Je, Sayansi Imethibitisha Kutokuwepo kwa Mungu? – Kuvunja Dhana Potofu za Wanaoamini Hakuna Mungu - Uhalisia wa Kimungu

Je, Sayansi Imethibitisha Kutokuwepo kwa Mungu? – Kuvunja Dhana Potofu za Wanaoamini Hakuna Mungu - Uhalisia wa Kimungu | Quran Course

0% read · 16 min left

Uhalisia wa Kimungu Bookmark

This chapter was translated automatically from English and may contain mistakes. Read the original

Show original

Je, Sayansi Imethibitisha Kutokuwepo kwa Mungu? – Kuvunja Dhana Potofu za Wanaoamini Hakuna Mungu

Has Science Disproved God? – Deconstructing False Atheist Assumptions

by By Hamza Andreas Tzortzis16 min readViewed 109 times

Fikiria umeingia katika jumba la kifahari la ajabu. Unapotembea kwenye ukumbi, unastaajabishwa na ukubwa wa jengo na unaamua kuchunguza kwa kufungua mlango wa karibu nawe. Unapoingia chumbani, unaona mamia ya viti na meza vimepangwa kama darasani. Ghafla unapoteza hamu yote ya kuchunguza vyumba vingine. Unaamua kuondoka jumbani na kwenda kukutana na rafiki yako katika mkahawa wa karibu. Mnapokunywa kahawa pamoja, rafiki yako anakuuliza, "Basi uliona nini ndani ya jumba?" Unajibu, "Chumba kimoja tu kilichojaa meza na viti vilivyopangwa kama darasani." Rafiki yako kisha anauliza, "Kwa nini hukuona vyumba vingine?" Unajibu kwa kusema, "Hakuna maana, hakukuwa na kitu cha kuona. Kama chumba hiki kilijaa viti na meza, basi vyumba vingine havitakuwa na chochote ndani yake." Je, jibu lako ni la kimantiki? Je, inafuata kimantiki kwamba kwa sababu kuna kitu chumba kimoja, hakutakuwa na kitu katika vyumba vingine? Hakika haifuati. Wanaoamini kwamba hakuna Mungu ambao wanadai kwamba sayansi imethibitisha kwamba Mungu hayupo wanafuata mantiki inayofanana. Sayansi huelekeza umakini wake kwenye yale tu ambayo uchunguzi unaweza kuyatatua. Hata hivyo, Mungu, kwa ufafanuzi, ni Kiumbe aliye nje ya ulimwengu wa kimwili. Kwa hiyo, uchunguzi wa moja kwa moja juu yake hauwezekani. Lakini mtu asiyeamini Mungu anaweza kusema kwamba uchunguzi usio wa moja kwa moja unaweza kuthibitisha au kukanusha kuwepo kwa Mungu. Hili si kweli. Uchunguzi wowote usio wa moja kwa moja hauwezi kamwe kukanusha kuwepo kwa Mungu, kwa sababu ni sawa na kusema kwamba jambo lililoonekana linaweza kukanusha jambo lisiloonekana. Hii inafuata mantiki ile ile ya mfano wa jumba hapo juu. Ukweli kwamba sayansi haiongozi kwenye kukataa kuwepo kwa Mungu unathibitishwa na wengi wa wanafalsafa wa sayansi. Kwa mfano, Hugh Gauch anahitimisha kwa usahihi kwamba kusisitiza kwamba… sayansi inaunga mkono kutokuwepo kwa Mungu ni kupata alama za juu kwa shauku lakini alama za chini kwa mantiki.335 Gauch yuko sahihi kabisa kwa sababu njia ya kufikiri inayotegemea uchunguzi haiwezi kukataa kile ambacho hakiwezi kuchunguzwa. Hata hivyo, kile sayansi inachoweza kufanya ni kunyamaza kuhusu jambo hilo au kutoa ushahidi ambao wanafalsafa wanaweza kutumia kuunda hoja ya kifalsafa kwamba Mungu yupo. Pamoja na hayo, zipo hoja zinazotumia ushahidi wa kisayansi na kuhitimisha kwamba kuwepo kwa Mungu hakuna uwezekano. Hoja hizi hujulikana kama hoja za kiushahidi; kwa asili yake ni za kifalsafa na si hitimisho la kisayansi.

Imagine you entered an amazing palace. As you walk through the hallway, you are struck by the size of the building and decide to explore by opening the nearest door. As you enter the room, you see hundreds of chairs and tables arranged like a classroom. Suddenly you lose any motivation to explore the other rooms. You decide to leave the palace and head off to meet your friend at a local coffee shop. As you drink coffee with your friend he asks you, “So what did you see in the palace?” You reply, “Just a room full of tables and chairs arranged like a classroom”. Your friend then asks, “Why didn’t you see the other rooms?” You reply by saying, “There’s no point, there was nothing to see. If this room was full of chairs and tables, then the other rooms will have nothing in them.” Is your reply rational? Does it logically follow that just because there is something in one room, there will be nothing in the other rooms? Of course it does not. Atheists who claim that science has disproved God follow a similar logic. Science focuses its attention on only what observations can solve. However, God, by definition, is a Being who is outside the physical universe. Therefore, any direct observation of Him is impossible. However, an atheist may argue that indirect observation may support or negate God’s existence. This is not true. Any form of indirect observation could never negate God’s existence, because it is like saying an observed phenomenon can negate an unobserved phenomenon. This follows the same logic as the above example in the palace. The fact that science does not lead to atheism is attested by the majority of the philosophers of science. For example, Hugh Gauch rightly concludes that to “insist that… science supports atheism is to get high marks for enthusiasm but low marks for logic.”335 Gauch makes perfect sense because the method of thinking that relies on observation cannot deny what cannot be observed. What science can do, however, is stay silent on that matter or provide evidence that philosophers can use to formulate a philosophical argument that God exists. Notwithstanding, there are arguments that use scientific evidence that conclude God’s existence is unlikely. These are known as evidential arguments; they are philosophical in nature and not scientific conclusions.

