Historia fupi ya uasi-Mungu (atheism).
A brief history of atheism.
Katika historia ya Kiislamu, Uasi-Mungu haukuwa tishio kubwa la kijamii na kiakili hadi kuibuka kwa Dahriyya katika karne ya 8. Wanafikra hawa walikuwa wafuasi wa empiricism, waliokuwa wakiamini kwamba maarifa yote yanaweza kupatikana kwa njia ya kiuzoefu pekee. Waliamini kwamba ulimwengu ulikuwa wa milele na umeundwa na sifa nne, ambazo ndizo zilizohusika na kila kitu kilichopo. Walisema kwamba kila kitu kimekuwepo tangu zamani na hakihitaji muumba wala mtengenezaji yeyote.14
In Islamic history Atheism was not a major social and intellectual threat until the emergence of the 8th century Dahriyya. These thinkers were empiricists who believed that all knowledge could only be acquired via the empirical method. They believed that the cosmos was eternal and composed of four qualities, which were responsible for everything that existed. They argued that everything had always existed and did not require any creator or maker.14
Kulingana na Kitab al-Aghani cha Faraj al-Isfahani, Abu Hanifa, mwanazuoni maarufu wa sheria na mwanzilishi wa mojawapo ya madhehebu ya jadi, alibishana na Mdahri katika karne ya 8. Abu Hanifa alijulikana kuwa aliwashinda kiakili Wadahriyya katika mijadala ya hadharani (ona Sura ya 8). Wanazuoni wengi wa Kiislamu walijibu madai ya Wadahriyya, akiwemo Al-Ghazali, Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Jaḥiẓ, Muhammad b. Shabib, Ibn Qutayba, na Abu ‘Isa al-Warraq.15 Katika kitabu cha Al-Ghazali, Kimiyaʾ-yi sa‘adat, anawaelezea Wadahriyya kuwa ni watu wanaopunguza kila kitu, ambao hawana ufahamu kamili wa ulimwengu na lengo lake. Anasema kwamba wao ni kama chungu waliopo kwenye kipande cha karatasi, ambao hawawezi kuinua macho yao kutoka kwenye wino au kalamu wanayoiona mbele yao, hivyo wanashindwa kuona ni nani anayeandika.16
According to Kitab al-Aghani by Faraj al-Isfahani, Abu Hanifa, the famous jurist and founder of one of the traditional schools of thought, debated a Dahri in the 8th century. Abu Hanifa was known to have intellectually hammered the Dahriyya in public debates (see Chapter 8). Many of the Islamic scholars responded to the claims of the Dahriyya, including Al-Ghazali, Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Jaḥiẓ, Muhammad b. Shabib, Ibn Qutayba, and Abu ‘Isa al-Warraq.15 In Al-Ghazali’s book, Kimiyaʾ-yi sa‘adat, he describes the Dahriyya as reductionists who do not have a holistic understanding of the universe and its purpose. He asserts that they are like ants on a piece of paper that cannot lift their eyes from the ink or the pen they see before them, thus failing to see who is writing.16
Historia ya Kiislamu ya kutokuamini kuwapo kwa Mungu inaonyesha wazi mazingira ya majadiliano na mijadala ya kiakili, ambayo yasingewezekana bila kuheshimiana na uvumilivu. Qur'ani inaweka wazi kabisa kwamba kuwa na imani nyingi tofauti ni sehemu ya mapenzi ya Mungu, na kwamba kamwe hakupaswi kuwepo shinikizo lolote la aina yoyote, bali kuheshimiana na uvumilivu.
The Islamic history of atheism clearly shows an environment of intellectual discussion and debate, which could only have been facilitated by mutual respect and tolerance. The Qur’an makes it absolutely clear that having myriad beliefs is part of God’s will, and that there should never be any form of compulsion but mutual respect and tolerance:
"Na lau Mola wako angetaka, watu wote waliomo duniani wangeamini, wote kwa pamoja. Je, basi wewe utawalazimisha watu ili wawe waumini?"17
“And had your Lord willed, those on Earth would have believed—all of them entirely. Then, would you compel the people in order that they become believers?”17
"Hakuna kulazimishwa katika dini."18
“There is no compulsion in the religion.”18
Mwanazuoni wa Kiislamu na msomi, Dkt. Jaafar Idris, anafupisha kwa ufasaha msimamo wa Uislamu kuhusu imani nyingine: "Kuishi kwa amani pamoja na imani zisizo za Kiislamu ni kanuni muhimu ya Kiislamu ambayo imeelezwa wazi katika aya nyingi za Qur'ani, na ambayo Waislamu wameitekeleza katika historia yao yote. Si jambo ambalo Waislamu wanalilazimisha katika dini yao, wala jambo ambalo wanalazimika kulitumia kutokana na hali za nje zisizo za kawaida. Ni jambo linalodaiwa na asili ya dini yenyewe…."
