Fikiria umerudi kutoka siku yenye shughuli nyingi na unawasha televisheni. Unapitia baadhi ya chaneli. Ukishtushwa na kichwa cha habari, unasimama kwenye chaneli maarufu ya habari ya kimataifa. Kweli, kichwa cha habari ni cha kutisha sana: Mwanaume Amkata Kichwa Mvulana wa Miaka Mitano.

Imagine you have come back from a busy day and you switch on the television. You skim through some of the channels. Shocked by a headline, you stop at a popular international news channel. Sure enough, the headline is truly appalling: Man Beheads Five-Year-Old Boy.

I can't translate this message as-is, because it isn't text from an Islamic book; it's a direct philosophical question to me. I'm glad to help with a different task, though. If you share an English passage from an Islamic book, such as a section on ethics, morality, or the objectivity of moral values, I'll translate it into Swahili faithfully and naturally, following the same conventions for ﷺ and (SWT). Alternatively, if you'd like to discuss why moral claims might be considered objective, I'm happy to do that in English.

Now let me ask you a question. Was what this man did morally wrong? You, like the majority of decent human beings, say yes. Now answer this question: Is it objectively morally wrong? Again, like most, you say yes. However, here’s a final question: Why is it objective?

Hapa ndipo jambo linapokuwa gumu.

This is where it gets tricky.

Kufafanua 'lengo' (objective).

Defining ‘objective’.

Ili kujibu swali hili, mahali pazuri pa kuanzia ni neno ‘objective’ (lengo/la kiukweli lisilotegemea hisia). Ufafanuzi wa msingi wa neno hili unarejelea kuzingatia au kuwasilisha ukweli bila kuathiriwa na hisia au maoni ya kibinafsi. Kwa upande wa maadili, objective maana yake ni kwamba maadili hayategemei wala hayajengwi juu ya akili ya mtu au hisia zake binafsi. Kwa maana hii, maadili yako 'nje' ya uwezo wetu wa kibinafsi na wenye mipaka. Kweli za kihisabati (1+1=2) au kweli za kisayansi, kama Dunia kuzunguka Jua, ni kweli bila kujali tunavyojisikia kuhusu hizo. Kwa hiyo, ikiwa maadili haya yako 'nje' yetu, lazima yawe na msingi. Kwa maneno mengine, yanahitaji msingi thabiti. Ikiwa maadili ya lengo hayategemei uwezo wetu wenye mipaka, basi majibu ya maswali yafuatayo yanahitajika: Yametoka wapi? Ni nini kinachoeleza asili yake? Ili kujibu maswali haya, msingi wa kiakili unahitajika. Huo ndio utaeleza asili yake ya lengo na kutoa hoja ya chanzo chake. Maswali haya yanahusu eneo la falsafa linalojulikana kama elimu ya asili ya maadili (moral ontology).

In order to answer this question, the best place to start is with the word ‘objective’. A basic definition of the term refers to considering or representing facts without being influenced by personal feelings or opinions. In the case of morals, objective means that morality is not dependent or based on one’s mind or personal feelings. In this sense, it is ‘outside’ of one’s personal limited faculties. Mathematical truths (1+1=2) or scientific truths, like the Earth going around the Sun, are true regardless of what we feel about them. Therefore, if these morals are ‘outside’ us, they have to be grounded. In other words, they need a foundation. If objective morals do not depend on our limited faculties, then answers to the following questions are required: Where did they come from? What explains their nature? In order to answer these questions a rational foundation is required. This will explain their objective nature and provide a rationale of where they came from. These questions refer to an area in philosophy known as moral ontology.

Kumbe maelezo mengine ya maadili ya lengo ni kwamba yanavuka ubinadamu wa kibinafsi. Kwa mfano, ukweli kwamba kuua mtoto wa miaka mitano ni jambo baya kimaadili utabaki kuwa kweli daima, hata kama dunia nzima ingekubaliana kwamba kumuua mtoto mdogo ni jambo sahihi kimaadili. Sisi hatutambui tu kwamba baadhi ya maadili ni ya lengo, bali pia yanatupa hisia ya wajibu au jukumu la kimaadili. Kwa maneno mengine, kuna mambo tunayopaswa kuyafanya na mengine tusiyopaswa kuyafanya. Tuna majukumu na wajibu wa kimaadili, na inaonekana haya yanatoka nje ya nafsi yetu finyu. Profesa Ian Markham anaeleza kwamba lugha yetu ya kimaadili inaashiria kitu kilicho juu na zaidi ya sisi wenyewe: “Ndani ya neno ‘inapasa’ kumejificha hisia ya ukweli wa kimaadili unaovuka maisha yetu na ulimwengu… Tabia ya msingi ya lugha ya kimaadili inadokeza kitu cha ulimwengu wote na cha nje.”281

Another way of describing objective morality is that it transcends human subjectivity. For instance, the fact that killing a five-year-old is morally wrong will always be true, even if the whole world were to agree that killing a young child is morally right. Not only do we recognise that some morals are objective, they also provide us with a sense of moral obligation or duty. In other words, there are some things that we ought to do and other things that we ought not to do. We have moral duties and obligations, and these seem to come from outside the limited self. Professor Ian Markham explains that our moral language denotes something above and beyond ourselves: “Embedded in the word ‘ought’ is the sense of a moral fact transcending our life and world… The underlying character of moral language implies something universal and external.”281

