Inaweza kuwa rahisi kwa mtu kubisha kwamba ikiwa wanaume wazima (na wanawake) wamefurahi kubashiri juu ya mwelekeo wa viwango vya riba, nguvu ya soko la nyumba la Marekani, na juu ya nani atafanikiwa na nani hatafanikiwa katika ulimwengu wa makampuni (kwa mfano kupitia Credit Default Swaps), wanapaswa kuruhusiwa kuendelea na mambo yao. Baada ya yote kuna daima mshindi na mshindwa, na labda mshindwa atajifunza kutokana na makosa yake na kurudi kuwa mtu bora zaidi. Kama mcheza kamari anayeshindwa daima ambaye hurudi akiwa mraibu lakini akitarajia malipo makubwa, dhana ilikuwa kwamba masoko yana ufanisi na walioshindwa watalipa kikamilifu na kwa wakati, kama vile washindi watakavyofurahia kuchukua faida zao. Wazo hili ni la kipuuzi, kwani linashindwa kuzingatia kutokuwa na ufanisi kwa wale walioingia katika mambo wasiyoyaweza, ambao watapata shida kulipa madeni yao, na wale ambao wameangamizwa kabisa na hasara zao za kamari. Mgogoro huu si tofauti na hayo.

It would be easy for one to argue that if grown men (and women) are happy to gamble on the direction of interest rates, the strength of the US housing market and over who will, and who will not fail in the corporate world (for example with Credit Default Swaps), they should be allowed to get on with it. After all there is always a winner and a loser, and maybe the loser will learn from his mistakes and come back a better person. Like the perpetually failing gambler who always returns addicted yet expectant for a big payout, the assumption was that the markets are efficient and losers will pay out fully and on time just as the winners will gleefully pocket their gains. This is an absurd notion, which fails to take note of the inefficiency of those that get in out of their depth who will struggle to meet their debts and those that are completely wiped out by their gambling losses. This crisis is no different.

Wameona kampuni zikiweka "kampuni nzima" rehani, au kwa usahihi zaidi kupitia kutumia mikopo (leverage), zikiweka rehani mara nyingi zaidi ya thamani ya kampuni yenyewe. Licha ya jeshi kubwa la wahasibu, wataalamu wa kupima hatari na wafanyakazi wa kufuata sheria, benki kubwa zaidi duniani hazikuona yaliyokuwa yanakuja, na zikaingia kwenye dhoruba. Zikiwa zimepofushwa na ndoto za kuendelea kujilimbikizia faida kwenye kamari kubwa zaidi na hatari zaidi, zilidhani kwamba hazitapoteza kamwe. Kuanzia wakurugenzi wakuu hadi wafanyabiashara wa chini, wote wanawajibika kwa matokeo hayo. Hata hivyo, isipokuwa wachache, hawakufanya chochote kinyume cha sheria. Mfumo na sheria viliidhinisha walichokuwa wakifanya. Chanzo kikuu cha tatizo kiko kwenye mfumo (Ubepari) na mtazamo wake kuhusu miamala na kamari kwa ujumla. Benki ya Royal Bank of Scotland na Barclays, mbili kati ya benki kubwa na zenye heshima zaidi, hivi karibuni ziliripotiwa kila moja kushikilia (kulingana na ripoti na hesabu zilizochapishwa) dola trilioni 2.4 za Credit Default Swaps, karibu mara mbili ya jumla ya Pato la Taifa la Uingereza. Haishangazi kwamba zote mbili zimekuwa kitovu cha mazungumzo ya uokoaji na serikali ya Uingereza, huku RBS ikianguka.

We’ve watched companies bet “the firm”, or to be more accurate through leveraging (loans) bet many multiples of the firm. Despite armies of accountants, risk experts and compliance staff the world’s largest banks did not see it coming and walked into the storm. Blinded by dreams of constantly accumulating profits on ever larger and riskier bets they just assumed they would never lose. And from the chief executives all the way down to the traders they are all culpable for the results. Yet, with only a few exceptions, they did nothing illegal. The system and the law endorsed what they did. The heart of the problem lies with the system (Capitalism) and its approach to transactions and gambling in general. Both the Royal Bank of Scotland and Barclays two of the largest and most prestigious banks have recently been reported to be each holding (according to their published report and accounts) $2.4 trillion dollars of Credit Default Swaps, nearly twice the size of Britain’s total Gross Domestic Product. Little wonder they have both been at the centre of bailout discussions with the British government with the RBS succumbing.