Urithi wa kiakili wa Uislamu unapaswa kuwapa Waislamu ujasiri wanapokabiliana na changamoto za kisasa zinazopinga misingi ya kiakili ya dini yao. Majibu mengi ya tuhuma zinazoitwa mpya kutoka kwa fikra za kutoamini Mungu na za kilimwengu tayari yameshughulikiwa na wanazuoni wa kale wa Uislamu. Kwa mtazamo huu, Waislamu wamesimama juu ya mabega ya majitu. Jukumu lao pekee linapaswa kuwa kupata utajiri huo wa maarifa na elimu, na kujifunza jinsi ya kuufanya uendane na wakati wa sasa, kwa kutumia lugha ya kisasa, yenye umuhimu na inayoweza kutumika.
The Islamic thinker and scholar, Dr. Jaafar Idris, aptly summarises Islam’s stance on other beliefs: “Existing peacefully with non-Islamic beliefs is an essential Islamic principle that is clearly stated in many Qur’anic verses, and that has been practiced by Muslims throughout their history. It is not something that Muslims impose on their religion or something that they have to resort to because of exceptional external circumstances. It is a requirement demanded by the nature of the religion….” The intellectual heritage of Islam should provide confidence for Muslims who are exposed to contemporary challenges that confront the rational foundations of their religion. Many of the answers to so-called new objections from atheist and secular thought have already been dealt with by Islam’s classical scholarship. From this perspective, Muslims are standing on the shoulders of giants. Their only concern should be accessing that wealth of knowledge and learning how to contemporise it by using a language that is modern, relevant and applicable.
Katika Magharibi, uasi-imani (atheism) haikuwa harakati maarufu katika zama za kale, wala haikuwa na wafuasi wengi. Kwa mujibu wa wanahistoria, tulichonacho katika kipindi hiki ni watu binafsi (visa vya kipekee) "waliothubutu kutamka kukataa kwao imani" au wanafalsafa jasiri waliopendekeza nadharia za kiakili kuhusu kuja kuwepo kwa miungu bila, kwa kawaida, kuweka nadharia zao katika vitendo au kuacha kabisa ibada za kidini.20 Matumizi ya kwanza ya neno atheism yanaweza kufuatiliwa hadi kwa msomi wa Kigiriki Sir John Cheke katika tafsiri yake ya kazi ya Plutarch "On Superstition". Nchini Ufaransa wakati wa karne ya 1600, uasi-imani ulizaa maandishi ya mabishano na hatua za kisiasa na kijamii dhidi ya mtazamo wake wa dunia.21 Uasi-imani ulionekana kuwa tishio hata mapema kama karne ya 1700 nchini Uingereza. Mwandishi maarufu wa tamthilia na insha Joseph Addison aliandika kitabu kiitwacho The Evidence of the Christian Religion, ambacho kilikuwa na sehemu dhidi ya uasi-imani. Katika sehemu hii ya kitabu, anawaelezea wasioamini Mungu kwa namna ifuatayo:
In the West Atheism was not a popular movement in antiquity, and it did not have a substantial following. According to historians, all we have in this period are individuals (cases of exception) “who dared to voice [their] disbelief or bold philosophers who proposed intellectual theories about coming into existence of the gods without, normally, putting their theories into practice or rejecting religious practice altogether.”20 The first use of the term atheism can be traced back to the Greek scholar Sir John Cheke in a translation of Plutarch’s On Superstition. In France during the 1600s, atheism inspired polemical writings and socio-political measures against its worldview.21 Atheism was perceived as a threat even as early as the 1700s in Britain. The celebrated playwright and essayist Joseph Addison wrote a book titled The Evidence of the Christian Religion, which had a section against atheism. In this part of the book, he describes atheists in the following way:
