It is not permissible that a hukm be given upon things and actions except if there is a shar’i evidence for that hukm, because there is no hukm for things and for actions of the sane, before the coming of the shar’; the Exalted says,

(al-Nisā’: 165); and because the hukm is not established except by one of two: the shar’ or the intellect. As for the intellect, it has no place here because the matter is one of obligation and prohibition, and it is not permissible for the intellect to obligate or prohibit, for this is not its realm. Rather this is the realm of the shar’, thus the hukm depends on the shar’. Because there is no shar’ before the coming of the shar’, the hukm thus depends on the coming of the shar’ from Allah, that is, on the coming of a messenger with regards to a whole shari’ah, and the shar’i evidence with regards to a given issue for which evidence is sought. With respect to (the coming of) a messenger, then this is clear from the explicit meaning [sarīh] of the āyah, because the negation of punishment on the people prior to the advent of a messenger indicates upon their not having responsibility [taklīf] for any rules or beliefs, that is, their not having responsibility for anything. This means naught but a complete negation of the hukm for the people prior to Allah raising for them a messenger. Thus the ahl al-fatrah – those who lived between the loss of a message and the advent of a message, like those who lived before the advent of Muhammad (saw) (and after the corruption of the message of Isa (as)) – are saved from punishment and their judgment is the judgment of those to whom the message does not reach. Similarly those to whom the message of Muhammad (saw) does not reach in its correct form, are saved from punishment like the ahl al fatrah, because the āyah applies to them and they are considered as if no messenger was sent to them, because the message did not reach them and the sin of it not reaching them is upon those who were able to take it to them but did not. Therefore, prior to the advent of the Messenger it is not said that the hukm of things is halāl or harām, because they had no hukm; the same with the actions. Rather, until Allah does not send a messenger, man is free to act as he wishes, without being under any hukm, and nothing is upon him from Allah. When a messenger is sent then man is obliged by the ahkām of Allah which the messenger communicates to him, as communicated to him (the messenger) from Allah

After the advent of a messenger and his deliverance of his message, the matter is considered: if the message came with specific things and commanded the following of a different message (of another messenger) for other things, as in the case with our master ‘Isā (as) then until this message is abrogated the people are responsible for the ahkām communicated to them and are obligated to follow them and will be punished for not living by them. If the message of the messenger came with some things and not others, then the people are obligated only by what came and are not punished for what did not come. On the other hand, if the message covers all things and came explaining all things, then the people are obligated with everything in this message, as is the case with our master Muhammad (saw); his message covers all things and came explaining all things; therefore there is no hukm except what came in it. This is because the mafhūm [implied meaning] of His saying

It should not be said then that the ‘asl [original state] of things and actions is prohibition [tahrim], by the argument that it is free disposal [tasarruf] in the dominion of Allah the Exalted without his permission so it is prohibited, drawing analogy upon the created beings, because the explicit meaning of the āyah is that Allah does not punish until he raises a messenger, so He does not account until he clarifies the hukm. Further the creation is able to be harmed, but Allah the Exalted is above being benefited or harmed.

Similarly it should not be said that the ‘asl of actions and things is permissibility, by the argument that it is utilisation that is free from any sign of corruption or harm to the owner and so it is permissible. This should not be said because the implied meaning [mafhūm] of the āyah is that man is obligated with what the messenger comes with; he is punished for contravening this; thus the ‘asl becomes following [ittibā’] the messenger and being bound by the ahkām of his message; the ‘asl is not permissibility, which is the absence of being bound. Since the generality of the verses of ahkām indicate upon the necessity of referring back to the shar’ and the necessity of being bound by its ahkām; the Exalted says

It should not be said then that the ‘asl [original state] of things and actions is prohibition [tahrim], by the argument that it is free disposal [tasarruf] in the dominion of Allah the Exalted without his permission so it is prohibited, drawing analogy upon the created beings, because the explicit meaning of the āyah is that Allah does not punish until he raises a messenger, so He does not account until he clarifies the hukm. Further the creation is able to be harmed, but Allah the Exalted is above being benefited or harmed.

Similarly it should not be said that the ‘asl of actions and things is permissibility, by the argument that it is utilisation that is free from any sign of corruption or harm to the owner and so it is permissible. This should not be said because the implied meaning [mafhūm] of the āyah is that man is obligated with what the messenger comes with; he is punished for contravening this; thus the ‘asl becomes following [ittibā’] the messenger and being bound by the ahkām of his message; the ‘asl is not permissibility, which is the absence of being bound. Since the generality of the verses of ahkām indicate upon the necessity of referring back to the shar’ and the necessity of being bound by its ahkām; the Exalted says

and

Further utilisation that is free from any sign of corruption or bringing harm to the owner is not a proof for permissibility. It is not evident that adultery with an unmarried female who has no relatives constitutes utilisation that is free from any sign of corruption or harm to the owner, yet it is prohibited. Similarly lying in jest to make someone laugh is free from any indication of corruption or harm with regards to both the one who lies and the one who is lied to, yet it is prohibited. Therefore the things and actions have a hukm after the coming of the shar’; so the ‘asl is to search in the Shari’ah for the things and actions: has a hukm come for them or not? The ‘asl is not permissibility by assumption nor should the hukm of permissibility by given by the intellect straight away in the presence of the shar’.