Dhana ya pili ni kwamba, kwa kuwa sayansi imefanikiwa sana, hitimisho la kisayansi lazima liwe kweli. Ikiwa hitimisho la kisayansi ni kweli, na sayansi haiwezi kushughulikia hali halisi isiyoonekana kama Mungu, basi inafuata kwamba yeye hayupo. Mantiki iliyo nyuma ya dhana hii si wazi, na inaonyesha kutojua kwa kawaida kuhusu falsafa ya sayansi. Kwa kifupi, kwamba kitu kinafanya kazi hakumaanishi kwamba ni kweli. Hii ni dhana ya msingi katika falsafa ya sayansi. Kwa bahati mbaya, hata baadhi ya wanaoitwa wasioamini Mungu mashuhuri wanashikilia mtazamo usio na mantiki kwamba matumizi ya vitendo yenye mafanikio ya nadharia ya kisayansi yanathibitisha kuwa ni kweli kwa maana kamili. Nilikutana na Richard Dawkins kwa muda mfupi katika Kongamano la Dunia la Wasioamini Mungu mwaka 2010, lililofanyika Dublin, Ireland. Nilizungumza naye kwa ufupi na nikamuuliza kwa nini alimwambia mmoja wa waulizaji asisome falsafa ya sayansi na badala yake "afanye sayansi tu". Hakunipa jibu la kutosha. Kwa kuchunguza kazi zake za hadharani, sasa inaonekana wazi kwamba mojawapo ya sababu zake kuu ni kwamba sayansi "inafanya kazi, b*tches".336

• The second assumption is that since science is so successful, scientific conclusions must be true. If scientific conclusions are true, and science cannot address an unobserved reality like God, then it follows He does not exist. The logic behind this assumption is fuzzy and it exposes a common ignorance concerning the philosophy of science. Simply put, just because something works does not mean it is true. This is a basic idea in the philosophy of science. Unfortunately, even some highly acclaimed atheists take the incoherent view that the successful practical application of a scientific theory proves it to be true in an absolute sense. I once met Richard Dawkins at the World Atheist Convention in 2010, held in Dublin, Ireland. I spoke to him briefly and asked him why he told one questioner not to study the philosophy of science and “just do the science”. He didn’t give me much of a reply. Surveying his public work, it is now becoming clear that one of his main reasons is that science “works, b*tches”336

Kama ilivyotajwa katika Sura ya 9, Charles Darwin alizingatia maadili na sayansi (hasa biolojia), na akatoa mfano uliokithiri wa athari zinazowezekana za maadili yetu kutokana na mchakato wa kibiolojia. Alipendekeza kwamba ikiwa tungelelewa chini ya seti tofauti ya hali za kibiolojia, basi kile tunachoona kuwa cha kimaadili kingeweza kuwa tofauti sana na maoni yetu ya sasa.340 Huenda Darwin alikuwa anatuambia kwamba ikiwa kile wanadamu wanachoona kuwa cha kimaadili kilikuwa ni matokeo tu ya uzoefu wa kibiolojia wa awali, basi kuwa na seti tofauti ya hali kungesababisha viwango tofauti vya kimaadili. Hili lina athari kubwa kwa misingi na maana ya maadili. Kwanza, kuweka biolojia au seti ya hali za kimwili kama msingi wa maadili hufanya maadili kuwa ya kibinafsi, kwa sababu yanakabiliwa (na yalikabiliwa) na mabadiliko yasiyoepukika. Hata hivyo, hili linapingana na ukweli wa asili usiopingika kwamba baadhi ya maadili ni ya lengo (angalia Sura ya 9). Pili, ikiwa hisia zetu za maadili zingetegemea hali za kibiolojia, basi maadili yetu yana maana gani? Kwa kuwa maadili yetu yangeweza kuwa tofauti ikiwa tungelelewa kwa namna tofauti, basi maadili yetu hupoteza maana yake. Hii ni kwa sababu hakuna chochote cha lazima katika mtazamo wetu wa kimaadili, kwani ni matokeo tu ya bahati nasibu na michakato ya kimwili. Katika kitabu chake, The Moral Landscape, mwanasayansi wa neva na mwanakinyume wa imani ya Mungu anayejieleza wazi, Sam Harris, amejaribu kuhalalisha hisia zetu za maadili ya lengo kwa kueleza jinsi sayansi inavyoweza kubainisha thamani zetu za kimaadili. Wenzake wasioamini Mungu wamepongeza juhudi zake, lakini pia amekabiliwa na ukosoaji mkubwa kutoka kwa wanaoamini Mungu na kutoka kwa wenzake wenyewe. Harris anatuwasilisha mandhari yake ya maadili. Kileleni kuna wema wa kimaadili, na katika mabonde kuna uovu wa kimaadili. Anajuaje kipi ni wema na kipi ni uovu? Naam, vilele vinawakilisha ustawi wa watu, na mabonde yanawakilisha mateso. Maelezo haya yanaweza kusikika kama muhtasari mbaya wa mjadala wake, lakini kwa haki yake, yanakuja kwa hoja moja: Harris anasawazisha uovu na mateso, na wema na ustawi. Hapa ndipo Harris anapokosea. Ikiwa inaweza kuonyeshwa kwamba watu wanaweza kuongeza ustawi wao wenyewe kwa kuwadhuru wengine, basi mandhari yake ya kimaadili inabomoka. Njia nyingine ya kupinga hoja yake ni kuonyesha kwamba baadhi ya mambo yanayoweza kukuza ustawi wetu ni ya kuchukiza kimaadili. Fikiria, kwa mfano, uzinzi wa mahusiano ya kindugu kwa kutumia uzazi wa mpango. Pande zote mbili zinaongeza ustawi wao (kwa kuwa wanaamua kwa hiari kutenda kwa tamaa zao), na hakuna hatari yoyote ya madhara au mateso, kama vile kupata mtoto mwenye kasoro za kijeni, kwa sababu ya matumizi ya uzazi wa mpango. Nilimtaja suala la uhusiano wa kindugu hata wakati wa mdahalo wetu na Profesa Krauss, na hakuwa na uhakika kabisa na msimamo wake (alisema haikuwa wazi kwake kwamba ni kosa, na kwamba hawezi kulaani kimaadili). Baadhi ya mambo yanayoweza kukuza ustawi wetu ni ya kuchukiza kimaadili. Hata kama hukubaliani na mfano huu, kuna mifano mingine mingi ya kuchagua ili kuthibitisha hoja hii.

