这种局面很快演变成全面的流动性危机,金融机构之间互不信任。银行同业拆借几近停滞。英格兰银行设定的利率与各银行之间借贷所用利率之间的差距急剧扩大(即伦敦银行同业拆借利率,LIBOR)。这又引发了新的问题,因为大多数银行都是借入短期资金来发放长期贷款。如果短期贷款无法获得,那么还能向谁借钱呢?作为最后贷款人的中央银行不得不介入。美国联邦储备system和英格兰银行被迫通过"紧急"贷款提供大量流动性,以维持迅速崩溃的银行继续运营。这种做法几乎无助于增强人们对银行和整个体系的信心。难怪最近一项英国银行救助法案专门加入了特别条款,隐瞒使用紧急贷款的银行名称,以消除这样做所带来的"污名"。流动性危机的另一个关键因素是,陷入困境的银行难以承受资产负债表进一步恶化的风险,不敢再向其他"可疑"的银行、(在经济衰退中的)抵押贷款持有人以及经营失败的公司发放更多高风险贷款,由此形成了恶性循环。因此,银行正在囤积能够拿到手的现金。这远不利于推动政府所期待的下一轮商业复苏。如今银行在囤积现金,而许多富人也将会效仿。

This situation then rapidly led to a full blown liquidity crisis where financial institutions don’t trust one another. Inter bank lending ground to a halt. The spread between what the Bank of England set as its interest rate, and what the banks would use to lend between them ballooned (the LIBOR rate). This created further problems as most banks borrow short term to provide long term loans. If short term loans are not available who is left to get money from? The central banks as lenders of last resort had to step in. The US Federal Reserve and Bank of England have been forced to provide masses of liquidity via “emergency” loans to keeping rapidly failing banks afloat. A position which hardly strengthens confidence in the banks or the system. It is no wonder that the most recent UK bank bailout bill included special provisions to hide the names of banks making use of emergency loans in order that the “stigma” of doing so was taken away. The other key factor in the liquidity crisis is that failing banks can hardly afford to weaken their balance sheets by making more risky loans to other “dodgy” banks, mortgage holders (in a recession) and failing companies – a vicious cycle. Consequently the banks are hoarding what cash they can get their hands on. Hardly conducive to encouraging the next big business upturn the governments expect. The banks are now hoarding cash, and many of the wealthy will be following them.