自1948年建国以来,以色列的军事实力一直笼罩在一层不可战胜的神话光环之下。耐人寻味的是,这类神话并非以色列主动宣扬的,而是被那些背信弃义的穆斯林统治者的所作所为所催生的。

Since its formation in 1948, the reality of Israel’s military strength has been shrouded by a mythical aura of invincibility. Interestingly such myths have not been actively expressed by Israel, but have been given life by the actions of the treacherous Muslim rulers.

以色列在1948年、1956年、1967年和1973年与该地区穆斯林之间的战争中的表现，长期以来被视为以色列军事优势的证明。鉴于这种明显的优势以及它对穆斯林土地的占领，有人认为阿拉伯国家不宜与以色列发生直接军事冲突，因而有必要进行谈判。这种做法的直接后果，就是通过和平进程等计划接受了以色列的主权。

Israel’s performance in the wars of 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 against the Muslims in the region has long been seen as confirmation of Israel’s military superiority. In light of this apparent superiority and its seizure of Muslim lands, it is argued that direct military conflict with Israel is not a viable course of action for the Arab states, creating the necessity of entering into negotiations. The direct consequence of such a move has been the acceptance of Israel’s sovereignty through plans such as the peace process.

在审视以色列所谓的军事实力时，必须牢记一点：这一神话的建构服务于什么目的？

In reviewing Israel’s supposed military might one must keep in mind: What purpose does the construction of this myth serve?

1948年的战争导致了以色列国的建立。从表面上看，人们很难理解为何4000万阿拉伯人的战斗力竟比不过仅有60万的犹太人。深入考察巴勒斯坦事业的捍卫者，就会发现他们的行为实际上直接导致了以色列的建立。

The war of 1948 led to the establishment of the state of Israel. On the surface it’s difficult to understand how 40 million Arabs could not match the fighting strength of just 600,000 Jews. A closer study of the defenders of the Palestinian cause shows how their actions in fact led directly to the establishment of Israel.

巴勒斯坦事业的主要代表是外约旦国王阿卜杜拉、埃及国王法鲁克以及巴勒斯坦大穆夫提，他们都是极其软弱的统治者，不断受到英国人的操纵。阿卜杜拉国王自我标榜为巴勒斯坦事业的捍卫者，这不过是一层假象。人们早已知道，他与本-古里安（以色列首任总理）之间……

The primary representatives of the Palestinian cause were King Abdullah of Transjordan, King Farook of Egypt and the Mufti of Palestine, all of them were extremely weak rulers subject to constant manipulation by the British. King Abdullah’s portrayal of himself as a defender of the Palestinian cause was a façade. It was known that he and Ben Gurion (Israel’s first Prime Minister)

我们曾一同在伊斯坦布尔求学。在秘密会晤中，阿卜杜拉曾提出，只要约旦能控制巴勒斯坦阿拉伯人聚居的地区，他便愿意接受以色列的建立。

were students together in Istanbul and that in clandestine meetings Abdullah had offered to accept the establishment of Israel in return for Jordanian control of the Arab populated parts of Palestine.

阿卜杜拉国王指挥着阿拉伯军团，这是一支训练有素的精锐部队，共有4500人，由英国人约翰·格拉布将军担任指挥官。格拉布在其回忆录中写道，他接到英国方面的严格命令，不得进入犹太人控制的地区。21 埃及的进攻力度也因此进一步减弱：总理纳克拉希帕夏最初并未动用现有的军事部队，而是派出了一支志愿军，这支军队直到当年一月才组建完成。约旦也拖延了伊拉克军队通过其领土的时间，从而挫败了对以色列的任何进攻。正因如此，在战役前被请来鼓舞约旦军队士气的一位盲人伊玛目，说出了“啊，军队啊，我但愿你们是我们的！”（意指阿拉伯军团是英国人的部队），这让阿卜杜拉感到尴尬。

King Abdullah had the Arab Legion at his disposal, a highly trained unit of 4,500 men, with General John Glubb an Englishman as its commanding officer. Glubb in his memoirs recounted that he was under strict orders from the British, not to enter areas under Jewish control.21 Egypt further weakened the attack against Israel when Nakrashi Pasha, the Prime Minister, initially did not use existing military units but sent an army of volunteers that had only been organised in January of that year. Jordan also delayed the passage of Iraqi troops across its territory thus thwarting any attack on Israel. This is why a blind Imam brought to rouse the Jordanian army prior to the battle embarrassed Abdullah when he said: “O army I wish you were ours” (referring to the Arab Legion being British).

尽管联合的穆斯林军队共有40,000人，但其中只有10,000人是受过训练的士兵。犹太复国主义者拥有30,000名武装人员，另有10,000人负责当地防卫，还有25,000人担任家园守卫队。

Although the combined Muslim forces were 40,000 only 10,000 were trained soldiers. The Zionists had 30,000 armed personnel, 10,000 men for local defence and another 25,000 for home guard.

这场冲突从来不是为了解放巴勒斯坦而进行的战争，而是美国和英国之间为争夺具有战略重要性的苏伊士运河控制权而展开的斗争。

This conflict was never a war for the liberation of Palestine but rather a struggle between America and Britain for control over the strategically important Suez Canal.

美国视埃及为关键盟友,认为若要在中东获得影响力,埃及不可或缺。通过中央情报局,美国于1952年策划政变,推翻亲英的法鲁克国王,扶持由贾迈勒·阿卜杜勒·纳赛尔领导的“自由军官”上台。中央情报局在1951年还曾开展过一项计划。

The US saw Egypt as a critical ally if America was to gain influence in the Middle East. Through the CIA, she moved to depose the Pro-British King Farook in a coup in 1952, bringing into power the Free Officers who were to be led by Gamal Abdul-Nasser. The CIA worked on a project in 1951

被称为“寻找穆斯林版比利·格雷厄姆”。中情局特工迈克·科普兰在1989年出版的回忆录《游戏玩家》中披露了机密信息，内容涉及中情局支持的、推翻英国傀儡国王法鲁克的政变。策划此项目的科普兰解释道：“中情局需要一位有领袖魅力的人物，能够化解该地区日益高涨的反美敌意。”他还解释说，中情局与纳赛尔在以色列问题上意见一致。对纳赛尔而言，与以色列开战的言论无关紧要，更优先的是英国对苏伊士运河区的占领。纳赛尔的敌人是英国。

known as “The Search for a Moslem Billy Graham.” Mike Copeland the CIA operative, published classified information in his memoirs in 1989, ‘The Game Player,’ about the CIA backed coup d’etat that ousted the British puppet King Farook. Copeland, who activated the project, explains that ‘the CIA needed a charismatic leader who would be able to divert the growing anti-American hostility that was building up in the area.’ He explains both the CIA and Nasser were in agreement on Israel. For Nasser talk of war with Israel was irrelevant. Much more of a priority was British occupation of the Suez Canal Zone. Nasser’s enemy was Britain.

1956年，纳赛尔按照美国的要求将苏伊士运河收归国有。英国的反应是诱使法国和以色列卷入这场斗争。历史学家科雷利·巴尼特（Corelli Barnett）在其著作《英国力量的衰落》（*The Collapse of British Power*）中对此作了概述，书中写道：“法国敌视纳赛尔，因为埃及正在帮助阿尔及利亚反抗者，并且出于历史原因而重视这条运河。毕竟，运河是一名法国人修建的。以色列本来就渴望对纳赛尔动手，因为巴勒斯坦游击队（fedayeen）的袭击，以及埃及对蒂朗海峡的封锁。”

In 1956 Nasser carried out American demands of nationalising the Suez Canal. The response of Britain was to lure France and Israel into the struggle. This was outlined by historian Corelli Barnett, who wrote about the Suez in his book, ‘The Collapse of British Power’: ‘France was hostile to Nasser because Egypt was helping the Algerian rebels, and attached to the canal for historical reasons. After all, a Frenchman built it. Israel was longing to have a go at Nasser anyway because of Palestinian fedayeen attacks and the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran.

英国首相安东尼·艾登爵士与法国和以色列秘密策划了一项三方阴谋。’23 他进一步解释说：“以色列将穿越西奈半岛入侵埃及。”“随后，英国和法国将向交战各方发出最后通牒，要求停止战斗，否则它们将进行干预，以“保护”运河。

so Sir Anthony Eden (British Prime Minister) concocted a secret tripartite plot with France and Israel.’23 He further explained ‘that Israel would invade Egypt across the Sinai Peninsula.’ ‘Britain and France would then give an ultimatum to the parties to stop fighting or they would intervene to ‘protect’ the canal.

这场战争再一次成为英美争夺该地区控制权的又一段插曲。

This war was again another episode in the Anglo-American conflict for control of the region.

英国在十一年前就已被该地区的主导力量地位取代，但仍通过其在约旦、叙利亚和以色列的代理人保留了一些影响力。为削弱纳赛尔，英国企图诱使以色列挑起战争，把埃及拖入其中。以色列可借此夺取领土，并将其作为未来和平协议中的筹码；这是实现以色列人迫切追求的安全的一种手段。1967年6月5日，以色列发动先发制人的袭击，摧毁了埃及约60%的停放在地面的空军力量，以及叙利亚和约旦约66%的作战飞机。

Britain had been surpassed as the region's dominant force 11 years earlier, but still retained some influence through its agents in Jordan, Syria and Israel. In an attempt to weaken Nasser, Britain sought to lure Israel to drag Egypt into a war whereby Israel would seize territory and use it as a bargaining tool in any future peace settlement; a means through which to achieve the security which the Israelis so desperately sought. On 5th June 1967 Israel launched a pre-emptive strike destroying 60% of Egypt's grounded air force and 66% of Syrian and Jordanian combat aircraft.

以色列从约旦手中夺取了约旦河西岸和东耶路撒冷。在战役爆发前,侯赛因国王将其部队部署在远离主战场的不同地区。短短48小时内,以色列便攻占了约旦河西岸的主要城镇。同样,以色列在战争第六天夺取了具有重要战略意义的戈兰高地。驻守戈兰高地的叙利亚军队明明仍控制着那里,却是通过本国的国家电台得知以色列占领高地的消息。以色列还攻占了沙姆沙伊赫,控制了蒂朗海峡水道,给美国所支持的纳赛尔带来了又一次打击。削弱纳赛尔政权的目标得以实现,从而间接地助长了英国在该地区的利益。以色列得以夺取更多土地,并将其作为"以土地换和平"谈判中的筹码,时至今日,这一框架仍是谈判的基础,而非1948年的状况。联合国于1947年制定了《联合国分治计划》,将57%的领土划归以色列,巴勒斯坦则只剩下原有面积的42%。在1967年战争中,以色列的占领范围进一步扩大,其领土扩张高达历史上巴勒斯坦地区的78%。

The Israelis seized the West Bank and east Jerusalem from Jordanian control. King Hussein, prior to the battle, had positioned his troops in different areas from where the main battle was taking place. In a matter of 48 hours the Israelis seized the major West Bank towns. In a similar manner the Israelis seized the strategically important Golan Heights on the 6th day of the war. The Syrian troops occupying the Golan Heights heard news of Israel’s capture of the heights through their own State radio despite the Syrian troops clearly occupying them. Israel also dealt America’s Nasser a blow by capturing Sharm al Sheikh and securing the waterway of the Straits of Tiran. The objective of weakening the regime of Nasser was achieved, thus indirectly aiding British interests within the region. Israel was able to seize more land and use it as a bargaining asset in any land for peace negotiations, which today is still used as a basis for negotiations rather then the status of 1948. The United Nations established the UN Partition plan in 1947, which gave 57% of territory to Israel with Palestine becoming 42% of its former self. In the 1967 war Israeli occupation increased further with its territorial gains of up to 78% of historic Palestine.

对1973年10月埃及和叙利亚对以色列发动的战争进行考察后可以看出,其目标是有限的,从来不包括解放巴勒斯坦。这些目标甚至不包括解放戈兰高地,而该地区原本设想是作为叙以和平条约的一部分予以归还。这场战争的目的在于巩固安瓦尔·萨达特和哈菲兹·阿萨德的地位。两人当时都是较新的领导人,而两国都容易发生军事政变。萨达特尤其处于脆弱境地,因为他是继魅力超群的纳赛尔之后上台的。

An examination of the October 1973 war launched by Egypt and Syria against Israel shows that the aims were limited and never included the liberation of Palestine. The aims never even included the liberation of the Golan Heights which were designed to be restored as part of a peace treaty between Syria and Israel. The aims were to solidify the positions of Anwar Sadat and Hafez al-Assad who were relatively new leaders in countries prone to military coups. Sadat in particular was vulnerable given the fact that he had succeeded the charismatic Nasser.

穆罕默德·海卡尔是《金字塔报》（Al Ahram）1957年至1974年的受人尊敬的主编，他亲历了那场战争。他在《通往斋月之路》一书中阐明了安瓦尔·萨达特潜藏动机的程度，书中引述了萨达特在战前的心境。海卡尔引用了萨达特的一位将军穆罕默德·福齐的话，后者以武士拔出长短两把剑准备战斗作比喻。福齐说，这场战斗将是“短剑”的情形，象征着出于某些动机而进行的有限战争。

Mohammed Heikal the respected editor of Al Ahram from 1957 – 1974, who witnessed the war, explained the extent of Anwar Sadat’s underlying motives in his book ‘The Road to Ramadhan’ where he cites Sadat’s mood in the run up to the war. Heikal quotes one of Sadat’s generals, Mohammed Fouwzi who gave the analogy of a samurai drawing two swords - a long one and short one in preparation for battle. Fouwzi said that this battle would be a case of the short sword, signifying a limited battle for certain motives.

安瓦尔·萨达特从未打算与以色列进行一场旷日持久的解放战争。正因如此，他在战争中已处于优势地位的情况下，仍寻求与以色列和谈。战争头24小时内，埃及就突破了以色列号称坚不可摧的苏伊士运河东岸巴列夫防线，而埃方仅有68人伤亡。与此同时，叙利亚的2个师和500辆坦克冲入戈兰高地，收复了1967年失去的部分土地。两天的战斗中，以色列损失了49架飞机和500辆坦克。在此期间，萨达特致信美国国务卿亨利·基辛格，表示此次战争的目标是"实现中东和平，而非局部解决"。信中还称，如果以色列撤出所有被占领土，埃及愿意在联合国或中立方的主持下参加和平会议。由此可见，尽管埃及拥有巨大的战略优势，萨达特在战争如此初期就已有意进行谈判。萨达特没有乘胜追击扩大初期优势，并且推迟发动第二次西奈攻势，这使以色列得以动员，并在美国的援助下开始夺回失地。1974年10月25日，敌对行动正式结束。

Anwar Sadat had no intention of having a protracted war of liberation with Israel. This is why he sought peace with Israel whilst commanding a winning position in the war. In the first 24 hours of the war Egypt smashed through Israel’s much heralded Bar-Lev fortifications east of the Suez Canal with only 68 casualties. Meanwhile 2 Syrian divisions and 500 tanks swept into the Golan Heights and retook some of the land captured in 1967. In two days of fighting Israel had lost 49 aircraft and 500 tanks. In the midst of this Sadat sent a message to US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in which he said that the objective of the war was ‘the achievement of peace in the Middle East and not partial settlements.’ The message went on to state that if Israel withdrew from all occupied territories Egypt would be prepared to participate in a Peace conference under UN or neutral auspices. Thus despite having an immense strategic advantage Sadat was in the mood for negotiations at such an early stage. Sadat’s refusal to press home his initial advantage and his delay in launching the second Sinai offensive allowed Israel to mobilise, with aid from the US and she began to seize back lost territory. Hostilities formally came to an end on 25th October 1974.