nyumbani. Paka hajijitegemezi; anahitaji vitu vya nje ili aishi. Hivi ni pamoja na chakula, maji, oksijeni na makazi.

3. Thirdly, a thing is dependent if it relies on something outside itself for its existence. This is a common sense understanding of the word. Another way of explaining that something is dependent is by stating that it is not self-sustaining. An example includes a pet cat. The cat does not sustain itself; it requires external things to survive. These include food, water, oxygen and shelter.

4. Mwishowe, sifa bainifu za kitu tegemezi ni kwamba kina sifa za kimwili zenye mipaka. Sifa hizo zinaweza kujumuisha umbo, ukubwa, rangi, joto, chaji, uzito, n.k. Kwa nini hali iko hivyo?

4. Finally, the defining features of a dependent thing are that it has limited physical qualities. These can include shape, size, colour, temperature, charge, mass, etc. Why is this so?

Basi, ikiwa kitu kina sifa ya kimwili yenye mipaka, sifa hiyo lazima iwe imewekewa mipaka na kitu cha nje kwake, kama chanzo cha nje au seti ya mambo ya nje. Maswali yafuatayo yanaonyesha hoja hii: Kwa nini kina mipaka hii?

Well, if something has a limited physical feature, that feature must be limited by something external to itself, such as an external source or external set of factors. The following questions highlight this point: Why does it have these limits?

Kwa nini haiko mara mbili ya ukubwa wake, au ya umbo au rangi tofauti? Kitu hicho hakijijipa mipaka hii chenyewe. Kwa mfano, kama ningeokota keki ndogo yenye sifa zake chache za kimwili za ukubwa, umbo, rangi na umbile, kisha nikadai kwamba ipo kwa lazima, ungeniona mjinga. Unajua kwamba ukubwa, rangi na umbile lake vimedhibitiwa na chanzo cha nje: katika kesi hii, mwokaji. Vitu vyenye sifa chache za kimwili havikujijengea sifa hizo. Lazima kuwe na maelezo yanayoeleza kuwepo kwa sifa hizi chache za kimwili.

Why is it not twice the size, or a different shape or colour? The thing did not give itself these limitations. For example, if I picked up a cupcake with its limited physical qualities of size, shape, colour and texture, and claimed that it existed necessarily, you would think I was foolish. You know that its size, colour and texture have been controlled by an external source: in this case, the baker. Things with limited physical qualities did not give rise to them. There must be an explanation to explain the existence of these limited physical qualities.

Ni jambo la busara kudai kwamba vitu vyote vyenye sifa za kimwili zilizo na kikomo ni vya mwisho; lazima kulikuwepo kitu kilichotangulia ambacho ndicho kilichosababisha sifa zake. Hii ina maana kwamba vitu vyote vya kimwili vyenye kikomo vilikuwa na mwanzo wakati fulani, kwa sababu haiwezekani kufikiri kwamba vitu vya kimwili vyenye kikomo ni vya milele. Sababu ni kwamba chanzo cha nje au seti ya mambo lazima kiwe kimekuwepo kabla ya kitu chochote cha kimwili chenye kikomo na kikasababisha mipaka yake. Fikiria kwamba ningechukua mmea na kudai kwamba ni wa milele. Ungejibuje? Ungecheka dai kama hilo. Hata kama hukushuhudia mwanzo wa mmea, unajua kwamba ni wa mwisho kwa sababu ya sifa zake za kimwili zenye kikomo. Hata hivyo, hata kama vitu vya kimwili vyenye kikomo (pamoja na ulimwengu) vingekuwa vya milele, hilo lisingebadilisha ukweli kwamba ni tegemezi na havipo kwa lazima. Hoja hii inafanya kazi bila kujali kama vitu ni vya milele au vina mwanzo.

It is reasonable to assert that all things with limited physical qualities are finite; there must have been something prior that was responsible for their qualities. This means that all limited physical objects at one point had a beginning, because it is inconceivable that limited physical objects are eternal. This is due to the fact that an external source or set of factors must have existed prior to any limited physical object and caused its limitations. Imagine if I picked up a plant and claimed that it was eternal. How would you respond? You would laugh at such an assertion. Even if you didn’t witness the plant’s beginning, you know it is finite because of its limited physical qualities. However, even if limited physical objects (including the universe) were eternal, it would not change the fact that they are dependent and do not exist necessarily. This argument works regardless of whether or not objects are eternal or have a beginning.

Kutumia ufafanuzi kamili uliotolewa hapo juu wa maana ya kutegemea kunatuongoza kuhitimisha kwamba ulimwengu na kila kilichomo ndani yake vinategemea. Fikiria chochote kinachokujia akilini—kalamu, mti, jua, elektroni, na hata uwanja wa kiquantum. Vyote hivi vinategemea kwa namna fulani. Ikiwa hili ni kweli, basi kila tunachokiona—ikiwa ni pamoja na ulimwengu—kinaweza kufafanuliwa kwa mojawapo ya njia zifuatazo:

Applying the above comprehensive definition of what it means to be dependent leads us to conclude that the universe and everything within it is dependent. Reflect on anything that comes to mind—a pen, a tree, the sun, an electron, and even a quantum field. All of these things are dependent in some way. If this is true, then all that we perceive—including the universe—can be explained in one of the following ways:

1. Ulimwengu na kila kitu tunachokiona ni wa milele, ni wa lazima, na hautegemei kitu kingine.

1. The universe and all that we perceive are eternal, necessary and independent.

2. Kuwepo kwa ulimwengu na kila tunachokiona kunategemea kitu kingine ambacho nacho pia kinategemea kitu kingine.

2. The existence of the universe and all that we perceive depends on something else which is also dependent.

3. Ulimwengu wote na kila kitu tunachokiona hupata uwepo wake kutoka kwa kitu kingine ambacho kipo kwa asili yake, na kwa hiyo ni cha milele na kinachojitegemea.