As mentioned in Chapter 9, Charles Darwin considered morals and science (specifically biology), and came up with an extreme example of the possible implications of our morality stemming from a biological process. He suggested that if we were reared under a different set of biological conditions, then what we would consider moral could be very different from our current views.340 What Darwin may have been telling us is that if what human beings consider to be moral was just a result of previous biological conditioning, then having a different set of conditions would result in different moral standards. This has immense implications for the foundations and meaningfulness of morality. Firstly, establishing biology or a set of physical conditions as a basis for morality renders morals subjective— because they are (and were) subject to inevitable changes. However, this contradicts the innate and undeniable fact that some morals are objective (see Chapter 9). Secondly, if our sense of morality was based on biological conditions, then what meaning do our morals have? Since our morals could have been different if we were ‘reared’ differently, then our morals lose their meaning. This is because there is nothing necessary about our moral outlook, as it is simply a result of chance and physical processes. In his book, The Moral Landscape, the outspoken atheist and neuroscientist Sam Harris has attempted to justify our sense of objective morality by explaining how science can determine our moral values. Fellow atheists have commended his efforts, but he has also faced tremendous criticism from both theists and his comrades in arms. Harris presents us with his landscape of morality. On the peaks is moral goodness and in the troughs is moral evil. How does he know what is good and evil? Well, the peaks represent well-being and the troughs represent suffering. This may sound like a crude summary of his discussion, but in fairness it boils down to Harris equating evil with suffering and goodness with well-being. This is where Harris fails. If it can be shown that people can increase their own well-being by harming others, his moral landscape is demolished. Another way to dismiss Harris’ argument is to show that some things that can promote our well-being are morally abhorrent. Consider, for instance, incest with the use of contraception. Both parties have increased well-being (as they freely decide to act upon their desires), and there is no chance of harm or suffering—such as conceiving a child with genetic defects—due to the use of contraception. I even raised the issue of incest to Professor Krauss during our debate, and he wasn’t entirely sure about his position (he argued that it was not clear to him that it was wrong and he could not morally condemn it341). Some things that can promote our well-being are morally abhorrent. Even if you disagree with this example, there are many other examples to choose from to make this point.

Sayansi hujivunia kwa kupima mawazo. Bila kupima hakuna sayansi. Hata hivyo, kufikia kiwango fulani, kupima lazima kutoa nafasi kwa kuamini. Kwa mfano, tunajuaje watu walichokusudia? Tunajuaje mtu anahisi nini? Mwanasayansi anaweza kusema kwamba anaweza kumtambua mtu anayedanganya kwa kutumia kipimo cha uwongo (lie detector); anaweza pia kusema kwamba mkusanyiko mzima wa dalili za kifiziolojia na kitabia unahusiana na hisia fulani (hili si kweli, nalo litajadiliwa hapa chini). Ana hoja yake, lakini jambo hilo si rahisi hivyo. Fikiria urafiki kama mfano. Rafiki yako anakuuliza kuhusu siku yako na jinsi unavyojisikia, nawe unamjibu kwamba siku imekuwa nzuri sana na kwamba unajisikia mwenye furaha kubwa. Fikiria kwamba siku iliyofuata unakutana naye, naye anakuuliza swali lile lile, lakini hatakuamini isipokuwa ujiunganishe na kipimo cha uwongo ili kunasa data muhimu za kifiziolojia. Je, hilo lingeharibu urafiki wenu? Kama angeendelea kuomba hivyo kila mara unapomjibu, uhusiano mliojenga ungeathirika? Bila shaka ungeathirika. Ulimwengu wa urafiki wa kibinafsi unadumu ikiwa sisi ni waaminifu katika majibu yetu na ikiwa tunaamini wanachosema watu. Mfano mwingine ni hisia. Tunajuaje kama mtu ana huzuni ya kushuka moyo? Je, tunayo kipimo cha huzuni ya kushuka moyo tunachoweza kutumia? Ingawa data ya kifiziolojia inatoa mchango fulani, sehemu kubwa ya taarifa muhimu iko katika mazungumzo ya kibinafsi kati ya mwanasaikolojia na mgonjwa. Hii kwa kawaida huchukua sura ya maswali, majibu, na hata dodoso lililojazwa. Yote haya yanahitaji tuamini baadhi ya majibu ya mgonjwa. Kwa hiyo, inaonekana kwangu kwamba uchunguzi peke yake hautoshi kwa baadhi ya nyanja za maisha ya binadamu, kama vile urafiki na afya ya akili. Kwa hiyo sayansi lazima itegemee kuamini, badala ya kutegemea kupima peke yake.

Science prides itself on testing ideas. Without testing there is no science. However, at some point testing must give way to trust. For instance, how do we know what people have intended? How do we know what a person is feeling? The scientist may argue that they can tell someone is lying by using a lie detector; they may also assert that an entire array of physiological and behavioural indicators correlates to certain feelings (this is not true and will be discussed below). They have a point, but it is not as simple as that. Consider friendships as an example. Your friend asks you about your day and how you are feeling, and you respond by saying it has been a great day and that you are feeling quite happy. Imagine, you meet him the following day and he asks you the same question, but will only believe you if you hook yourself up to a lie detector to capture essential physiological data. Would that harm your friendship? If he continued to make the same request every time you responded to his question, would the relationship you have built with him be affected? Of course it would. The realm of personal friendship is preserved, if we are trustworthy in our responses and if we trust what people say. Another example is emotions. How do we know if someone is feeling depressed? Do we have a depression detector that we could use? Although physiological data provides some input, a significant portion of the vital information is in the personal interaction between the psychiatrist and the patient. This usually takes the form of questions, answers and even a completed questionnaire. These all require that we trust some of the patient’s answers. Therefore, it seems to me that observations alone are not enough for certain domains of human life, such as friendship and mental health. Science, therefore, must rely on trusting, rather than depending solely on testing.

Shangazi yangu anagonga mlango wako na kukupa keki tamu ya chokoleti aliyoioka nyumbani. Unapokea zawadi hiyo na kuweka keki mezani jikoni kwako. Shangazi yangu akishaondoka, unafungua kisanduku ili ujipatie kipande. Kabla ya kuanza kula, unajiuliza swali: Kwa nini amenioka keki hii? Kama mwanasayansi, huwezi kufanya mengi zaidi ya kuchunguza kipande kimoja cha data ulichonacho mkononi: keki yenyewe. Baada ya kufanya vipimo vingi, unagundua kwamba keki huenda iliokwa kwa nyuzi joto 350 Fahrenheit, na viungo vilivyotumika vilikuwa unga wa kakao, sukari, mayai na maziwa. Hata hivyo, kujua taarifa hizi zote hakukusaidii kujibu swali. Njia pekee ya kupata jibu ni kumuuliza yeye mwenyewe. Mfano huu unatuonyesha kwamba sayansi inaweza kutuambia ‘nini’ na ‘jinsi’, lakini inashindwa kutupa ‘kwa nini’. Kinachomaanishwa na ‘kwa nini’ hapa ni kwamba kuna kusudi nyuma ya mambo. Sayansi inaweza kujibu kwa nini milima ipo kwa mtazamo kwamba iliundwa kupitia michakato ya kijiolojia, lakini haiwezi kutoa kusudi lililo nyuma ya kuundwa kwa milima. Wengi wangekataa kabisa dhana ya kusudi.