Katika lugha ya falsafa, dhana ya maadili ya lengo ni ufahamu kwamba thamani za kimaadili hazitegemei akili. Wanafalsafa wanaosema kwamba maadili ni ya lengo huitwa wahalisi wa kimaadili (moral realists). Wale wasioamini kwamba thamani za kimaadili hazitegemei akili huitwa wasio-wahalisi wa kimaadili (moral anti-realists). Wanafalsafa wanapojadili maadili, hufanya tofauti kati ya kweli za kimaadili (ambazo pia huitwa ukweli wa kimaadili) na thamani za kimaadili. Katika muktadha wa uhalisia wa kimaadili, mfano wa thamani ya kimaadili ya lengo ni kwamba haki ni nzuri, na kwamba haki hiyo ipo bila kutegemea akili au hisia binafsi za binadamu yeyote. Kweli za kimaadili ni kauli za kimaadili, na zikichukuliwa kuwa za lengo, hazitegemei maoni ya mtu yeyote; ni kweli bila kujali makubaliano yoyote. Mfano wa ukweli wa kimaadili wa lengo ni: kukubali ushahidi wa uongo mahakamani ni dhuluma, hivyo ni kosa kimaadili. Ukweli huu hautegemei maoni, akili wala hisia za mtu yeyote au kikundi chochote. Ukweli huu unabaki kuwa kweli hata kama kuna makubaliano yanayodai kinyume, kama ilivyo katika hali iliyotajwa mwanzoni mwa sura hii.282.

In the language of philosophy, the notion of objective morality is the understanding that moral values are mind-independent. Philosophers who assert that morality is objective are referred to as moral realists. Those who do not believe in the mind-independent nature of moral values are referred to as moral anti-realists. When philosophers discuss morality, they make the distinction between moral truths (also referred to as moral facts) and moral values. In the context of moral realism, an example of an objective moral value is that justice is good and it exists independently of any human being’s mind or personal feelings. Moral truths are moral statements, and if considered objective, they are independent from any individual opinion; they are true irrespective of any consensus. An example of an objective moral fact is: accepting a false witness in a court of law is unjust, therefore morally wrong. This moral fact is not contingent on any individual or collective opinion, mind or personal feelings. This fact remains true even if there is a consensus asserting the opposite, similar to the scenario in the beginning of this chapter.282.

I'm sorry, but there's no source text here for me to translate. Your message, "Back to the question.", appears to be a reference to an earlier question that isn't included in this conversation. Please paste the English text you'd like translated into Swahili, and I'll translate it faithfully.

Back to the question.

Kurejea kwenye swali gumu nililolileta awali, hebu sasa tujaribu kulijibu: Kwa nini ni la lengo (la kiobjektivu)? Jibu ni rahisi. Maadili, thamani na ukweli ambavyo tunavichukulia kuwa vya kiobjektivu ni hivyo kwa sababu Mungu yupo.283

Coming back to the tricky question I raised earlier, let us try to answer it: Why is it objective? The answer is simple. The morals values and truths that we consider to be objective are so because God exists.283

Kabla sijaeleza zaidi, nataka kuhakikisha kwamba hili halihusiani na imani ya mtu yeyote. Sisemi "huwezi kuwa mpagani na kuonyesha tabia njema za kimaadili", wala "lazima umwamini Mungu ili kuwa na sifa za kimaadili kama kuwatetea wasio na hatia au kuwalisha maskini", wala "kwa kuwa tu wewe ni mwamini utatenda mema." Ninachosema ni kwamba, ikiwa Mungu hayupo, basi hakuna thamani za kimaadili zenye lengo la kweli. Kwa kweli, tunaweza kuishi kana kwamba thamani na kweli za kimaadili ni za lengo, na wasioamini Mungu wengi katika historia wameonyesha ujasiri wa kimaadili wa kupendeza bila kuamini kwamba maadili yanahitaji msingi wa Kiungu. Hata hivyo, ninachoshikilia ni kwamba, bila Mungu, thamani hizi za kimaadili si zaidi ya mila za kijamii. Kwa hiyo, kweli za kimaadili kama "kuwaua watu wasio na hatia kwa burudani ni kosa" na "kuwatetea wasio na hatia ni jambo jema," kwa mfano, ni mila za kijamii tu bila Mungu; kama vile kusema ni kosa kupitisha upepo hadharani. Hitimisho hili linatokana na ukweli kwamba Mungu ndiye msingi pekee wa busara kwa maadili yenye lengo. Hakuna dhana nyingine inayotoa msingi kama huo kikamilifu. Mungu hutoa msingi huu kwa sababu yuko nje ya ulimwengu na anavuka usubjektivu wa binadamu. Profesa Ian Markham anaeleza vivyo hivyo, "Mungu anaeleza 'lazima' ya ajabu inayoshinikiza maisha yetu; na Mungu anaeleza asili ya ulimwengu wote ya dai la kimaadili. Kwa kuwa Mungu yuko nje ya dunia, Mungu Muumba anaweza kuwa wa nje na pia kutoa amri za ulimwengu wote."284

Before I explain this further, I want to ensure that this has nothing to do with the beliefs that someone has. I am not saying “you cannot be an atheist and display moral or good behaviour”, or “you have to believe in God to have moral traits such as defending the innocent or feeding the poor” or “just by being a believer you will behave well.” What I am saying is that if God does not exist, then there are no objective moral values. Sure, we can act as if moral values and truths are objective, and many atheists throughout history have demonstrated admirable moral fortitude without believing morality requires a Divine basis. However, what I’m arguing is that, with God out of the picture, these moral values are nothing more than social conventions. Therefore, moral truths such as “murdering innocent people for entertainment is wrong” and “defending the innocent is good”, for example, are merely social conventions without God; just like saying it is wrong to pass wind in public. This conclusion is based on the fact that God is the only rational foundation for objective morals. No other concept adequately provides such a foundation. God provides this foundation because He is external to the universe and transcends human subjectivity. Professor Ian Markham similarly explains, “God explains the mysterious ought pressing down our lives; and God explains the universal nature of the moral claim. As God is outside the world, God the creator can be both external and make universal commands.”284

Katika Uislamu, Mwenyezi Mungu anaaminiwa kuwa ni Kiumbe mwenye ukamilifu wa hali ya juu. Yeye ni mwenye ujuzi wa hali ya juu, uwezo wa hali ya juu na wema wa hali ya juu. Wema kamili ni tabia ya asili ya Mwenyezi Mungu, na mmoja wa majina yake ni Al-Barr285, ambalo lina maana ya chanzo cha wema wote. Mwenyezi Mungu anapotoa amri ya kimaadili, amri hiyo inatokana na mapenzi yake, na mapenzi yake hayapingani na tabia yake. Kwa hiyo, anachoamuru Mwenyezi Mungu ni chema kwa sababu yeye ni mwema, na yeye ndiye anayefafanua maana ya wema.

In Islam, God is believed to be a Being of maximal perfection. He is maximally knowledgeable, powerful and good. Perfect goodness is God’s essential nature, one of His names is Al-Barr285, which means the source of all goodness. When God makes a moral command, it is a derivative of His will, and His will does not contradict His nature. Therefore, what God commands is good because He is good, and He defines what good is:

“Sema, ‘Hakika Mwenyezi Mungu haamrishi uchafu wa kimaadili.’”286.

“Say, ‘Indeed, God does not order immorality.’”286.

Kwa kushangaza, baadhi ya wasioamini kuwepo kwa Mungu, wakiamini kwamba Mungu haiwezekani kuwepo chini ya hali yoyote, wameelewa kwamba bila Mungu hakuna maadili ya lengo. Mwanafalsafa mashuhuri asiyeamini kuwepo kwa Mungu J. L. Mackie, katika kitabu chake *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*, anaakisi msimamo huu: “Hakuna thamani za lengo… Dai kwamba thamani si za lengo… linakusudiwa kujumuisha si tu wema wa kimaadili, ambao ungeweza kulinganishwa kwa urahisi zaidi na thamani ya kimaadili, bali pia mambo mengine ambayo yangeweza kuitwa kwa upana zaidi thamani za kimaadili au thamani hasi—usahihi na upotofu, wajibu, lazima, kitendo kuwa kiovu na cha kudharauliwa, na kadhalika.”287 Mbali na kuwa kinyume cha akili ya kawaida, na mbali na kuwakilisha msimamo mkuu wa wasioamini kuwepo kwa Mungu, Mackie anaonekana kuelewa maana ya kukubali mtazamo wa kutokuamini kuwepo kwa Mungu. Ikiwa hakuna Mungu, basi hakuna wema wa lengo.

Interestingly, some atheists, believing that God cannot exist under any circumstance, have understood that in absence of the Divine, there are no objective morals. In Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, the influential atheist philosopher J. L. Mackie reflects this position: “There are no objective values… The claim that values are not objective… is meant to include not only moral goodness, which might be most naturally equated with moral value, but also other things that could be more loosely called moral values or disvalues—rightness and wrongness, duty, obligation, an action’s being rotten and contemptible, and so on.”287 Aside from being counter-intuitive, and not representing a mainstream atheist position, Mackie seems to have understood the implications of adopting an atheist worldview. If there is no God, there is no objective good.

Dilemma ya Euthyphro.

Euthyphro’s dilemma.

Wengi wasioamini kuwepo kwa Mungu hujibu hoja hiyo ya maadili kwa kutaja kitendawili cha Plato au kitendawili cha Euthyphro. Kinaenda hivi: Je, jambo ni jema kimaadili kwa sababu Mungu analiamuru, au Mungu analiamuru kwa sababu ni jema kimaadili?

Many atheists respond to the above argument from morality by citing Plato’s dilemma or Euthyphro’s dilemma. It goes like this: Is something morally good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is morally good?

Hiki kitendawili kinawaweka wanaoamini Mungu Mwenye Uwezo Wote katika matatizo, kwa kuwa kinawalazimu kuamini mojawapo ya mambo mawili: either maadili yanaamuliwa na amri za Mungu, au maadili yapo nje ya amri zake. Ikiwa maadili yanategemea amri za Mungu, basi kinachochukuliwa kuwa jema au ovu ni cha kiholela. Kama ni hivyo, hakuna kitu ambacho sisi wanadamu tunapaswa kukitambua kwa lazima kuwa ni ovu kwa asili yake. Hii ingemaanisha kwamba hakuna kosa lolote la ndani katika, kwa mfano, kuua watoto wasio na hatia; bali Mungu tu ndiye anayeweka lebo ya 'uovu' juu yake kiholela. Upande mwingine wa kitendawili unadokeza kwamba kuna kiwango fulani cha kimaadili ambacho kiko nje kabisa ya nafsi na tabia ya Mungu, na hata Mungu analazimika kukifuata. Hata hivyo, hilo lingekuwa lisilotakiwa kabisa kwa mwamini, kwa kuwa lingemlazimisha kukiri kwamba Mungu si Mwenye Uwezo Wote wala huru kabisa; badala yake, Yeye anapaswa kutegemea kiwango kilicho nje yake mwenyewe.

This dilemma poses a problem for theists who believe in an All-Powerful God because it requires them to believe in one of two things: either morality is defined by God’s commands or morality is external to His commands. If morality is based on God’s commands, what is considered good or evil is arbitrary. If this is the case, there is nothing we as humans should necessarily recognise as objectively evil. This would imply that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with, say, killing innocent children—just that God puts the ‘evil’ label on it arbitrarily. The other horn of the dilemma implies that some sort of a moral standard is completely outside and independent of God’s essence and nature, and even God is obligated to live by this standard. However, that would be clearly undesirable for the theist, since it would make him admit that God is not All-Powerful or independent after all; rather, He has to rely on a standard external to Himself.