3. The universe and all that we perceive derives its existence from something else that exists by its own nature and is accordingly eternal and independent.

Nitazichukua kila maelezo na kujadili ni lipi linaloeleza vyema utegemezi wa ulimwengu na kila kilichomo ndani yake.

I will take each explanation and discuss which one best explains the dependency of the universe and everything within it.

1. Ulimwengu na kila kitu tunachokiona ni wa milele, ni wa lazima, na hautegemei kitu kingine.

1. The universe and all that we perceive are eternal, necessary and independent.

Je, ulimwengu na kila kitu tunachokiona vinaweza kuwepo milele na kujitegemea vyenyewe? Hii si hoja ya kimantiki. Ulimwengu na vitu vyote tunavyoviona si lazima viwepo; vingeweza kutokuwepo kabisa. Pia vina sifa za kimwili zenye mipaka. Kwa kuwa haviwezi kuzalisha mipaka yao wenyewe, lazima kuna kitu cha nje kilichowawekea mipaka hiyo. Ulimwengu na kila kitu tunachokiona havielezi kuwepo kwao kwa sababu ya kuwepo kwa asili yake, na vipengele vyake vingeweza kupangwa kwa njia nyingine. Kwa hiyo, ni vitu tegemezi, na vitu tegemezi havipo kwa kujitegemea. Hata kama ulimwengu ungekuwa wa milele, bado ingebaki kwamba lazima kuna seti ya vitu vya nje vilivyosababisha sifa zake za kimwili zenye mipaka. Zaidi ya hayo, vipengele vya msingi vya ulimwengu vingeweza kupangwa kwa njia nyingine, na ulimwengu ungeweza kutokuwepo. Ulimwengu hauwezi kujieleza kwa sababu ya kuwepo kwake wenyewe. Kwa mazingatio haya, tunaweza kuikataa kwa usalama hoja kwamba umilele wa ulimwengu unatoa maelezo ya kuwepo kwake (jambo hili litafafanuliwa zaidi hapa chini).

Could the universe and everything that we perceive exist eternally and depend on themselves? This is not a rational explanation. The universe and all the things that we perceive do not necessarily exist; they could have not existed. They also have limited physical qualities. Since they could not give rise to their own limitations, something external must have imposed these limitations on them. The universe and all the things we perceive do not explain themselves by virtue of their own existence, and their components could have been arranged in a different way. Therefore, they are dependent, and dependent things do not exist independently. Even if the universe were eternal, it still stands that there must have been an external set of factors that gave rise to its limited physical qualities. In addition, the universe’s components or basic building blocks could have been arranged in a different way, and the universe could have not existed. The universe cannot explain itself by virtue of its own existence. With these considerations, we can safely reject the view that the eternity of the universe somehow provides an explanation for its existence (this point is explained further below).

2. Kuwepo kwa ulimwengu na yote tunayoyatambua kunategemea kitu kingine ambacho nacho pia kinategemea kitu kingine.

2. The existence of the universe and all we perceive depends on something else which is also dependent.

Kuwepo kwa ulimwengu na kila tunachokiona hakuweza kutegemea kitu kingine ambacho nacho pia kinategemea. Kwa kuwa ulimwengu na kila tunachokiona hazijielezi zenyewe, basi kudhani kuwepo kwa kitu kingine kinachotegemea ili kuyaeleza hakueleza chochote kabisa. Hii ni kwa sababu kitu kinachotegemea, ambacho kinadaiwa kueleza ulimwengu na kila kilichopo, nacho pia kinahitaji maelezo ya kuwepo kwake. Kwa hiyo, njia pekee ya kueleza vitu vinavyotegemea ni kwa kurejea kitu ambacho hakitegemei, na hivyo ni cha lazima.

The existence of the universe and all that we perceive could not depend on something else which is also dependent. Since the universe and all that we perceive do not explain themselves, then postulating another dependent thing to explain them does not explain anything at all. This is because the dependent thing that is supposed to explain the universe and everything that exists, also requires an explanation for its existence. Therefore, the only way to explain things that are dependent is by referring to something that is not dependent and therefore necessary.

Licha ya hayo, mtu anaweza kubishana kwamba kuwepo kwa kila kitu tunachokitambua kunategemea kitu kingine, ambacho nacho kinategemea kitu kingine, bila mwisho. Hili si sahihi. Kwa mfano: Je, ulimwengu huu unaweza kuelezwa na ulimwengu mwingine, ambao nao unaelezwa na ulimwengu mwingine, huku mfululizo wa maelezo hayo ukiendelea milele? Hii haitatatua tatizo la kuhitaji maelezo. Hata kama kungekuwepo idadi isiyo na mwisho ya ulimwengu wote unaotegemeana, bado tungeweza kuuliza: Kwa nini mnyororo huu usio na mwisho wa ulimwengu upo? Iwe ulimwengu ni wa milele au la, bado unahitaji maelezo ya kuwepo kwake.