My aunty knocks on your door and presents you with a lovely home-baked chocolate cake. You accept the gift and place the cake on your kitchen table. Once my aunty has gone, you open the box to have a slice. Before you indulge, you ask yourself a question: Why has she baked me this cake? As a scientist you cannot do much apart from explore the only piece of data you have at hand: the cake. After doing many tests, you find out that the cake was probably baked at 350 degrees Fahrenheit, and the ingredients included cocoa powder, sugar, eggs and milk. However, knowing all of this information does not help you to answer the question. The only way you can find out is if you ask her. This example shows us that science can tell us the ‘what’ and the ‘how’, but it fails to give us the ‘why’. What is meant by ‘why’ here is that there is a purpose behind things. Science can answer why mountains exist from the point of view that they were formed via geological processes, but it cannot provide the purpose behind the formation of the mountains. Many would simply deny the concept of purpose altogether.

McMyler's summary seems quite intuitive and highlights why we claim some knowledge solely based on testimonial transmission. The world being a sphere is a striking example. The belief that the world is a sphere is—for most of us—not based on mathematics or science. It is purely centred on testimony. Your initial reactions may entail the following statements: "I have seen pictures", "I have read it in science books", "All my teachers told me", "I can go on the highest mountain peak and observe the curvature of the Earth", and so on. However, upon intellectual scrutiny, all of our answers fall under testimonial knowledge. Seeing pictures or images is testimonial because you have to accept the say-so of the authority or person who said it is an image of the world. Learning this fact from science textbooks is also due to testimonial transmission, as you have to accept what the authors say as true. This also applies when referring to your teachers. Attempting to empirically justify your current conviction by standing on the highest peak is also based on testimony, as many of us have never done such a thing. Your assumption that standing on the highest peak will provide you with evidence for the roundness of the Earth is still based, ultimately, on the say-so of others. Even if you have done it before, it does not in any way prove the roundness of the Earth. Standing on a peak will only indicate that the Earth has some form of curvature—and not a complete sphere (after all, it can be semi-circular or shaped like a flower). In summary, for the majority of us, the fact that the world is round is not based on anything else apart from testimony.

McMyler’s summary seems quite intuitive and highlights why we claim some knowledge solely based on testimonial transmission. The world being a sphere is a striking example. The belief that the world is a sphere is—for most of us—not based on mathematics or science. It is purely centred on testimony. Your initial reactions may entail the following statements: “I have seen pictures”, “I have read it in science books”, “All my teachers told me”, “I can go on the highest mountain peak and observe the curvature of the Earth”, and so on. However, upon intellectual scrutiny, all of our answers fall under testimonial knowledge. Seeing pictures or images is testimonial because you have to accept the say-so of the authority or person who said it is an image of the world. Learning this fact from science textbooks is also due to testimonial transmission, as you have to accept what the authors say as true. This also applies when referring to your teachers. Attempting to empirically justify your current conviction by standing on the highest peak is also based on testimony, as many of us have never done such a thing. Your assumption that standing on the highest peak will provide you with evidence for the roundness of the Earth is still based, ultimately, on the say-so of others. Even if you have done it before, it does not in any way prove the roundness of the Earth. Standing on a peak will only indicate that the Earth has some form of curvature—and not a complete sphere (after all, it can be semi-circular or shaped like a flower). In summary, for the majority of us, the fact that the world is round is not based on anything else apart from testimony.

Wanasayansi wa mwanzo walidhania nadharia kwamba katika vitu vyote vinavyoweza kuungua kulikuwepo kipengele kiitwacho flojistoni. Kulingana na nadharia hii, kitu kinachoungua kingetoa flojistoni. Kadiri nyenzo ilivyokuwa rahisi kuungua, ndivyo ilivyokuwa na flojistoni nyingi. Nadharia hii ilikubaliwa na jumuiya ya kisayansi kama ukweli. Nadharia ilifanya kazi vizuri kiasi kwamba mwaka 1772 Dan Rutherford aliitumia kugundua naitrojeni, ambayo wakati ule aliiita 'hewa iliyo na flojistoni'. Hata hivyo, baadaye ilibainika kuwa flojistoni ilikuwa nadharia ya uongo; flojistoni haikuwepo. Huu ni mfano mmoja kati ya mingi unaoonyesha kwamba nadharia inaweza kufanya kazi na kuzalisha ukweli mpya wa kisayansi, na bado baadaye ikaonekana kuwa ya uongo. Funzo lake liko wazi: kitu kuwa na kazi haimaanishi kwamba ni kweli. Baadhi ya wapinzani wasio na mafunzo wangeweza kusema kwamba mfano huo hapo juu ni mahususi na hauwezi kutumika kwa sayansi ya kisasa. Wao wanashikilia kwamba nadharia ya flojistoni haikuwa nadharia kamili na ilikuwa na dhana. Hata hivyo, nadharia za kisayansi za leo hazina matatizo haya. Hili si kweli kabisa. Chukua mageuzi ya Kidarwini kama mfano wa nadharia iliyothibitishwa vizuri. Kulingana na wasomi wakuu wa kidunia, nadharia hiyo imejengwa juu ya dhana, inachukuliwa kuwa ya kubashiri kiasi, na kuna mabishano kuhusu mawazo yake ya msingi.348

Early chemists postulated a theory that in all combustible objects was an element called phlogiston. According to this theory, when a combustible object burned, it would release phlogiston. The more combustible a material was, the more phlogiston it contained. This theory was adopted as a fact by the scientific community. The theory worked so well that in 1772 Dan Rutherford used it to discover nitrogen, which he called ‘phlogisticated air’ at the time. However, phlogiston was later found to be a false theory; phlogiston did not exist. This is one of many examples to show that a theory can work and produce new scientific truths, and yet later be found to be false. The lesson is obvious: just because something works, does not mean it is true. Some untrained objectors would argue that the example above is specific and cannot apply to modern science. They maintain that the theory of phlogiston was not a complete theory and had assumptions. However, today’s scientific theories do not suffer from these problems. This is completely false. Take Darwinian evolution as an example of a well-established theory. According to mainstream secular academics, it is based on assumptions, considered relatively speculative, and there are disputes about its core ideas.348

