Baba yangu anapenda sana kwenda kutembea. Yeye hutafakari maswali ya kina yanayowasumbua watu wanaofikiri. Siku moja, katika mojawapo ya matembezi hayo, aliamua kutembelea Speakers Corner maarufu jijini London. Mahali hapa panajulikana kwa mijadala mikali na yenye kelele kuhusu mwanadamu, maisha na ulimwengu, ikiwa ni pamoja na siasa na nadharia mbalimbali za njama. Ni mahali pa uhuru usio na vikwazo wa kusema, ambapo kila mtu anaweza kusema karibu chochote anachotaka kwa namna yoyote anayotaka. Kona hii huwa mara nyingi shahidi wa mijadala ya kitheolojia na kifalsafa inayozunguka kuwepo kwa Mungu. Siku aliyotembelea kona hiyo, Baba yangu alikuwa akisikiliza mjadala kuhusu kama tuna sababu nzuri za kuamini Uungu au la. Baba yangu aliingilia mjadala huo na kuwaambia, "Mkimkataa Mungu, mnajikana nafsi zenu." Baba alipoyasimulia hadithi hii, mimi sikuelewa vizuri maana ya alichosema. Hata hivyo, baada ya miongo kadhaa kupita, ningependa kupanua hekima yake ya kina katika sura hii.

My father loves going for walks. He ponders the profound questions that plague the thinking man. On one of these walks, he decided to visit the famous Speakers Corner in London. It is known for its loud and heated discussions about man, life and the universe, including politics and all sorts of conspiracies. It is a place for unfettered free speech, where anyone and everyone can say almost what they want in any way they want. The corner usually witnesses theological and philosophical debates centred on God’s existence. The day my father visited the corner he was listening to a discussion about whether or not we have good reasons to believe in the Divine. My father interrupted the discussion and told them, “If you reject God, you deny yourself.” When my father told me this story, I didn’t really understand the implications of what he said. However, fast-forward a few decades, I would like to expand on his profound wisdom in this chapter.

Baba yangu alikuwa akijaribu kuwaambia umati kwamba, kwa kuwa tuna ufahamu wa sisi ni nani (na tunavyohisi), hilo ni ishara kwamba Mungu yupo. Kwa maana pana, alichokuwa akikirejelea baba yangu ni fahamu ya kifenomenolojia; kwa lugha rahisi, ukweli kwamba tuna uzoefu wa ndani wa kibinafsi. Fahamu ya kifenomenolojia inahusu uwezo wetu wa kuwa na ufahamu wa ndani wa kibinafsi wa jinsi ilivyo kupitia hali fulani ya fahamu. Kwa mfano, ninapokula chokoleti ninayoipenda au ninaposikiliza usomaji wa Qur’an, nina ufahamu wa uzoefu huo wa ndani, na naweza kuthamini jinsi ilivyo kuwa katika hali hiyo ya fahamu. Hata hivyo, hakuna mtu mwingine anayeweza kufikia jinsi ilivyo kwangu kuwa na uzoefu huo wa kibinafsi. Bila shaka, watu wengine watakuwa na mitazamo yao kuhusu chokoleti na usomaji wa Qur’an, lakini hawatawahi kuhisi au kuelewa kikweli ninachohisi wakati wa uzoefu huo.

My father was trying to tell the crowd that since we have an awareness of who we are (and what we feel), it is a sign that God exists. In a broad sense, what my father was referring to was phenomenal consciousness; in simple terms, the fact that we have inner subjective experiences. Phenomenal consciousness relates to our ability to have an inner subjective awareness of what it is like to experience a particular conscious state. For example, when I eat my favourite chocolate or when I listen to a recitation of the Qur’an, I am aware of that internal experience, and I can appreciate what it is like to be in that conscious state. However, no one else can access what it is like for me to have those subjective experiences. Of course, other people will have their own perspectives of chocolate and the recitation of the Qur’an, but they will never truly experience or comprehend what I feel during those experiences.

Hata ukijua kila kitu kuhusu ubongo wangu wa kimwili, bado usingeweza kujua ni vipi kwangu kuwa na uzoefu fulani, iwe ni kunywa juisi ya chungwa, kutazama machweo mazuri au kupenda. Sababu kuu ni kwamba sayansi ya neva ni hasa sayansi ya uhusiano. Wanasayansi wa neva huchunguza shughuli za ubongo na kuhusisha shughuli hiyo na yale ambayo washiriki wanasema wanayafahamu. Hata hivyo, uhusiano huu hauwezi kamwe kutuambia ni vipi kwa washiriki kuwa katika hali fulani ya fahamu; unaweza tu kutuambia wakati hali hiyo inapotokea. Huenda mtu akasema kwamba mshiriki anaweza kuwapa wanasayansi data ya mtu wa kwanza kwa kueleza uzoefu wake binafsi, hivyo akajibu swali hilo. Lakini hii si jibu, kwa sababu hata mtu akitumia maneno kama 'baridi', 'maumivu', 'tamu', 'uzuri' na 'huzuni', hawezi kamwe kutuambia ni vipi kuwa na uzoefu na hisia hizo. Maneno ni vyombo vya maana na uzoefu, lakini ni lazima tupite zaidi ya maneno ili kuelewa kikamilifu uzoefu wa fahamu wa mwingine. Jambo lingine gumu kuelewa kuhusu uzoefu wa ndani wa fahamu ni kwa nini uzoefu binafsi unatokea kutoka kwenye michakato ya kibiolojia na kimwili isiyo na fahamu. Kwa nini uzoefu wa kipekee wa ndani unatokea kutoka kwenye jambo lisilo na fahamu? Hili ni swali jingine muhimu katika falsafa ya akili na sayansi ya neva. Masuala niliyoyaeleza hadi sasa yanaunda kile wasomi wanachokiita tatizo gumu la fahamu. Tatizo hili bado halijatatuliwa, licha ya kuzua mijadala mingi mikali kuhusu asili ya sisi ni nani na uzoefu wetu wa fahamu. Mtafiti Daniel Bor analieleza tatizo hilo kwa namna ifuatayo:

Even if you were to know everything about my physical brain, you would not be able to find out what it is like for me to have a particular experience, whether drinking orange juice, staring at a beautiful sunset or falling in love. The main reason for this is that neuroscience is mostly a science of correlations. Neuroscientists observe brain activity and correlate that activity with what the participants report they are conscious of. However, these correlations can never tell us anything about what it is like for participants to be in a given state of consciousness; it can only tell us when it occurs. You may argue that a participant may provide neuroscientists with first-person data by describing his or her subjective experience, thereby answering the question. Nonetheless, this is not an answer, because even if someone uses words like ‘cold’, ‘painful’, ‘sweet’, ‘beautiful’ and ‘sad’, they can never tell us what it is like to have those experiences and feelings. Words are vehicles for meaning and experience, but we must go beyond words to fully understand the conscious experience of another. Another elusive aspect of internal conscious experiences is why subjective experiences arise from non-conscious biological and physical processes. Why does a unique internal experience arise from non-conscious matter? This is another important question in the philosophy of the mind and neuroscience. The issues I have introduced so far form what academics call the hard problem of consciousness. This has remained unresolved, despite having sparked many heated debates on the nature of who we are and our conscious experiences. Research fellow Daniel Bor states the problem in the following way:

"Kuna matatizo mengi magumu duniani, lakini ni moja tu linalojiita 'tatizo gumu'. Hilo ni tatizo la fahamu—jinsi takriban gramu 1300 za seli za neva zinavyozalisha mkusanyiko usiokatika wa hisia, mawazo, kumbukumbu na hisia zinazojaza kila dakika ya kuamka… Tatizo gumu bado halijapata suluhisho."

“There are a lot of hard problems in the world, but only one gets to call itself ‘the hard problem’. That is the problem of consciousness—how 1300 grams or so of nerve cells conjures up the seamless kaleidoscope of sensations, thoughts, memories and emotions that occupy every waking moment… The hard problem remains unresolved.”190.

Hakuna jambo la kwamba uzoefu wetu wa ndani wa kibinafsi wenye fahamu unaweza kuelezwa tu kwa kuwepo kwa Mwenyezi Mungu Mwenye kujua yote. Kiumbe hiki kiliumba ulimwengu wa kimwili pamoja na viumbe wenye fahamu, na kuwapa uwezo wa kutambua uzoefu wao wa ndani wa kibinafsi. Maelezo mengine yanashindwa tangu mwanzo; kwa mfano, mtazamo baridi wa kimaada juu ya ulimwengu hautoi tumaini lolote la kutatua tatizo hili. Fikiria mwanzoni mwa ulimwengu ulikuwa na mpangilio rahisi wa maada tu, na baada ya kipindi kirefu, yakajipanga upya kuwa binadamu ili kuunda fahamu. Hili linaonekana kama uchawi, kwa sababu maada ni baridi, haioni na haina fahamu, basi inawezaje kuwajibika kwa jambo kama hilo? Haiwezi. Kwa mfano, siwezi kukupa pauni 10 kama sina fedha hizo. Vivyo hivyo, maada haiwezi kuzaa fahamu kama haina fahamu au uwezo wa kuizaa. Unaweza kubisha kwamba ninaweza kupata pesa kisha nikampa mtu; vivyo hivyo, maada inaweza kwa namna fulani "kupata" fahamu kupitia mchakato tata. Hili si sahihi, kwa sababu mchakato mmoja usio na fahamu pamoja na mchakato mwingine usio na fahamu bado ni michakato miwili isiyo na fahamu. Ni kama kujaribu kugeuza kipande cha chuma kuwa mbao: bila kujali unavyokichakata chuma, hakitageuka kuwa mbao, hata ukiongeza chuma zaidi.

The very fact that we have internal subjective conscious experiences can only be explained by the existence of an All-Aware Being. This Being created the physical universe with conscious creatures, and gave them the ability to be aware of their internal subjective experiences. Other explanations fail from the onset—for instance, a cold, materialistic view on the universe offers no hope for a solution to the problem. Imagine in the beginning of the universe all you had were simple arrangements of matter, and after a long period of time, they rearranged themselves into human beings to form consciousness. This sounds like magic, because matter is cold, blind and non-conscious, so how can it be responsible for such a phenomenon? It cannot. For example, I cannot give you £10 if I do not have it. Likewise, matter cannot give rise to consciousness if it does not contain it or have the potential to give rise to it. You may argue that I can earn the money and then give it to someone; likewise, matter can somehow ‘earn’ consciousness via some complex process. This is false, because an individual non-conscious process plus another individual non-complex process still equal two non-conscious processes. It is like trying to turn a piece of iron into wood: no matter how you manipulate the iron, it will never turn into wood, even if you add more iron.

Lengo la sura hii ni kuchambua maelezo maarufu kuhusu tatizo gumu la fahamu (consciousness), na kueleza jinsi mbinu ya kiteism, na kwa kuongezea kuwepo kwa Mungu, inavyotoa maelezo yaliyo bora zaidi. Pia nitaonyesha kwamba hili si tatizo ambalo "sayansi siku moja itatupa majibu", kwa sababu hata tukijua kila kitu kuhusu ubongo na kung'ang'ania maelezo ya kibiolojia na ya kimaada pekee (au hata maelezo ya kifalsafa yasiyo ya kiteism), bado hatutaweza kulijibu tatizo gumu la fahamu.

The scope of this chapter is to deconstruct the popular explanations for the hard problem of consciousness and explain how a theistic approach, and by extension God’s existence, provides a far better explanation. I will also bring to light that this is not an issue for which ‘science will eventually give us the answers’, because even if we were to know everything about the brain and insist on referring solely to biological, materialist (or even non-theistic philosophical) explanations, we will still not answer the hard problem of consciousness.

Zaidi kuhusu tatizo gumu.

More about the hard problem.

Kwa kukiri wao wenyewe, suala la fahamu (consciousness) limewasababishia wasomi wengi matatizo yasiyoweza kutatuliwa, hasa wale walio wakali mno katika mtazamo wao wa kimaada. Katika kitabu chake Consciousness: Confessions of a Romantic Reductionist, Profesa Christof Koch anakiri wazi kwamba:

By their own admission, the issue of consciousness has caused many academics unsolvable problems, especially those who are excessively dogmatic in their materialistic approach. In his book Consciousness: Confessions of a Romantic Reductionist, Professor Christof Koch openly admits:

"Jinsi ubongo unavyogeuza shughuli ya kibiolojia-umeme kuwa hali za kibinafsi za kihisia-fahamu, jinsi miale ya mwanga inayoakisiwa kutoka kwenye maji inavyogeuzwa kwa namna ya ajabu kuwa taswira ya ziwa dogo la mlimani lenye rangi ya aquamarine inayong'aa kama upinde wa mvua, ni fumbo. Asili ya uhusiano kati ya mfumo wa fahamu na fahamu yenyewe bado haijulikani wazi, na ni mada ya mijadala mikali isiyo na mwisho… Kueleza jinsi kipande chenye mpangilio mzuri wa maada kinavyoweza kuwa na mtazamo wa ndani kumelishinda chombo cha mbinu za kisayansi, ambacho katika maeneo mengine mengi kimethibitika kuwa chenye matunda makubwa sana." 191.

“How the brain converts bioelectrical activity into subjective states, how photons reflected off water are magically transformed into the percept of an iridescent aquamarine mountain tarn is a puzzle. The nature of the relationship between the nervous system and consciousness remains elusive and the subject of heated and interminable debates… Explaining how a highly organized piece of matter can possess an interior perspective has daunted the scientific method, which in so many other areas has proved immensely fruitful.”191.

Matatizo haya ambayo bado hayajatatuliwa hayahusu muundo wa kimwili wa ubongo na jinsi tunavyoweza kuunganisha baadhi ya hali za fahamu na shughuli za ubongo. Kama ninaumwa maumivu, kuna aina fulani ya shughuli katika ubongo wangu inayoonyesha kwamba ninaumwa. Hakuna anayekataa kwamba ubongo wa kimwili na fahamu vinahusiana, lakini ninapaswa kusisitiza hapa kwamba ni uhusiano tu. Ubongo na fahamu si kitu kimoja. Fikiria mfano huu: ubongo ni gari, na fahamu ni dereva. Gari haliwezi kusogea bila dereva, na dereva hataweza kuliwasha wala kulitumia ipasavyo kama limeharibika au limevunjika. Hata hivyo, vyote viwili ni tofauti na huru kwa namna fulani.