Similarly it should be said that the ‘asl of things is cessation [tawaqquf] and the absence of the hukm. Since cessation means the action is suspended or the hukm is suspended and this is impermissible, because the established (rule) in the Qur’an and Hadith for the lack of knowledge is inquiring about the hukm and not the cessation and absence of the hukm. The Exalted says

Therefore it is after the advent of a Messenger that it that the hukm becomes for the shar’ and there is no hukm prior to the coming of the shar’, so the hukm depends on the coming of the shar’, that is, on the presence of a shar’i evidence for a single issue. Thus no hukm can be given except on the basis of an evidence, just as no hukm can be given except after the coming of the shar’. The ‘asl, then, is to search for the hukm in the shar’, that is, the ‘asl is to search for the shar’i evidence for a shar’i hukm from the shar’.

One issue remains: does the Islamic Shari’ah encompass the rulings of all matters that have passed, all the present problems, as well as all those matters that may occur in the future? The answer to this is that there is no event which occurs, issue which arises, or incident which takes place but that it has a hukm. The Islamic Shari’ah has encompassed all the actions of man entirely. Nothing occurred in the past, nor is there anything in the present or possible thing occurring in the future except that all these have a hukm in the Shari’ah. Allah the Exalted says:

Even if there are solitary ahadith, whose narration from the Messenger (saw) is authenticated, which carry this meaning, namely, that there exists some actions of the servants for which the Shari’ah has not given a hukm; the meaning [dirayah] of such ahadith is discarded because of its contradiction to a text of the Qur’an which is definitive [qat’i] in transmission [thubūt] and meaning [dalalah], because the two above-mentioned āyāt are definitive in transmission and meaning, so any solitary report which contradicts them, its meaning is discarded. Therefore is it not permissible, from any perspective, for a Muslim after understanding these two definitive āyāt to say that there exists even one reality from the actions of man that the shar’ has not clarified for it a hukm.

As for what was narrated by Ibn Majah and Tirmidhi from Salman al-Farisi that he said, “The Messenger of Allah (saw) was questioned about ghee, cheese and the fur, so he said, ‘The halāl is that which Allah has made halāl in his Book, and the harām is that which Allah has made harām in his Book, and on that which He remained silent, it has been conceded to you [‘afa lakum]’”, and what was related by al-Bazzar from Abu Darda’ from the Prophet (saw) that he said, “What Allah has made halāl in his Book is halāl, and what he has made harām is harām, and what he has remained silent about is a concession, so accept from Allah His concession for verily Allah does not forget anything – and he recited – ‘And your Lord is not forgetful’ (Maryam: 64)” and what was related by al-Baihaqi from the chain of Tha’labah from the Prophet (saw) that he said, “Allah has obligated the obligations so do not neglect them, and He has set the limits [hudūd] so do not transgress them, and He has remained silent about things as a mercy to you, not out of forgetfulness, so do not ask about them”; then from one perspective these ahādith are solitary reports so they cannot contradict the definitive text. From another perspective, these ahādith do not indicate upon there being things which the Shari’ah has not expounded; they only indicate upon there being things which Allah has not prohibited out of mercy for you and has remained silent about their prohibition. Thus the subject of these ahādīth is not silence on the legislation of rulings for these things; rather it is silence on their prohibition. The meaning of ‘silence on (their) prohibition’ is not the legislating of permissibility [ibaha] for everything which is not expounded; rather this silence is the silence of the legislator with regards to prohibition and His silence on prohibition is (the legislation of) permissibility [halal], included in the scope of which is the obligatory [wajib], the recommended [mandub], the permissible [mubah], and the reprehensible [makruh], and this applies only to that about which he is silent, not to everything which has not be expounded.