Mabadiliko ya kisayansi hayajali ni nani aliyeketi kwenye kiti cha abiria. Hata mambo yaliyoonekana wazi, yasiyopingika na yanayoweza kuthibitishwa yanaweza kupinduliwa. Mfano wa hivi karibuni ni utafiti wa mafuvu ya Neanderthal barani Ulaya. Wanabiolojia wa Kidarwin walidai kwamba Neanderthal lazima alikuwa babu wa spishi yetu. Katika vitabu vya kiada, filamu za kielimu na makumbusho, "ukweli huu wa kisayansi" ulifundishwa; mwaka 1997 wanabiolojia walitangaza kwamba Neanderthal hakuweza kabisa kuwa mtangulizi wetu, kwa kuzingatia upimaji wa kisasa wa DNA. Kila kipengele cha sayansi, hata nadharia ndogo zinazounda nadharia kubwa zaidi katika kila fani, hatimaye zitarekebisha hitimisho lake. Historia ya sayansi imetuonyesha mwelekeo huu, kwa hiyo kuzungumzia "ukweli wa kisayansi" kama kitu kisichobadilika si sahihi. Pia si cha vitendo. Nadharia zote za kisayansi ni "kazi inayoendelea" na "miundo ya kukadiria". Ikiwa mtu anadai kwamba kuna ukweli kamili wa kisayansi, basi atafafanuaje ukweli kwamba "mekaniki ya quantum" na "nadharia ya jumla ya uhusiano", ambazo wanafizikia wote wanazichukulia kuwa za kweli, zinapingana katika kiwango cha msingi? Haziwezi zote mbili kuwa kweli kwa maana kamili. Wakijua hili, wanafizikia wanachukulia zote mbili kuwa miundo halisi ya kufanyia kazi na kutumia mbinu hii kupiga hatua zaidi. Wazo kwamba nadharia za kisayansi zilizothibitishwa vizuri ni za mwisho kwa hiyo ni la kupotosha, si la vitendo na ni hatari kwa maendeleo ya sayansi. Wanahistoria na wanafalsafa wa sayansi wamepinga kwa sauti kubwa matumizi ya lugha ya aina hii. Wanafalsafa wa sayansi Gillian Barker na Philip Kitcher wanasisitiza hoja hii: "Sayansi inaweza kurekebishwa. Kwa hiyo, kuzungumzia 'uthibitisho' wa kisayansi ni hatari, kwa sababu neno hilo linakuza wazo la hitimisho lililochongwa kwenye jiwe."349.

Scientific U-turns do not care about who is sitting in the passenger seat. Even things which seemed obvious, undeniable and observable can be overturned. A relatively recent example of this is the study of Neanderthal skulls in Europe. Darwinian biologists argued that Neanderthals must have been the ancestors to our species. In textbooks, documentaries and museums, this ‘scientific fact’ was taught; in 1997 biologists announced the Neanderthal simply could not be our forerunner, based on modern DNA testing. Every aspect of science, and even the subtheories that make up the bigger theories in every field, will eventually revise their conclusions. The history of science has shown us this trend, so to speak of ‘scientific facts’ as immutable is not accurate. It is also impractical. All scientific theories are ‘work in progress’ and ‘approximate models’. If someone claims there is such a thing as scientific absolute truths, then how would he or she explain the fact that ‘quantum mechanics’ and ‘general relativity’, which are both seen as true by physicists, contradict each other at a fundamental level? They both cannot be true in an absolute sense. Knowing this, physicists assume both to be true working models and use this approach to make further progress. The idea that well-confirmed scientific theories are final is therefore misleading, impractical and dangerous for scientific progress. Historians and philosophers of science have been vocal in their opposition of using such language. Philosophers of science Gillian Barker and Philip Kitcher drive the point home: “Science is revisable. Hence, to talk of scientific ‘proof’ is dangerous, because the term fosters the idea of conclusions that are graven in stone.”349.

Mifano iliyotangulia inaonyesha kwamba hoja za kiinduktivu hufikia hitimisho kwa kupita kutoka kwa mahususi hadi kwa jumla. Kwa maneno mengine, mtu huhama kutoka kwenye seti ndogo ya uzoefu na kuhitimisha kuhusu uzoefu ambao bado haujapatikana. Hoja za kiinduktivu si halali kwa mujibu wa mantiki ya kidedukti, kwa maana kwamba hitimisho halifuati kwa lazima kutoka kwenye hoja zake za msingi. Hume hazuii hoja yake kwenye kutokuwa na uhakika wa induction; anadai kwamba hazina msingi wowote wa kuthibitishwa. Hoja za kiinduktivu zinategemea dhana kwamba "wakati ujao utafanana na wakati uliopita", 352 jambo linalomaanisha kwamba maumbile ni sawa kila mahali na kila wakati. Hata hivyo, njia pekee ya kuthibitisha dhana hii ingekuwa kutumia hoja ya kiinduktivu. Hume anasema kwamba hoja hii ni ya mzunguko, kwa sababu dhana hiyo inategemea jambo lile lile tunalotaka kulithibitisha. Kuthibitisha hoja ya kiinduktivu kwa dhana hii kungekuwa sawa na kuthibitisha hoja za kiinduktivu kwa hoja za kiinduktivu. Baada ya yote, inaweza kuwa kwamba maumbile si sawa.353

The previous examples show that inductive arguments make a conclusion by moving from the particular to the general. In other words, one moves from a limited set of experiences to conclude for experiences that have not been experienced. Inductive arguments are not deductively valid, in that the conclusion does not necessarily follow from its premises. Hume does not restrict his argument to the uncertainty of induction; he claims that they are not justified in any way. Inductive arguments are based on an assumption that “the future will resemble the past”, 352 which implies that nature is uniform. However, the only way to justify this assumption would be to use an inductive argument. Hume argues that this reasoning is circular, because the assumption is based on the thing that we are seeking to justify. To justify an inductive argument with this assumption would be tantamount to justifying induction arguments with inductive arguments. After all, it could be that nature is not uniform.353