These unresolved problems do not concern the physical makeup of the brain and how we can correlate some conscious states with brain activity. If I am experiencing pain, some sort of activity in my brain indicates that I am experiencing pain. No one is denying that the physical brain and consciousness are related, but I must stress here, it is just a relationship. The brain and consciousness is not the same thing. Take the following analogy into consideration: the brain is the car, and consciousness is the driver. The car will not move without the driver, and the driver will not be able to start the car—or use it properly—if it is damaged or broken. However, they are both different and independent in some way.

Je, ni matatizo gani wataalamu wa fani hii wanayojaribu kuyashughulikia, na kwa nini ubongo na fahamu si kitu kimoja? Jibu la maswali haya liko katika kile kinachojulikana kama tatizo gumu la fahamu (hard problem of consciousness). Tatizo gumu la fahamu linahusu ukweli kwamba sisi tuna uzoefu wa ndani wa kibinafsi. Kwa maneno mengine, tatizo ni kwamba hatuwezi kueleza kwa lugha ya mtu wa tatu ya sayansi kile kiumbe fulani anachohisi anapokuwa na uzoefu wa fahamu wa kibinafsi. Profesa David Chalmers, aliyeeneza msemo wa tatizo gumu la fahamu, anaeleza:

What are the problems that specialists in the field are trying to address, and why are the brain and consciousness not the same thing? The answer to these questions lies in what is known as the hard problem of consciousness. The hard problem of consciousness concerns the fact that we have internal subjective experiences. In other words, the problem is that we cannot explain what it is like for a particular organism to have a subjective conscious experience in terms of the third-person language of science. Professor David Chalmers, who popularised the phrase the hard problem of consciousness, explains:

Tatizo ngumu kweli la fahamu ni tatizo la uzoefu. Tunapofikiri na kutambua, kuna mvumo wa usindikaji wa taarifa, lakini pia kuna upande wa kibinafsi… Upande huu wa kibinafsi ndio uzoefu. Tunapoona, kwa mfano, tunapata hisia za kuona: sifa inayohisiwa ya rangi nyekundu, uzoefu wa giza na mwanga, sifa ya kina katika uwanja wa kimwili. Uzoefu mwingine huambatana na mtazamo katika njia nyingine: sauti ya klarineti, harufu ya nondo wa kabati. Kisha kuna hisia za mwili, kuanzia maumivu hadi msisimko wa kilele cha tendo la ndoa; picha za akili zinazoibuliwa ndani; sifa inayohisiwa ya hisia; na uzoefu wa mkondo wa mawazo ya fahamu. Kinachounganisha hali hizi zote ni kwamba kuna kitu kinachofanana na kuwa katika hali hizo. Zote ni hali za uzoefu… Ikiwa tatizo lolote linastahili kuitwa tatizo la fahamu, ni hili. Kwa maana hii kuu ya 'fahamu', kiumbe, na hali ya kiakili, huwa na fahamu ikiwa kuna kitu kinachofanana na kuwa katika hali hiyo.

“The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information processing, but there is also a subjective aspect… This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a physical field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion; and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience… If any problem qualifies as the problem of consciousness, it is this one. In this central sense of ‘consciousness’, an organism, and a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that state.”192.

Profesa Torin Alter anaongeza mwelekeo mwingine katika ufafanuzi wa tatizo gumu la fahamu, kwa kulenga kutoweza kujibu swali la kwa nini michakato ya kimwili ya ubongo hutoa uzoefu wa kifahamu.

Professor Torin Alter adds another dimension to the definition of the hard problem of consciousness, by focusing on the inability to answer why physical brain processes produce conscious experience:

Ninapoandika maneno haya, mifumo ya kiakili katika ubongo wangu inashiriki katika kuchakata taarifa za kuona na kusikia. Uchakataji huu unaambatana na hali za fahamu za kiuzoefu, kama vile uzoefu wa kusikia sauti ya tap-tap-tap ya kibodi na uzoefu wa kuona herufi zikionekana kwenye skrini. Ubongo wangu unazalishaje uzoefu huo? Kwa nini ni huo na si mwingine? Kwa kweli, kwa nini tukio lolote la kimwili linaambatana na uzoefu wa fahamu? Seti ya matatizo haya inajulikana kama tatizo gumu la fahamu… Hata baada ya kazi na uwezo wote husika kuelezwa, mtu anaweza kwa sababu nzuri kushangaa kwa nini kuna hali ya "kuwa kama" kuona herufi zikionekana kwenye skrini ya kompyuta.

“As I type these words, cognitive systems in my brain engage in visual and auditory information processing. This processing is accompanied by states of phenomenal consciousness, such as the auditory experience of hearing the tap-tap-tap of the keyboard and the visual experience of seeing the letters appear on the screen. How does my brain's activity generate those experiences? Why those and not others? Indeed, why is any physical event accompanied by conscious experience? The set of such problems is known as the hard problem of consciousness… Even after all the associated functions and abilities are explained, one might reasonably wonder why there is something it is like to see letters appear on a computer screen.”193.

Hebu nirahisishe maelezo hapo juu kwa mfano. Sema umekula strawberry. Wanasayansi na wanafalsafa wangeweza kupata uhusiano (correlations) katika ubongo unaoonyesha kwamba unakula kitu, labda hata ukweli kwamba unakula tunda, na kama unaona ni tamu au la, kwa kukuuliza ueleze uzoefu wako wa fahamu. Hata hivyo, wasingeweza kamwe kugundua au kuchunguza jinsi ilivyo kwako kula strawberry, au utamu na ladha vina maana gani na vinahisiwaje kwako, na kwa nini umekuwa na uzoefu huo wa kibinafsi wa kula strawberry unaotokana na michakato ya kimwili.

Let me simplify the above definitions with an example. Say you were to eat a strawberry. Scientists and philosophers would be able to find correlations in the brain that indicate that you are eating something, maybe even the fact that you are eating a piece of fruit, and whether or not you find it tasty or sweet by asking you to describe your conscious experience. Nevertheless, they could never find out or examine what it is like for you to eat a strawberry, or what tastiness or sweetness mean and feel for you, and why you have had that particular subjective experience of eating a strawberry arising from physical processes.

Ni muhimu kutambua kwamba suala lililopo si la kielimu tu; halitokani na ukosefu wa uelewa wa neurobiolojia au kushindwa kuelewa jinsi ilivyo kwa mtu kuwa na uzoefu wa ndani wa fahamu kwa kuangalia tu matukio ya kineurobiolojia. Badala yake, ni tatizo la kiontolojia; linahusu chanzo na asili ya uzoefu wa kifenomenolojia. Asili ya kimwili (hapa, neurobiolojia) na fahamu ya kibinafsi ni tofauti kabisa. Kushindwa kujua jinsi ilivyo kwa mtu kuwa na uzoefu wa fahamu wa kibinafsi, na kutojua jinsi uzoefu huu unavyotokea kutoka michakato ya kimwili, kunaibua maswali yafuatayo ya kimetafizikia: Asili ya uzoefu wa fahamu ni nini? Chanzo cha mwisho cha uzoefu huu ni kipi?

It is important to note that the issue at hand is not merely an epistemic one; it is not due to a lack of understanding neurobiology or not being able to understand what it is like for someone to have an inner subjective conscious experience just by observing neurobiological happenings. Rather, it is an ontological problem; it concerns the source and nature of phenomenal experience. The nature of the physical (in this case, neurobiology) and subjective consciousness are completely different. Not being able to find out what it is like for someone to have a subjective conscious experience, and not knowing how these experiences arise from physical processes, raises the following metaphysical questions: What is the nature of conscious experience? What is the ultimate source of these experiences?.

Kushughulikia mbinu zilizoshindwa.

Addressing the failed approaches.

Kuna mbinu kadhaa zinazoshindana zinazojaribu kueleza jambo la fahamu (consciousness) na tatizo lake gumu (hard problem). Mbinu hizi ni pamoja na maelezo ya kibaiolojia, ya kimaada (materialist) na yasiyo ya kimaada (non-materialist). Nitajaribu kujadili kwa nini hazilishughulikii tatizo gumu la fahamu, na kwa nini mbinu ya kiteism (theistic) inatoa maelezo bora zaidi. Kwa maneno mengine, kuwepo kwa Mungu kunatoa msingi wa kimantiki wa kujibu maswali ambayo wanafalsafa na wanasayansi wa neva wameshindwa kuyajibu.

A range of competing approaches attempt to explain the phenomenon of consciousness and its hard problem. These approaches include biological, materialist and non-materialist explanations. I will attempt to discuss why they do not address the hard problem of consciousness, and why a theistic approach provides the best explanation. In other words, God’s existence provides a rational basis to answer the questions philosophers and neuroscientists have been unable to answer.

Mbinu za kibaiolojia.

Biological approaches.

Hebu kwanza tueleze kwa nini maelezo ya kibiolojia yameshindwa. Baadhi ya jitihada hizo ni pamoja na Toward a Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness ya Francis Crick na Christof Koch, nadharia ya Global Workplace ya Bernard Baars, nadharia ya The Dynamic Core ya Gerald Elderman na Giulio Tononi, nadharia ya Thalamocortical Binding ya Rodolfo Llinas, nadharia ya Recurrent Processing ya Victor Lamme, nadharia ya Microconsciousness ya Semir Zeki, na nadharia ya The Feeling of What Happens ya Antonio Damasio. Ingawa si lengo la sura hii kujadili kwa undani ufundi na mapungufu ya nadharia hizi za kimajaribio (kwa sababu zote zina athari na dhana za kifalsafa, ambazo zinashughulikiwa hapa chini), hakuna hata moja kati yake inayoshughulikia kikamilifu tatizo gumu la fahamu. Profesa David Chalmers anaeleza kushindwa kwa mbinu za kibiolojia katika kushughulikia tatizo gumu la fahamu. Katika kitabu chake The Character of Consciousness, yeye 145.

Let us first address why biological explanations have failed. Some of these attempts include Francis Crick and Christof Koch’s Toward a Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness, Bernard Baars’s Global Workplace theory, Gerald Elderman’s and Giulio Tononi’s The Dynamic Core theory, Rodolfo Llinas’s Thalamocortical Binding theory, Victor Lamme’s Recurrent Processing theory, Semir Zeki’s Microconsciousness theory and Antonio Damasio’s The Feeling of What Happens theory. Although it is not the purpose of this chapter to discuss the technicalities and shortcomings of these empirical theories (because they all have philosophical implications and assumptions, which are addressed below), none of them comprehensively addresses the hard problem of consciousness. Professor David Chalmers explains the failure of the biological approaches in addressing the hard problem of consciousness. In his book The Character of Consciousness, he 145.

anatajwa mikakati mitano hatari ambayo imepitishwa194:

mentions five perilous strategies that have been adopted194:

Mkakati wa kwanza ni kueleza jambo jingine. Watafiti wanakubali tu kwamba tatizo la uzoefu ni gumu mno kwa sasa. Koch anakiri waziwazi mkakati huu ulioshindwa. Katika mahojiano yaliyochapishwa, alikiri: "Kwa hiyo, hebu kwanza tusahau vipengele halisi vigumu, kama hisia za kibinafsi, kwa sababu huenda visiwe na suluhisho la kisayansi. Hali ya kibinafsi ya maumivu, ya raha, ya kuona rangi ya bluu, ya kunusa waridi—inaonekana kuna pengo kubwa kati ya ngazi ya kimaada, ya kueleza molekuli na niuroni, na ngazi ya kibinafsi."195.

1. The first strategy is to explain something else. Researchers simply admit the problem of experience is too difficult for now. Koch openly admits this failed strategy. In a published interview, he confessed: “Well, let's first forget about the real difficult aspects, like subjective feelings, because they may not have a scientific solution. The subjective state of play, of pain, of pleasure, of seeing blue, of smelling a rose—there seems to be a huge jump between the materialistic level, of explaining molecules and neurons, and the subjective level.”195.

Mkakati wa pili ni kukataa tatizo gumu la fahamu. Ni kuamua kwamba sisi ni kama zombi, tuna udanganyifu tu wa hiari. Mkakati huu unaeleza hali ya binadamu kama mashine ya kibiolojia isiyo na uzoefu wa kibinafsi. Kwa maneno mengine, unapuuza tatizo na kufafanua upya maana ya kuwa binadamu.

2. The second strategy is to deny the hard problem of consciousness. It is to decide that we are zombies, with only an illusion of free will. This strategy describes the human reality as a biological machine with no subjective experience. In other words, it ignores the problem and redefines what it means to be human.

3. Mkakati wa tatu unadai kwamba uzoefu wa kibinafsi unaelezwa kwa kuelewa michakato ya kimwili katika ubongo wetu. Hata hivyo, hili linasikika kama uchawi. Fahamu, yaani uzoefu wa ndani, hujitokeza kwa namna fulani bila maelezo yoyote. Swali ni: michakato hii inazaaje uzoefu wa ndani wa kibinafsi?

3. The third strategy claims that subjective experience is explained by understanding the physical processes in our brain. However, this sounds like magic. Conscious experience somehow emerges without any explanation. The question, how do these processes give rise to an inner subjective experience?

Swali halijajibiwa. Zaidi ya hayo, kuelewa michakato ya kimwili hakutuambii chochote kuhusu jinsi inavyokuwa kwa mtu kuwa na uzoefu fulani wa ndani wenye fahamu.

is never answered. Furthermore, understanding physical processes tells us nothing about what it is like for a person to have a particular internal conscious experience.

4. Mkakati wa nne ni kueleza muundo wa uzoefu. Mkakati huu hautuambii chochote kuhusu kwa nini uzoefu upo kwanza kabisa, na kwa kueleza tu muundo wa uzoefu, hautupi majibu yoyote kuhusu ni nini hisia ya mtu kuwa na uzoefu huo.

4. The fourth strategy is to explain the structure of experience. This strategy tells us nothing of why experience exists in the first place, and just by explaining the structure of experience, it provides us with no answers to what it is like for a person to 146

Wana uzoefu wa kipekee.

have unique experiences.

