Kuma ana cewa: "Babu wani abu da ake kira gaskiya mai cikakken tabbaci da ƙarya mai cikakken tabbaci" (Henry Augustus Rowland), yayin da a yanzu ya zama ruwan dare a ce: "Gaskiya abu ce ta dangi, tana sauyawa daga mutum zuwa mutum, daga ƙungiya zuwa ƙungiya, daga zamani zuwa zamani, kuma ba ta da ma'auni na zahiri." To ta yaya, to, za a ce hanyar hankali tana ba wa ɗan adam gaskiyoyi masu cikakken tabbaci waɗanda kimiyya ba ta iya bayarwa? Shin ba akidar taurin kai ce ke kafa tsarin ƙaddara da ƙayyadaddun hukunci wajen yanke hukunci a kan ra'ayoyi, tunani da imani ba? Bugu da ƙari, wasu daga cikin hukunce-hukuncen hanyar hankali da kanta ba su da tabbas, don haka shin ba ta yi kama da hanyar kimiyya ba? To ta yaya hanyar hankali za ta zama tushen tunani, bisa hujjar cewa tana da tabbaci?

And it is also said: “There is no such thing as absolute truth and absolute falsehood” (Henry Augustus Rowland), whilst it is now common place to say, “truth is relative, varying from one individual to another, from one group to another, from one time to another, having no objective standards.” So how can it then be said that the rational method provides the human being decisive absolute truths, which science is not able to provide? Is it not Dogmatism that establishes Determinism and Absolutism in judging opinions, thoughts and convictions? In addition, some of the judgments of the rational method itself are indecisive and so is it not similar to the scientific method? So how can the rational method be a basis of thinking, upon the argument that it is decisive?

Amsar waɗannan tambayoyin tana da alaƙa da bayyana gaskiyar gaskiya, da kuma gaskiyar tabbatacci da rashin tabbatacci na hukuncin da hankali ya kai gare shi.

The answer to these questions is related to clarifying the reality of truth, as well as the reality of decisiveness and indecisiveness of the judgment arrived at by the mind.

Ra'ayin gaskiya ya bayyana ga kowane mutum, ba kamar rikitattun tunanin da falsafar Yammacin zamani ta ƙirƙira ba, kamar utilitarianism, correlationism, dualism da relativism, ko na hankali, al'adu ko ɗabi'a, da sauran waɗanda ba su da alaƙa da gaskiyar zahiri. Waɗannan ra'ayoyi falsafa ne kawai da tunanin da hankali da hujja suka karyata. Saboda haka gaskiya ba kalma ce da kowane mutane za su iya ayyana ta yadda suka ga dama ba. Gaskiya ba tunani ne kawai da masana falsafa suka fahimta bisa son ransu ba, kuma ba ra'ayin wayewar kai ba ne da wasu al'ummomi suka zaɓa daga cikin al'ummomi. Maimakon haka, gaskiya gaskiya ce ta musamman ga dukkan ɗan Adam, ba tare da la'akari da bambance-bambancensu wajen bayyana gaskiyar ba. Wannan gaskiyar ita ce ainihin yanayin gaskiya a tsakanin dukkan mutane, ko sun fahimce ta ko ba su fahimce ta ba. Gaskiya tana kasancewa ne idan hukunci ko tunani ya yi daidai da gaskiyar da yake nunawa.

The concept of truth is straightforward for any person, unlike the convolutions manufactured by the modern Western theories, such as utilitarianism, correlationism, dualism and relativism, whether cognitive, cultural or moral, as well as others that have nothing to do with reality. These theories are just philosophies and fanciful constructs falsified by reason and sense. Thus truth is not a term to be defined by any people arbitrarily. Truth is not a mere thought comprehended by the philosophers arbitrarily, nor is it a civilizational concept chosen by some nations amongst nations. Instead, truth is a specific reality for all human beings, regardless of their differences in expressing the truth. This reality is the nature of truth amongst all humans, whether they comprehend it or not. It is in truth that the judgment or thought agrees with the reality that it denotes.

Misali, idan za mu zana wani siffa ta lissafi mai layuka huɗu masu daidai da kuma masu layi ɗaya, tare da kusurwoyi huɗu masu daidai da digiri casa'in, sannan mu nuna wa Zaid da Thomas domin su yanke hukunci a kanta. Tabbatar da gaskiyar hukuncinsu zai kasance bisa hanya ɗaya ga dukkan mutane. Wannan hanya ita ce daidaituwar hukuncinsu da gaskiyar siffar da aka zana. Idan ɗaya daga cikinsu, ko su biyun, sun ce siffar murabba'i ce, za mu ce hukuncin gaskiya ne. Idan wani daga cikinsu ya ce tana da siffar triangle, za mu ce hukuncin ba gaskiya ba ne. Wannan saboda siffar lissafin da aka zana ba yanki ba ne da layuka uku suka iyakance shi.

For instance, if we were to draw a geometric figure with four equal and parallel lines with four right angles and show it to Zaid and Thomas to make a judgment regarding it. Affirming the truth of their judgments will be according to a single method for all humans. The method is the agreement of their judgments with the reality of the shape drawn. If one or both of them says that the shape is a square, we will say that it is true. If any one of them says it is a triangle, we will say that it is not true. This is because the geometrical shape drawn is not an area defined by three lines.