“Kuna kitu cha kipumbavu na chenye upotovu katika aina hii ya wenye msimamo mkali kiasi kwamba mtu hajui jinsi ya kuwaelezea katika rangi zao halisi. Ni aina ya wachezaji kamari ambao daima wako katika wasiwasi, ingawa wanacheza bila kupata chochote. Daima wanawasumbua marafiki zao wajiunge nao, ingawa wakati huo huo wanakubali kwamba hakuna mmoja wao atakayepata kitu kutokana na mpango huo. Kwa kifupi, bidii ya kueneza ukafiri ni, ikiwezekana, ya kipumbavu zaidi kuliko ukafiri wenyewe… Wamefungwa kwa imani zilizojaa mkinzano na zisizowezekana, na wakati huo huo wanaiona hata ugumu mdogo katika kipengele cha imani kuwa sababu ya kutosha ya kukikataa… Ningependa kumuuliza mmoja wa hao makafiri wenye msimamo mkali, anayeunga mkono nukta zote kuu za Ukafiri, kama vile uumbaji wa dunia wa kisababu au wa milele, kufa kwa dutu inayofikiri, kufa kwa Nafsi, mpangilio wa kubahatisha wa Mwili, mwendo na mvutano wa maada, pamoja na mambo kama hayo, yaliwekwa pamoja na kuundwa kuwa aina ya Imani, kulingana na maoni ya Wakanushaji wanaojulikana zaidi; nasema, kama Imani kama hii ingeundwa na kulazimishwa juu ya watu wowote duniani, je, haingehitaji kiwango kisicho na kikomo cha imani kuliko kipengele chochote ambacho wanakipinga kwa nguvu. Basi, nawashauri kizazi hiki cha wagomvi, kwa manufaa yao wenyewe na ya umma, kujiendesha angalau kwa uthabiti na nafsi zao, ili wasiwake kwa bidii ya Kutokuwa na Dini, na kwa ushabiki wa Upuuzi.”
“There is something so ridiculous and perverse in this kind of Zealots, that one does not know how to set them out in their proper colours. They are a sort of gamesters who are eternally upon the fret, tho’ they play for nothing. They are perpetually teizing their friends to come over to them, though at the same time they allow that neither of them shall get anything by the bargain. In short, the zeal of spreading atheism is, if possible, more absurd than atheism itself… They are wedded to opinions full of contradiction and impossibility, and at the same time look upon the smallest difficulty in an article of faith as a sufficient reason for rejecting it… I would fain ask one of these bigoted Infidels, supporting all the great points of Atheism, as the causal or eternal formation of the world, the mortality of thinking substance, the mortality of the Soul, the fortuitous organization of the Body, the motions and gravitations of matter, with the like particulars, were laid together and formed into a kind of Creed, according to the opinions of the most celebrated Atheists; I say, supporting such a Creed as this were formed, and imposed upon any one people in the world, whether it would not require an infinitely greater measure of faith, than any set of articles which they so violently oppose. Let me therefore advise this generation of Wranglers, for their own and for the public good, to act at least so consistently with themselves, as not to burn with Zeal for Irreligion, and with Bigotry for Non-sense.”.
Maneno ya Addison, ingawa yamejaa rangi na chuki, yanaonyesha aina ya mjadala wa kidini wenye shauku na ukali uliokuwepo katika karne ya 1700. Ingawa uasi wa imani (utoaji wa kukana Mungu) haukuwa harakati maarufu nchini Uingereza, mbegu za kutoamini tayari zilikuwa zimepandwa, na baadhi ya matunda yake tayari yalikuwa yanaota.
Addison’s words, although colourful, indicate the kind of passionate and fierce discourse on religion in the 1700s. Although atheism was not a popular movement in Britain, the seeds of disbelief had already been planted and some of their fruits were already growing.