Mkakati wa tano ni kutenganisha msingi (substrate), yaani safu ya msingi au tabaka la chini la uzoefu. Mkakati huu unalenga kutenganisha msingi wa kiakili-neva wa uzoefu kwa kuelewa michakato fulani. Hata hivyo, mkakati huu hauelezi jinsi ilivyo kuwa na uzoefu wa ndani wenye fahamu, wala kwa nini uzoefu huo unajitokeza kutoka kwenye michakato hii, wala kwa namna gani.

5. The fifth strategy is to isolate the substrate (the underlying basis or layer) of experience. This strategy aims to isolate the neural basis for experience by understanding certain processes. However, this strategy does not explain what it is like to have an internal conscious experience, why it emerges from these processes and how.

Ingia katika falsafa ya akili.

Enter the philosophy of mind.

Sasa tupo katika nafasi ya kushughulikia jinsi wanafalsafa wa akili wanavyoeleza fahamu kwa namna inayojaribu kulikabili tatizo gumu. Jambo muhimu la kuongeza hapa ni kwamba nadharia za kisayansi zina dhana za kifalsafa zilizofichika. Kwa hiyo, kushughulikia nadharia za kifalsafa kutasaidia pia kushughulikia nadharia za kimajaribio. Profesa Antti Revonsuo anafafanua jambo hili waziwazi:

Now we are in a position to address how philosophers of the mind explain consciousness in a way that attempts to address the hard problem. An important note to add here is that scientific theories have implied philosophical assumptions. Therefore, addressing the philosophical theories will also address the empirical theories. Professor Antti Revonsuo makes this point clear:

“Hata hivyo, ni muhimu pia kwa wanasayansi wa kimajaribio kufahamu njia mbalimbali za kifalsafa, kwa sababu kila nadharia ya kimajaribio kwa lazima hubeba aina fulani ya ahadi za kifalsafa zisizo wazi… Mwelekeo wa jumla wa kimajaribio ambao mwanasayansi huuchukua kuhusu fahamu huongozwa na ahadi zake za awali za kifalsafa au dhana zake kuhusu asili ya sayansi na asili ya fahamu, iwe anazifahamu ahadi hizo au hazifahamu.”196.

“However, it is useful also for empirical scientists to be aware of the different philosophical alternatives, because every empirical theory also necessarily involves some sort of implicit philosophical commitments… The overall empirical approach that a scientist takes to consciousness is guided by his prior philosophical commitments or intuitions about the nature of science and the nature of consciousness, whether he is aware of such commitments or not.”196.

Maprofesa Ricardo Manzotti na Paolo Moderato pia wanasisitiza kwamba sayansi ya neva "haina hatia ya kimetafizikia"197, na kwamba "data za kiempiria zinahitaji kufasiriwa kutoka mtazamo wa dhana fulani."198

Professors Ricardo Manzotti and Paolo Moderato also highlight that the neurosciences are “not metaphysically innocent”197 and that “empirical data needs to be interpreted from the perspective of some premise.”198.

Hakuna majaribio yoyote ya kifalsafa ya kueleza fahamu (consciousness) ambayo ni pana vya kutosha kupinga mbadala wa kiteista. Majaribio haya yanaweza kugawanywa kwa upana katika makundi mawili: yale ya kimaada au kifizikia (materialist au physicalist), na yale yasiyo ya kimaada. Ifuatayo ni maelezo mafupi ya majaribio haya na ufafanuzi wa sababu zilizofanya yashindwe.

None of the various philosophical attempts to explain consciousness are comprehensive enough to challenge the theistic alternative. These attempts can be broadly categorised as materialist or physicalist, and non-materialist. Below is a brief account of these attempts and an explanation of why they have failed.

Mbinu za kimaada

Materialistic approaches.

Kwa kuiga watafiti na wasomi wengine, maneno physicalism na materialism yatatumika kwa kubadilishana.199 200 Ingawa yana historia tofauti na tofauti fulani za kimawazo201, hizi hazileti tatizo kwa dhana zinazoshughulikiwa katika sura hii. Maneno hayo mawili yanamaanisha kwamba fahamu inaweza kuelezwa kwa sayansi ya kimwili, lakini hayamaanishi kila mara kwamba hali za kifahamu lazima zilinganishwe na vipande vya maada.

Echoing other researchers and academics, the terms physicalism and materialism will be used interchangeably.199 200 Although they have separate histories and some conceptual differences201, these do not pose a problem to the concepts dealt with in this chapter. The two terms mean that consciousness can be explained by the physical sciences, but do not always imply that conscious states must be equated to bits of matter.

Ukweli wa kimwili si ukweli wote!

Physical facts are not all the facts!.

Kabla sijaingia katika mbinu zote za kimaada, ningependa kueleza jinsi physicalism na materialism kwa ujumla zinavyodhoofishwa na hoja yenye nguvu ya Frank Jackson ya Mary. Hapa kuna muhtasari wake: Mary ameishi maisha yake yote katika chumba cheusi na cheupe na hupata taarifa za dunia kupitia kompyuta na televisheni nyeusi na nyeupe. Ndani ya chumba chake, Mary anapata taarifa zote za kisayansi za kimalengo kuhusu kinachotokea wanadamu wanapoona matukio ya kimwili. Anajua kila kitu kuhusu sayansi inayohusiana na kuona vitu kwa jicho la binadamu. Hata hivyo, hajui jinsi ilivyo kuona rangi. Siku moja anaruhusiwa kutoka chumbani. Mara tu anapofungua mlango, anaona waridi jekundu, na anapata uzoefu wa rangi nyekundu kwa mara ya kwanza. Anaithamini rangi nyekundu tu wakati anapoiona.202 Ujuzi wake wa ukweli wote wa kimwili kuhusu mtazamo wa kuona na rangi haukumtayarisha kwa uzoefu mpya wa kuona nyekundu. Hakujua jinsi ilivyo kuona waridi jekundu kwa kujifunza ukweli wa kimwili; alijua tu uzoefu huo ulivyokuwa wakati ulipotokea.

Before I get into all the materialist approaches, I would like to explain how physicalism and materialism in general are undermined by Frank Jackson’s powerful Mary argument. Here is a summary of it: Mary has lived in a black and white room all her life and acquires information about the world via black and white computers and televisions. In her room, Mary has access to all of the scientific objective information about what happens when humans see physical phenomena. She knows everything about the science related to perceiving objects with the human eye. Yet, she is unaware of what it is like to see colours. One day she is allowed to leave the room. The moment she opens the door she looks at a red rose, and experiences the colour red for the first time. She only appreciates the colour red the moment she sees it.202 Her knowledge about all the physical facts concerning visual perception and colours did nothing to prepare her for the new experience of seeing red. She did not know what it was like to see a red rose by learning the physical facts, she only knew what that experience was like the moment it occurred.

Chalmers hutoa hoja zifuatazo ili kuonyesha kwamba hoja ya Mary inafanya uyakinifu (materialism) ushindwe kutatua tatizo gumu la fahamu (hard problem of consciousness):

Chalmers provides the following premises to show that the Mary argument renders materialism unable to solve the hard problem of consciousness:

1. Mary anajua ukweli wote wa kimwili.

1. Mary knows all the physical facts.

2. Maryam hajui ukweli wote.

2. Mary does not know all the facts.

3. Ukweli wa kimwili haukamilishi ukweli wote.203.

3. The physical facts do not exhaust all the facts.203.

Hoja ya Chalmers hapa inaonyesha kwamba maarifa kuhusu ulimwengu wa kimwili hayatapelekea maarifa kuhusu uhalisia wa kibinafsi wa fahamu—kwa mfano, ni hisia gani ya kuona rangi nyekundu. Hili linaonekana kudhoofisha uyakinifu. Chalmers analijumuisha hoja hii kwa njia ifuatayo:

Chalmers’s argument here shows that knowledge of the physical world will not lead to knowledge of subjective conscious reality—for example, what it is like to see red. This seems to undermine materialism. Chalmers generalises the argument in the following way:

1. Kuna ukweli kuhusu fahamu (ufahamu) ambao hauwezi kupatikana kwa kutumia ukweli wa kimwili.

1. There are truths about consciousness that are not deducible from physical truths.

2. Ikiwa kuna ukweli kuhusu fahamu (consciousness) ambao hauwezi kupatikana kwa kuufikiria kutoka katika ukweli wa kimwili, basi materialism ni batili.

2. If there are truths about consciousness that are not deducible from physical truths, then materialism is false.

3. Ubepari si sahihi.204.

3. Materialism is false.204.

Ufizikia na ujumuishaji wa vitu (materialism) hauelezi hali ya kibinafsi (subjective).

Physicalism and materialism do not explain subjective.

kwa sababu maarifa ya ubongo wa kimwili hayaelekezi kwenye uelewa wa uzoefu wa kibinafsi (wa kimaudhui), na kwa nini uzoefu huo hujitokeza kutokana na shughuli za ubongo. Umaterialisti hautoshi, kwa kuwa kuna ukweli kuhusu fahamu ambao hauwezi kutolewa kutoka kwa ukweli wa kimwili.

consciousness because knowledge of the physical brain does not lead to an understanding of a subjective experience, and why that experience emerges from brain activity. Materialism is inadequate, because there are facts about consciousness that cannot be deduced from physical facts.

Hoja ya Mary imezua pingamizi za kuvutia. Pingamizi moja inadai kwamba haiwezekani kubainisha kile ambacho Mary angekijua iwapo angepata ukweli wote wa kimwili. Pingamizi hili halielewi hoja ya Mary. Linadhani kwamba hoja ya Mary inalenga kile kinachomaanishwa kuyajua mambo yote ya kimwili. Hata hivyo, hoja hiyo inalenga kutokuwa na uwezo wa Mary kujua jinsi ilivyo kuona rangi nyekundu, iwapo hajawahi kuwa na uzoefu wa kuona rangi nyekundu. Kwa hiyo, pingamizi lolote dhidi ya hoja ya Mary lazima lilenge kile Mary anachokipata kwa kuona rangi nyekundu, na si kile angekijua kama angekuwa na ukweli wote wa kimwili.

The Mary argument has generated interesting objections. One objection argues that it is not possible to identify what Mary would know if she acquired all of the physical facts. This objection misunderstands the Mary argument. It assumes that the Mary argument is focused on what it is like to know all the physical facts. However, the argument is focused on Mary’s inability to know what it is like to see red if she never had the experience of seeing red. Therefore, any objection to the Mary argument must focus on what Mary gains by seeing red and not what she would know if she had all the physical facts.

Pingamizi lingine ni Nadharia ya Uwezo (Ability Hypothesis). Nadharia hii inadai kwamba Mary haipati maarifa mapya yoyote, bali anapata uwezo mpya tu. Kwa mfano, mtu anapojifunza kuendesha baiskeli, hajifunzi mambo mapya kuhusu baiskeli; anapata tu uwezo wa kuiendesha. Pingamizi hili linachukuliwa kuwa halitoshelezi. Ikiwa Mary anaweza kupata uwezo mpya anapotoka chumbani, basi pia inawezekana kwamba anapata ukweli mpya ambao hakuwa nao kabla ya kutoka chumbani. Mtu anapojifunza kuendesha baiskeli, hapati uwezo wa kufanya hivyo tu, bali pia hupata ukweli mpya. Kwa mfano, mtu anayeshuka mteremko kwa kasi atajifunza hatimaye kutotumia breki kila mara kwa sababu hilo litasababisha rimu kupata joto kupita kiasi. Ili kushuka kwa udhibiti, breki zinapaswa kubanwa kwa upole kwa mipigo ya takriban sekunde mbili. Profesa Brian Loar ametoa pingamizi lenye changamoto kubwa kwa hoja ya Mary. Loar anasema kwamba Mary hapati maarifa mapya kuhusu rangi nyekundu, bali njia mpya ya kufikiri kuhusu kile alichokwisha kujua kuhusu rangi hiyo. Mkakati huu unasema kwamba kuna sifa moja tu inayoweza kuzaa dhana tofauti za sifa hiyo. Dhana hizo ni dhana za kimwili-kiutendaji (physical-functional concepts) na dhana za kifenomenolojia (phenomenal concepts), yaani dhana zinazorejelea uzoefu wa kibinafsi. Kwa hiyo, Mary alipoona rangi nyekundu kwa mara ya kwanza, hakuwa anapitia sifa mpya wala kujifunza ukweli mpya kuhusu sifa hiyo. Alikuwa anapitia njia tofauti ya kufikiri kuhusu kile alichokwisha kujua. Kabla ya kutoka chumbani, alitambua sifa ya rangi nyekundu kwa maneno ya kimwili-kiutendaji. Lakini alipotoka chumbani, alipata njia mpya ya kutambua sifa hiyo ya kimwili kwa maneno ya kifenomenolojia. Mary anaweza kupata dhana za kifenomenolojia pale tu anapoona rangi nyekundu, kwa sababu dhana hizi hupatikana kwa kuiona rangi hiyo tu. Udhaifu mkuu wa mkakati wa Loar ni kwamba unategemea dhana kwamba tunaweza kupata dhana za kifenomenolojia kwa kuchunguza sifa za kimwili. Hata hivyo, swali hili linaibua hoja hii: Ubongo wetu, wakati tunapopata hali ya kufahamu ya kuona sifa ya kimwili-kiutendaji, unawezaje kupata dhana ya kifenomenolojia? Loar hatoi jibu la kutosha kwa swali hilo. Mwanafalsafa asiye wa kimwili atasema kwamba hoja ya Mary inasimama imara kwa sababu inatoa jibu kwa swali hilo la msingi: tunapata dhana za kifenomenolojia kwa sababu vitu (ikiwa ni pamoja nasi wenyewe) vina sifa za kimwili na za kifenomenolojia. Kwa muhtasari, kudai kwamba dhana za kifenomenolojia zinaweza kutokana na sifa ya kimwili hakutoshi kueleza maarifa ambayo mtu hupata kutokana na kupitia uzoefu wa kibinafsi wa kufahamu.206

Another objection is the Ability Hypothesis. This hypothesis asserts that Mary does not gain any new knowledge, but only acquires new abilities. For example, when someone learns how to ride a bike they are not learning new things about the bike, they simply acquire the ability to ride it. This objection is considered inadequate. If Mary can gain new abilities when she leaves the room, then it is also possible that she gains new facts that she did not have prior to leaving the room. When someone learns how to ride a bike, they do not only acquire the ability to do so, they also gain new facts. For example, if someone is riding downhill fast, they will eventually learn not to constantly use the brakes as this will cause the rims to overheat. For a controlled descent, the brakes must be gently squeezed with around two second pulses. Professor Brian Loar’s objection provides a strong challenge to the Mary argument. Loar argues that Mary does not acquire new knowledge about red, only a new way of conceptualising what she already knew about the colour. This strategy declares that there is only one property that can give rise to distinct concepts of that property. These concepts are physical-functional concepts and phenomenal concepts (concepts that refer to subjective experience). So, when Mary saw red for the first time, she was not experiencing a new property and learning new facts about it. She was experiencing a different way of conceptualising what she already knew. Prior to leaving the room, she recognised the property of red in physical-functional terms. However, when she left the room, she acquired a new way of recognising the physical property of red in phenomenal terms. Mary can only acquire phenomenal concepts when she sees red, because these concepts come about only by seeing the colour red.205 The main problem with Loar’s strategy is that it is based on the assumption that we can acquire phenomenal concepts from observing physical properties. However, this begs the question: How can our brains, while we experience the conscious state of observing a physical-functional property, acquire a phenomenal concept? Loar does not provide any adequate answer. The non-physicalist will then state that the Mary argument holds its ground because it provides an answer to that fundamental question: we gain phenomenal concepts because things (including ourselves) contain physical and phenomenal properties. In summary, to claim that phenomenal concepts can arise from a physical property is inadequate to explain the knowledge one gains from experiencing a subjective conscious experience.206

Kuna sababu nyingine kwa nini mkakati wa dhana ya kifenomenolojia wa Loar si wa kuamua. Kwa majadiliano ya kina na majibu kwa akaunti ya Loar, tafadhali rejea Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts ya Michael Tye207, Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts ya Erhan Demircioglu208, Brian Loar on Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts ya Karol Polcyn209, na insha ya David Chalmers, Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap210.