The meaning of the ahadith of concession [afwu] is similar to His saying,

Al-Tabari narrates in his tafsir from Ubayd ibn Umayr, “Allah the exalted has permitted and prohibited (things and actions), so whatever He has permitted take it as permitted, and whatever he has prohibited refrain from it, and He has left from that some things which He has not permitted or prohibited (expressly); that is a concession (afwu) from Allah which He has conceded.” The Prophet (saw) disliked excessive questioning regarding that about which no hukm had been revealed, on the basis of the original concession [al-bara’ah al-asliyya] since it returns to this meaning. Its meaning is that the related actions are conceded. And he (saw) said, “The worst of the Muslims amongst the Muslims is the one who asks about a thing which is not prohibited on them and consequently becomes prohibited upon them due to his questioning,” related by Muslim; and he said, “Leave me with what I have left you. Verily those before you perished only on account of their excessive questioning and their disagreements with their prophets; what I have prohibited you from stay away from it, and what I have ordered you, do as much of it as you are able,” narrated by Ahmad. Further, Muslim and Ahmad related from Abu Hurayra that he said, “The Messenger of Allah (saw) addressed us saying, ‘O people, Allah has obligated the pilgrimage on you, so make the pilgrimage’, so a man asked ‘Every year O Messenger of Allah?’ He (the Messenger) remained silent until the man asked three times, so the Messenger of Allah (saw) replied, “If I said yes, it would be obligated, and you would not be able (to fulfill it)’ then he said, ‘Leave me with what I have left you.’ So all of this indicates that the intent of his saying, “and He was silent on things” is that He did not prohibit them, and it is similar to his saying, in another hadith, “leave me with what I have left you”. This (meaning) is supported by another narration of this same hadith, “and He conceded you things”, that is, he left them and did not prohibit them. Therefore the meaning of his saying, “and He was silent on things” or his saying, “and that about which He was silent, is conceded” is not that the hukm of some actions of the servants has not been expounded, rather their meaning is that (some) things have not been prohibited as a mercy to you; and that which is not prohibited of specific things comes under the hukm of silence, so it is not prohibited; its hukm is that it is halal. Thus the matter is connected to the silence of the Legislator about the prohibition of things. It is not connected to the absence of the expounding the rulings of things.

This is from the perspective of the meaning of the hadith. As for the perspective of the position of the hadith as far as the hukm of the Shariah is concerned then the actions of the legally responsible (mukallafeen) with respect to their being legally responsible are either collectively under the address of legal responsibility (khitab al-takleef) – namely the command (iqtida’) or the option (takhyīr) – or is not under this. If it is then there must be a hukm for it in the Shari’ah, as it comes under the address of legal responsibility. If it is not, this necessitates that some of the legally responsible are outside the hukm of the address of legal responsibility, even if at one time or under one situation, and this is invalid from its basis, because if we assume him to be legally responsible then he cannot be outside the address of legal responsibility, and if we assume him to not be legally responsible then this assumption is invalid in and of itself. This is because the legal responsibility is general because of the generality of the address of legal responsibility, so it includes all situations and times. Therefore it cannot be that the meaning of his (saw) saying, “and He was silent about some things” be that He did not expound their ruling, because this meaning implies the existence of an individual who in a given state or time is not legally responsible. Hence the meaning can only be that He remained silent about the prohibition of some things.

Thus have all the ayāt which permit the things come in the general form, their generality indicating the permissibility of all things. Hence if a thing is prohibited there must exist a text specifying this generality, indicating that this thing is an exception to the permissibility of all things. From here, the ‘asl of things is permissibility.

Accordingly we find in the revelation, when things are prohibited, specific texts about these things specifically as an exception to the general texts; so the Exalted says:

It should not be said that the thing is inseparable from the action of the servant, so its hukm comes from the hukm of the action, and it takes the hukm of the action. This should not be said because the things, notwithstanding that they are necessarily connected to the actions and that their evidence comes from the exposition of the hukm of the action, are different from the actions. The evidence of the action of the servant, when connected to a thing clarifies with respect to the thing two rulings alone, either permissibility or prohibition. It is not said about the hukm of a thing that it is obligatory or recommended. Thus the ruling of the things is confined to permissibility or prohibition, and in this respect the thing is different to the action of the servant, so it does not just take the hukm of the action, even if its hukm comes in the clarification of the hukm of the action.

From another perspective the generality of the evidence of permissibility and the specification of the specific thing in the evidence of prohibition makes the permissibility general for all things and prohibition specific to alone those expressly prohibited. This too makes the hukm of the thing different, with respect to the original rule and the hukm with which it is described, to the hukm of the action. The original rule of things is permissibility as long as there is no evidence of prohibition, and the original rule for actions is being bound by the legal hukm. Further, things are not described except by permissibility or prohibition, contrary to the actions, with respect to which the address of the legislator is of two types: takleef and wad’. The former is of five types: the obligatory, the recommended, the prohibited, the reprehensible and the permissible. The latter is also of five types: the cause, the condition, the preventative factor, the valid, invalid and void, and the original rule and concession. The sum (of the above discussion) is that it is not permitted, after the advent of our Master Muhammad (saw) to all of mankind, to say that there is an action or thing which has no hukm. Nor is there any hukm of a thing or action without an evidence from the revelation, because a hukm is the address of the Legislator. Nor it is permissible to say that all that which the revelation has not expounded a hukm for is permissible, because the permissible is a legal hukm itself, as it is the address of the Legislator of conferring choice related to the actions of servants. The claim that there are things whose hukm has not been clarified by the Legislator means that there are things which the Qur’an has not clarified and that the Shari’ah is deficient. This is incorrect as it contradicts the definitive text, in transmission and meaning, of the Qur’an.

Thus there is no action possible of being done by man, nor a thing connected to the action of man except that it has a hukm in the Shari’ah, and there is no hukm except after the presence of an evidence from the address of the Legislator indicating upon this specific hukm, because there is no hukm before the coming of the revelation. Thus there is no hukm before the coming of the Messenger, and there is no hukm after his coming except with an evidence from the revelation he came with indicating upon that hukm