Despite this, someone may argue that the existence of all we perceive depends on something else, which in turn depends on another thing, ad infinitum. This is false. For instance: Could this universe be explained by another universe, which in turn is explained by another universe, with the series of explanations continuing forever? This would not solve the problem of requiring an explanation. Even if there were an infinite number of universes all dependent on each other, we could still ask: Why does this infinite chain of universes exist? Whether or not the universe is eternal, it still requires an explanation for its existence.

Fikiria mfano ufuatao. Chukulia kwamba kuna idadi isiyo na mwisho ya wanadamu. Kila mwanadamu alizaliwa kutokana na shughuli za kibaiolojia za wazazi wake, na kila mzazi huyo naye alizaliwa kutokana na shughuli za kibaiolojia za wazazi wake, na kadhalika bila kikomo. Bado ingekuwa jambo la busara kabisa kuuliza: Kwa nini kuna wanadamu hata kidogo? Hata kama mnyororo huu wa wanadamu haukuwa na mwanzo, ukweli unabaki kwamba mnyororo huu unahitaji maelezo. Kwa kuwa kila mwanadamu katika mnyororo huo angeweza kutokuwepo na ana sifa chache za kimwili, ni tegemezi na si wa lazima. Bado wanahitaji maelezo. Kusema tu kwamba mnyororo wa wanadamu hauna mwisho hakubadilishi hitaji la maelezo.

Consider the following example. Imagine there are an infinite number of human beings. Each human being was produced by the biological activity of their parents, and each of these parents was in turn produced by the biological activity of their parents, ad infinitum. It would still be perfectly reasonable to ask: Why are there any human beings at all? Even if this chain of human beings had no beginning, the fact remains that this chain requires an explanation. Since each human being in the chain could have not existed and possesses limited physical qualities, they are dependent and not necessary. They still require an explanation. Just saying the chain of human beings is infinite does nothing to change the need for an explanation.

Chaguo hili pia linadhani kwamba mlolongo usio na mwisho wa utegemezi unawezekana. Hata hivyo, hili haliwezekani kufikirika. Ili kulieleza, fikiria kwamba kuwepo kwa ulimwengu huu kunategemea ulimwengu mwingine, na kuwepo kwa ulimwengu huo kunategemea ulimwengu mwingine tena, na kadhalika. Je, ulimwengu huu ungewahi kuwepo? Jibu ni hapana, kwa sababu utegemezi usio na kikomo ungepaswa kuanzishwa kabla ulimwengu huu haujaweza kuwepo. Kumbuka, vitu visivyo na kikomo havina mwisho; kwa hiyo, ulimwengu huu usingeweza kuwepo kama kungekuwa na mlolongo usio na kikomo wa utegemezi.

This option also assumes that an infinite regress of dependencies is possible. However, this is inconceivable. To illustrate this point, imagine the existence of this universe was dependent on another universe, and the existence of that universe was also dependent on another universe, and so on. Would this universe ever come to be? The answer is no, because an infinite number of dependencies would need to be established before this universe could exist. Remember, an infinite number of things do not end; therefore, this universe could not exist if there were an infinite set of dependencies.

3. Ulimwengu wote na kila kitu tunachokiona hupata uwepo wake kutoka kwa kitu kingine ambacho kipo kwa asili yake, na kwa hiyo ni cha milele na kinachojitegemea.

3. The universe and all that we perceive derives its existence from something else that exists by its own nature and is accordingly eternal and independent.

Kwa kuwa kila kitu tunachokitambua kinategemea kwa namna fulani, basi maelezo yenye mantiki zaidi ni kwamba kuwepo kwa kila kitu kunategemea kitu kingine ambacho ni huru, na hivyo ni cha milele. Ni lazima kiwe huru kwa sababu kama kingekuwa tegemezi, kingehitaji maelezo. Pia ni lazima kiwe cha milele kwa sababu kama kisingekuwa cha milele—yaani, chenye mwisho—kingekuwa tegemezi, kwani vitu vyenye mwisho vinahitaji maelezo ya kuwepo kwake. Kwa hiyo, tunaweza kuhitimisha kwamba ulimwengu, na kila kitu tunachokitambua, vinategemea kitu ambacho ni cha milele na huru. Hili linaelezwa vyema zaidi kwa kuwepo kwa Mungu. Hoja ya utegemezi inaungwa mkono na mapokeo ya kielimu ya Kiislamu. Dhana ya Kiumbe huru ambacho ndicho chenye jukumu la kuleta kila kitu katika kuwepo imesisitizwa katika sehemu mbalimbali za Qur’ani. Kwa mfano, Mungu anasema:

Since everything we perceive is dependent in some way, then the most rational explanation is that the existence of everything depends on something else that is independent, and therefore eternal. It has to be independent because if it were dependent, it would require an explanation. It also has to be eternal because if it was not eternal—in other words, finite—it would be dependent as finite things require an explanation for their existence. Therefore, we can conclude that the universe, and everything that we perceive, depends upon something that is eternal and independent. This is best explained by the existence of God. The argument from dependency is supported by the Islamic intellectual tradition. The concept of an independent Being that is responsible for bringing everything into existence is highlighted in various places in the Qur’an. For example, God says:

"Mungu hana haja na chochote kilichopo."178

“God is independent of all that exists.”178

"Enyi watu! Ni nyinyi mnaohitaji Mwenyezi Mungu, ilhali Yeye peke yake ndiye Mwenye kujitosheleza, Mwenye kustahiki kila sifa."179

“O mankind! It is you who stand in need of God, whereas He alone is self-sufficient, the One whom all praise is due.”179