There are other reasons why Loar’s phenomenal concept strategy is not decisive. For detailed discussions and responses to Loar’s account, please refer to Michael Tye’s Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts207, Erhan Demircioglu’s Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts208, Karol Polcyn’s Brian Loar on Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts209 and David Chalmers’s essay, Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap210.

Fasihi ya kitaaluma kuhusu hoja ya Mary pia ni pana, ikiwa na hoja zenye nguvu zinazounga mkono na zinazopinga fizikalizimu. Hii si nafasi ya kuchunguza fasihi hiyo kwa undani. Hata hivyo, mijadala ya kitaaluma haibatilishi kwa uhakika kile kilichowasilishwa katika sehemu hii.

The academic literature on the Mary argument is also vast, with compelling arguments supporting and challenging physicalism. This is not the space to explore the literature on the topic. However, the academic discussions do not conclusively undermine what has been presented in this section.

‘Tuache tatizo’: Uondoaji wa kimaada (Eliminative materialism) Wanauondoaji wa kimaada wanadhani kwamba kila kitu kinaweza kuelezwa kupitia michakato ya kimwili, na hawakubali kwamba hali za fahamu za kibinafsi (subjective conscious states) zipo. Wanasema kwamba ubongo unaundwa na niuroni zinazopitia michakato ya kimwili na kikemikali; kwa hiyo, kueleza michakato hii tata kutaeleza fahamu kwa namna fulani.211 Wanauondoaji wa kimaada wanasisitiza kwamba dhana za ‘saikolojia ya kawaida’ (folk psychology) ambazo tumezitengeneza ili kueleza fahamu ya kibinafsi (kutokana na ukosefu wa suluhisho zinazotolewa na sayansi ya kimwili kwa sasa) zitakuwa hazina maana wakati elimu ya neva (neuroscience) itakapo "kukomaa"212. Hapo ndipo elimu ya neva itakapoibadilisha fahamu ya kibinafsi kwa "shughuli za neva katika maeneo maalum ya kianatomia"213. Kwa muhtasari, siku moja sayansi itaeleza kile tunachokiita fahamu ya kibinafsi; kwa hiyo, tatizo gumu litatatuliwa.

‘Let’s ignore the problem’: Eliminative materialism Eliminative materialists assume everything can be explained via physical processes, and do not accept that subjective conscious states exist. They argue that the brain is made up of neurons undergoing physical and chemical processes; therefore, explaining these complex processes will somehow explain consciousness.211 Eliminative materialists assert that the ideas of ‘folk psychology’ we have developed to describe subjective consciousness (due to the current lack of solutions provided by the physical sciences) will be made redundant when neuroscience has “matured”212. This is when neuroscience will replace subjective consciousness with “neural activity in specialized anatomical areas”.213. In summary, science will one day explain what we call subjective consciousness; therefore, the hard problem will be solved.

Kulingana na mwanafalsafa wa uchanganuzi Patricia Churchland, akifuata mkabala wa eliminative materialism, swali linaloonekana kuwa la fahamu ya kibinafsi (subjective consciousness) litaondolewa siri yake pale tutakapoboresha maarifa yetu ya kisayansi. Churchland anasema kwamba tatizo gumu la fahamu (hard problem of consciousness) halipaswi kutofautishwa na matatizo mengine katika sayansi ya neva. Sababu, kwa mujibu wa Churchland, ni kwamba watafiti wana idadi ya matatizo ambayo bado hayajashughulikiwa, na kudai kwamba hayatawahi kutatuliwa ni jambo lisilo la busara. Kuelezwa kwa tatizo gumu kama fumbo au changamoto ngumu kwa fizikalism hakumaanishi kwamba halitapata suluhisho la kisayansi. Churchland anarejea historia ya sayansi kuunga mkono hoja zake. Historia inaonyesha kwamba sayansi imetatua matatizo mengi magumu, jambo linaloashiria kwamba tatizo gumu la fahamu nalo litatatuliwa.214

Echoing the eliminative materialist approach, the analytical philosopher Patricia Churchland asserts that the apparent question of subjective consciousness will be demystified when we improve our scientific knowledge. Churchland argues the hard problem of consciousness should not be distinguished from other problems in neuroscience. The reason, according to Churchland, is that researchers have an array of problems that are unaddressed, and to argue that they will never be solved seems unreasonable. Just because the hard problem is described as mysterious or a difficult challenge to physicalism does not mean that it will never have a scientific solution. Churchland refers to the history of science in support of her arguments. History shows that science has solved many ‘hard problems’, indicating that the hard problem of consciousness will also be solved.214

Tutokapo, michakato ya kimwili na kikemikali haituambii chochote kuhusu jinsi ilivyo kwa kiumbe fulani chenye fahamu kuwa na uzoefu wa ndani wa kibinafsi. Hii inamaanisha kwamba, kwa mwanamaada-nadharia wa kuondoa (eliminative materialist), uzoefu wa ndani wa kibinafsi ni udanganyifu tu. Kwa maneno mengine, wafuasi wa mtazamo huu hawakubali kweli tatizo gumu la fahamu, kwa sababu wanadai kwamba jambo na michakato ya kimwili ndivyo vinavyohitajika kueleza chochote. Hata hivyo, jambo na michakato ya kimwili haviwezi kutuambia chochote kuhusu jinsi ilivyo kuwa na uzoefu wa ndani wa kibinafsi wenye fahamu. Zaidi ya hayo, jambo haliwezi kueleza kuibuka kwa uzoefu wa kibinafsi wenye fahamu kwa sababu jambo ni baridi, si na macho, na halina fahamu. Kitu hakiwezi kuzaa kitu chochote isipokuwa kiwe tayari kina kitu hicho au kina uwezo wa kukizaa. Jambo na michakato ya kimwili havina fahamu, hivyo haviwezi kuzaa uzoefu wa kibinafsi wenye fahamu kwa kuwa havina uzoefu huo ndani yake. Frank Jackson na Philip Pettit wanashikilia kwamba dai la mwanamaada-nadharia wa kuondoa, kwamba historia ya sayansi imeonyesha kwamba lugha ya kifizikia itachukua nafasi ya saikolojia ya kawaida ya kiasili, halifuati kimantiki. Hoja yao ya msingi ni kwamba si busara kukataa hitimisho la nadharia kwa sababu ya uwezekano wa kugunduliwa kwa nadharia nyingine yenye upeo na nguvu kubwa zaidi ya kufafanua. Huenda madai ya nadharia "dhaifu" zaidi bado yakawa ya kweli, licha ya njia bora zaidi ya kisayansi ya kufafanua matukio yale yale. Jackson na Pettit wanatumia nadharia ya kinetiki ya gesi kama mfano. Nadharia ya kinetiki ya gesi inachunguza "tabia ndogo ndogo za molekuli na mwingiliano unaoleta mahusiano makubwa" (macroscopic relationships).215 Nadharia hii hutumia uchambuzi wa takwimu kutoa "matokeo sahihi kwa udhihirisho mkubwa wa matukio madogo madogo". (Ibid) Jackson na Pettit wanadai kwamba, kama nadharia dhahania ya "Super Kinetic" ingetoa hesabu zisizo za takwimu na zenye uamuzi kamili za "mahali kamili, uzito, kasi, na ukubwa wa kila chembe ya gesi", bado haingetoa msingi wa kukataa ukweli kwamba gesi zina joto na shinikizo.216 Sababu ni kwamba nadharia ya super kinetic haina "taarifa inayounga mkono sehemu husika ya nadharia ya zamani."217 Jackson na Pettit wanafupisha hoja yao kama ifuatavyo:

However, physical and chemical processes tell us nothing about what it is like for a particular conscious being to have an internal subjective experience. This implies that, for the eliminative materialist, inner subjective experiences are just an illusion. In other words, proponents of this view do not really accept the hard problem of consciousness, because they claim that matter and physical processes are all that is required to explain anything. Nevertheless, matter and physical processes cannot tell us anything about what it is like to have an inner subjective conscious experience. Furthermore, matter cannot explain the emergence of subjective conscious experience because matter is cold, blind and non-conscious. Something cannot give rise to anything unless it contains that thing in the first place or has the ability to give rise to it. Matter and physical processes are non-conscious and therefore cannot give rise to subjective conscious experience as they do not contain it. Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit maintain that the eliminative materialist’s claim—that the history of science has shown that a physicalist language will replace our primitive folk psychology—does not logically follow. The basis of their argument is that it is unreasonable to reject the conclusions of a theory due to the potential discovery of another theory that may have greater explanatory scope and power. It could be that the claims of the ‘weaker’ theory are still true despite a scientifically better way of explaining the same phenomena. Jackson and Pettit use the kinetic theory of gases as an example. The kinetic theory of gases studies “the microscopic behavior of molecules and the interactions which lead to macroscopic relationships”.215 This theory uses statistical analysis to provide accurate “results for macroscopic manifestations of microscopic phenomena”. (Ibid) Jackson and Pettit postulate that if a hypothetical “Super Kinetic” theory provided non-statistical, deterministic calculations of the “exact position, mass, velocity, and size of every gas molecule” it would not provide a basis to reject the fact that gases have temperature and pressure.216 The reason is that the super kinetic theory does not contain “information that supports the relevant part of the old theory.”217 Jackson and Pettit summarise their argument:

“Na bado, hakuna utambulisho wa kupunguza (reductive) unaowezekana kati ya halijoto na shinikizo kwa upande mmoja, na sifa za msingi za nadharia ya nguvu kinetiki kuu kwa upande mwingine. Halijoto, kwa mfano, si wingi, kasi, wala nafasi ya molekuli yoyote moja. Hakutakuwa na isomorfizimu hata kwa viwango vilivyolegezwa zaidi kati ya sheria za gesi zilizofafanuliwa kwa halijoto, shinikizo na ujazo, na sheria zilizofafanuliwa kwa wingi, nafasi na kasi ya molekuli za nadharia ya nguvu kinetiki kuu. Kanuni za msingi za uainishaji za nadharia hizi mbili ni tofauti sana.”218

“And yet no reductive reductive identifications of temperature and pressure with fundamental properties of the super kinetic theory are possible. Temperature, for instance, is not the mass, velocity, or position of any individual molecule. There will be no isomorphism even by the most relaxed standards between gas laws framed in terms of temperature, pressure, and volume and the laws framed in terms of mass, position, and velocity of molecules of the super kinetic theory. The basic taxonomic principles of the two theories are very different.”218

Kwa kuzingatia hayo, ubinafsi wa kuondoa (eliminative materialism) si maelezo ya kutosha kwa tatizo gumu la fahamu (hard problem of consciousness), kwa kuwa hupuuza kile hasa kinachohitaji kuelezwa kwanza. Hitimisho la ubinafsi wa kuondoa linaweza kupunguzwa hadi upuuzi ufuatao: hatuna ubinafsi wa ndani (inner subjectivity). Hata hivyo, uwezo wetu wa kuwa na uzoefu wa ndani wa kibinafsi ni ukweli wa mtu wa kwanza (first-person fact); kuukana ni jambo la kipuuzi.

In light of this, eliminative materialism is not an adequate explanation of the hard problem of consciousness as it ignores what requires explaining in the first place. The conclusions of eliminative materialism can be reduced to the following absurdity: we do not have inner subjectivity. However, our ability to have inner subjective experiences is a first-person fact; it is ludicrous to deny it.

Uondoaji wa kimaumbile (eliminative materialism) ulipata umaarufu kupitia mwanafalsafa Daniel Dennett alipochapisha kitabu chake, *Consciousness Explained*. Katika kitabu hiki, ambacho kimekosolewa sana, alifafanua upya dhana ya fahamu kwa kupuuza kile kinachohitaji maelezo: hali zetu za fahamu za kibinafsi na za kiuzoefu. Kwa mujibu wa Dennett, hatuna uzoefu halisi wa kibinafsi wa kiuzoefu; sisi ni roboti za kibaiolojia tu. Kwa maneno mengine, sisi ni kama viumbe wasio na fahamu wenye udanganyifu wa kuwa na uzoefu wa kiuzoefu. Ukosoaji wa mbinu ya Dennett, ambayo pia hujulikana kama nadharia ya Rasimu Nyingi (Multiple Drafts theory), umefupishwa na Profesa Antti Revonsuo katika kitabu chake, *Consciousness: The Science of Subjectivity*.