Haka kuma, idan Ali ya ce irin wannan mutum yana gida, Jimmy kuma ya ce: irin wannan mutum ba ya gida, to gaskiya ita ce daidaituwar hukuncinsu da hakikanin abin da ake magana a kai. Idan irin wannan mutum yana gida, to maganar Ali gaskiya ce. Idan kuma ba ya gida, to maganar Jimmy ce gaskiya. Wannan shi ne ma'anar gaskiya. Gaskiya ita ce daidaituwar tunani da hakikanin abin da tunanin ke nunawa. Wannan ba ya canzawa ko tunanin ya kasance na hankali ne ko na kimiyya ko na dabaru ko wani nau'in tunani daban.

Similarly, if Ali says such a person is at home and Jimmy says: such a person is not at home, then the truth is the agreement of their judgments with the reality. If such a person is at home, then the statement of Ali is true. If he is not at home, then the statement of Jimmy is true. This is the concept of truth. Truth is the agreement of the thought to the reality denoted by the thought. This is regardless of the thinking itself, whether the thinking is rational or scientific or logical or any other.

Game da batun ma'auni na tantance tabbatacce da ingantattun gaskiya, da kaiwa gare su, da tunani a kansu, da bambance su da wanda ba tabbatacce ba, duk wannan ana tafiyar da shi ne ta hanyar duba fagage guda na nazarin hankali. Saboda haka, tunanin hankali shi ne isar da hakikanin abu zuwa ga kwakwalwa ta hanyar gabobin jiki masu ji, tare da haɗa shi da bayanan da suka gabata, ta yadda ake fassara wannan hakikanin abu. Hukunce-hukunce kan abubuwa da al'amura suna kasancewa ne ta fuskar wanzuwarsu, mahaddacinsu da siffofinsu.

As for the issue of a criteria to determine the decisiveness and certainty of truths, arriving at them, thinking about them and distinguishing them from indecisiveness, all of this is governed by looking at the same fields of rational study. Accordingly, rational thinking is the transference of reality to the brain through sensations, linked with previous information, by which the reality is interpreted. The judgments upon things and matters are in terms of their existence, essence and characteristics.

Idan hukuncin hankali yana da alaƙa da wanzuwar wani abu, to babu shakka cewa yana da tabbas kuma yana da tabbatacce. Wannan saboda hukuncin game da wanzuwa yana zuwa ta hanyar jin wani gaskiyar abu. Gabobin jiki ba sa kuskure game da wanzuwar wani abu. Don haka,

If rational judgment is related to the existence of an object, then there is no doubt that it is definite and certain. This is because the judgment about the existence comes through sensation of a reality. The senses are not mistaken regarding the existence of a reality. So,

hukuncin da aka bayar ta hanyar tunani mai hankali game da wanzuwar wata hakika shi ne mai yanke hukunci.

judgment issued by the rational method of thinking about the existence of a reality is decisive.

Game da hukuncin da ya shafi zatin abu (tsarinsa) ko siffantuwarsa (halayensa da sifofinsa), hukuncin yana cikin wanda ba shi da tabbas, wato yana iya shiga kuskure. Wannan saboda hukunci a kan zati ko siffa yana zuwa ta hanyar bayani game da abin, ko ta hanyar nazarin abin da aka gani ko aka ji, bisa ga bayanan da aka riga aka samu. Kuskure na iya shiga cikin wannan. Saboda haka, wannan hukunci yana iya bambanta da sabani saboda bambancin iyawar mutane wajen nazari, da yawan bayanan da suke da su game da abin, da kuma yadda suke nazarin bayanan. Misali, idan muka ji sautin motsi, za mu iya yanke hukunci tabbatacce game da kasancewar motsin. Amma ba za mu iya tabbatar da zatinsa ko siffarsa ba. Motsin na iya fitowa daga mutum ko kuma daga abu. Don haka hukuncinmu a nan yana cikin rashin tabbaci. Duk da haka, kasancewar wasu hukunce-hukunce ba su da tabbas ba ya nufin babu gaskiya tabbatacciya kuma cikakka. Wannan saboda idan hukuncinmu ya dace da hakikanin abin, to mun fahimci gaskiya. Haka kuma, idan muka yanke hukunci a kan abin da ke motsi, kamar yadda misalin da ya gabata ya nuna, cewa mutum ne ko dabba daga motsin da muka ji, kuma hukuncinmu ya dace da abin da aka ji a zahiri, to mun fahimci gaskiya. Saboda haka, kasancewar yiwuwar rashin tabbaci a wasu hukunce-hukunce da tunani ba ya kawar da kasancewar gaskiya tabbatacciya, wadda hankali yake tilasta wa kansa ya miƙa mata.

As for the judgment related to the essence (composition) or characterization (properties and qualities) of an object, the judgment is indecisive, that is, susceptible to error. This is because the judgment upon the essence or characterization comes through information about the object or through the analysis of the perceived reality, according to previous information. Error can seep into this. Therefore, this judgment is liable to disparity and differences because of disparity in human abilities in terms of analysis, in the amount of information about the thing and in how the information is analyzed. For instance, if we hear the sound of a movement, we can decisively judge the existence of the movement. However, we cannot be certain about its essence or characterization. The movement could be from a man or from an object. So, our judgment here falls within indecisiveness. Nevertheless, acknowledging the occurrence of indecisiveness in some judgments does not mean that there is no, decisive absolute truth. This is because when our judgment agrees with its reality, we perceive its truth. Moreover, if we judged upon the moving object, as in the aforementioned example, that it is a man or an animal from its sensed movement, and our judgment agreed with the sensed reality, then we would have perceived the truth. Therefore, the existence of the possibility of indecisiveness, in some judgments and thoughts, does not negate the existence of decisive truth, which the mind is compelled to submit to.