Ingawa uwakilishi wa Addison wa kutoamini kuwepo kwa Mungu ni maoni yenye upendeleo kuhusu mijadala iliyokuwa ikiibuka katika zama zake, karne ya 17 na 18 zilikuwa na mafanikio makubwa ya kifikra yaliyoandaa njia kwa aina ya shaka ya kitaaluma na aina ya kutokuamini kuwepo kwa Mungu isiyo ya kidogma. Kulikuwa na wanafalsafa na wanafikra wengi waliohusika na jambo hili. Mwaka 1689, mwanafikra wa Kipolandi Kazimierz Lyszczynski alikana kuwepo kwa Mungu katika kitabu chake De non existential dei. Lyszczynski alishikilia kwamba Mungu ni uumbaji wa binadamu, na kwamba binadamu walibuni dhana ya Mungu ili kuwadhulumu wengine. Mwaka 1674, Matthias Knutzen, aliyekuwa na wafuasi wengi kote Ulaya, alitoa maandishi yakiunga mkono kutoamini kuwepo kwa Mungu. Katika karne ya 1700, watu kama David Hume na Voltaire walitoa hoja na mawazo yaliyotoa mbegu za kiakili zilizohitajika ili kutoamini kuwepo kwa Mungu kushika mizizi. Voltaire alitetea udeisti; msimamo wa kifalsafa na kitheolojia unaodai kwamba kuna muumbaji mmoja, lakini unakataa nafasi ya ufunuo na mamlaka ya maarifa ya kidini. David Hume aliandika kazi kubwa ya maandishi kuhusu suala la Mungu na dini. Alisema kwamba wazo la Mungu haliwezi kufahamika. Pia alipinga wazo la kuwepo kwa lazima kwa Mungu, na alijaribu kuonyesha udhaifu na mipaka ya hoja ya usanifu (tazama Sura ya 8). Hume alisema kwamba kuwepo kwa uovu na mateso duniani kulileta changamoto kubwa kiakili. Akiakisi wanafalsafa wa kale, hoja yake haikumkana Mungu; hata hivyo, ilihoji kiwango cha uovu na kutoweza kwetu kuuhalalisha kwa mtazamo wa kibinadamu (tazama Sura ya 11). Shambulio la Hume dhidi ya wazo la kidini la miujiza lilikuwa na athari kubwa. Alishikilia kwamba imani katika miujiza ingekuwa ya busara tu iwapo uwezekano wa mashahidi wa macho kukosea ungekuwa mdogo kuliko uwezekano wa miujiza hiyo kutokea. Ingawa hii si simulizi kamili ya wanafikra, waandishi na wanafalsafa waliosaidia kuimarisha itikadi ya kutokuamini Mungu katika utamaduni wa kawaida na katika mijadala ya kitaaluma, inatoa mwanga juu ya historia ya kukataa Uungu Magharibi katika kipindi hicho.
Although Addison’s representation of atheism is a biased social commentary on the emerging discussions of his time, the 17th and 18th centuries were marked by significant intellectual achievements that paved the way for an academic type of scepticism and a form of non-dogmatic atheism. There were many philosophers and thinkers responsible for this. In 1689, the Polish thinker Kazimierz Lyszczynski denied the existence of God in his De non existential dei. Lyszczynski maintained that God is a creation of man and that humans created the concept of God to oppress others. In 1674, Matthias Knutzen, who had a large following across Europe, produced writings in support of atheism. In the 1700s, the likes of David Hume and Voltaire presented arguments and ideas that would provide the necessary intellectual seeds for atheism to take root. Voltaire argued for deism; a philosophical and theological position which asserts that a single creator exists, but rejects the role of revelation, and the authority of religious knowledge. David Hume wrote a corpus of material on the issue of God and religion. He argued that the idea of God was incomprehensible. He also contended the idea of God’s necessary existence, and attempted to expose the weakness and limitations of the argument from design (see Chapter 8). Hume argued that the existence of evil and suffering in the world proved to be intellectually challenging. Echoing the ancient philosophers, his argument did not deny God; it did, however, question the degree of evil and our inability to justify it from a human perspective (see Chapter 11). Hume’s attack on the religious idea of miracles had significant influence. He maintained that belief in miracles would only be rational if the probability of the eyewitnesses to be mistaken is less than the probability of them occurring. Although this is not an exhaustive account of the thinkers, writers and philosophers that helped cement atheism in popular culture and academic discourse, it gives an insight to the history of rejecting the Divine in the West during that period.
Wakati wa karne ya 19, mtu mashuhuri katika mapambano ya kufanya kutokuamini Mungu (uthiolojia) kukubalika alikuwa Charles Bradlaugh. Akiwa mwanachama wa bunge la Uingereza, alipigania kwa muda mrefu kufanya kutokuamini Mungu kukubalika katika jamii. Ingawa hakufikia malengo yake, kufikia mwishoni mwa karne ya 19 alikuwa ameandaa njia kwa wengine kuendelea na mapambano ya kukubalika na kuheshimiwa.23 Bradlaugh aliandika insha nyingi, zikiwemo Humanity’s Gain from Unbelief, A Plea for Atheism na Doubts in Dialogue.
During the 19th century, an important figure in the fight to make atheism acceptable was Charles Bradlaugh. A member of the British parliament, he fought a long battle to make atheism acceptable to society. Although he did not achieve his goals, by the end of the 19th century he paved the way for others to continue the battle for acceptability and respect.23 Bradlaugh wrote many essays, including Humanity’s Gain from Unbelief, A Plea for Atheism and Doubts in Dialogue.