Mwanatafsiri wa kale Ibn Kathir anatoa maoni juu ya aya iliyotajwa hapo juu: “Wanamhitaji Yeye katika kila wanalofanya, lakini Yeye hana haja nao kabisa… Yeye peke yake ndiye aliye huru kutokana na mahitaji yote, na hana mshirika wala mwenza.”180

The classical exegete Ibn Kathir comments on the above verse: “They need Him in all that they do, but He has no need of them at all… He is unique in His being free of all needs, and has no partner or associate.”180

Tradisheni ya kielimu ya Uislamu ilizaa wanazuoni kama Ibn Sina (anayejulikana Magharibi kama Avicenna), ambaye alitoa hoja inayofanana. Alisema kwamba Mungu ni Waajib al-Wujood, yaani aliyekuwepo kwa lazima. Ibn Sina alihoji kwamba Mungu yupo kwa lazima na kwamba Yeye ndiye anayehusika na kuwepo kwa kila kitu. Kila kitu kingine isipokuwa Mungu ni tegemezi, jambo ambalo Ibn Sina alilieleza kuwa Mumkin al-Wujud.

Islam’s intellectual tradition produced the like of Ibn Sina (known in the West as Avicenna), who articulated a similar argument. He maintained that God is Waajib al-Wujood, necessarily existent. Ibn Sina argued that God necessarily exists and He is responsible for the existence of everything. Everything other than God is dependent, which Ibn Sina described as Mumkin al-Wujud.

181 Hoja ya utegemezi pia imepitishwa—na kurekebishwa—na wanazuoni wengine wengi wenye ushawishi wa Kiislamu, baadhi yao wakiwa Al-Razi, Al-Ghazali na Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni. Al-Ghazali anatoa muhtasari mfupi wa hoja hii:

181 The argument from dependency has also been adopted—and adapted—by many other influential Islamic scholars, some of whom include Al-Razi, Al-Ghazali and Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni. Al-Ghazali provides a concise summary of this argument:

"Hakuna anayeweza kukataa kuwepo kwenyewe. Kitu lazima kiwepo, na yeyote anayesema hakuna chochote kabisa kilichopo anafanya maana na zile kanuni za lazima kuwa mzaa. Pendekezo kwamba hakuna wa kukataa uwepo wenyewe, basi, ni dhana ya lazima. Sasa Uwepo huu ambao umekubaliwa kimsingi ni wa lazima au wa kutegemea… Maana yake ni kwamba kiwepo lazima kiwe kinajitosheleza au kinategemea. Kutoka hapa tunahoji: Ikiwa kiwepo ambacho kuwepo kwake kumekubaliwa ni cha lazima, basi kuwepo kwa Kiwepo cha lazima kumethibitika. Ikiwa, kwa upande mwingine, kuwepo kwake ni cha kutegemea, kila kiwepo cha kutegemea kinategemea Kiwepo cha lazima; kwa maana ya kutegemea kwake ni kwamba kuwepo kwake na kutokuwepo kwake kunawezekana kwa kiwango sawa. Kitu chochote chenye sifa kama hiyo hakiwezi kuchaguliwa kuwepo bila wakala anayeamua au kuchagua. Hili nalo ni la lazima. Kwa hiyo kutoka katika dhana hizi za lazima, kuwepo kwa Kiwepo cha lazima kunathibitika." 182.

“There is no denying existence itself. Something must exist and anyone who says nothing exists at all makes a mockery of sense and necessity. The proposition that there is no denying being itself, then, is a necessary premise. Now this Being which has been admitted in principle is either necessary or contingent… What this means is that a being must be self-sufficient or dependent… From here we argue: If the being the existence of which is conceded be necessary, then the existence of a necessary Being is established. If, on the other hand, its existence is contingent, every contingent being depends on a necessary Being; for the meaning of its contingency is that its existence and non-existence are equally possible. Whatever has such a characteristic cannot have its existence selected for without a determining or selecting agent. This too is necessary. So from these necessary premises the existence of a necessary Being is established.”182.

Kwa muhtasari, kwa mujibu wa elimu ya theolojia ya Kiislamu, Mungu ni:

In summary, according to Islamic theology, God is:

• Huru.

• Independent.

• Kiumbe ambaye kila kitu kinamtegemea.

• The Being that everything depends on.

• Yule anayesimamia na kuhifadhi kila kitu.

• The One that sustains everything.

• Wa milele.

• Everlasting.

• Anayejitegemea.

• Self-sufficient.

• Waajib al-Wujood (aliyepo kwa lazima).

• Waajib al-Wujood (necessarily existent).

Nitazijibu sasa baadhi ya hoja kuu zinazopingana na hoja hii.

I will now address some of the key objections against this argument.

Ulimwengu upo kwa kujitegemea.

The universe exists independently.