Eliminative materialism became popular with the philosopher Daniel Dennet when he published his book, Consciousness Explained. In this heavily criticised book, he redefined consciousness by ignoring what requires explaining: our subjective conscious states. According to Dennet, we have no real personal subjective experiences; we are simply biological robots. In other words, we are zombies with the illusion of subjective experience. Criticism of Dennet’s approach, also known as Multiple Drafts theory, has been summarised by Professor Antti Revonsuo in his book, Consciousness: The Science of Subjectivity:

Nadharia ya Dennet imekosolewa sana kwa sababu inaonekana kufafanua upya neno 'fahamu' kwa namna ambayo neno hilo linakuja kumaanisha kitu tofauti sana na kile tulichokusudia kueleza awali. Kitabu maarufu cha Dennet cha mwaka 1991 kinaitwa 'Consciousness Explained' (Fahamu Imefafanuliwa), lakini wengi walihisi kingepaswa kuitwa 'Consciousness Explained Away' (Fahamu Imefafanuliwa Hadi Kuondolewa). Kile ambacho watu wengi walitaka kupata maelezo yake ni fahamu ya kibinafsi ya kuhisi (phenomenal consciousness), qualia na ubinafsi wa uzoefu (subjectivity), lakini Dennet anavikataa kuwa ni udanganyifu tu. 219.

“Dennet’s theory has been heavily criticized because it seems to redefine ‘consciousness’ in such a way that the term comes to mean something very different from what we originally set out to explain. Dennet’s famous 1991 book is titled ‘Consciousness Explained’, but many felt it should have been called ‘Consciousness Explained Away’. What most people wanted to find an explanation for is phenomenal consciousness, qualia and subjectivity, but Dennet dismisses them as mere illusions.”219.

‘Kuwepo kwa mtu binafsi ni jambo halisi, lakini ni maada tu’: Uhalisia-maada wa kupunguza Uhalisia-maada wa kupunguza unadai kwamba kuna pengo la maarifa kati ya michakato ya kimwili na uzoefu wa fahamu wa kimtu binafsi. Hata hivyo, wanashikilia kwamba pengo hilo linaweza kufafanuliwa ndani ya falsafa ya kimaada. Wafuasi wa mtazamo huu wanasema kwamba uzoefu wa fahamu wa kimtu binafsi upo, lakini haujitenga na michakato ya kimwili. Msingi wa hoja zao ni kwamba kuna uhusiano kati ya shughuli fulani katika ubongo na uzoefu fulani wa fahamu; kwa hiyo, fahamu inaweza kupunguzwa hadi michakato ya kimwili. Tofauti na uhalisia-maada wa kuondoa, uhalisia-maada wa kupunguza unakubali kwamba fahamu ya kimtu binafsi ipo, lakini inaweza kupunguzwa hadi matukio ya kimwili yanayotokea katika ubongo wetu. Kwa njia hii, fahamu ya kimtu binafsi inafanana na shughuli za kemikali za neva.220 Ingawa hivi sasa hakuna njia ya kupunguza hali zote za fahamu za kimtu binafsi hadi matukio ya kimwili, uhalisia-maada wa kupunguza unatokana na matarajio kwamba sayansi ya neva itafuata mfano wa sayansi nyingine, ambapo maneno ya zamani, kama ‘joto’, yamebadilishwa na ‘sayansi ya wastani wa nishati ya mwendo ya molekuli’. Vivyo hivyo, sayansi ya neva inaweza kubadilisha maneno kama ‘upendo’ kwa kitara chake cha kikemikali cha neva. Kwa msingi, “fahamu si kitu zaidi ya seti changamano ya shughuli za neva zinazoendelea katika ubongo wetu”.22.

‘Subjectivity exists, but it’s just matter’: Reductive materialism Reductive materialism asserts that there is a knowledge-gap between physical processes and subjective conscious experiences. However, they maintain that the gap can be explained within a materialistic philosophy. Proponents of this view assert that subjective conscious experience exists, but is not distinct from physical processes. The basis for their arguments is that there is a link between certain activities in the brain and certain experiences of consciousness; therefore, consciousness can be reduced to physical processes. Reductive materialism, unlike eliminative materialism, accepts that subjective consciousness exists, but can be reduced to physical happenings in our brains. In this way, subjective consciousness is identical with neurochemical activity.220 Although there is currently no way of reducing all subjective conscious states to physical phenomena, reductive materialism is based on the expectation that neuroscience will follow the other sciences in that old terms, such as ‘heat’, will have been replaced with ‘the science of mean kinetic energy of molecules’. Similarly, neuroscience may replace words like ‘love’ with a neurochemical equivalent. In essence, “consciousness is nothing over and above a complex set of neural activities going on in our brain”.22.

Mtazamo huu hauna maelezo ya kutosha kwa hali za kibinafsi za fahamu, kwa sababu umejengwa juu ya dhana kwamba uzoefu wa kibinafsi ni halisi, lakini utaelezwa siku zijazo kwa maendeleo katika sayansi ya neva. Kimsingi, uyakinifu wa kupunguza unasema kwamba hali za fahamu za kibinafsi zitapunguzwa kuwa hali za kimwili za ubongo. Hili halitatatua tatizo gumu la fahamu. Haiwezekani kujua kinachohisiwa na kiumbe fulani anapopitia hali ya kibinafsi kwa kuangalia tu mkusanyiko wa neuroni zinazowaka. Uyakinifu wa kupunguza pia hauelezi chanzo cha uzoefu wa fahamu. Neurobiolojia na uzoefu wa kibinafsi ni tofauti kabisa. Kueleza tu kwamba fahamu hutokea kutoka michakato ya kimwili isiyo na fahamu hakutoshi. Kama wataalamu wa uyakinifu wa kuondoa, wataalamu wa uyakinifu wa kupunguza hawawezi kutatua tatizo gumu. Uhalisia wa ndani wa kibinafsi wa binadamu unapuuzwa tena. Profesa Revonsuo anaeleza:

This view is not an adequate explanation for subjective conscious states, because it is based on the assumption that subjective experiences are real, but will be explained in the future by developments in neuroscience. Essentially, reductive materialism argues that subjective conscious states will be reduced to physical brain states. This does not solve the hard problem of consciousness. It is impossible to know what it is like for a particular organism to experience a subjective state simply by observing a bunch of neurons firing. Reductive materialism also doesn’t explain the source of conscious experience. Neurobiology and subjective experience are completely different. Simply explaining that consciousness emerges from non-conscious physical processes is not adequate. Just like the eliminative materialists, reductive materialists cannot solve the hard problem. The inner subjective realities of the human being are once again being ignored. Professor Revonsuo explains:

"Hata hivyo, inaonekana wazi kwamba kuzungumzia mwako wa neva, uanzishaji na usitishaji wa shughuli katika maeneo tofauti ya ubongo, au mlandanisho wa mitetemo katika mikusanyiko ya neva si jambo sawa kabisa na kuzungumzia hisia za maumivu, mhemko wa rangi, hisia kali au mawazo ya ndani—na kamwe haitakuwa hivyo. Kinachoachwa nje, kwanza kabisa, ni upande wa kibinafsi wa matukio ya kiakili yenye fahamu."222

“Still, it seems clear that to talk about neural firings, activations and deactivations in different brain areas or oscillatory synchrony in neural assemblies is not at all the same thing as talking about feelings of pain, sensations of colour, passionate emotions or inner thoughts—and never will be. What is being left out is, first and foremost, the subjective aspect of the conscious mental events.”222

Tofauti kati ya uhalisia-mpunguzi wa kuondoa (eliminative materialism) na uhalisia-mpunguzi wa kupunguza (reductive materialism) ni ndogo sana. Uhalisia-mpunguzi wa kuondoa unasema kwamba ufahamu wa kibinafsi (subjective consciousness) ni udanganyifu na haupo. Kwa mtazamo huu, udanganyifu wa ufahamu wa kibinafsi si kitu zaidi ya niuroni kuwaka. Uhalisia-mpunguzi wa kupunguza unakubali kwamba ufahamu wa kibinafsi upo, lakini unashikilia kwamba si kitu zaidi ya shughuli ya kimwili katika ubongo. Mitazamo yote miwili inashindwa kushughulikia ukweli wa nafsi ya kwanza (first-person fact) wa ufahamu wa kibinafsi.

The difference between eliminative materialism and reductive materialism is quite subtle. Eliminative materialism argues that subjective consciousness is an illusion and does not exist. According to this approach, the illusion of subjective consciousness is nothing more than neurons firing. Reductive materialism accepts that subjective consciousness exists, but maintains that it is nothing more than physical activity in the brain. Both fail to address the first-person fact of subjective consciousness.

“Ni kile unachofanya”: Tabia-jaribio (Behaviourism) Mbinu nyingine inayoshiriki hitimisho la nadharia ya kuondoa-akili (eliminative materialism) ni tabia-jaribio (behaviourism). Tabia-jaribio inadai kwamba fahamu (consciousness) hufafanuliwa kwa maneno ya tabia. Wanatabia-jaribio wanasema kwamba mtu huwa na hali fulani ya fahamu ikiwa tu inaweza kuthibitishwa kwa tabia ya mtu huyo (kwa mfano, Susan yuko katika maumivu ikiwa, baada ya kupigwa na kitu fulani, analia “ouch!”). Tabia-jaribio inakataa uzoefu wa fahamu wa kibinafsi (subjective conscious experience), na inafafanua fahamu kama namna tunavyotenda badala ya namna tulivyo. Mbinu hii inakanusha tatizo gumu la fahamu (hard problem of consciousness) kwa sababu inashindwa kukiri kwamba binadamu anaweza kuwa na hali za kiakili bila kuonyesha tabia yoyote. Kama mwanafalsafa David Lund anavyotoa hoja, hatuwezi kupuuza ukweli kwamba sisi hupata hali za ndani za kibinafsi ambazo hazifunuliwi kila wakati kupitia tabia zetu.223

‘It’s what you do’: Behaviourism Another approach that shares the conclusions of eliminative materialism is behaviourism. Behaviourism postulates that consciousness is defined in behavioural terms. Behaviourists assert that a person only has a certain conscious state if it can be verified by that person’s behaviour (for example, Susan is in pain if, after being struck with something, she cries ‘ouch!’). Behaviourism denies subjective conscious experience, and defines consciousness as the way we act rather than the way we are. This approach denies the hard problem of consciousness because it fails to acknowledge that humans can have mental states without displaying any behaviour. As the philosopher David Lund argues, we cannot dismiss the fact that we do experience inner subjective states that are not always revealed via our behaviours.223

Tabia-mwenendo (behaviourism) inafanya hali ya kufahamu kuwa sawa na hali ya kimwili. Tatizo la mbinu hii ni kwamba inapuuza ukweli kwamba ni hali ya kufahamu inayosababisha tabia. Kwa mfano, ni maumivu yanayomchochea Susan kusema 'ouch!', kwa hiyo maumivu na kusema 'ouch!' si kitu kimoja.

Behaviourism makes a conscious state identical to a physical state. The problem with this approach is that it ignores the fact that it is the conscious state that causes the behaviour. For example, it is the pain that provokes Susan to say ‘ouch!’, so pain and saying ‘ouch!’ are not identical to each other.

‘Just a bunch of inputs, mental states and outputs’: Functionalism Functionalism ni wanazuoni wanaosema kwamba fahamu (consciousness) hufafanuliwa kwa kazi au nafasi inayotekeleza, ikitokana na mfululizo wa mahusiano ndani ya kiumbe au mfumo, kama ilivyo kwa kompyuta. Kazi hufafanuliwa kama uhusiano wa pembejeo (inputs), hali za kiakili (mental states) na matokeo (outputs). Kwa mfano, nikiona basi langu linakaribia (pembejeo), ninapata hali ya kiakili ya wasiwasi kwamba huenda nikachelewa kwa kuhofia kukosa basi hilo (hali ya kiakili); kisha ninakimbilia kituo cha basi (matokeo). Wanafunzi wa functionalism wanasema kwamba fahamu inafanana na programu ya kompyuta, inayotokana na mifumo tata ya ubongo.224 Functionalism imekabiliwa na pingamizi kadhaa.225

‘Just a bunch of inputs, mental states and outputs’: Functionalism Functionalists postulate that consciousness is defined as the functions or roles it plays, emerging from a set of relations within an organism or system, just like a computer. A function is defined as a relation of inputs, mental states and outputs. For example, if I see my bus arriving (input), I experience the mental state of worrying that I may be late due to the possibility of missing my bus (mental state); I then run towards the bus stop (output). Functionalists assert that consciousness is similar to a computer program, which arises from complex patterns within the brain.224 Functionalism has faced a number of objections.225

Moja ya hoja hizo ni kwamba functionalism haiwezi kuzingatia hali za fahamu za kibinafsi (subjective) kwa sababu haziwezi kueleweka kiutendaji (functionally).226 Haifuati kwamba kwa kujua tu pembejeo zote, hali za akili na matokeo tutajua kwa namna fulani inakuwaje kwa kiumbe fulani kupitia hali ya kiakili. Ninaweza kuelewa kwamba mtu anapoona mbwa hatari akimkimbilia (pembejeo), atapata hofu (hali ya kiakili), na bila shaka atakimbia kutafuta usalama (matokeo). Hata hivyo, kwa kujua uhusiano kati ya pembejeo, hali ya kiakili na matokeo, sijasogea karibu zaidi kuelewa inakuwaje kwa mtu huyo kuwa katika hali fulani ya kiakili. Pia haituambii chochote kuhusu jinsi na kwa nini hali za kiakili hutokana na seti hiyo ya uhusiano. Kurejea mfano wa hapo juu, siwezi kujua inakuwaje kwa mtu mwingine kupata hisia ya kutishiwa na mnyama hatari. Kuelewa jinsi hali za kiakili zinavyohusiana na pembejeo na matokeo hakuleti ujuzi wa kujua inakuwaje kuwa katika hali hiyo ya kiakili.