Sayansi ni matumizi ya akili katika ulimwengu wa asili. Lengo lake ni kuelewa jinsi ulimwengu unavyofanya kazi. Qur'ani pia inataja matukio ya kimaumbile, na bila shaka kumekuwepo na migongano ya moja kwa moja kati ya Qur'ani na hitimisho la kisayansi. Migongano hiyo inapotokea, hakuna sababu ya kuogopa wala ya kukataa aya ya Qur'ani isiyoendana na sayansi; wala hakuna mtu anayeweza kutumia hali hiyo kudai kwamba Qur'ani si sahihi. Kufanya hivyo kungekuwa ni kudhani kwamba hitimisho la kisayansi ni kweli kwa maana ya kabisa na kwamba halitabadilika; hilo si kweli kabisa. Historia imeonyesha kwamba sayansi hurekebisha hitimisho lake. Kuamini hivyo hakumfanyi mtu kuwa mpinzani wa sayansi. Fikiria ni maendeleo kiasi gani tungepata kama wanasayansi wasingeruhusiwa kupinga hitimisho la zamani: hakungekuwa na maendeleo kabisa. Sayansi si mkusanyiko wa ukweli wa milele, wala haikukusudiwa kuwa hivyo. Kwa kuwa kuna hoja nzuri za kuthibitisha dai la Qur'ani kwamba ni neno la Mwenyezi Mungu (angalia Sura ya 13), basi ikiwa Qur'ani inagongana na maarifa machache ya kibinadamu, hilo halipaswi kuleta mkanganyiko mkubwa. Kumbuka, Mungu ana picha kamili, sisi tuna chembe moja tu. Hadi miaka ya 1950, wanafizikia wote, akiwemo Einstein, waliamini kwamba ulimwengu ni wa milele; data zote ziliunga mkono imani hii, na imani hii ilipingana na Qur'ani. Hata hivyo, Qur'ani inasema waziwazi kwamba ulimwengu ulikuwa na mwanzo. Uchunguzi mpya uliotumia darubini zenye nguvu za kisasa uliwafanya wanafizikia waachane na modeli ya 'steady state' (ulimwengu wa milele) na kuikubali Modeli ya Big Bang (ulimwengu wenye mwanzo, pengine takriban miaka bilioni 13.7 iliyopita). Hivyo, sayansi ilikubaliana na Qur'ani. Jambo hilohilo lilitokea kuhusu mtazamo wa Qur'ani juu ya jua. Qur'ani inasema kwamba jua lina mzunguko; wanaastronomia walipinga, wakisema kwamba lipo tuli. Hii ilikuwa ndiyo migongano ya moja kwa moja kabisa kati ya uchunguzi wa wanasayansi na Qur'ani. Hata hivyo, baada ya kugunduliwa kwa darubini ya Hubble, wanaastronomia walirekebisha hitimisho lao na kugundua kwamba Jua linazunguka kuzunguka kitovu cha galaksi ya Milky Way. Lakini hili halimaanishi kwamba Qur'ani ni kitabu cha sayansi. Ni kitabu cha ishara. Qur'ani haitoi maelezo yoyote kuhusu matukio ya kimaumbile. Mambo mengi inayoyataja yanaweza kueleweka na kuthibitishwa kwa jicho la kawaida. Lengo kuu la aya zinazoelekeza kwenye ulimwengu wa kimaumbile ni kudhihirisha nguvu na hekima ya kimetafizikia. Jukumu lake halijumuishi kufafanua maelezo ya kisayansi. Hayo yanaweza kubadilika kadiri muda unavyopita; hata hivyo, ukweli kwamba matukio ya kimaumbile yana nguvu na hekima nyuma yake ni ukweli usiobadilika kwa wakati wowote. Kwa mtazamo huu, mgongano kati ya Qur'ani na hitimisho la kisayansi huenda ukaendelea, kwa kuwa ni aina mbili tofauti kabisa za elimu.

Science is the application of reason to the natural world. It seeks to understand how the world works. The Qur’an also refers to natural phenomena, and inevitably there have been direct conflicts with scientific conclusions. When a conflict arises, there is no reason to panic or to deny the Qur’anic verse that is not in line with science; nor can anyone use this situation to claim that the Qur’an is wrong. To do so, would be to assume that scientific conclusions are true in an absolute sense and will not change; this is patently false. History has shown that science revises its conclusions. Believing this does not make one anti-science. Imagine how much progress we would make if scientists were not allowed to challenge past conclusions: there would be none. Science is not a collection of eternal facts and was never meant to be. Since there are good arguments to justify the Qur’an’s claim of being God’s word (see Chapter 13), then if the Qur’an conflicts with limited human knowledge, it should not create massive confusion. Remember, God has the picture, we have just a pixel. Until the 1950s, all physicists, including Einstein, believed that the universe was eternal; all the data supported this, and this belief conflicted with the Qur’an. Yet the Qur’an explicitly states that the universe had a beginning. New observations using powerful advanced telescopes made physicists drop the ‘steady state’ model (eternal universe) and replace that with the Big Bang Model (universe with a beginning, possibly about 13.7 billion years ago). So, science came into line with the Qur’an. The same thing happened with the Qur’anic view of the sun. The Qur’an states that the sun has an orbit; astronomers disagreed, saying it was stationary. This was the most direct contradiction between observations of scientists and the Qur’an. However, after the discovery of the Hubble telescope, astronomers revised their conclusions and found the Sun was orbiting around the centre of the Milky Way galaxy. Yet this does not mean that the Qur’an is a book of science. It’s a book of signs. The Qur’an does not give any details concerning natural phenomena. Most of the things it refers to can be understood and verified with the naked eye. The main objective of the verses that point towards the natural world is to expose a metaphysical power and wisdom. Their role does not include elucidating scientific details. These can change over time; however, the fact that natural phenomena have a power and wisdom behind them is a timeless reality. From this perspective, conflict between the Qur’an and scientific conclusions will probably continue, as they are two completely different types of knowledge.