Mojawapo ya hoja za kawaida za wanaokana Mungu ni hii: Ikiwa tunasema kwamba Mungu ni huru na ni wa lazima, kwa nini hatuwezi kusema jambo hilo hilo kuhusu ulimwengu? Hoja hii haina msingi kwa sababu zifuatazo. Kwanza, hakuna chochote cha lazima kuhusu ulimwengu; ungeweza kutokuwepo. Pili, vipengele vya ulimwengu vingeweza kupangwa kwa namna tofauti. Iwe mtu anachukulia vipengele hivi kuwa ni quarks au aina fulani ya uwanja wa quantum, bado linaibuka swali hili:

A typical atheist contention is: If we are saying that God is independent and necessary, why cannot we say the same thing for the universe? This is a misplaced contention for the following reasons. Firstly, there is nothing necessary about the universe; it could have not existed. Secondly, the components of the universe could have been arranged in a different way. Whether one considers these components to be quarks or some type of quantum field, it still raises the question:

Mpangilio huo wao ni wa aina gani? Kwa kuwa mpangilio tofauti wa quarks au fields ungeweza kuwepo badala ya mkusanyiko uliopo, inafuata kwamba ulimwengu ni tegemezi.183

Why are they arranged the way that they are? Since a different arrangement of quarks or fields could have existed instead of the collection that does exist, it follows that the universe is dependent.183

Kila kitu tunachokitambua ndani ya ulimwengu kina sifa za kimwili zenye mipaka; hii inajumuisha magalaksi, nyota, miti, wanyama na elektroni. Vina umbo maalum, ukubwa maalum na hali maalum ya kimwili. Kwa hiyo, vitu hivi tunavyoviona kote kutuzunguka—vitu vinavyounda ulimwengu wote mzima—ni vya kikomo na vinategemea wengine.

Everything we perceive within the universe has limited physical qualities; this includes the galaxies, stars, trees, animals and electrons. They have a specific shape, size and physical form. As such, these things that we perceive around us—the things that make up the entire universe—are finite and dependent.

Ulimwengu ni ukweli mtupu tu.

The universe is just a brute fact.

Mzozano mwingine unapendekeza kwamba hatupaswi kuuliza maswali yoyote kuhusu ulimwengu. Wakati wa mdahalo wake maarufu wa redio na Padre Copleston, mwanafalsafa Bertrand Russell alisema, "Ningesema kwamba ulimwengu upo tu, na hiyo ndiyo yote"184. Msimamo huu kwa kweli ni kukwepa kufikiri kiakili. Fikiria mfano huu wa mpira wa kijani unaoelea:185

Another contention suggests that we should not ask any questions about the universe. During his famous radio debate with Father Copleston, the philosopher Bertrand Russell said, “I should say that the universe is just there, and that’s all”184. This position is frankly an intellectual cop-out. Consider the following hovering green ball analogy:185

Fikiria ungetembea katika bustani ya mtaani kwako ukaona mpira wa kijani unaoelea hewani katikati ya uwanja wa michezo wa watoto. Ungeitikiaje? Je, ungepita tu na kuukubali kama sehemu ya lazima ya uwanja huo? Bila shaka hapana; ungejiuliza kwa nini upo na kwa nini ulivyo. Sasa ukuze mpira huo hadi uwe na ukubwa wa ulimwengu mzima. Swali bado linabaki pale pale: Kwa nini mpira huo upo na kwa nini ulivyo? Hivyo basi, ni halali kuuliza kwa nini ulimwengu ulivyo.

Imagine you were walking in your local park and you saw a hovering green ball in the middle of the children’s playground. How would you react? Would you walk by and accept it as a necessary part of the playground? Of course not; you would question why it exists and how it is the way that it is. Now, extend the ball to the size of a universe. The question still remains: Why does the ball exist and why is it the way that it is? Hence, the validity of questioning why the universe is the way that it is.

Zaidi ya hayo, msimamo huu hauna maana kwa sababu unaidhoofisha sayansi yenyewe. Ndani ya jumuiya ya kisayansi kuna uwanja wa utafiti unaojitolea kujaribu kueleza kuwepo kwa ulimwengu na sifa zake za msingi. Uwanja huu unaitwa cosmology. Huu ni uwanja halali kabisa wa uchunguzi wa kisayansi, na kuuita ulimwengu "ukweli usio na sababu" ni kuidharau desturi iliyoanzishwa ya kisayansi.

Furthermore, this contention is absurd because it undermines science itself. Within the scientific community is a field of study dedicated to trying to explain the existence and basic features of the universe. This field is called cosmology. This is a perfectly legitimate field of scientific enquiry, and to label the universe as a ‘brute fact’ does a disservice to an established scientific practice.

Sayansi hatimaye itapata jibu!

Science will eventually find an answer!.

Pingamizi hili linasema kwamba yale yaliyowasilishwa katika sura hii ni aina ya uongo wa ‘Mungu wa mapengo’ (God of the gaps). Linasema kwamba kutojua kwetu matukio ya kisayansi hakupaswi kuchukuliwa kama uthibitisho wa kuwepo kwa Mungu au shughuli za Kiungu, kwa sababu sayansi siku moja itatoa maelezo. Pingamizi hili si sahihi, kwa sababu hoja ya utegemezi haikusudii kushughulikia swali la kisayansi. Lengo lake ni la kimetafizikia; inatafuta kuelewa asili na athari za vitu tegemezi. Hoja hii inaweza kutumika kwa maelezo yote ya kisayansi na matukio yote ya kimaumbile. Kwa mfano, hata kama tungebuni ulimwengu mwingi kama maelezo ya matukio ya kimaumbile, bado yangekuwa tegemezi. Kwa nini? Kwa sababu vipengele vya maelezo hayo vingeweza kupangwa kwa namna nyingine, na haviwezi kuelezwa kwa sababu ya kuwepo kwao wenyewe, au vinahitaji kitu kingine nje yao ili kuwepo, na vina sifa chache za kimwili. Kwa hiyo ni tegemezi, na—kama ilivyojadiliwa katika sura hii—huwezi kueleza kitu tegemezi kwa kitu kingine tegemezi. Iwapo wanasayansi wataeleza kuwa wamepata kitu huru na cha milele, na kwa hilo kueleza kuwepo kwa ulimwengu, ningeomba uthibitisho. Cha kushangaza, wakati wowote watakapotoa uthibitisho wa kijaribio, ndipo watakapojipinga wenyewe, kwa sababu vitu vinavyoweza kuhisiwa vina sifa chache za kimwili, hivyo vinastahili kuitwa tegemezi.