One of these is that functionalism is unable to consider subjective conscious states because they cannot be understood functionally.226 It does not follow that just by knowing all of the inputs, mental states and outputs we will somehow know what it is like for a particular organism to experience a mental state. I can understand that when someone sees a dangerous dog running towards them (input), they will experience fear (mental state), they will inevitably run for safety (output). However, by knowing the relations between the input, mental state and output, I am no closer to understanding what it is like for that person to be in a particular mental state. It also tells me nothing about how and why mental states arise from the set of relations. Referring back to the above example, I cannot know what it is like for someone else to experience the feeling of being threatened by a dangerous animal. Understanding how mental states relate to inputs and outputs does not give rise to knowing what it is like to be in that mental state.

Wasomi wengi wanashikilia kwamba, licha ya umaarufu wake, mtazamo wa utendakazi (functionalism) hauna uzito mkubwa kama suluhisho la tatizo gumu la fahamu (hard problem of consciousness).227.

Many academics maintain that despite its popularity, functionalism does not carry much weight as a solution to the hard problem of consciousness.227.

"Yyote ni katika ugumu wake": Uhalisia wa kimaada unaojitokeza (emergent materialism).

‘It’s in the complexity’: Emergent materialism.

Wazo hili linatokana na dhana ya kujitokeza (emergence). Kujitokeza hutokea pale vitu vinapopangwa kwa namna ambayo hubadilika na kuwa vitu changamano, vyenye mahusiano tata ya sababu na matokeo, ambayo kutokana nayo hujitokeza matukio mapya.228 Kuna aina mbili za uyakinifu wa kujitokeza: ule wenye nguvu (strong) na ule dhaifu (weak).

This idea is based on the concept of emergence. Emergence occurs when things become arranged in such a way that they transform into complex entities and have complicated causal relationships from which new phenomena appear.228 There are two types of emergent materialism: the strong and the weak.

Fomu dhaifu inadai kwamba hatimaye tutaelewa fahamu ya kibinafsi mara tu michakato yote changamano ya kimwili itakapoeleweka. Fomu dhaifu inaweza kueleza jinsi fahamu inavyojitokeza kutokana na michakato ya kimwili, lakini haifuatii kwamba itatupa maarifa ya kile kinachohisiwa na kiumbe chenye fahamu anapokuwa na uzoefu wa ndani wa kibinafsi. Je, fumbo la fahamu ya kibinafsi litatoweka mara tutakapoelewa jinsi inavyojitokeza kutokana na michakato yote changamano ya kimwili? Ikiwa litatoweka, basi inaonekana kukataa kile kinachohitaji kuelezwa kwanza. Ikiwa fahamu ya kibinafsi itaendelea kubaki, basi uhalisia-mwili wa kujitokeza unakabiliwa na matatizo yale yale ya uhalisia-mwili wa kupunguza; fahamu ya kibinafsi inaweza kuwa na msingi wa kimwili bila kutuambia chochote kuhusu kile kinachohisiwa kuwa na uzoefu huu wa fahamu ya kibinafsi.229

The weak form asserts that we will eventually understand subjective consciousness once all of the complex physical processes are understood. The weak form may explain how consciousness emerges from physical processes, but it does not follow that it will lead to knowledge of what it is like for a conscious organism to have an inner subjective experience. Will the mystery of subjective consciousness disappear once we have understood how it emerges from all of the complex physical processes? If it does, then it seems to be denying what requires explaining in the first place. If subjective consciousness remains, then emergent materialism suffers from the same problems as reductive materialism; subjective consciousness may have a physical basis without telling us anything about what it is like to have these subjective conscious experiences.229

Toleo moja la uyakinifu dhaifu wa kujitokeza (weak emergent materialism) linashikilia kwamba hatutaweza kamwe kuelewa michakato yote ya kimwili inayosimamia fahamu ya kibinafsi (subjective consciousness). Hata hivyo, kinadharia, kama tungewahi kuwa na uelewa kamili wa jinsi ubongo unavyofanya kazi, basi tungeweza kuelewa fahamu ya kibinafsi. Aina hii ya uyakinifu dhaifu wa kujitokeza haifafanui chochote kabisa. Katika muktadha wa hoja iliyowasilishwa katika sura hii, kukubali maelezo yanayofafanua kweli tatizo gumu la fahamu (hard problem of consciousness) ni jambo la busara zaidi kuliko kukubali mbinu isiyofanya hivyo.

A variant of weak emergent materialism maintains that we will never understand all of the physical processes that underpin subjective consciousness. However, theoretically speaking, if we were ever to have a perfect understanding of how the brain works, we could understand subjective consciousness. This form of weak emergent materialism does not explain anything at all. In the context of the argument presented in this chapter, accepting an explanation that actually explains the hard problem of consciousness is more rational than accepting an approach that does not.

Nadharia kali ya uibukaji wa kimaada (strong emergent materialism) inasema kwamba fahamu ya kibinafsi ni jambo la kiasili; hata hivyo, nadharia yoyote ya kimwili inayojaribu kueleza uhalisia wake iko nje ya uwezo wa akili ya binadamu. Aina hii ya uibukaji inasema kwamba tunaweza kupata jambo jipya X kutoka Y, bila kujua jinsi X inavyoibuka kutoka Y. Uibukaji wa kimaada wa kina unashikilia kwamba tunaweza kupata kitu kipya kutoka kwa michakato changamano ya kimwili, lakini pengo katika uelewa wetu wa jinsi kitu hicho kipya kinavyoibuka halitawahi kufungwa. Njia hii haielezi tatizo gumu la fahamu, kwa kuwa inakiri kwamba haliwezi kuelezwa. Kwa maoni yangu hili halitofautiani na kusema, "Hutokea tu. Ni changamano sana hata hakuna anayejua." Revonsuo anasema kwamba uibukaji wa kimaada wa kina hautawahi kueleza fahamu ya kibinafsi, na hata kama tungepewa nadharia sahihi, "ingekuwa sawa na kile panya wangeweza kufanya na kitabu cha Charles Darwin, Origins of Species, endapo nakala ingewekwa kwenye ngome yao."230 Kwa kuwa tunajaribu kueleza tatizo gumu la fahamu, kulikataa jambo la fahamu ya kibinafsi kama fumbo hakumzuii mtu mwenye busara kukubali mbinu inayoweza kulieleza kwa mshikamano. Je, sayansi itaeleza siku moja fahamu ya kibinafsi? Kama inavyoonekana katika mbinu hizo za kimaada hapo juu, hoja kuu ni kwamba maelezo ya kisayansi siku moja yatafunga pengo lililopo sasa katika maarifa yetu. Mbinu hii, hata hivyo, haitoi maelezo ya kutosha ya fahamu, kwa kuwa ninaamini ni aina ya mantiki potofu ya 'science of the gaps'. Tukichunguza mbinu ya kisayansi na falsafa ya sayansi, tutaelewa kwamba fahamu ya kibinafsi iko nje ya uwezo wa sayansi. Mafanikio ya awali ya sayansi yalitokana na uwezo wake wa kuona matukio mapya au kutoa miundo mipya ya kinadharia iliyoeleza data zilizopo zinazoweza kuonekana. Mfanano wa kiumbe fulani chenye fahamu hauwezi kueleweka na sayansi. Wanasayansi wamewekewa mipaka na uchunguzi walio nao, kwa sababu sayansi "inalazimika kuelekeza umakini wake katika matatizo ambayo uchunguzi unaweza kuyatatua pekee".

The strong form of emergent materialism argues that subjective consciousness is a natural phenomenon; however, any physicalist theory that attempts to address its reality is beyond the capacity of the human intellect. This form of emergence argues that we can get a new phenomenon X from Y, without knowing how X emerges from Y. Strong emergent materialism maintains that we can get something new from the complex physical processes, but the gap in our understanding of how this new thing emerges will never be closed. This approach does not explain the hard problem of consciousness, as it admits that it cannot be explained. In my view this is no different to saying, “It just happens. It is so complex that no one knows.” Revonsuo argues that strong emergent materialism will never be able to address subjective consciousness, and even if we were to be given the correct theory, it “would equal what hamsters could make of Charles Darwin’s Origins of Species if a copy was placed in their cage.”230 Since we are trying to explain the hard problem of consciousness, dismissing subjective consciousness as a mystery does nothing to prevent a rational person from accepting an approach that actually does coherently explain it. Will science eventually explain subjective consciousness? As seen from the above materialist approaches, the main argument is that a scientific explanation will someday close the current gap in our knowledge. This approach, however, does not provide an adequate explanation of consciousness, as I believe it is a form of the ‘science of the gaps’ fallacy. If we examine the scientific method and the philosophy of science, we will understand that subjective consciousness is beyond the reach of science. The previous successes of science stemmed from the fact that they were able to observe new phenomena or provide new theoretical models that explained existing observable data. The likeness of a particular conscious organism cannot be understood by science. Scientists are limited to the observations they have, because science is “forced to restrict its attention to problems that observations can solve”.

231 Kwa kuwa haiwezekani kuchunguza fahamu za kibinafsi (mtazamo wa nafsi ya kwanza) kutoka mtazamo wa mtu wa tatu, sayansi haiwezi kushughulikia fahamu za kibinafsi. Kama ilivyotajwa hapo awali, hata kama tungejua kila kitu kuhusu ubongo, bado tusingeweza kushughulikia tatizo gumu la fahamu. Shughuli ya ubongo inaonyesha tu kwamba kitu fulani kinatokea, si jinsi ilivyo kwa kitu hicho kutokea. Hata kama shughuli zote za kemikali za neva katika ubongo wa mtu zingeainishwa na kuhusishwa na masimulizi ya nafsi ya kwanza ya uzoefu wake wa kibinafsi, sayansi isingeweza kubaini uzoefu wa mtu huyo mahususi au kwa nini unatokana na michakato ya kimwili.

231 Since it is impossible to observe subjective consciousness (first-person perspective) from the perspective of the third person, science cannot address subjective consciousness. As mentioned before, even if we were to know everything about the brain we would still not be able to address the hard problem of consciousness. Brain activity only indicates that something is happening, not what it is like for that something to happen. Even if all of the neurochemical activity were mapped out in someone’s brain and correlated with first-person accounts of his or her subjective experience, science would be unable to determine that particular person’s experience or why it results from physical processes.

Hata ikiwa, baada ya miaka kumi kuanzia sasa, nadharia mpya ya kisayansi au maelezo mapya ya kibiolojia kuhusu fahamu yatakuwa yameundwa, bado hayataweza kubainisha ni nini hisia ya mtu kuwa na uzoefu wa kibinafsi (subjective experience), wala kwa nini uzoefu huo mahususi unajitokeza kutoka michakato ya kimwili. Uzoefu wa fahamu wa kibinafsi uko nje ya upeo wa maelezo ya kisayansi. Kwa kuzingatia yaliyo juu, majaribio ya kimaada (materialistic) ya kueleza fahamu yanashindwa kabisa. Mwanafiziolojia wa mfumo wa neva John C. Eccles anafupisha kushindwa huku kwa njia inayofaa: “Ninashikilia kwamba fumbo la kibinadamu linadharauliwa mno na upunguzaji wa kisayansi (scientific reductionism), pamoja na dai lake la uyakinifu wa ahadi (promissory materialism)….”232.

Even if, ten years from now, a new scientific theory or biological explanation for consciousness is developed, it would still not be able to determine what it is like for a person to have a subjective experience, or why that particular subjective experience emerges from physical processes. Subjective conscious experience is outside of the scope of a scientific explanation. In light of the above, materialistic attempts to explain consciousness fail comprehensively. The neurophysiologist John C. Eccles aptly summarises this failure: “I maintain that the human mystery is incredibly demeaned by scientific reductionism, with its claim in promissory materialism….”232.

Mbinu zisizo za kimaada Mbinu hizi zinakubali kwamba uhalisia una zaidi ya maada. Huu ni mtazamo ambao Uislamu, pamoja na imani ya Mungu kwa ujumla, unautambua. Sisi ni zaidi ya maada na nishati; kuna sehemu ya kiroho katika uwepo wetu. Hata hivyo, baadhi ya mbinu hizi zinalenga kueleza fahamu bila kukubali au kutegemea kuwepo kwa Mungu. Nitazikosoa na kueleza jinsi imani ya Mungu inavyotoa njia yenye mantiki zaidi ya kueleza fahamu.

Non-materialistic approaches These approaches admit that the.re is more to reality than matter. This is a view that Islam, and theism in general, recognises. We are more than matter and energy; there is a spiritual component to our existence. However, several of these strategies aim to explain consciousness without admitting, or invoking, the existence of God. I will criticise these and explain how theism provides the most rational way of explaining consciousness.

"Ni tofauti, lakini hatujui jinsi gani": Ubaguzi wa Dhati (Substance Dualism).

‘They’re different, but we do not know how’: Substance Dualism.

Uwili wa dutu ni mtazamo kwamba kuna dutu mbili tofauti: moja ni ya kimwili na nyingine si ya kimwili. Dutu hizi ni tofauti kimsingi na zipo kwa kujitegemea kutoka kwa nyingine. Katika muktadha wa majadiliano yetu, uwili wa dutu unashikilia kwamba fahamu na ubongo ni tofauti na havitokani na dutu moja; kimoja ni cha kimaada na kingine ni cha kiroho, lakini vyote viwili vinaingiliana. Maelezo haya ya fahamu ni rahisi sana kuelewa na yanaendana na uzoefu wetu wa kila siku. Kwa mfano, tunapitia uzoefu kwamba hali za fahamu zinaweza kusababisha hali za kimwili, na kinyume chake. Ikiwa nina uzoefu wa ndani wa huzuni, unaweza kusababisha hali ya kimwili ya kukunja uso au kulia. Kwa upande mwingine, nikigonga kichwa changu kwenye kitu, nitahisi uzoefu wa ndani wa maumivu. Pingamizi kuu dhidi ya uwili wa dutu ni kwamba, kwa kuwa hali za fahamu na ubongo ni tofauti kabisa, basi kujua jinsi vinavyoingiliana haiwezekani. Hili linajulikana kama tatizo la mwingiliano; kwa mujibu wa baadhi ya wanafalsafa, hakuna maelezo yenye mantiki ya jinsi na kwa nini ubongo wa kimwili na fahamu isiyo ya kimwili vinavyoingiliana.233

Substance dualism is the view that there are two different substances: one is physical and the other is non-physical. These substances are fundamentally distinct and exist independently of each other. In the context of our discussion, substance dualism maintains that consciousness and the brain are different and are not from the same substance; one is material and the other immaterial, yet they interact with each other. This account of consciousness is very intuitive, making sense of our everyday experiences. For instance, we experience that conscious states can cause physical states, and vice versa. If I have the subjective conscious experience of sadness, it can cause the physical state of frowning or crying. On the converse side, if I bump my head on an object, I will feel the inner subjective experience of pain. A key objection to substance dualism is that since conscious states and the brain are radically different, then knowing how they interact is impossible. This is known as the interactionist problem; there is— according to some philosophers—no coherent account of how and why the material brain and the immaterial consciousness interact.233

Hata hivyo, pingamizi hili limejengwa juu ya dhana potofu kwamba iwapo hatujui jinsi X inavyosababisha Y, basi hatuna haki ya kuamini kwamba X inasababisha Y. Kuna visa vingi vya mwingiliano wa kisababishi ambavyo tunajua jambo moja linasababisha jingine bila kujua jinsi linavyolisababisha.

However, this objection is based on the false assumption that if we do not know how X causes Y, then we are not justified to believe that X causes Y. There are many cases of causal interactions in which we know one thing causes another without knowing how.

Ingawa uwili wa dutu (substance dualism) ni mshindani mkuu wa njia mbadala ya kitheist, ikiwa uwili wa dutu utakubaliwa ndani ya mfumo usio wa kitheist, haushughulikii baadhi ya maswali ya msingi: Dutu isiyo ya kimwili ilitoka wapi? Inawepoje katika ulimwengu wa kimwili? Zaidi ya hayo, maelezo ya kitheist yanatoa maelezo yenye mshikamano zaidi kuhusu jinsi ubongo wa kimwili na fahamu isiyo ya kimwili zinavyoingiliana. Hii ndiyo sababu uwili wa kitheist ndio njia yenye mshikamano zaidi (tazama sehemu ya Mungu Ndiye Maelezo Bora hapa chini).

Although substance dualism is a strong contender to the theistic alternative, if substance dualism is adopted within a non-theistic paradigm, it does not address some fundamental questions: Where did the immaterial substance come from? How does it exist in the physical universe? Moreover, a theistic explanation provides a more coherent account of how the physical brain and non-physical consciousness interact. This is why a theistic type of dualism is the most coherent approach (see God Is the Best Explanation section below).

‘Ni bahati mbaya tu’: Epifenomenalism Kwa nadharia hii, hali za fahamu ni tofauti na hali za kimwili, na hali za kimwili husababisha hali za fahamu, lakini si kinyume chake. Kwa njia hii, hali za fahamu hazina uwezo wa kusababisha chochote. Mifano maarufu inayopinga epifenomenalism ni kwamba, kama ingekuwa kweli, hisia ya maumivu mkononi mwangu (uzoefu wa fahamu) inayotokana na moto mkali isingekuwa na nafasi yoyote ya kisababishi katika mkono wangu kuondoka (hali ya kimwili). Mfano mwingine ni kwamba, kama ungekuwa na bahati mbaya ya kufukuzwa na mlevi aliyedhamiria kukutupia chupa iliyovunjika, kuona chupa hiyo ikikusogelea kunaweza kuibua hisia ya woga, lakini hisia hiyo ya woga isingekusababisha kuinama na kujikinga; hatua yako ya kujilinda ingetokea kwa sababu ya ajali fulani ya kubahatisha. Hili linapingana na uelewa wetu wa msingi wa uhalisia wa binadamu. Tunajua kwamba tuna miitikio ya kimwili kutokana na hali za fahamu za kibinafsi, na pia tunapata hisia na uzoefu wa kibinafsi kutokana na sababu za kimwili. Kama epifenomenalism ingekuwa kweli, saikolojia ya binadamu ingeharibika kabisa. Fikiria tu mgonjwa mwenye msongo wa mawazo akimwambia mtaalamu wake wa tiba ya akili kwamba hisia zake za ndani za msongo wa mawazo ndizo zinazosababisha mashambulizi yake ya wasiwasi, kisha akaambiwa kwamba hilo halina uhusiano wowote nalo.

‘It’s a lucky accident’: Epiphenomenalism With this theory, conscious states are distinct from physical states, and physical states cause conscious states, but not the other way around. In this way, conscious states are causally impotent. Popular rejections of epiphenomenalism include that, if true, a sensation of pain in my hand (conscious experience) due to a hot flame plays no causal role in my hand moving away (physical state). Another example includes that if you were to have the unfortunate experience of being chased by a drunkard hell-bent on throwing a broken bottle at you, the sight of the bottle moving towards you might create the conscious experience of fear, but the feeling of fear would not cause you to duck and protect yourself; your defensive move would occur due to some random accident. This contradicts our basic understanding of the human reality. We know that we have physical reactions due to subjective conscious states, and we also experience subjective feelings and experiences due to physical causes. If epiphenomenalism were true, human psychology would be in ruin. Just imagine a patient with depression telling his psychotherapist that his internal feelings of depression cause his anxiety attacks, only to be told that it has nothing to do with it.

"Kila kitu kina fahamu": Panpsychism.

‘Everything is conscious’: Panpsychism.

Panpsychism ni sawa kwa kiasi fulani na uhalisia wa sifa mbili (property dualism), ambao unashikilia kwamba kuna dutu moja tu iliyopo (dutu ya kimwili), lakini ina sifa mbili (sifa za kimwili na sifa zisizo za kimwili, yaani sifa za fahamu za kibinafsi). Panpsychism inashikilia kwamba jambo (matter) lina aina fulani ya fahamu ya kibinafsi. Kwa mtazamo huu, inasema kwamba fahamu ni sifa ya asili ya ulimwengu, na kwamba ina nafasi ya kisababishi. Wanaounga mkono panpsychism ni pamoja na maprofesa David Chalmers na Thomas Nagel. Kwa kuwa kila sehemu ya jambo ina fahamu, fahamu ya ubongo ni mkusanyiko tu wa sehemu hizi za fahamu. Aina moja ya panpsychism inasema kwamba jambo lote lina fahamu kwa namna ile ile wanadamu walivyo nayo. Aina nyingine ya panpsychism inashikilia kwamba fahamu iliyomo katika jambo iko katika hali ya msingi, inayojulikana pia kama protoconsciousness (fahamu ya awali).

Panpsychism is somewhat similar to property dualism, which asserts that one substance exists (physical substance), but contains two properties (physical and non-physical or subjective conscious properties). Panpsychism asserts that matter contains a form of subjective consciousness. From this perspective, it argues that consciousness is an intrinsic property of the universe and it plays a causal role. Advocates of panpsychism include professors David Chalmers and Thomas Nagel. Since each component of matter contains consciousness, the brain’s consciousness is just an accumulation of these components of consciousness. One form of panpsychism states that all matter is conscious in the same way humans are. The other form of panpsychism asserts that consciousness contained in matter is in a basic state, also known as protoconsciousness.

Kuna matatizo kadhaa katika panpsychism. • Kwanza, hakuna ushahidi unaounga mkono dai kwamba jambo (matter) lina fahamu ya kibinafsi (subjective consciousness). Protoni, elektroni, quarks na atomi hazionyeshi dalili zozote za kuwa na fahamu ya kibinafsi.234.

There are a number of problems with panpsychism. • Firstly, there is an absence of evidence for the claim that matter contains subjective consciousness. Protons, electrons, quarks and atoms do not exhibit any signs of having subjective consciousness.234.

• Pili, mbinu hii inashindwa kutoa maelezo ya kutosha ya kimetafizikia au ya kimwili kuhusu jinsi maada inavyokuwa na fahamu. Mali ya fahamu ilitoka wapi? Maada inawezaje kuwa na sifa hii ya kibinafsi ya kufahamu? Kushindwa kwa wanaoamini panpsychism kujibu maswali haya kunadhoofisha maelezo yoyote ya kimetafizikia na ya kimwili.

• Secondly, this approach fails to provide an adequate metaphysical or physical explanation of how matter contains consciousness. Where did the property of consciousness come from? How does matter contain this subjective conscious property? The panpsychist’s failure to answer these questions undermines any metaphysical and physical explanation.

• Tatu, hakuna mifano yoyote ya fahamu (consciousness) inayokuwepo nje ya uzoefu wa kibinafsi wa kiumbe hai. Kwa mfano, maumivu yana maana gani pasipo nafsi au 'Mimi'? Kuwa na ufahamu wa mawazo kunamaanisha nini pasipo mtu anayefikiri? Maswali haya yanaonyesha kwa nguvu kwamba fahamu inaleta maana tu pale kiumbe kimoja chenye fahamu kinapopitia mkusanyiko wa hali za kibinafsi.

• Thirdly, there are no examples of consciousness existing outside of the subjective experience of a living entity. For instance, what does pain mean without a self or an ‘I’? What does being conscious of a thought mean without someone who is thinking? These questions strongly suggest that consciousness only makes sense with a unified conscious being experiencing an array of subjective states.

• Hatimaye, je, fahamu moja iliyoungana inawezaje kutokea kutoka kwa vipande vingi vya maada ambavyo vyote vina aina fulani ya fahamu? Vipande binafsi vya maada vyenye fahamu ya kibinafsi vinawezaje kujumlisha kuwa uzoefu wenye maana na ulioungana? Kama uzoefu wetu wa kifahamu ungekuwa matokeo tu ya vipengele vingi vya fahamu vilivyomo katika sehemu za kimwili zinazounda ubongo, uzoefu wetu ungekuwa usio na mshikamano, au usioungana sana. Profesa Edward Feser anafafanua maana iliyoungana ya uzoefu mmoja wa kifahamu. Anaeleza kwamba uzoefu wetu si jumla tu ya vipengele vingi tofauti vya fahamu; uzoefu wetu una hisia iliyoungana. Anatoa hoja yake kwa kutumia uzoefu wa kifahamu wa kusoma kitabu:

• Finally, how can a unified conscious experience emerge from many pieces of matter that all contain a form of consciousness? How do individual pieces of matter that contain subjective consciousness manage to add up to a meaningful, unified experience? If our conscious experiences were just a result of many conscious elements contained in the physical parts that make up the brain, our experience would be incoherent, or less unified. Professor Edward Feser comments on the unified meaning of a single conscious experience. He explains that our experiences are not just a summation of many different conscious elements; our experiences have a unified feel. He presents his case using the conscious experience of reading a book:

"Uzoefu huo una maana au umuhimu wenye mshikamano, na maana hiyo ni kwa mhusika mmoja wa uzoefu. Hauhisi tu umbo, muundo, rangi, n.k. kama vipengele vilivyotengana, bali unavihisi kama kitabu; na ni wewe unayevihisi, badala ya matukio mengi ya neva kila moja 'likihisi' kipengele kimoja tu cha kitabu." 235.

“The experience has a coherent significance or meaning, and significance or meaning for a single subject of experience. You are not only aware of the shape, texture, colors, etc. as separate elements, but are aware of them as a book; and it is you who are aware of them, rather than myriad neural events somehow each being ‘aware’ of one particular aspect of the book.” 235.

Kuna mijadala mingi ya kitaaluma kuhusu mbinu nilizozifupisha hapo juu. Hata hivyo, lengo kuu lilikuwa kutambulisha mbinu hizi kwa ufupi na kuweka wazi baadhi ya ukosoaji unaodhoofisha uwezo wake wa kueleza fahamu ya kibinafsi (subjective consciousness) kwa kina kama inavyofanya nadharia ya uumini wa Mungu (theism).

There is a lot of academic discussion around the approaches I have summarised above. However, the main intention was to briefly introduce these approaches and bring to light some criticisms which undermine their ability to explain subjective consciousness as sufficiently as theism does.

Mungu ndiye maelezo bora zaidi.

God is the best explanation.

Je, tunawezaje kueleza fahamu (consciousness) kwa kuzingatia majaribio yasiyofanikiwa ya kueleza kikamilifu uzoefu wetu wa kibinafsi wa kibinadamu? Mtazamo wa kiimani (theistic) ndio maelezo yanayokubalika zaidi. Ni jambo lenye mantiki zaidi kudhani kwamba Mwenye Kujua Yote, kiumbe mwenye fahamu, mapenzi na kusudi, ndiye mwandishi wa fahamu zote. Hapa kuna sababu tatu kuu zinazoonyesha kwamba Mungu ndiye maelezo bora zaidi:

How do we explain consciousness in light of the failed attempts to comprehensively explain our subjective personal experiences? A theistic approach is the most adequate explanation. It is far more reasonable to postulate that an All-Aware, conscious agent with volition and purpose is the author of all consciousness. Here are three main reasons why God is the best explanation:

Kwanza, inajibu swali ambalo hakuna mtazamo uliopo ambao umelijibu: Fahamu ilitoka wapi? Profesa J. P. Moreland anaeleza jinsi haikuweza kutokana na michakato ya kimaumbile ya kiasili: "Ujuzi wetu wa ulimwengu wa kiasili ungetupa sababu chanya za kutoamini kwamba fahamu isiyoweza kupunguzwa ingejitokeza ndani yake, k.m., mpangilio upya wa kijiometri wa vitu visivyo hai vya kimaumbile katika miundo tofauti ya kianga hauonekani kutosha kueleza kujitokeza kwa fahamu."236

Firstly, it answers a question that none of the existing views have answered: Where did consciousness come from? Professor J. P. Moreland explains how it could not have been via natural physical processes: “Our knowledge of the natural world would give us positive reasons for not believing that irreducible consciousness would appear in it, e.g., the geometrical rearrangement of inert physical entities into different spatial structures hardly seems sufficient to explain the appearance of consciousness.”236

Ikiwa jambo (matter) na fahamu (consciousness) ni vitu tofauti, basi inafuata kwamba fahamu haingeweza kutokana na jambo. Lakini ikiwa jambo lina sifa za kuwa na fahamu, basi sifa hizo zilijitokezaje? Tunahitaji kuuliza swali hili la kiontolojia kwa sababu fahamu ni tofauti sana na vitu vya kimaada. Ili kueleza ukweli kwamba uzoefu wa kibinafsi wa fahamu upo, Mungu lazima alikuwa ameumba fahamu. Ni jambo lenye mantiki zaidi kudhania wakala mwenye fahamu anayejua yote ili kueleza fahamu. Kwa mtazamo huu, uungu (theism) unatoa maelezo tajiri zaidi. Moreland anasema kwamba misimamo ya kimwili (physicalist) na ya kimaada kuhusu fahamu ina "…hakuna njia yenye mashiko ya kueleza kujitokeza kwa sifa na matukio halisi, yasiyopunguzika, ya kiakili katika ulimwengu… ikilinganishwa na rasilimali tajiri za kueleza za uungu…."237.

If matter and consciousness are distinct, it follows that consciousness could not have emerged from matter. However, if matter contains conscious properties, then how did these properties arise? We need to ask this ontological question because consciousness is very different from material stuff. In order to explain the fact that subjective conscious experiences exist, God must have created consciousness. It is far more coherent to postulate an All-Aware conscious agent to explain consciousness. From this point of view, theism offers a far richer explanation. Moreland argues that physicalist and materialist accounts of consciousness have “…no plausible way to explain the appearance of irreducible, genuine mental properties/events in the cosmos… when compared to the rich explanatory resources for theism….”237.

Pili, uyakinifu hutoa jibu la jinsi fahamu ilivyoweza kuingia katika ulimwengu wa kimwili. Watu wengi hushangaa jinsi viumbe visivyo vya kimwili, kama nafsi, vinavyoweza kuingiliana na, na kwa kweli kudhibiti, sehemu za kimwili kama miili ya binadamu na wanyama. Hata hivyo, uyakinifu unaeleza hili kwa namna ya asili kabisa. Mapenzi ya Mungu yaliyo kamili na shughuli za Kimungu huhakikisha ulimwengu ambamo vya kimwili na visivyo vya kimwili vinaingiliana. Charles Taliaferro anaeleza:

Secondly, theism answers how consciousness could have entered the physical world. It often surprises people how non-physical entities like the soul can interact, and in fact control, physical aspects like the bodies of humans and animals. However, theism explains this very naturally. God’s comprehensive will and Divine activity ensure a world where the physical and non-physical interact. Charles Taliaferro explains:

"Lakini katika mtazamo wa kiteisti kuhusu fahamu, hakuna hila ya kizushi wala tendo maalum la kimiujiza la Mungu nyuma ya kuibuka kwa fahamu. Fahamu huibuka kutoka ulimwengu wa kimwili kupitia mapenzi yaliyoenea na ya kudumu ya Mungu kwamba kuwepo na ulimwengu wa vitu, sifa na uhusiano vya kimwili na visivyo vya kimwili. Uhusiano kati ya maada, nishati, fahamu, sheria za nafasi na wakati, kwa ujumla wake, vyote hutokana na shughuli ya kiungu yenye nguvu isiyo na kikomo."238

“But in a theistic view of consciousness, there is no parlor trick or discrete miraculous act of God behind the emergence of consciousness. Consciousness emerges from the physical cosmos through an abiding comprehensive will of God that there be a world of physical and non-physical objects, properties, and relations. The relation between matter, energy, consciousness, the laws of space-time, tout court, all stem from an overwhelming, divine, activity.”238

Kulingana na mtazamo usiomtambua Mungu kuhusu fahamu, inaonekana kwamba fahamu zimejitokeza kwa njia ya kimuujiza bila maelezo yoyote ya kutosha ya kimaumbile. Hata hivyo, uelewa wa kiteisti hauikabili changamoto hii, kwa kuwa kujitokeza kwa fahamu kunachukuliwa kuwa sehemu ya uhalisia. Kwa kuwa Mungu ni mwenye fahamu, Mwenye Kuishi Milele na Mwenye Kujua Kila Kitu, ni jambo linaloingia akilini kwamba ulimwengu aliouumba una viumbe vyenye fahamu ya kujitambua. Taliaferro naye anahitimisha kwa namna kama hiyo:

According to a non-theistic approach to consciousness, consciousness seems to have miraculously popped into existence without any adequate physical explanation. However, theism does not face this problem, as the emergence of consciousness is viewed as part of reality. Since God is conscious, Ever-Living and All-Aware, it is plausible that the world He created contains beings with a conscious awareness of themselves. Taliaferro similarly concludes:

"Kutoka mtazamo wa ulimwengu wa kimaada unaoamini kwamba vitu vyote ni mata tu, kuibuka kwa fahamu kunaonekana kuwa jambo la ajabu; hulinganishwa na kudai kwamba ‘kisha muujiza hutokea.’ Lakini kutoka mtazamo wa uungu, kuibuka kwa fahamu kunaweza kuonekana kuwa jambo lililokita mizizi katika asili yenyewe ya uhalisia. Kuumbwa kwa fahamu ya wanyama na ya binadamu si muujiza uliotengwa peke yake, bali ni kielelezo cha muundo wa msingi wa uhalisia."239

“From the vantage point of a fundamentally materialist cosmology, the emergence of consciousness seems strange; it is likened to claiming ‘then a miracle happens.’ But from the vantage point of theism, the emergence of consciousness may be seen as something deeply rooted in the very nature of reality. The creation of animal and human consciousness is not some isolated miracle, but a reflection of the underlying structure of reality.”239

Uthebu (theism) unaeleza mwingiliano kati ya hali za kiakili zisizo za kimwili na hali za ubongo za kimwili. Mapenzi na uwezo wa Mungu vimewezesha mwingiliano huo kutokea, kwa kuwa mwingiliano huu ni sehemu muhimu ya uhalisia ambao Mungu ameuumba. Kwa kifupi, kama mwanzoni mwa ulimwengu kulikuwepo jambo tu, basi fahamu zisingekuwepo. Lakini kama mwanzoni aina fulani ya fahamu iliumba ulimwengu wa kimwili, basi mwingiliano kati ya hali za kiakili zisizo za kimwili na hali za ubongo za kimwili unakuwa na maana.

Theism explains the interaction between nonphysical mental and physical brain states. God’s will and power have enabled such interaction to take place, as this interaction is part and parcel of the reality that God has created. Simply, if, in the beginning of the cosmos, only matter existed, then consciousness would not. However, if in the beginning a type of consciousness created the physical world, then the interaction between nonphysical mental states and physical brain states makes sense.

Thirdly, uyakinifu hutueleza uwezo wetu wa kuwa na hali za fahamu za kibinafsi na ukweli kwamba tuna ufahamu wa jinsi ilivyo kuwa sisi wenyewe, tukionja ladha, kusikia sauti na kuhisi maumbile. Kwa kuwa ulimwengu uliumbwa na Kiumbe Asiyekufa, Aliye Hai, Mwenye Ufahamu Kamili, inafuata kwamba tumepewa uwezo huu wa kufahamu hali zetu za ndani za kibinafsi:

Thirdly, theism explains our ability to have subjective conscious states and the fact that we have an awareness of what it is to be like ourselves, experiencing tastes, sounds and textures. Since the universe was created by an Ever-Living, Alive, All-Aware Being, it follows that we have been given this capacity to be aware of our inner subjective states:

"Mungu, hakuna Mungu isipokuwa Yeye, Aliye Hai milele."240.

“God, there is no god except Him, the Ever Living.”240.

"Naye Yeye ndiye Mwenye Upole Mwingi, Mwenye Kujua yote."241.

“And He is the All-subtle, the All-aware.”241.

Maoni ya kiteolojia kuhusu kuibuka kwa fahamu yana nguvu kubwa zaidi ya ufafanuzi kuliko maelezo mengine yanayoshindana nayo. Hata hivyo, ninasisitiza hapa kwamba sikatai umuhimu wa maelezo ya kibiolojia katika kugundua uhusiano wa kineurolojia. Sayansi ya neva inaweza kufanywa kwa bidii na kwa matunda vilevile katika muktadha wa kiteolojia. Ninachopendekeza ni kuongeza uteolojia kama msingi wa kifalsafa ili kueleza kikamilifu yale ambayo maelezo yasiyo ya kiteolojia hayawezi kueleza: tatizo gumu la fahamu. Kwa maana hii, mtazamo wangu ni aina ya ukinzani wa kiakili (dualism), ambao unaweza kuitwa ukinzani wa kiteolojia. Katika ukinzani wa kiteolojia, sayansi ya neva haidhoofishwi, na miradi yote ya utafiti inaweza kuendelea kutoa mwangaza na hitimisho lake la ajabu kuhusu mada hii. Hata hivyo, ukinzani wa kiteolojia ni nadharia ya kimetafizikia inayotoa maelezo kamili. Profesa Taliaferro anaunga mkono msimamo unaofanana na huu: “Sioni sababu kwa nini sayansi ya ubongo isiendelee na utafiti wake wa mwingiliano wa kisaikolojia-kimwili. Kushindwa kutambua kimetafizikia fahamu na hali za ubongo kuwa kitu kimoja hakuzuii, hata kwa sekunde moja, utafiti wa uhusiano. Zaidi ya hayo, mtu anaweza kuwa mkinzani na kuchukulia fahamu na hali za ubongo, nafsi na mwili, kama vitengo vya kifanyakazi bila kudhani kwamba kuna aina moja tu ya kitu kimetafizikia kinachohusika. Ukinzani wa akili na mwili (au, kama ninavyopendelea kuuita, ukinzani wa kuunganisha) ni nadharia katika metafizikia… ukinzani wa kuunganisha si dhana ya kisayansi inayoshindana na madai yoyote ya kisayansi.” 242: Kuwepo kwa Mungu kunahitajika ili kueleza kuwepo na kuibuka kwa uzoefu wa fahamu wa kibinafsi. Zaidi ya hayo, tatizo gumu la fahamu na kuwepo kwa uzoefu wa ndani wa kibinafsi kwa uwazi kabisa vinaelekeza kwa Mwenye Kujua Yote, ambaye aliumba ulimwengu na uwezo wa wewe na mimi kuwa na ufahamu wa hali zetu za fahamu za kibinafsi.

A theistic explanation for the emergence of consciousness has greater explanatory power than competing explanations. I must stress here, however, that I am not denying the usefulness of biological explanations in unearthing neuro-correlations. Neuroscience can be conducted just as vigorously and fruitfully in a theistic context. What I am advocating is adding theism as a philosophical basis to fully explain what non-theistic explanations cannot: the hard problem of consciousness. In this sense, my approach is a form of dualism, which can be called theistic-dualism. In theistic-dualism, neuroscience is not undermined, and all the research projects can continue to provide their amazing insights and conclusions on the topic. However, theistic-dualism is a metaphysical thesis that provides a comprehensive explanation. Professor Taliaferro advocates a similar position: “I do not see why the brain sciences cannot continue with its study of psycho-physical interaction. The failure to identify metaphysically consciousness with brain states does not for a nanosecond impede the study of correlation. Moreover one may be a dualist and treat consciousness and brain states, the person and body, as functional units without supposing that there is only one kind of thing metaphysically that is in play. Mind-body (or, as I prefer to call it, integrative) dualism is a thesis in metaphysics… integrative dualism is not a scientific hypothesis that competes with any scientific claims.” 242, God’s existence is required to explain the existence and emergence of subjective conscious experience. In addition, the hard problem of consciousness and the existence of inner subjective experiences clearly point to an All-Aware Being, that created the universe and the ability for you and me to have an awareness of our subjective conscious states.

Hatupaswi kujua mengi kuhusu roho.

We are not meant to know much about the soul.

Wasomaji wa Kiislamu watauliza kwa haki kama hoja hii inaendana na theolojia ya Kiislamu ya kawaida. Pingamizi la kawaida mara nyingi linajumuisha ukweli kwamba Qur'ani inasema wazi kwamba rooh (maana yake nafsi, roho, fahamu au kitu kinachoupa mwili uhai) ni amri ya Mungu, na kwamba binadamu amepewa elimu kidogo sana kuhusu jambo hilo. Kwa hiyo, tunapaswa kunyamaza kuhusu suala hilo: "Nao wanakuuliza, [Ewe Muhammad], kuhusu roho. Sema, 'Roho ni katika amri ya Mola wangu. Wala hamkupewa elimu isipokuwa kidogo.'"243

Muslim readers will rightly ask if this argument is compatible with normative Islamic theology. The common objection usually includes the fact that the Qur’an explicitly states that the rooh (meaning soul, spirit, consciousness or the thing that animates the body) is the affair or command of God and humanity has been given very little knowledge about it. Therefore, we should keep silent on the matter: “And they ask you, [O Muhammad], about the soul. Say, ‘The soul is of the affair of my Lord. And you have not been given of knowledge except a little.’”243

To reconcile this apparent theological conflict, it must be understood that this verse concerns the essence of consciousness or the soul, not its existence. The verse affirms that an immaterial substance animates the body—in other words, a soul or consciousness. This is exactly what the argument in this chapter has presented: that the existence of consciousness can only be explained by a non-materialist worldview. The chapter is not discussing anything beyond what is already implied by Islamic source texts. For instance, the Qur'an affirms that the rooh is different from our material universe, that it animates the body, that it is a unified 'I', and that it was created by God. Therefore, nothing here contradicts core orthodox Islamic principles.

To reconcile this apparent theological conflict, it must be understood that this verse concerns the essence of consciousness or the soul, not its existence. The verse affirms that an immaterial substance animates the body—in other words, a soul or consciousness. This is exactly what the argument in this chapter has presented: that the existence of consciousness can only be explained by a non-materialist worldview. The chapter is not discussing anything beyond what is already implied by Islamic source texts. For instance, the Qur’an affirms that the rooh is different from our material universe, that it animates the body, that it is a unified ‘I’, and that it was created by God. Therefore, nothing here contradicts core orthodox Islamic principles.

Kwa kumalizia, nadhani lazima tuzingatie ukweli kwamba Mungu anatuamuru tutafakari ndani ya nafsi zetu, na kwa kufanya hivyo tunaweza kufikia hitimisho kwamba kama hakuna Mungu, basi hatungeweza kuwa na uzoefu wowote wa fahamu wa kibinafsi—kwa maneno mengine, kwa kukataa Mungu, tunajikana sisi wenyewe!

To conclude, I think we must consider the fact that God tells us to ponder within ourselves, and by doing so we may conclude that if there is no God, then we could not have any subjective conscious experience—in other words, by denying God, we deny ourselves!.

"Je, hawafikiri ndani ya nafsi zao?"244

“Do they not reflect within themselves?”244