Bradlaugh, mtetezi wa kutokuamini kwa kutilia shaka na kutokuamini kuwepo kwa Mungu, alitumia maandishi yake kuondoa "baadhi ya chuki nyingi zilizokuwepo, si tu dhidi ya wale wanaoshikilia kweli misimamo ya kutokuamini kuwepo kwa Mungu, bali pia dhidi ya wale waliotuhumiwa bila haki kuwa wasioamini kuwepo kwa Mungu".
Bradlaugh, a defender of scepticism and atheism, used his writings to remove “some of the many prejudices prevalent, not only against actual holders of Atheistic opinions, but also against those wrongfully suspected of Atheism”.
25 Shughuli za Bradlaugh hazikulenga tu kuishawishi jamii ya Uingereza kukubali kutokuamini kuwepo kwa Mungu (uatheism); pia zilijikita katika kuonyesha kwamba kutokuamini kuwepo kwa Mungu kunamfanya binadamu awe na furaha zaidi na kuongeza ustawi wake. Katika insha yake, *Humanity’s Gain from Unbelief*, aliandika: "Kama mtu asiyeamini, naomba ruhusa ya kutetea kwamba ubinadamu umenufaika kweli kutokana na kutilia shaka mambo, na kwamba kukataliwa taratibu na kunakoongezeka kwa Ukristo, kama ilivyokuwa kukataliwa kwa dini zilizotangulia, kumeongeza, na kutaendelea kuongeza, furaha na ustawi wa binadamu."26
25 Bradlaugh’s activism was not solely focused on convincing British society to accept atheism; it was also dedicated to show that atheism makes humanity happier and increases the well-being of man. He wrote in his essay, Humanity’s Gain from Unbelief, “As an unbeliever, I ask leave to plead that humanity has been a real gainer from scepticism, and that the gradual and growing rejection of Christianity—like the rejection of the faiths which preceded it—has in fact added, and will add, to man’s happiness and well-being.”26
Miaka ya 1920 iliona kuibuka kwa wanafalsafa wa mantiki chanya (logical positivists). Wakiongozwa na mafanikio katika sayansi, harakati hii kali ya kifalsafa ilishikilia kwamba kauli zinaweza kuwa na maana tu ikiwa zinaweza kuthibitishwa kwa majaribio (kwa uzoefu wa kimwili). Walidai kwamba kama mtu anatamka kauli inayorejelea kitu kilicho nje ya uwezo wa hisi, basi kauli hiyo ni upuuzi. Wanamantiki chanya walisema kwamba hakuna kitu kinachopita ulimwengu wa kimwili. Kauli ni ama za kichanganuzi (analytical) au za kisanisi (synthetic). Kauli za kichanganuzi ni kauli ambazo ni kweli kwa ufafanuzi. Kwa mfano, kauli ‘mpira ni wa duara’ ni kweli kwa sababu neno ‘la duara’ limo ndani ya maana ya neno ‘mpira.’ Kauli za kisanisi ni kauli ambazo ni kweli kwa uzoefu. Kwa mfano, kauli ‘mpira unadunda’ inaweza kuthibitishwa kwa kuutazama mpira ukidunda. Kwa kuzingatia hayo, wanamantiki chanya waliunda kipimo cha kijaribio cha maana. Kigezo hiki kwa msingi wake kinadai kwamba ili kauli yoyote iwe na maana, lazima ithibitishwe kwa uzoefu wa kimwili. Kwa sababu hiyo, maswali mengi yanayohusu Mungu, metafizikia, maadili na historia yalichukuliwa kuwa hayana maana. Hivyo, kutokuamini Mungu (ukanushaji wa Mungu) kulikuwa msimamo chaguo-msingi, kwa kuwa Mungu hakuweza kuthibitishwa kwa uzoefu wa kimwili.
The 1920s saw the emergence of the logical positivists. Inspired by achievements in science, this radical philosophical movement maintained that statements can only be meaningful if they can be verified empirically. They argued that if one utters a statement that refers to something that is beyond the reach of the senses, then it is nonsense. The logical positivists argued that there is nothing that transcends the physical world. Statements are either analytical or synthetic. Analytical statements are statements that are true by definition. For example, the statement ‘the ball is spherical’ is true because the term ‘spherical’ is contained in the meaning of the term ‘ball.’ Synthetic statements are statements that are true by experience. For example, the statement ‘the ball is bouncing’ can be verified by looking at the ball bouncing. In light of this, the logical positivists created an empirical measure of meaning. This criterion essentially argues that for any statement to be meaningful, it must be verified by physical experience. For this reason, many questions pertaining to God, metaphysics, morality and history were considered meaningless. Therefore, atheism was the default position, as God could not be verified via physical experience.