Credit default swaps (CDS) zilichukua nafasi kubwa katika mzozo wa mikopo uliokua kwa kasi na kusababisha Lehman Brothers kuomba ulinzi wa kufilisika. Vivyo hivyo, mpango wa uokoaji wa serikali kwa kampuni ya bima American International Group Inc. (AIG) ($124 bilioni na bado unaendelea) pamoja na uuzaji wa dharura wa Merrill Lynch & Co kwa Bank of America una mizizi yake katika Bubu la CDS. AIG ilikuwa imekuwa mchezaji mkubwa katika soko la CDS, ikiacha bima ya kawaida kwa ajili ya soko la CDS lenye utata zaidi na linalodhaniwa kuwa lenye faida kubwa zaidi. Kama muuzaji mkubwa wa CDS, AIG ingeshindwa, ingesababisha hasara za mabilioni ya dola kwa benki na makundi mengine mengi ya kifedha yaliyofanya biashara na AIG, na nayo ingeyapeleka kwenye kushindwa pia. Mnyororo wa kuanguka kama domino ungeanza kikamilifu. Lehman Brothers, licha ya historia yake na nafasi yake kwenye Wall Street, ilichukuliwa kuwa inaweza kuachwa, na ikaruhusiwa kushindwa. Hata hivyo, kushindwa kwake kumekosolewa na watu wengi kwa sababu kulichangia pakubwa katika mzozo wa sasa.

Credit default swaps played a major role in the mushrooming credit crisis which led to Lehman Brothers filing for bankruptcy protection. Similarly the government rescue plan for insurer American International Group Inc. (AIG) ($124 billion and counting) and the emergency sale of Merryll Lynch & Co to Bank of America is rooted in the CDS bubble. AIG had become a major player in the CDS market, shunning traditional insurance for the more exotic and supposedly more lucrative CDS market. As a major seller of CDSs, had AIG failed, it would have triggered many billions of dollars in losses at numerous other banks and financial groups who traded with AIG, sending them into failure as well. The domino chain would be well and truly kicked off. Lehman Brothers despite its history and standing on Wall Street was deemed expendable, and was allowed to fail. Nevertheless its failure has in many quarters been criticised because it has played a key part in the current crisis.

Kwa kuingia kwenye kufilisiwa, kiwango kamili cha nafasi zake kubwa za bidhaa za kifedha za kubashiri (derivatives) na nafasi zilizokopwa kwa mkopo kiliwekwa wazi zaidi. Bado kuna mikataba 1.5 milioni ya derivatives ya Lehman ambayo timu kubwa ya mawakili inapambana kuipitia. Pia kilisababisha "tukio la mkopo" (credit event) kwa Lehman, kufuatia matukio ya aina hiyo yaliyotokana na serikali kuchukua udhibiti wa kampuni kubwa zaidi za rehani za Marekani, Freddie Mac na Fannie Mae. Matukio haya ya mikopo yaliuweka udhaifu wa mfumo wa kifedha katika mwangaza mkali, na hakuna aliyejua ni nani angefilisika ijayo. Huku hasara kubwa za CDS na derivatives nyingine zikizunguka kwenye mfumo, hakuna aliyeweza kujua nani angeweza kumlipa nani. Ikiwa benki kubwa zaidi, zikiwemo benki zote kuu za uwekezaji, zilikuwa katika hatari ya kushindwa kulipa madeni, basi unamwamini nani? Benki tano kuu za uwekezaji za Marekani sasa zote zimeshindwa (Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch) au zimeacha muundo wao wa biashara na kuwa benki zenye upatikanaji wa msaada maalum wa kifedha na kinga kutoka serikali ya Marekani (Goldman Sachs na Morgan Stanley).

By going into liquidation the full extent of its massive derivatives and leveraged positions became clearer – there is still 1.5 million Lehman derivative contracts which a large team of lawyers are struggling through. It also triggered a “credit event” over Lehman, following the credit events of the Government takeovers of the largest US mortgage companies Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. These credit events brought the fragility of the financial system into sharp focus and no one knew who would fail next, or with such large CDS and other derivative losses washing around the system, who could pay who. If the largest of banks including all the key investment banks, were possibly insolvent who do you trust? The five core US investment banks have now all either failed (Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Meryll Lynch) or abandoned their business model and become banks with access to special funding support and protections from the US government (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley).