Among the most important of inquiries related to the hukm, one of priority and requiring explanation, is the knowledge of who it is the issuing of the hukm returns to, that is, who is the hākim? Upon the knowledge of this rests the knowledge of the hukm and its types. The intent of ‘hākim’ here is not the executive authority who executes all the affairs with the authority it possesses. Rather, the intent of hākim is the one who possesses the right of issuing the hukm upon actions and things, because all that exists of the sensorially perceivable comprises either of the actions of the human or of the things which are other than the actions of the human. The human, by his description of being alive in this universe, is the subject of the study, and the issuing of the hukm is only because of him and is related to him. Therefore the hukm upon the actions of the human and upon the things related to these actions is necessary. Who then is the one who alone has the right to issue the hukm upon that: it is Allah, or the human himself? In other words, is it the shar’ or the intellect [‘aql]? That which allows us to know the hukm of Allah is the shar’, and that which the human judges by is the intellect. So what judges (upon the actions and things), the shar’ or the intellect?

As for the result of this hukm, that is, the thing issued as a judgment upon the actions and the things, it is the husn [beauty] and the qubh [ugliness], because the intent of ‘issuing the hukm’ is the specifying of the stance of the human towards an action: should he do it or leave it, or choose between doing it and leaving it, and the specifying of his stance towards the things related to his actions: should he use them, or leave them, or choose between using and leaving. The specifying of this stance of his depends on his view about the thing: is it hasan or qabīh or neither. Thus the result of the sought hukm is the husn and qubh. So is the judgment of husn and qubh for the intellect or the shar’? There is no third option with regards to the issuing of this hukm. The answer to that is that the hukm on the actions and things can be from a number of perspectives. It can be from the perspective of its reality, or from the perspective of its accordance or discordance with the nature of the human being and his innate [fitri] inclinations, or from the perspective of its commission being praiseworthy and its omission being blameworthy or it being neither praiseworthy or blameworthy, that is, from the perspective of reward and punishment for its commission or omission or the lack of reward or punishment. Thus these are the three perspectives of the hukm upon the actions and things: one, their reality, what is it; two, their harmony, or the lack thereof, with the nature of the human; and three, with regards to reward or punishment and praise or reproach.