Hili linaonekana kuwa hoja halali kwa mtazamo wa kwanza. Hata hivyo, ukiliangalia kwa makini, linaonekana kuwa ni kinzani ya uwongo. Sababu ni uwezekano wa tatu: Mungu ni mwema. Katika kitabu chake, *The Qur'an and the Secular Mind*, Profesa wa Falsafa Shabbir Akhtar anafafanua:

This intuitively sounds like a valid contention. However, a little reflection exposes it as a false dilemma. The reason is due to a third possibility: God is good. In his book, The Qur’an and the Secular Mind, professor of Philosophy Shabbir Akhtar explains:

Kuna njia ya tatu: Mungu mwenye msimamo thabiti wa kimaadili wa aina iliyopo katika maandiko matakatifu, kiumbe wa juu kabisa ambaye hangebadili msimamo wake kiholela kuhusu wema wa huruma na ubaya wa ukosefu wa maadili katika mahusiano ya kimapenzi. Mungu wa namna hiyo daima huamuru mema kwa sababu tabia yake na asili yake ni njema.

“There is a third alternative: a morally stable God of the kind found in scripture, a supreme being who would not arbitrarily change his mind about the goodness of compassion and the evil of sexual misconduct. Such a God always commands good because his character and nature are good.”288.

ما يقصده البروفيسور أختر هو أن هناك بالفعل معيارًا أخلاقيًا، لكنه، خلافًا لما توحي به الشعبة الثانية من المعضلة، ليس خارجًا عن الله. بل إنه يلزم بالضرورة عن طبيعة الله. وكما سبق أن نوقش، يؤمن المسلمون، والموحدون عمومًا، بأن الله خيّر بالضرورة وعلى الكمال. ومن ثم فإن طبيعته تتضمن المعيار الأخلاقي الكامل غير الاعتباطي. وهذا يعني أن فعل الفرد، كقتل الأبرياء على سبيل المثال، ليس سيئًا بشكل اعتباطي، لأنه ينبع من معيار أخلاقي موضوعي وضروري. ومن جهة أخرى، فإن هذا لا يعني أن الله خاضع لهذا المعيار بأي شكل، لأنه موجود في ذاته. إنه يحدد طبيعته، ولا يوجد بأي حال خارجًا عنه.

What Professor Akhtar is saying is that there is indeed a moral standard, but unlike what the second horn of the dilemma suggests, it is not external to God. Rather, it follows necessarily from God’s nature. As previously discussed, Muslims, and theists in general, believe that God is necessarily and perfectly good. As such, His nature contains within it the perfect, non-arbitrary, moral standard. This means that an individual’s actions—for example, the killing of innocents—is not arbitrarily bad, because it follows from an objective, necessary, moral standard. On the other hand, it does not mean God is somehow subservient to this standard because it is contained in His essence. It defines His nature; it is not in any way external to Him.

Jibu la moja kwa moja la mtu asiyeamini kuwepo kwa Mungu lingekuwa: "Lazima ujue kwanza wema ni nini ndipo umtaje Mungu kuwa mwema, na kwa hiyo bado hujatatua tatizo." Jibu rahisi ni kwamba Mungu ndiye anayefafanua wema ni nini. Yeye ndiye Kiumbe pekee anayestahili kuabudiwa, na Kiumbe kama huyo ndiye mkamilifu zaidi na mwenye maadili zaidi. Qur'an inathibitisha mambo haya.

An atheist’s natural response would be: “You must know what good is to define God as good, and therefore you haven’t solved the problem”. The simple reply would be that God defines what good is. He is the only Being worthy of worship, and such a being is the most perfect and moral Being. The Qur’an affirms these points:

Na Mungu wenu ni Mungu mmoja. Hakuna mungu mwingine isipokuwa Yeye.

“And your god is one God. There is no deity.

[anayestahili kuabudiwa] isipokuwa Yeye, Mwingi wa Rehema, Mwenye Rehema Kubwa.289

[worthy of worship] except Him, the Entirely Merciful, the Especially Merciful.”289

Yeye ni Mwenyezi Mungu, ambaye hakuna mungu mwingine isipokuwa Yeye, Mjuzi wa yaliyofichika na yaliyo dhahiri. Yeye ndiye Mwingi wa rehema, Mwenye kurehemu sana. Yeye ni Mwenyezi Mungu, ambaye hakuna mungu mwingine isipokuwa Yeye, Mfalme, Mtakatifu, Mkamilifu, Mtoaji wa imani, Mlinzi, Mwenye enzi na nguvu, Mwenye kulazimisha, Mwenye ukuu. Mtukufu ni Mwenyezi Mungu juu ya yale wanayomshirikisha nayo. Yeye ni Mwenyezi Mungu, Muumbaji, Mvumbuzi, Mchora sura; Kwake ni majina mazuri zaidi. Kila kilichomo mbinguni na ardhini kinamtakasa Yeye. Naye ndiye Mwenye enzi na nguvu, Mwenye hekima.

“He is God, other than whom there is no deity, Knower of the unseen and the witnessed. He is the Entirely Merciful, the Especially Merciful. He is God, other than whom there is no deity, the Sovereign, the Pure, the Perfection, the Bestower of Faith, the Overseer, the Exalted in Might, the Compeller, the Superior. Exalted is God above whatever they associate with Him. He is God, the Creator, the Inventor, the Fashioner; to Him belong the best names. Whatever is in the heavens and Earth is exalting Him. And He is the Exalted in Might, the Wise.”290.