Mjadala huu, hata hivyo, haupaswi kuwahimiza Waislamu na watu wa dini kukataa hitimisho la kisayansi. Kufanya hivyo itakuwa jambo la kipuuzi. Badala yake, nadharia za kisayansi zilizothibitishwa vizuri na ukweli wa wahyi unapaswa kukubaliwa, hata kama zinapingana. Hitimisho la kisayansi linaweza kukubaliwa kivitendo kama mifano ya kufanyia kazi ambayo inaweza kubadilika na si kamilifu, na ukweli wa wahyi unaweza kukubaliwa kama sehemu ya imani ya mtu. Ikiwa hakuna matumaini ya kuoanisha hitimisho la kisayansi na kauli ya Qur'ani, basi huna haja ya kukataa wahyi na kukubali sayansi ya wakati huo. Kinyume chake, sayansi nayo haipaswi kukataliwa. Kama ilivyotajwa awali, ni haki yako ya kiakili kukubali ukweli wa kisayansi na wa wahyi wote. Mtazamo wenye usawaziko na busara kuhusu sayansi na wahyi ni kukubali sayansi na kuruhusu ushahidi useme wenyewe. Hata hivyo, hili linapaswa kuwa katika muktadha wa kutofanya rukaruka kubwa za kiimani na kuhitimisha kwamba ushahidi tulioupata na hitimisho tulilofikia ni ukweli usiotiliwa shaka. Sayansi inaweza kubadilika. Zaidi ya hayo, mtazamo huu unajumuisha kukubali wahyi. Kwa muhtasari, tunaweza kukubali hitimisho la kisayansi kivitendo na kama mifano ya kufanyia kazi, lakini ikiwa chochote kinapingana na wahyi (baada ya kujaribu kuoanisha hivyo viwili), hauhitaji kulikubali hitimisho la kisayansi katika mfumo wako wa imani. Ndiyo sababu Waislamu hawapaswi kulazimika kukataa mageuzi ya Darwin; wanaweza kuyakubali kivitendo kama mfano bora wa sasa wa kufanyia kazi, lakini wakielewa kwamba baadhi ya vipengele vyake haviwezi kuoanishwa na msimamo wa kiorthodoksi. Kumbuka, kwa sababu jambo fulani ni mfano bora wa sasa wa kufanyia kazi, si lazima liwe ukweli kamili. Ni muhimu pia kutambua kwamba maarifa ya kisayansi na wahyi wa Mungu vina vyanzo viwili tofauti. Kimoja kinatokana na akili ndogo ya binadamu, na kingine kinatoka kwa Mungu. Mtu angekuwa amefanya kosa la kiepistemolojia endapo angetumia hitimisho za kisayansi kama njia ya kukataa wahyi. Uelewa wetu wa uhalisia ni wa vipande vidogo vidogo, kama pikseli. Maarifa yetu ni machache na yenye mipaka, lakini maarifa ya Mwenyezi Mungu hayana mipaka. Kwa hiyo, endapo kutatokea mgongano kati ya hayo mawili, mkakati huo hapo juu ndio unapaswa kufuatwa.

This discussion should not, however, encourage Muslims and religious people to deny scientific conclusions. To do so would be absurd. Rather, both well-confirmed scientific theories and the revelational truths should be accepted, even if they contradict each other. Scientific conclusions can be accepted practically as working models that can change and are not absolute, and the revelational truths can be accepted as part of one’s beliefs. If there is no hope of reconciling a scientific conclusion and a statement of the Qur’an, then you do not have to reject revelation and accept the science of the day. Conversely, the science should not be rejected either. As previously mentioned, it is within your epistemic right to accept both scientific and revelational truths. The balanced and nuanced approach concerning science and revelation is to accept the science and allow the evidence to speak for itself. However, this should be in the context of not making massive epistemic leaps of faith and concluding that the evidence we have acquired and the conclusions we have made are the gospel truth. Science can change. In addition, this approach includes accepting the revelation. In summary, we can accept scientific conclusions practically and as working models, but if anything contradicts revelation (after attempting to reconcile the two), you do not have to accept the scientific conclusion into your belief system. This is why Muslims should not need to deny Darwinian evolution; they can accept it practically as the current best-working model, but understand that some aspects of it cannot be reconciled with orthodoxy. Remember, just because something is the current best-working model, it is not the absolute truth. It is also important to note that scientific knowledge and Divine revelation have two different sources. One is from the human limited mind, the other is from God. One would have to commit an epistemological disqualification to use scientific conclusions as a means to dismiss revelation. We have a pixelated understanding of reality. Our knowledge is finite, God’s knowledge is not. Therefore, if there happens to be a contradiction between the two, the above strategy should be adopted.

Wasomi na waangalizi makini wa mjadala huu watatambua kwamba ingawa hii ndiyo mtazamo mkuu wa sayansi (miongoni mwa wanazuoni na wanafalsafa), pia inaibua hoja zinazoweza kuielekeza kwa uhakiki epistemolojia ya Kiislamu. Wanaweza kuhoji kwamba katika mapokeo ya Kiislamu, hoja za kiinduktiki zimetumika kuhifadhi Qur'ani na Hadithi za Mtume (ahadith, wingi wa hadithi). Kwa hiyo, Waislamu hawawezi kudai uhakika katika matini hizi muhimu za msingi wa Uislamu. Hoja hii si sahihi. Ili kueleza kwa nini, rejea tofauti iliyotajwa awali baina ya utoaji hoja wa kiinduktiki (inductive reasoning) na hoja za kiinduktiki (inductive arguments). Utoaji hoja wa kiinduktiki hutoa uhakika kwa aina za msingi za maarifa. Kwa mfano, nikiona X katika Y, inafuata kwa lazima kwamba Y huruhusu X; nikiona kwamba kunguru huruka, basi inafuata kwa lazima kwamba baadhi ya kunguru huruka. Kama unavyoona, aina hii ya utoaji hoja huakisi tu uchunguzi. Inatamka ukweli mtupu bila kufanya hitimisho kuhusu jambo ambalo bado halijaonekana. Aina hii ya kiinduktiki ndiyo iliyotumika katika kuhifadhi Qur'ani na Hadithi za Mtume. Kwa mfano, sahaba wa Mtume Muhammad ﷺ alisikia Qur'ani, naye alirudia tu alichokisikia. Hakuwahi kufanya hitimisho kuhusu aya asiyokuwa ameisikia. Kwa mfano, sahaba asingesikia "Iyyaka na'abudu wa iyyaka nasta'een" (ni Wewe tunayekuabudu, na ni Wewe tunayekuomba msaada) kisha akahitimisha "Qul huwa Allahu ahad" (Sema, Yeye ni Mwenyezi Mungu, Mmoja pekee). Kwa hiyo pingamizi hili si la kweli, kwani linapotosha aina ya kiinduktiki inayohusika katika kuhifadhi Qur'ani na Hadithi za Mtume.

Critical and learned observers of this discussion will notice that although this is a mainstream understanding of science (amongst academics and philosophers), it also brings to light potential criticisms of Islamic epistemology. They can argue that in the Islamic tradition, inductive arguments are used to preserve the Qur’an and Prophetic traditions (known as hadith; ahadith, pl.). Therefore, Muslims cannot claim certainty in these vital source texts for Islam. This is a misplaced contention. To explain why, refer back to the earlier distinction between inductive reasoning and inductive arguments. Inductive reasoning provides certainty for basic types of knowledge. For instance, if I observe X in Y, it follows that Y allows X; I observe that crows fly, so it necessarily follows that some crows fly. As you can see, this form of induction just ‘mirrors’ the observation. It states the plain facts without making a conclusion for something that is yet to be observed. This type of induction was used in the preservation of the Qur’an and the Prophetic traditions. For example, a companion of the Prophet Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلم heard the Qur’an, and he simply repeated what he had heard. He never made a conclusion for a verse that he never heard. For example, a companion wouldn’t hear “Iyyaka na’abudu wa iyyaka nasta’een” (it is You we worship and it is You we ask for help) and then conclude “Qul huwa Allahu ahad” (Say, He is God, the uniquely One). Hence this objection is false, as it misunderstands the type of induction involved in the preservation of the Qur’an and the Prophetic traditions.

