[Abū l-Qāsim al-Jabbulī:] Most people think that Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal became famous largely because of what he did during the Inquisition, but that’s not so. It was because you could ask him about any issue and he would answer as if he had all the learning in the world laid out before him. 9.1

[Al-Ḥarbī]: I lived to see three men like no other: men unlike any of woman born.

The first was Abū ʿUbayd al-Qāsim ibn Sallām. The only thing I can compare him to is a mountain filled with the breath of life. The second was Bishr ibn al-Ḥārith. The only way to describe him is to say that all of him, from the crown of his head down to the soles of his feet, seemed to have been kneaded from the clay of self-restraint. The third was Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal. To me he seemed to have gathered the learning of ancient times and latter days alike, of whatever kind, so that he could say as much as he wanted or keep back whatever he wished. 9.2

[Al-Dārimī:] I never saw a dark-headed man55 learn more Hadith reports of God’s Emissary (God bless and keep him) by heart, nor reach a better understanding of everything they meant, than Aḥmad did. 9.3

[Ibn Rāhawayh:] In Iraq I used to study with Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, Yaḥyā ibn Maʿīn, and my own cohort. We used to test each other on Hadith by asking about the chain of transmitters—or the two or three different chains—that might exist for a single report.

Then Yaḥyā ibn Maʿīn would speak up and offer yet another chain. “We all agree on that one, don’t we?” I would ask, and they would all say they did. Then I would ask, “What does the report mean? How would you explain it? And what implications can we draw from it?” 9.4

At that, everyone would fall silent except for Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal.

[Ibn Yūnus:] I heard Abū ʿĀṣim say, when the topic of religious understanding was raised, “There’s no one there”—in Baghdad—“except that man,” meaning Aḥmad.

“No one’s ever come to us from there who understands as well as he does.” 9.5

Someone then mentioned ʿAlī ibn al-Madīnī, but Abū ʿĀṣim waved his hand dismissively.

[Al-Kūfī:] Yaḥyā ibn Maʿīn was once asked a question about living in a shop. “I don’t deal with that,” he replied. “Ask Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal.” 9.6

Al-Khallāl said that Aḥmad copied down the books of rationalist jurisprudence and memorized them, but then stopped consulting them. Whenever he spoke about religious understanding, he did so with the air of a man who had tested all the forms of knowledge and could speak from experience. 9.7

Ḥubaysh ibn Mubashshir and a number of other jurists said, “When we debate, we’re willing to challenge anyone except Ibn Ḥanbal. With him, all we can do is keep quiet.” 9.8

[Al-Ḥarbī:] Aḥmad [ibn Ḥanbal] was asked whether a Muslim should say “May God grace you!” to a Christian. 9.9

“Yes,” he said. “He should say it, and mean by it ‘May God grace you by making you Muslim!’”56

He was also asked whether a man who has sworn three binding oaths to have intercourse with his wife that night, or divorce her, discovers that she is menstruating.

“He must divorce her and not have intercourse,” he replied. “God has permitted divorce but forbidden intercourse with a menstruating woman.”57

Abū l-Wafāʾ ʿAlī ibn ʿAqīl (may God be pleased with him) said:58 9.10

One of the surprising things you hear ignorant young men say is that Aḥmad was no good at religious understanding, only Hadith transmission. That claim is as ignorant as any they could make, and they make it because they don’t understand his method of using Hadith to reach decisions about the preferable course of action. Certainly, his rulings are more nuanced than any we have seen them produce. This is not even to mention his superior mastery of Hadith itself, which they themselves concede. More than once he joined them for Hadith sessions and outdid the best of them.

A particularly intricate ruling of his concerns the fact that his views differed about the division of a debt that is the liability of two persons. They did not differ in regard to the rejection of the validity of the division of a debt that is the liability of one person.

The point seems to be that, if it is a single liability, it is not subject to division. This is because the one who incurred the indebtedness is one person, and one of the two partners who are owed the debt has only the right to demand payment according to his rights under the partnership—he may do nothing else, so how could the liability be subject to division? But that is not the case when the debt is the obligation of two persons. That is because one of the two partners who are owed the debt may, on his own, seek recourse against the liability of one of the two who owe the debt. In such a case the division is valid, because one of the two sources of payment is distinguishable from the other. As for his view according to which such a division is precluded, that would be because division of a debt owed by two persons is precluded due to the fact that the liabilities usually differ, and are not equivalent.59 9.11

Another example of Aḥmad’s religious understanding and the subtlety of his reasoning is the time when he was asked about a man who had vowed to circle the Kaʿbah on all fours. He answered that the man should perform two circumambulations but not crawl. Note the religious understanding: Aḥmad seems to have contemplated the act of falling on one’s face and concluded that it provokes ridicule and reduces a sentient creature to the level of a beast. Accordingly, he moved to protect the man from becoming a spectacle and bringing dishonor to God’s House and the Mosque. But instead of invalidating the wording of the man’s vow to crawl, he substituted the feet— the proper instrument of motion—for the hands.60 9.12

On another occasion Aḥmad was asked about a man who had died and left a singing slave to his son, who needed to sell her. Aḥmad said that she could only be sold as if untrained. 9.13

“A singer is worth 30,000 dinars,” he was told, “but an untrained slave is worth only twenty!” “She can only be sold as if untrained,” he repeated.

This is an admirable bit of religious understanding on his part, because the ability to sing in a slave is like the construction of an instrument of idle diversion and it is not to be assigned a value in cases of usurpation. If a man usurps a singing female slave who then forgets how to sing, he is not liable.61

On another occasion, Aḥmad was asked what to do when a dead mouse was found in a quantity of sesame seeds that had been left to soak. He ruled that the seeds should be used as fodder for livestock. 9.14

“What about rinsing them repeatedly and then draining them?” he was asked.

“Not after they’ve been soaked,” he said.

This is another example of careful reasoning on his part. The water that had already been absorbed by the seeds would not be removed by pouring additional liquid over them, since water cannot displace water. Note the man’s acumen and his mastery of detail.

On another occasion he was asked about exposing silkworms to the sun to kill them in their cocoons and prevent them from consuming the filaments they had produced. “If there is no other way,” he said, “and if the purpose is something other than making them suffer, then it’s allowed.” 9.15

This verdict is evidence of his great discernment. He permitted an act that causes suffering only because the act had a purpose other than causing that suffering.

Ibn ʿAqīl added: Aḥmad’s striking feats of reasoning attest to the presence of a mind that had reached the highest level of understanding. On one occasion, for example, he received a visit from Abū ʿUbaydah and rose from his seat. 9.16

“Hasn’t it been reported,” asked Abū ʿUbaydah, “that ‘a man’s place is his own’?” “That’s right,” said Aḥmad. “It means he can take the place if he wants, or offer it to someone else.” This degree of understanding, here joined with quick thinking, is un surpassable.

Faced with this degree of insight and sound judgment, any fair observer can only avert his eyes in modesty.62 The only people who do find fault with Aḥmad are purveyors of reprehensible innovations who burn with resentment when they see how often his judgments are adopted and theirs forgotten. So well known are his verdicts that most scholars say, “My ruling in particular cases follows that of So-and-So, but the basis for my reasoning is Aḥmad’s.” To see a man’s judgments adopted as foundational should be enough to convince anyone of his merits. 9.17