7.1 Dhamana za Madeni (CDOs) - Mgogoro wa Kifedha Duniani | Quran Course

7.1 Dhamana za Madeni (CDOs) - Mgogoro wa Kifedha Duniani | Quran Course

Kwa kuwa bidhaa za CDO zinapaswa kuthaminiwa kwa msingi wa mark to market (ambapo dhamana huwekwa kwenye mizania kwa bei ya soko ya sasa), jambo hili, pamoja na kukwama kwa masoko ya mikopo na kuporomoka kwa upatikanaji wa fedha taslimu katika bidhaa hizi, lilisababisha upunguzaji mkubwa wa thamani mwaka 2007. Zaidi ya hayo, kumetokea upotevu mkubwa wa imani katika uhalali wa mchakato unaotumiwa na mashirika ya ukadiriaji kupanga alama za mikopo kwa tranche za CDO, na upotevu huu wa imani umeendelea hadi mwaka 2008. Kampuni ya utafiti Celent ilikadiria ukubwa wa soko la CDO duniani kuwa karibu dola trilioni 2 kufikia mwisho wa mwaka 2006. CDO hutofautiana katika muundo na mali zao za msingi, lakini kanuni yake ya msingi ni ile ile. Kwa ufupi, CDO ni dhamana iliyoundwa kushikilia mali kama dhamana na kuuza vifurushi vya mtiririko wa fedha zinazotokana na mali hizo kwa wawekezaji. Ni njia ya kubadilisha madeni kuwa dhamana zinazouzwa sokoni. Kadiri mahitaji ya CDO na uwekezaji mwingine wa dhamana zenye faida kubwa yalivyoongezeka, benki ziliona fursa ya kukusanya rehani za sub prime pamoja na rehani za daraja la juu na madeni mengine kwenye chombo kimoja. Mwekezaji wa CDO huchukua nafasi katika taasisi yenye hatari na faida zilizobainishwa, si moja kwa moja katika mali za msingi (k.m. rehani). Kwa hiyo, uwekezaji hutegemea ubora wa vipimo na dhana zinazotumika kubainisha hatari na faida za tranche. Imethibitika kuwa CDO nyingi zilithaminiwa kupita kiasi bila uhalisia, kutokana na ubora duni wa rehani za msingi zilizomo ndani yake nyingi, na kutokana na Bubble ya nyumba nchini Marekani na kushuka kwa bei kulikofuata.

As CDO products should be valued on a mark to market basis (where securities are marked in balance sheets at current market price), this coupled with the paralysis in the credit markets and the collapse of liquidity in these products led to substantial write-downs in 2007. Additionally a major loss of confidence has occurred in the validity of the process used by ratings agencies to assign credit ratings to CDO tranches and this loss of confidence has persisted through 2008. Research firm Celent estimated the size of the CDO global market at close to $2 trillion by the end of 2006. CDOs vary in structure and their underlying assets, but the basic principle is the same. Essentially a CDO is a security constructed to hold assets as collateral and to sell packages of cash flows from those assets to investors. It is a means to securitise debts. With growing demand for CDOs and other high yielding securities investment, banks saw an opportunity to package up sub prime mortgages together with higher grade mortgages and other debts into one vehicle. A CDO investor takes a position in an entity that has a defined risk and reward, not directly in the underlying assets (eg the mortgage). Therefore, the investment is dependent on the quality of the metrics and assumptions used for defining the risk and reward of the tranches. Many CDOs have been proven to be hopelessly overvalued in light of the poor quality of underlying mortgages included in many of them and in light of the US housing bubble, and subsequent price slide.

Taasisi nyingi zilikopa kiasi kikubwa mno kwa kutafuta faida kubwa. Mfano rahisi unaonyesha hili. Benki yenye mtaji wa dola milioni 1 ingekopa dola milioni 29 ili kisha kununua bidhaa ya kimuundo yenye thamani ya dola milioni 30, kama CDO, iliyojengwa juu ya deni la rehani kwa mfano. Malipo ya riba ya CDO ya dola milioni 30 yangekuwa makubwa zaidi kuliko gharama ya kukopa dola milioni 29. Asilimia ishirini (dola milioni 6) ya rehani zingeingia katika hali ya kutolipwa, na kiwango kibaya cha urejeshaji, tuseme theluthi mbili au dola milioni 4. Hii ingeacha hasara ya mtaji ya dola milioni 2, ambayo ingefuta kabisa mtaji wa awali wa dola milioni 1 na kuacha hasara halisi ya dola milioni 1 (mtaji wa minus dola milioni 1, mali za dola milioni 28 zinazoshuka thamani, na madeni ya dola milioni 29). Mfano huu unapotokea kweli, lakini kwa mabilioni ya dola, ndipo ukubwa wa tatizo unapoonekana. Kwa mchanganyiko wa kukopa (kuweka leverage) na sasa kushuka kwa kasi kwa soko la nyumba, hasara kwa bidhaa hizi zimekuwa za maafa. Hata sehemu zenye ubora wa juu zaidi za deni zimepata hasara kubwa. Kampuni ya Bear Stearns, ambayo wakati huo ilikuwa kampuni ya tano kwa ukubwa ya dhamana nchini Marekani, ilisema tarehe 18 Julai 2007 kwamba wawekezaji katika mfuko wake mbili wa uwekezaji uliofeli watapata kidogo sana, ikiwa chochote, baada ya "kushuka kusikowahi kutokea" kwa thamani ya dhamana zilizotumika kubashiri juu ya rehani za subprime.

Many institutions became vastly over-leveraged in the seeking of high returns. A simple example demonstrates this. A bank with $1 million of capital would borrow $29 million to then buy $30 million of structured product like a CDO, for example written over mortgage debt. The interest payments on the CDO of $30 million are much higher than the cost of borrowing on the $29 million. Twenty percent ($6 million) of the mortgages go into default, with a poor recovery rate (say 2 thirds or $4 million). This leaves a capital loss of $2 million which wipes out completely the original $1 million of capital and leaves a net loss of $1 million (capital of minus $1 million, assets of $28 million which are falling, and liabilities of $29 million). When the above example becomes real, but is in billions of dollars then the scale of the problem can be felt. With the mix of borrowings (leveraging) and now severe housing market downturn, the losses have been catastrophic on these products. And even the higher quality tranches of debt have suffered significant losses. The now defunct Bear Stearns, which at the time was the fifth-largest U.S. securities firm, said on July 18, 2007 that investors in its two failed hedge funds will get little if any money back after “unprecedented declines” in the value of securities used to bet on subprime mortgages.