"Musharraf anaweza kuwa tumaini la mwisho la Amerika nchini Pakistan, na asipofaulu, wenye msimamo mkali wa kidini wangeshika bomu la Kiislamu." -- Anthony Zinni Kuongezeka kwa mapigano kati ya wanafunzi wa Lal Masjid na jeshi la Pakistan kumeacha mamia wakiwa wamekufa na wengi wamejeruhiwa. Hali hii imemsukuma Rais Musharraf kutoa kauli ifuatayo ya kuchochea: "Wasipojisalimisha, ninasema hapa leo kwamba watauawa. Wasilazimishe sisi kutumia nguvu. Wanapaswa kutoka kwa hiari; vinginevyo watauawa…" Hata kabla ya kauli ya mwisho ya Musharraf, serikali yake ilikuwa ya haraka kumlaumu kwa ukamilifu Abdul Rashid Ghazi—mkuu wa madrasa—kwa mgogoro wa sasa. Hata hivyo, uchunguzi wa karibu wa matukio yaliyotangulia mzozo huu unaonyesha kwamba sakata yote imepangwa na serikali ya Pakistan.

"Musharraf may be America's last hope in Pakistan, and if he fails, the fundamentalists would get hold of the Islamic bomb." -- Anthony Zinni The intensification of fighting between the students of Lal Masjid and the Pakistani army has left hundreds dead and many injured. This has prompted President Musharraf to issue the following provocative statement: “If they do not surrender so I am saying here today that they will be killed. They should not force us to use force. They should come out voluntarily; otherwise they will be killed…” Even before Musharraf’ s ultimatum, his government was swift to attribute the entire blame for the current crisis on Abdul Rashid Ghazi—the principal of the seminary. However, a close examination of the events preceding the standoff, suggests that the entire saga has been engineered by the Pakistani government.

Kwa muda wa miezi sita iliyopita, serikali ya Musharraf imekuwa ikivumilia tabia ya wanafunzi wakati wowote walipochagua kupinga mamlaka yake. Mkusanyiko wa silaha haramu, utekaji nyara wa wanajamii mashuhuri wa Pakistan na maafisa wa polisi, pamoja na kuchukuliwa kwa wanawake sita wa China, vilikutana na ukosoaji hafifu kutoka kwa maafisa wa serikali. Zaidi ya hayo, shughuli hizi hazikufanyika kwa siri; zilipangwa na kutekelezwa mbele ya makao makuu ya ISI, yaliyo karibu sana na mipaka ya Lal Masjid. Ziara za mara kwa mara za maafisa wa ISI na wawakilishi wa serikali zinapinga madai ya serikali kwamba ilikuwa ikitafuta suluhisho la amani, hasa ikilinganishwa na ukali wa majibu ya serikali ya Pakistan kwa matukio kama hayo katika maeneo ya makabila na sehemu nyingine za Baluchistan. Kwa hiyo, je, ni kwa nini serikali ya Pakistan imesubiri muda mrefu hivi kuzingira Msikiti kwa vifaa vya kijeshi vinavyofaa kwa shambulio kubwa?

For the past six months the Musharraf government has tolerated the behaviour of the students whenever they chose to challenge its writ. The accumulation of illegal arms, the abduction of Pakistani socialites and policemen, and the seizure of six Chinese women was met with muted criticism from government officials. Furthermore, these activities were not clandestine, and were planned and executed in full view of ISI’ s headquarters located in close proximity to the confines of the Lal Masjid. The frequent visit of ISI officials and government representatives negates government claims that it was exploring an amicable outcome— especially when measured against the ferocity of the Pakistani government’ s response to similar incidents in tribal agencies and elsewhere in Baluchistan. So why has the Pakistani government waited so long to barricade the Masjid with military hardware fit for an overwhelming assault.

Swali hili linaweza kujibiwa tu ndani ya muktadha mpana wa changamoto zinazokabili utawala wa Musharraf. Kwa sasa serikali ya Musharraf imelazimika kukabiliana na upinzani wa kisekula pamoja na nguvu za Kiislamu zinazodai aondolewe madarakani.

This question can only be answered in the broader context of the challenges facing Musharraf’ s rule. At present the Musharraf government has had to contend with both the secular opposition and Islamic forces calling for his removal.

Nguvu za kisekula zinazoungwa mkono na Muungano wa Kurejesha Demokrasia (ARD) na Jaji Mkuu Iftikhar zimepata kasi na kuvuruga mpango wa Marekani wa kumchagua tena Musharraf. Ili kupunguza tishio hili, Musharraf, chini ya udhamini wa Marekani, amefanya mazungumzo ya siri na baadhi ya viongozi wa upinzani wa kisekula, na amepeleka nguvu za kijeshi dhidi ya wengine. Vifo vilivyotokea Karachi ni dhihirisho la mbinu hii ya pili. Kuhusu mazungumzo, Marekani kwa niaba ya Musharraf tayari inafanya mazungumzo ya hali ya juu na Benazir Bhutto kwa lengo la kuvunja nguvu za upinzani wa kisekula na kuhakikisha Musharraf anapata muhula wa pili wa urais. Hili pia linaeleza msimamo wa Bhutto wa hivi karibuni usio wazi kuhusu Mkutano wa Vyama Vyote (APC) mjini London, ambao hadi sasa ameukwepa.

The secular forces championed by the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) and Chief Justice Iftikhar have gained momentum and have frustrated America’ s initiative to get Musharraf re-elected. To diffuse this threat, Musharraf under US auspices has held secret talks with certain leaders of the secular opposition and has deployed force against others. The deaths in Karachi are a manifestation of the latter approach. As far as negotiations are concerned, the US on Musharraf’ s behalf is already engaged in advanced talks with Benazir Bhutto with aim to break the back of the secular opposition and secure a second presidential term for Musharraf. This also explains Bhutto’ s recent ambiguous stance on the All Parties Conference (APC) in Londonxv, which she has shunned so far.

Wakati upinzani wa Kiislamu usioridhika na sera za Musharraf zinazounga mkono Marekani na mitazamo yake ya ukombozi mamboleo umejichukulia jukumu la kumwondoa madarakani, baadhi yao wameamua kutumia msimamo wa kijeshi na wengine wamefanya maandamano ili kueleza hasira zao. Lakini chanzo cha chuki yao kinachochewa na madrasa za kidini ambazo Marekani imezitambua kwa ajili ya kuondolewa kwa msingi wa kidunia au kufungwa. Tofauti na upinzani wa kidunia, ambao Marekani ilikuwa tayari kufikia maridhiano na kupatanisha makubaliano, vikosi vya Kiislamu, machoni pa watunga sera za Marekani, lazima viondolewe msingi wake wa kidini kwa nguvu ya silaha, na upinzani wowote lazima ukandamizwe. Hivyo, kuzingirwa kwa Lal Masjid na jeshi bila kuwepo sheria ya kijeshi, kudhalilishwa kwa Abdul Aziz Ghazi kwenye televisheni ya Pakistan, kusitishwa ghafla kwa mazungumzo, kuzimwa kwa vyombo vya habari, na kutangazwa kwa 'jisalimishe au ufe' kama suluhisho la mgogoro huu ni dalili mbaya kwa mustakabali wa madrasa za kidini nchini Pakistan.

Whilst the Islamic opposition unhappy with Musharraf’ s pro- American policies and his neo-liberal attitudes have taken upon themselves to oust him from power. Some have resorted to militancy and others have engaged in protests to vent their anger. But the wellspring of their resentment is fuelled by the religious seminaries which America has identified for secularisation or closure. Unlike the secular opposition—where America was keen to compromise and broker a deal— the Islamic forces in the eyes of American policy makers must be secularised at gun point, and any resistance must be crushed. Hence the surrounding of Lal Masjid by the military in the absence of martial law, the humiliation of Abdul Aziz Ghazi on Pakistan television, the abrupt cancellation of talks, the media blackout and the announcement of ‘surrender or die’ as a solution to the crisis is an ominous sign for the future of religious seminaries in Pakistan.

Yaliyotokea katika Msikiti Mwekundu (Lal Masjid) yana dalili zote za kuwa kielelezo ambacho Musharraf atakitumia kushughulikia shule na taasisi nyingine za kidini—mpango wa kuanzisha vita vya wenyewe kwa wenyewe. Zaidi ya hayo, wakati wa mgogoro huu unamfaa Musharraf, kwa sababu unaelekeza usikivu wa umma mbali na upinzani wa kisekula na mwitikio mbaya wa serikali kwa mafuriko huko Baluchistan.

What transpired at Lal Masjid has all the hallmarks of becoming a template for Musharraf to deal with other religious schools and institutions— a recipe for civil war. Not to mention that the timing of the crisis suits Musharraf, as it deflects the public’ s attention away from the secular opposition and the government’ s disastrous response to the floods in Baluchistan.

Kilicho wazi ni kwamba matumizi ya nguvu na serikali kukabiliana na nguvu zote mbili, za kidunia na za Kiislamu, yanaonyesha ufilisi wa kifikra wa kauli mbiu ya Musharraf ya "usasa wa wastani." Badala ya kutumia hoja kupambana na mawazo ya upinzani, Musharraf amechagua kutumia nguvu. Mbinu hiyo hiyo imerudiwa na washirika wa Musharraf—Marekani, NATO na Israel—chini ya kivuli cha "vita vya nyoyo na akili," na wote wawili wameshindwa kuzivunja harakati za Kiislamu nchini Iraq, Afghanistan na Palestina. Basi Musharraf ana nafasi gani?

What is evident is that the utilisation of force by the government to deal with both secular and Islamic forces exposes the intellectual bankruptcy of Musharraf’ s mantra of enlightened moderation. Instead of employing thoughts to battle the ideas of the opposition, Musharraf has resorted to force. The same method has been repeated by Musharraf’ s allies—America, NATO and Israel— under the guise of ‘battle of hearts and minds’ and both have failed to crush the Islamic movements in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine. So what chance does Musharraf have?

Julai 9, 2007

July 9, 2007