Wanaosadiki kwamba sayansi inaongoza kwenye kutokuamini kuwepo kwa Mungu wanashikilia dhana isiyo ya kisayansi ya naturalism ya kifalsafa. Naturalism ya kifalsafa huunda "miwani" ambayo huwekwa machoni mwa mtu ili kuelewa dunia. Ukivaa miwani yenye rangi ya manjano, utaona rangi gani? Manjano. Vivyo hivyo, ukivaa miwani ya naturalism ya kifalsafa, utaona ulimwengu usio na Mungu. Naturalism ya kifalsafa huunda jinsi mtu anavyoiona dunia. Naturalism ya kifalsafa ni imani tu. Profesa Michael Ruse, mwanafalsafa asiyeamini kuwepo kwa Mungu, anakiri ukweli huu: "Ukitaka kukubali, nimekuwa nikisema kila wakati kwamba naturalism ni kitendo cha imani…." 356 Kwa nini ni imani? Naturalism haina mantiki, kwa sababu inaamini kwa upofu kwamba kila kitu kinaweza kufafanuliwa kupitia michakato ya kimwili, licha ya ukweli kadhaa usiopatana nayo; yaani, ukweli unaopinga nadharia. 357 Kwa mfano, sisi wote tunakutana leo kwenye mgahawa saa kumi na mbili jioni, na siku inayofuata polisi wanakuja nyumbani kwangu kunikamata kwa tuhuma za kumuua mtu kwa wakati ule ule ambao tulikuwa tukila chakula cha jioni. Ukweli usiopatana na tuhuma hizo ni kwamba nilikuwa pamoja nawe nikila wakati wa mauaji. Mahali nilipothibitishwa kuwepo kunapinga tuhuma za polisi kwamba nilitenda mauaji hayo. Huenda ukajiuliza, ni ukweli gani huu unaopinga ambao unaifanya naturalism ya kifalsafa isiwe na mantiki? Sura kadhaa zilizotangulia ni mwanzo mzuri. Naturalism ya kifalsafa haiwezi kueleza kwa kutosha tatizo gumu la fahamu (angalia Sura ya 7), ukomo na utegemezi wa ulimwengu (angalia Sura ya 5 na 6), kupangwa kwa sheria na mpangilio wa ulimwengu (angalia Sura ya 8), kuwepo kwa maadili ya lengo (angalia Sura ya 9) na mengine mengi. Kwa kuzingatia haya, ni kwa nini mtu angekubali kwa upofu falsafa kama hiyo, ambayo inamzuia kuruhusu uhalisia useme wenyewe? Wanaoamini kuwa hakuna Mungu wengi wana dhana kama hizo za kinaturalism. Kwa hivyo, haishangazi kwamba wanazipuuza hitimisho za hoja za kuwepo kwa Mungu. Kwa kawaida wao hukataa hoja nzuri, kwa sababu wamefungwa macho na dhana potofu kwamba kila kitu lazima kielezwe kwa michakato ya kimwili, na kwamba hawawezi kamwe kukubali maelezo ya kimaumbile yaliyo nje ya ulimwengu huu. Hata hivyo, naturalism ya kimbinu si tatizo kwa uthiolojia, hasa uthiolojia wa Kiislamu. Naturalism ya kimbinu si tatizo kwa uthiolojia wa Kiislamu kwa sababu mapokeo ya Kiislamu yanakubali kwamba ulimwengu mzima umeundwa na sababu za kimwili, na sababu hizi ni udhihirisho wa mapenzi ya Mwenyezi Mungu. Baadhi ya wanaatheism, hata hivyo, huchanganya naturalism ya kimbinu na naturalism ya kifalsafa. Kwa sababu hitimisho na nadharia za kisayansi haziwezi kurejelea uwezo na uumbaji wa Mungu (naturalism ya kimbinu), haimaanishi kwamba Mungu hayupo (naturalism ya kifalsafa). Kama mwanabiolojia wa mageuzi Scott C. Todd alivyosema, "mwanasayansi, kama mtu binafsi, yuko huru kukubali uhalisia unaovuka naturalism"358.

Atheists who believe that science leads to atheism hold the non-scientific assumption of philosophical naturalism. Philosophical naturalism forms the ‘lenses’ that are put on one’s eyes to understand the world. If you wore some yellow tinted glasses, what colour are you going to see? Yellow. Similarly, if you put on the lenses of philosophical naturalism, all you will see is a universe without God. Philosophical naturalism shapes the way one sees the world. Philosophical naturalism is simply a faith. The atheist Professor Michael Ruse admits this fact: “If you want a concession, I’ve always said that naturalism is an act of faith….” 356 Why is it a faith? Well, naturalism is incoherent, as it blindly believes that everything can be explained via physical processes, despite a number of recalcitrant facts; in other words, facts that resist a theory.357 For example, we both meet today at a restaurant at six o’clock, and the following day the police come to my house to arrest me on suspicion of murdering someone at the same time we were having dinner. The recalcitrant fact would be that I was with you eating at the time of the murder. My proven whereabouts resist the police’s suspicions that I committed the murder. You may be wondering, what are these recalcitrant facts that render philosophical naturalism as incoherent? Well, many of the previous chapters are a good starting point. Philosophical naturalism cannot adequately explain the hard problem of consciousness (see Chapter 7), the finitude and dependency of the universe (see Chapters 5 and 6), the fine-tuning of the laws and the order in the universe (see Chapter 8), the existence of objective morals (see Chapter 9) and much more. In light of this, why would anyone blindly adopt such a philosophy, which prevents one from allowing reality to speak for itself? Many atheists have such naturalistic presuppositions. Therefore, it is not surprising that they dismiss the conclusions of theistic arguments. Usually they reject good arguments, because they are blinded with the false assumption that everything has to be explained by physical processes and that they can never entertain supernatural explanations. Methodological naturalism however is not a problem for theism, especially Islamic theism. Methodological naturalism is not a problem for Islamic theism because the Islamic tradition accepts that the whole universe is made up of physical causes and these causes are a manifestation of the Divine will. Some atheists, however, conflate methodological naturalism with philosophical naturalism. Just because scientific conclusions and theories cannot refer to God’s power and creativity (methodological naturalism), it doesn’t follow that God doesn’t exist (philosophical naturalism). As evolutionary biologist Scott C. Todd said, “the scientist, as an individual, is free to embrace a reality that transcends naturalism”358.