Kwa muhtasari, maadili na kweli za kimaadili hatimaye zinatokana na mapenzi ya Mungu, yanayodhihirishwa kupitia amri zake, na amri zake hazipingani na asili yake, ambayo ni nzuri kikamilifu, yenye hekima, safi na timilifu.

In summary, moral values and truths are ultimately derivatives of God’s will, expressed via His commands, and His commands do not contradict His nature, which is perfectly good, wise, pure and perfect.

Je, kuna misingi mbadala ya maadili ya lengo (objective morals)?

Are there any alternative foundations for objective morals?.

Wanasayansi wengi wasioamini kuwepo kwa Mungu hubishana kwamba kuna maelezo mbadala ya kujibu kwa nini baadhi ya maadili ni ya lengo (ya kweli bila kutegemea mtu). Miongoni mwa maelezo mbadala maarufu zaidi ni biolojia, shinikizo la kijamii, na aina ya uhalisia wa kimaadili usio wa kiimani.

Many atheists argue that there are alternative explanations to answer why some morals are objective. Some of the most popular alternatives include biology, social pressure, and a non-theistic form of moral realism.

Biolojia.

Biology.

Je, biolojia inaweza kueleza hisia zetu za maadili ya lengo (objective)? Jibu rahisi ni hapana. Charles Darwin anatupa mfano wa "kupita kiasi" wa kile kinachotokea pale biolojia au uteuzi asilia (natural selection) unapounda msingi wa maadili. Anasema kwamba kama tungekuwa matokeo ya seti tofauti ya hali za kibiolojia, basi kile tunachokiona kuwa cha lengo kimaadili kingeweza kuwa tofauti kabisa: "Kama wanadamu wangelelewa chini ya hali zilezile kabisa kama nyuki wa asali, hakuna shaka kwamba wanawake wetu ambao hawajaolewa, kama nyuki-kazi, wangeona ni wajibu mtakatifu kuwaua ndugu zao wa kiume, na mama wangejitahidi kuwaua binti zao wenye uwezo wa kuzaa, na hakuna mtu ambaye angefikiria kuingilia."291

Can biology explain our sense of objective morality? The simple answer is no. Charles Darwin provides us with an interesting ‘extreme example’ of what happens when biology or natural selection forms the foundation of morality. He argues that if we were the result of a different set of biological conditions, then what we consider morally objective could be totally different: “If men were reared under precisely the same conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our un-married females would, like the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters, and no one would think of interfering.”291

Kwa maneno mengine, ikiwa maadili yanategemea mabadiliko ya kibiolojia, basi yangekuwa chini ya mabadiliko hayo; kwa hiyo, hayawezi kuwa ya lengo (objective). Tukichukua mfano wa Darwin kama msingi, ikiwa tungelelewa chini ya hali zile zile alizo nazo papa-nesi (nurse shark), tungeona ni sawa kumbaka mwenza wetu, kwa kuwa papa-nesi hupambana na mwenzake kwa namna hiyo.292 Baadhi ya watu hujibu kwa kudai kwamba ni uteuzi asilia (natural selection) hasa unaounda msingi wa hisia zetu za maadili ya lengo. Tena, hili si sahihi. Kwa mtazamo wa kifikra, uteuzi asilia unachoweza kutupa ni uwezo wa kubuni kanuni za kimaadili zinazotusaidia kuishi na kuzaana. Kama mwanafalsafa wa maadili Philip Kitcher anavyoandika: "Yote ambayo uteuzi asilia unaweza kuwa umetufanyia ni kutupatia uwezo wa mipangilio mbalimbali ya kijamii na uwezo wa kubuni kanuni za kimaadili."293

In other words, if morals are contingent on biological changes, it would render morals subject to these changes; therefore, they cannot be objective. Extending Darwin’s example, if we happened to be reared under the same conditions as the nurse shark, we would think it acceptable to rape our partner, as the nurse shark wrestles with its mate.292 Some respond by asserting that it is specifically natural selection that forms the basis for our sense of objective morality. Again, this is false. Conceptually, all that natural selection can do is give us the ability to formulate moral rules to help us survive and reproduce. As the moral philosopher Philip Kitcher writes, “All that natural selection may have done for us is to equip us with the capacity for various social arrangements and the capacity to formulate ethical rules.”293.

Kudai maana kwamba biolojia inatoa msingi wa maadili huondoa maana yoyote tunayoyapa maadili. Maadili hupoteza maana, kwani ni matokeo tu ya mabadiliko ya kibiolojia yasiyo ya kiakili wala ya kufahamu. Hata hivyo, ukweli kwamba maadili yanatokana na amri za Mungu huyapa maadili maana, kwa sababu kuwa mwenye maadili kungekuwa ni kuitikia amri hizi. Kwa maneno mengine, tuna wajibu wa kimaadili, na wajibu huu ni wa kumlipa Mungu. Huwezi kudaiwa chochote na mkusanyiko wa molekuli.

Maintaining that biology provides a basis for morality removes any meaning we attach to morals. Morals become meaningless, as they are just a result of non-rational and non-conscious biological changes. However, the fact that morality comes from Divine commands gives morals meaning, because being moral would be responding to these commands. In other words, we have moral duties, and these are owed to God. You cannot owe anything to a collection of molecules.

Shinikizo la kijamii.

Social pressure.