This objection argues that what has been presented in this chapter is a form of the ‘God of the gaps’ fallacy. It argues that our ignorance of scientific phenomena should not be taken as proof of God’s existence or Divine activity, because science will eventually provide an explanation. This is a misplaced objection because the argument from dependency does not aim to address a scientific question. Its concern is with metaphysics; it seeks to understand the nature and implications of dependent things. This argument can be applied to all scientific explanations and phenomena. For example, even if we were to theorise many universes as an explanation for natural phenomena, they would still be dependent. Why? Because the components of these explanations could be arranged in a different way and cannot be explained by virtue of their own existence, or they require something else outside of themselves to exist and have limited physical qualities. Therefore, they are dependent, and—as discussed in this chapter—you cannot explain a dependent thing with another dependent thing. If members of the scientific community claim to have found something that is independent and eternal, and in turn explained the existence of the universe, I would ask for proof. Interestingly, the minute they provide some empirical proof would be the moment they contradict themselves, because things that can be sensed have limited physical qualities, therefore qualifying as dependent.

Sayansi haiwezi kamwe kugundua kitu chochote kinachojitegemea na cha milele, si tu kwa sababu ingekuwa ya kimajaribio, bali pia kwa sababu sayansi hufanya kazi tu juu ya vitu vinavyoonekana na vinavyotegemea vingine. Kwa hiyo, haina maana kusema kwamba sayansi ingegundua kitu kisicho cha kisayansi! Tuchukue muda kidogo na tufikirie sayansi ni nini. Sayansi, kama taaluma, inajishughulisha na kutoa majibu na maelezo (ona Sura ya 12).

Science cannot ever discover anything independent and eternal, not only because it would be empirical, but also because science only works on observable dependent things. Therefore, it makes no sense to say that science would discover an unscientific object! Let’s take a moment and think about what science is. Science, as a discipline, is in the business of providing answers and explanations (see Chapter 12).

Kwa kuwa vitu tegemezi pekee ndivyo vinavyoweza kuwa na maelezo, tunatambua kwamba upeo wa sayansi umekomewa katika ulimwengu wa vitu tegemezi. Kwa hiyo, sayansi inaweza tu kutoa jibu linalohusiana na kitu kingine tegemezi. Haiwezi kushughulikia asili ya kimetafizikia ya hoja hii. Kama tulivyoeleza, huwezi kueleza kitu tegemezi kwa kitu kingine tegemezi, kwa sababu kitu hicho tegemezi nacho kingehitaji maelezo (na kama mnakumbuka, tumeshajadili kwamba haiwezekani kuwepo kwa kitu kinachotegemea kitu kingine ili kiwepo, ambacho nacho kinategemea kitu kingine tena, bila mwisho). Kwa kuwa maelezo ni kitu kisichotegemea chochote na cha milele, sayansi haiwezi kamwe kuingia katika mjadala huu kwa sababu ina upeo mdogo wa mambo ya kimajaribio na tegemezi.

Only dependent things can have explanations. With this in mind, we realise the scope of science is restricted to the realm of dependent objects. Therefore, science can only provide an answer that would relate to another dependent object. It cannot address the metaphysical nature of this argument. As we have explained, you cannot explain a dependent object with another dependent object, because that dependent object would also require an explanation (and if you recall, we have already discussed that there cannot be a thing that depends on something else to exist, which in turn depends on still another thing, ad infinitum). Since the explanation is something that is independent and eternal, science can never enter into the discussion because it has a limited scope of empirical, dependent things.

Umedhani kwamba Mungu yupo, kwa kuwa Yeye ndiye pekee aliyepo kwa lazima.

You’ve assumed God exists, as He is the only thing that necessarily exists.

Hoja katika sura hii haijadhania uwepo wa Mungu. Hoja haijabuni dhana ya uwajibikaji (necessity) ili kufikia Mungu. Badala yake, kutegemeana kwa ulimwengu na kila kitu tunachokiona kumetupeleka kwenye wazo kwamba lazima kuwepo kiumbe cha milele, kisichotegemea chochote, kinachokuwepo kwa lazima. Hitimisho hili linaendana na maana ya Mungu kama inavyofafanuliwa katika Uislamu. Dhana za uwajibikaji na kutegemeana zinajulikana vizuri na zimejadiliwa sana katika falsafa (matumizi ya neno kutegemeana katika hoja hii kwa kawaida huitwa contingency katika falsafa). Hizi si dhana zilizobuniwa ili kuingiza maelezo kuhusu Mungu kwa njia ya mlango wa nyuma.

The argument in this chapter has not assumed God. The argument has not made up the idea of necessity in order to lead to God. Rather, the dependency of the universe and everything that we perceive has led to the idea that there must be an eternal, independent being that exists necessarily. This conclusion makes sense of the Islamic definition of God. The ideas of necessity and dependency are well known and discussed in philosophy (the use of the word dependency in this argument is usually referred to as contingency in philosophy). They are not made up concepts to try and sneak the God explanation via the backdoor.

"Je, Mungu hahitaji maelezo?"

“Doesn’t God require an explanation?”.

Hoja iliyowasilishwa katika sura hii imehitimisha kwamba lazima kuwepo kiumbe cha milele, kinachojitegemea, ambacho kipo kwa lazima. Hili linaeleza kwa usahihi dhana ya Kiislamu ya Mungu. Kiumbe cha lazima hakihitaji maelezo. Kwa kweli, kiumbe kama hicho hakihitaji maelezo yanayorejelea kitu cha nje yake (tofauti na vitu tegemezi). Badala yake, kiumbe cha lazima hujielezea kwa sababu ya kuwepo kwake yenyewe. Kwa maneno mengine, haikuwezekana kwake kutokuwepo. Kwa hiyo, hakihitaji maelezo ya nje yake.

The argument presented in this chapter has concluded that there must be an eternal, independent being that exists necessarily. This makes sense of the Islamic conception of God. A necessary being doesn’t require an explanation. Technically, such a being doesn’t require an explanation that refers to something external to it (unlike dependent things). Rather, a necessary being is explained by virtue of its own existence. In other words, it was impossible for it to have not existed. Therefore, it doesn’t require an explanation external to itself.

Uongo wa Mchanganyiko.

The Fallacy of Composition.

Uongo wa muundo (fallacy of composition) ni kosa la kimantiki linalodhani kimakosa kwamba kitu kizima lazima kiwe na sifa zile zile za sehemu zake binafsi.186 Hata hivyo, kudai hivyo si mara zote kuwa uongo. Huenda baadhi ya vitu vizima vikawa na sifa zilizopo katika sehemu zake binafsi; lakini si mara zote ndivyo ilivyo. Kwa mfano, ukuta (kitu kizima) umeundwa kwa matofali (sehemu binafsi). Matofali ni magumu, basi ukuta ni mgumu. Hili ni kweli. Kinyume chake, chukua zulia la Kiajemi. Zulia (kitu kizima) limeundwa kwa nyuzi (sehemu binafsi); itakuwa si sahihi kuhitimisha kwamba kwa kuwa nyuzi binafsi ni nyepesi, zulia nalo ni jepesi. Kwa kuzingatia hayo, mpinzani anaweza kusema kwamba haifuati kimantiki kwamba ulimwengu ni tegemezi kwa sababu umeundwa kwa sehemu tegemezi. Hata hivyo, hii ni pingamizi lisilo sahihi. Kwa uzoefu wetu, vitu tegemezi daima huunda vitu vizima vinavyotegemea. Kwa mfano, nyumba imeundwa kwa vifaa tegemezi, na nyumba ni tegemezi. Ina sifa chache za kimwili, inaweza kuwa isiwepo, na vipengele vyake vya msingi vingeweza kupangwa kwa namna nyingine. Vivyo hivyo, ulimwengu umeundwa kwa vitu tegemezi, kwa hiyo ni tegemezi. Wajibu wa kuthibitisha ni juu ya mpinzani kuonyesha kwamba vitu tegemezi havifanyi vitu vizima tegemezi.

The fallacy of composition is a fallacy of reasoning that mistakenly concludes that the whole must have the same properties as its individual parts.186 However, making such a claim is not always fallacious. It could be that some wholes contain the properties that exist within its individual parts; however it is not always the case. For example, a wall (the whole) is made of bricks (individual parts). Bricks are hard, therefore the wall is hard. This is true. Conversely, take into consideration a Persian rug. The rug (the whole) is made up of threads (individual parts); it would be false to conclude that since the individual threads are light the rug is also light. With respect to the above, the objector may argue that it does not logically follow the universe is dependent because it is made up of dependent parts. Nevertheless this is a misplaced objection. From our experience dependent things always form dependent wholes. For example, a house is made up of dependent materials and a house is dependent. It has limited physical qualities, it could have not existed and its fundamental building blocks could have been arranged in a different way. Similarly the universe is made up of dependent things therefore it is dependent. The onus of proof is on the objector to show that dependent things do not make up dependent wholes.

Kabla ya kumaliza sura hii, ninapendekeza usome kitabu *Necessary Existence* cha Profesa Alexander R. Pruss na Profesa Joshua L. Rasmussen.187 Kitabu hicho kinashughulikia pingamizi zinazofanana na nyingine za kitaaluma dhidi ya hoja hii. Pia ninapendekeza usome kitabu cha Mohammed Hijab, *Kalam Cosmological Arguments*, kwa mtazamo wa kina wa Kiislamu.188

Before I end this chapter, I advise reading the book Necessary Existence by Professor Alexander R. Pruss and Professor Joshua L. Rasmussen.187 The book addresses similar and other academic objections to this argument. I also recommend reading Mohammed Hijab’s book Kalam Cosmological Arguments for an in-depth Islamic perspective.188

Kumalizia kwa kumbukumbu ya kiroho.

Ending on a spiritual note.

Uelewa huu wa Mungu si zoezi la kiakili tu; badala yake, unapaswa kuamsha ndani yetu hamu kubwa na upendo wa kina kwa Mungu. Katika sura hii, tumehitimisha kwamba Mungu lazima awepo, na kila kitu kinaweza kuwepo kwa sababu yake yeye pekee. Kwa maana hii, sisi binadamu hatutegemei Mungu kifalsafa tu, bali pia kwa maana ya kawaida ya neno hili; tusingekuwepo hapa bila yeye, na kila tulicho nacho kinatokana hatimaye na yeye peke yake.

This understanding of God is not just an intellectual exercise; rather, it should instil a deep sense of yearning and love for God. In this chapter, we have concluded that God necessarily exists and everything can only exist because of Him. In this sense, we as human beings are not only dependent on God in the philosophical sense, but also in the normal use of the word; we couldn’t be here without Him, and everything that we have is ultimately due to Him alone.

Hadithi fupi ya ajabu ifuatayo inatufundisha kwamba, kwa kuwa hatimaye sisi tunamtegemea Mwenyezi Mungu, na mafanikio yetu katika maisha haya na Akhera yako katika rehema zake zisizo na mipaka, tunapaswa kujisalimisha kwa Mwenyezi Mungu na kutekeleza mapenzi yake.

The following marvellous short story teaches us that, since we are ultimately dependent on God, and our success in this life and the hereafter lies with His boundless mercy, we should submit to God and accomplish His will:

Siku moja nilitoka kwenda kulima shamba langu, nikiwa pamoja na mbwa wangu mdogo, adui mkubwa wa nyani waliokuwa wakiharibu mashamba. Ilikuwa ni msimu wa joto kali. Mimi na mbwa wangu tulikuwa na joto sana hata tulikuwa hatuwezi kupumua vizuri. Nilianza kufikiri kwamba mmoja wetu au mwingine angeanguka kwa kuzimia hivi karibuni. Kisha, asante Mungu, niliona mti wa Tiayki, ambao matawi yake yalitengeneza dari ya kijani kibichi chenye kuburudisha. Mbwa wangu alitoa milio midogo ya furaha na kugeukia kivuli hiki chenye baraka.

“One day I set out to tend my fields, accompanied by my little dog, sworn enemy of the monkeys which ravaged the plantations. It was the season of great heat. My dog and I were so hot that we could scarcely breathe. I began to think that one or other of us would soon fall in a faint. Then, thank God, I saw a Tiayki tree, the branches of which presented a vault of refreshing greenery. My dog gave little cries of joy and turned towards this blessed shade.

Alipofika kwenye kivuli, badala ya kubaki pale alipokuwa, alirudi kwangu, ulimi wake ukiwa nje. Nilipoona jinsi ubavu wake ulivyokuwa ukipiga kwa kasi, nilitambua jinsi alivyochoka kabisa. Nilielekea kwenye kivuli. Mbwa wangu alijaa furaha. Kisha, kwa muda mfupi, nilijifanya kuendelea na safari yangu. Yule kiumbe maskini alilia kwa huzuni, lakini bado alinifuata, mkia wake ukiwa kati ya miguu yake. Ilikuwa dhahiri alikata tamaa, lakini alikuwa ameazimia kunifuata, liwe lolote litakalotokea. Uaminifu huu uliniguza sana moyo. Je, mtu angewezaje kuthamini kikamilifu utayari wa mnyama huyu kunifuata, hata hadi kufa, ingawa hakulazimishwa kufanya hivyo? Ananipenda, nilijiambia, kwa sababu ananiona kuwa bwana wake, na hivyo anahatarisha maisha yake ili tu abaki karibu nami. "Ee Mola wangu," nililia, "uponye nafsi yangu iliyo na shida! Fanya uaminifu wangu uwe kama wa kiumbe huyu ambaye mimi namwita kwa dharau, mbwa. Nipe, kama ulivyompa yeye, nguvu ya kuimudu maisha yangu ili niweze kutimiza mapenzi yako na kufuata—bila kuuliza, Ninaenda wapi?—njia ambayo Wewe unaniongoza! Mimi si muumbaji wa mbwa huyu, lakini yeye ananifuata kwa unyenyekevu, kwa gharama ya mateso elfu moja. Ni Wewe, Ee Bwana, uliyemjalia fadhila hii. Ee Bwana, wape wote wanaokuomba—kama mimi ninavyokuomba—fadhila ya Mapenzi na ujasiri wa Upendo wa kujitolea!" Kisha nilirudi nyuma na kujificha kwenye kivuli. Mwenzangu mdogo, akiwa amejaa furaha, alilala akinikabili ili macho yake yaelekee kwangu, kana kwamba alitaka kuzungumza nami kwa uzito.189

When he had reached the shade, instead of staying where he was, he came back to me, his tongue out. Seeing how his flanks were palpitating, I realised how completely exhausted he was. I walked towards the shade. My dog was full of joy. Then, for a moment, I pretended to continue on my way. The poor beast groaned plaintively, but followed me none the less, his tail between his legs. He was obviously in despair, but determined to follow me, whatever might come of it. This fidelity moved me profoundly. How could one fully appreciate the readiness of this animal to follow me, even to death, although he was under no constraint to do so? He is devoted to me, I said to myself, because he regards me as his master and so risks his life simply to stay beside me. ‘Oh my Lord,’ I cried, ‘Heal my troubled soul! Make my fidelity like that of this being whom I call, contemptuously, a dog. Give me, as You have given to him, the strength to master my life so that I may accomplish Your will and follow—without asking, Where am I going?—the path upon which You guide me! I am not the creator of this dog, yet he follows me in docility, at the cost of a thousand sufferings. It is You, Lord, who has gifted him with this virtue. Give, O Lord, to all who ask it of You—as I do— the virtue of Love and the courage of Charity!’ Then I retraced my steps and took refuge in the shade. Full of joy, my little companion lay down facing me so that his eyes were turned to mine, as though he wished to speak seriously to me.”189