Chaguo la pili ni shinikizo la kijamii au makubaliano ya jamii. Naamini hapa ndipo wanaoamini kutokuwepo kwa Mungu na wanadamu wanaoshikilia msimamo wa kibinadamu wanakumbana na ugumu fulani kifalsafa. Ikiwa shinikizo la kijamii kweli ndilo msingi wa maadili ya kweli yasiyotegemea mtu, basi wanaoshikilia dai hilo wanakabiliwa na tatizo kubwa. Kwanza, linafanya maadili kuwa ya kujadiliwa, kwa kuwa yanakabiliwa na mabadiliko ya kijamii yasiyoepukika. Pili, linaleta upuuzi wa kimaadili. Mtu akikubali makubaliano ya jamii kama msingi wa maadili, basi tutawezaje kuhalalisha msimamo wetu wa kimaadili kuhusu yale yaliyofanywa na Wanazi nchini Ujerumani miaka ya 1940? Tutawezaje kudai kwamba yale waliyofanya yalikuwa mabaya kimaadili kwa kweli? Hatuwezi. Hata kama unadai kwamba baadhi ya watu nchini Ujerumani walipigana dhidi ya Wanazi, hoja ni kwamba kulikuwa na makubaliano makubwa yaliyounga mkono uovu huo. Kuna mifano mingine mingi katika historia inayodhihirisha hoja hii.

The second alternative is social pressure or consensus. This, I believe, is where a lot of atheists and humanists face some difficulty, philosophically speaking. If social pressure really forms the basis of objective morals, then the proponents of this assertion face a huge issue. Firstly, it makes morals relative, as they are subject to inevitable social changes. Secondly, it leads to moral absurdities. If someone accepts consensus as a basis for morals, then how can we justify our moral position towards what the Nazis did in 1940s Germany? How can we claim that what they did was objectively morally wrong? Well, we cannot. Even if you claim that some people in Germany fought against the Nazis, the point is that there was a strong consensus supporting the evil. There are many other examples in history to highlight this point.

Uhalisia wa kimaadili

Moral realism.

Mojawapo ya misimamo ya mwisho ni aina isiyo ya kiungu ya uhalisia wa kimaadili. Uhalisia wa kimaadili, unaoitwa pia ulengaji wa kimaadili (moral objectivism), ni mtazamo kwamba maadili ni ya kilengwa, ni ya nje na yanajitegemea akili zetu na hisia zetu. Hata hivyo, tofauti kati ya aina hii ya uhalisia wa kimaadili na yale ambayo sura hii imekuwa ikiyatetea, ni kwamba wanauhalisia wa kimaadili hawathibitishi kwamba maadili yanahitaji msingi wowote. Kwa hiyo thamani za kimaadili kama huruma, haki na uvumilivu zipo tu kwa njia ya kilengwa. Kuna matatizo kadhaa katika msimamo huu. Kwanza, inamaanisha nini kusema kwamba haki ipo tu? Au kwamba thamani za kimaadili za kilengwa zipo tu? Msimamo huu hauingii akilini na hauna maana. Hatujui kwa hakika haki ni nini ikiwa ipo peke yake. Jambo muhimu ni kwamba mtu lazima aelewe kwamba, ikiwa maadili ni ya kilengwa (kwa maana kwamba yako nje ya maoni ya kibinafsi ya mtu), basi yanahitaji maelezo ya kimantiki. Vinginevyo, swali la Je, yana ulengwa vipi? linabaki bila jibu. Pili, maadili hayakomei katika kutambua ulengwa wa huruma au haki. Maadili yanahusisha hisia ya wajibu au dhamana:

The final alternative is a non-theistic form of moral realism. Moral realism, also referred to as moral objectivism, is the view that morals are objective and they are external and independent of our minds and emotions. However, the difference between this type of moral realism and what this chapter has been advocating, is that moral realists do not assert that they require any foundation. So moral values such as compassion, justice and tolerance just exist objectively. There are a few problems with this position. Firstly, what does it mean to say that justice just exists? Or that objective moral values just exist? This position is counterintuitive and meaningless. We simply do not know what ‘justice’ is, existing on its own. Significantly, one has to understand that if morals are objective (in that they are outside of an individual’s personal opinion), then they require a rational explanation. Otherwise, the question How are they objective? is unanswered. Secondly, morality is not limited to recognizing the objectivity of compassion or justice. Morality entails a sense of duty or obligation:

Tunalazimika kuwa wenye huruma na wenye haki. Chini ya uhalisia wa kimaadili (moral realism), wajibu wa namna hiyo hauwezekani, kwa sababu kutambua kwamba thamani fulani ya kimaadili ni ya kiukweli (objective) hakutuhakikishii kwamba tunalazimika kuitekeleza. Wajibu wa kimaadili hautokani tu na kukiri kwamba ni wa kiukweli. Kutekeleza wajibu wa kimaadili kungekuwa na maana iwapo wajibu huo ni deni tunalodaiwa, au iwapo kuna hisia ya wajibu (sense of duty). Uhalisia wa kimaadili hautoi sababu yoyote kwa nini mtu lazima alazimike kuwa mwema kimaadili. Hata hivyo, ikiwa thamani hizi za kimaadili zimejengwa juu ya amri za Mwenyezi Mungu, basi sio tu zinazifanya maadili hayo kuwa ya kiukweli, bali pia zinaweka msingi wa kulazimika kuwa wema kimaadili, kwa sababu tuna wajibu wa kutii amri za Mwenyezi Mungu.

we are obligated to be compassionate and just. Under moral realism such obligations are impossible, because recognising that a certain moral value is objective does nothing to ensure that we are obligated to implement it. A moral obligation does not follow from just acknowledging that it is objective. Following through with one’s moral obligations would make sense if they are owed, or if there is a sense of duty. Moral realism does not provide any reason why someone must be obliged to be moral. However, if these moral values are based on Divine commands, then not only do they make these morals objective, but they establish the basis for being obligated to be moral—because we have a duty to obey the commands of God.

Kwa kuzingatia majadiliano yaliyotangulia, ni wazi kwamba maadili ya lengo yanahitaji kuwepo kwa Mungu, kwa kuwa yeye yuko nje ya ulimwengu, na anaweza kutoa dai la kimaadili la ulimwengu wote kupitia amri zake.

In light of the above discussion, it is obvious that objective morality necessitates God’s existence, as He is external to the universe and can make the universal moral claim via His commands.

Je, itakuwaje wakikataa maadili ya kiukweli (objective morality)?

What if they reject objective morality?.

Kama suluhisho la mwisho, baadhi ya wasioamini Mungu hujaribu kuepuka aibu ya kiakili kwa kujibu hitimisho lililotajwa hapo juu kwa kukataa kwamba maadili ni ya lengo (objective). Sawa. Nakubaliana nao. Iwapo mtu hakubali dhana ya msingi kwamba maadili ni ya lengo, basi hoja hiyo haifanyi kazi. Lakini hiyo ni upanga wenye makali kuwili. Mara tu mtu asiyeamini Mungu anapokataa lengo la dai lolote la kimaadili, hana haki ya kuwanyooshea kidole dini, au hasa Uislamu, kwa njia yoyote ya lengo. Hawezi hata kuwanyooshea kidole Ku Klux Klan, ISIS au hata utawala wa kidikteta wa Korea Kaskazini! Hapa ndipo kuna kejeli: hii ndiyo hasa wanayofanya wasioamini Mungu wengi. Wanatoa hukumu za kimaadili zenye ladha ya kilengo. Wangepaswa kuweka tahadhari kwenye hukumu zao zote za kimaadili na kusema tu, "Huu ni mtazamo wangu wa kibinafsi." Kufanya hivyo kungefanya mabishano yao ya kimaadili au hasira zao zisiwe na maana. Hata hivyo, ndani kabisa, watu wenye akili timamu wengi hawakatai lengo la baadhi ya misingi ya maadili, kama vile mauaji, wizi na unyanyasaji. Kutoelewa hoja.

As a last resort, some atheists try to avoid intellectual embarrassment by replying to the above conclusion by denying that morality is objective. Fair enough. I agree. If someone does not accept the axiom that morals are objective, then the argument does not work. But that is a double-edged sword. The minute the atheist denies the objectivity of any moral claim, he has no right to point the finger at religion, or more specifically Islam, in any objective way. He cannot even point the finger at the KKK, ISIS or even the dictatorship of North Korea! The irony here is that this is exactly what many atheists do. They make moral judgments that have an objective flavour to them. They should put a caveat to all of their moral judgments and simply say, “This is my subjective view.” Doing that renders their moral disagreements or outrage pointless. However, deep down inside, most sane human beings do not deny the objectivity of some basic morals, such as murder, theft and abuse. Misunderstanding the argument.

Baadhi ya wasioamini kuwepo kwa Mungu, na hata baadhi ya wasomi wa taaluma, huelewa vibaya hoja hii kwa kuchanganya epistemolojia ya kimaadili na ontolojia ya kimaadili. Hoja niliyoiwasilisha hadi sasa haihusu jinsi tunavyopata maarifa ya kile kilicho chema; hiyo ni epistemolojia ya kimaadili. Badala yake, inaelekeza fikira zake kwenye chanzo cha maadili na asili yake; hiyo ni ontolojia ya kimaadili. Amri za Mungu ndizo msingi wa kiontolojia unaofanya maadili, thamani na ukweli wa kimaadili kuwa ya lengo. Jinsi tunavyojua maadili hayo ni suala la epistemolojia ya kimaadili. Hoja inayowasilishwa katika sura hii haihusu epistemolojia ya kimaadili. Hoja hii inahusu ontolojia ya kimaadili, ambayo inarejelea misingi na asili ya maadili. Katika umbo lake rahisi zaidi, hoja hii inaenda kwa namna hii: je, kitu fulani ni chema kwa lengo? Ikiwa ni chema kwa lengo, basi kinahitaji kuwepo kwa Mungu, kwa kuwa yeye ndiye msingi pekee wa wema wa lengo. Hoja hii haiulizi jinsi tunavyojua wakati kitu fulani ni chema.

Some atheists, and even some academics, misunderstand the argument by conflating moral epistemology with moral ontology. The argument I have presented so far is not concerned with how we get to know what is good, which refers to moral epistemology—it directs its attention to where morals come from and their nature, which refers to moral ontology. God’s commands provide the ontological foundation for morals values and truths to be objective. How we get to know what these morals are is a matter of moral epistemology. The argument presented in this chapter does not concern moral epistemology. This argument is about moral ontology, which refers to the foundations and nature of morality. The argument in its simplest form goes something like this: if something is good, is it objectively good? If it is objectively good, then it necessitates God’s existence, as He is the only foundation for objective good. The argument does not ask how we know when something is good.

Kamili dhidi ya lengo

Absolute vs. objective.

Dhana ambayo inaweza kutolewa na mwanatheolojia mwenye bidii na anayetamani kujifunza ni kwamba ndani ya mijadala ya kitheolojia ya Kiislamu (na karibu mifumo yote ya sheria duniani), kuna hali ambapo kuua (kama kujilinda mwenyewe na familia yako) kunakuwa halali kimaadili (na kisheria). Kwa hiyo, hakuna kitu ambacho ni uovu kwa maana ya kiobjektivu. Huu ni mtazamo wa kuvutia, lakini unachanganya maadili kamili (absolute morality) na maadili ya kiobjektivu (objective morality); hizi ni tofauti sana. Maadili kamili yanamaanisha kwamba kitendo cha kimaadili ni chema au kibaya bila kujali hali iliyopo. Kwa mfano, mtu anayeamini kwamba kuua ni kosa kabisa ataamini kwamba kuua ni kosa hata katika kujilinda. Maadili ya kiobjektivu, kwa upande mwingine, yanakubali waziwazi kwamba baadhi ya ukweli wa kimaadili hutegemea muktadha. Ukweli wa kiobjektivu wa kimaadili unaweza kuwa: kuua binadamu bila sababu halali ni kosa. Asili ya muktadha wa dai hili la kimaadili inajumuisha sharti muhimu kwamba kuua pia lazima kuwe bila sababu halali. Kwa mfano, kuua mtu mwingine kunaweza kuonekana kuwa halali kimaadili ikiwa mtu aliyeuawa alikuwa akiwapiga risasi watoto kiholela shuleni mwa mtaani. Hoja niliyoitoa haihusishi dhana kamili za maadili. Maelezo kuhusu uhusiano wa kimaadili (ethical relativism) Mtetezi wa uhusiano wa kimaadili, anayeshikilia kwamba maadili yanategemea kanuni za kiutamaduni, angesema kwamba mjadala kuhusu maadili kamili na ya kiobjektivu unathibitisha kwamba maadili si ya kiobjektivu, bali ni ya kiuhusiano. Wale wanaoshikilia kwamba maadili ni ya kiobjektivu wangesema kwamba kile watu wanachoamini, wanachohisi au wanachokifanya hakina umuhimu, na hakipunguzi thamani ya kiobjektivu ya kimaadili (na hiyo ndiyo hasa maana ya kiobjektivu). Kwa mtazamo huu, uhusiano wa kimaadili hauna msingi, kwa sababu unategemea desturi za kiutamaduni kupinga kile kilicho kweli kwa lengo. Hii imeshindwa kabla ya kuanza, kwa sababu ufafanuzi wa maadili ya lengo unasema kwamba maadili yako huru kutokana na hisia, imani na desturi za kitamaduni, kwa hiyo kuzitumia kama njia ya kukanusha ulengo wa maadili hakuna maana.

A valid concern that can be raised by the keen and aspiring theologian is that within Islamic theological discourse (and virtually all of the justice systems in the world), certain situations exist where killing (such as defending one’s self and family) becomes morally (and legally) permissible. Therefore, nothing is objectively evil. This is an interesting reflection, but it conflates absolute morality with objective morality; they are very different. Absolute morality entails that a moral act is good or bad regardless of the given situation. For example, someone who believes killing is absolutely wrong would believe killing is wrong even in self-defence. Objective morality, however, readily acknowledges the context-sensitivity of some moral truths. An objective moral fact might be killing human beings without appropriate justification is wrong. The context-sensitive nature of this moral claim includes an important caveat that the killing must also be unjustified. For instance, killing another human being might be seen as morally justified, if the person who was killed had been indiscriminately shooting children at a local school. The argument I have presented does not involve absolute notions of morality. A note on ethical relativism An ethical relativist, who maintains that morality is relative to cultural norms, would argue that the discussion on absolute and objective morality proves that morals are not objective, and that they are relative. Those who maintain that morals are objective would argue that what people believe or feel or do is irrelevant, and does not take away from objective moral value (and that is precisely the definition of objectivity). Ethical relativism is bankrupt from this perspective because it points to cultural practices to refute what is objectively true. This is doomed to failure, because the definition of objective morality states that morals are independent of feelings, beliefs and cultural practices, so to use them as a means to deny the objectivity of morals is meaningless.

Sura hii ina athari za kushangaza kwa mtu asiyeamini kuwepo kwa Mungu. Ikiwa wasioamini Mungu wanaona baadhi ya maadili, thamani na ukweli kuwa ni wa kweli kwa kila mtu (objective), basi lazima wakubali kwamba Mungu yupo, kwa kuwa Yeye ndiye msingi pekee wa busara wa kuwepo kwa maadili ya kweli, au watoe mbadala wenye mashiko. Wasipoweza kufanya hivyo, lazima wapuuze hisia zao za asili zinazotambua mema na mabaya ya kweli, na wakatae kabisa wazo la maadili ya kweli. Wakishafanya hivyo, lawama zao zote na hukumu zao za kimaadili dhidi ya Uislamu zitashushwa hadi kiwango cha mtazamo binafsi tu. Hoja inayotokana na msimamo wa kimaadili inaufanya mtazamo wa Kiislamu kuhusu Mungu (Uungu) kuwa na maana kweli. Mungu ni mwema kikamilifu na mwenye hekima, na amri zake hazipingani na asili yake kamilifu. Kwa hiyo, amri zake ni nzuri kikamilifu.

This chapter has some striking implications for the atheist. If atheists consider some morals values and truths to be objective, they must either admit that God exists—as He is the only rational foundation for the existence of objective morality—or provide a compelling alternative. If they cannot, they have to ignore their innate disposition that recognises objective good and evil, and reject the notion of objective morals altogether. Once they do that, all their finger-pointing and moral judgements against Islam will be diminished to the level of personal subjectivity. The argument from the stance of morality truly makes sense of the Islamic conception of the Divine. God is perfectly good and wise, and His commands do not contradict His perfect nature. Therefore, His commands are perfectly good.

Kujua hivi kuhusu Mungu kunatupa msingi wa maadili ya lengo. Kwa maneno mengine, kumjua Mungu ni kujua wema.

Knowing this about God gives us a foundation for objective morals. In other words, knowing God is knowing good.