Fursa ya kuwekeza mali, kukusanya nguvu kazi na utaalamu, na kuunda kampuni kwa ufanisi ni msingi wa jamii yoyote. Ingawa jamii za Magharibi zimejikusanya kuzunguka kampuni ya hisa ya pamoja inayouzwa kwa uhuru katika masoko ya hisa, Uislamu umeweka kanuni maalum za kuunda na kuendesha kampuni ambazo zina tofauti fulani zinazojitokeza.

The opportunity to invest wealth, aggregate labour and expertise, and form companies in an efficient manner is fundamental to any society. While western societies have congregated around the joint stock company which is freely traded on stock markets, Islam has set out specific rules for the formation and function of companies which have some distinct differences.

Uislamu unaichukulia uundaji wa kampuni kuwa muamala maalum unaohitaji ofa na kukubaliwa na washiriki wote, maana yake ni lazima kuwepo makubaliano kati ya washirika kwa ajili ya washiriki wapya. Pia, jambo la msingi katika muamala huu ni wazo kwamba chombo cha kampuni kina mtaji maalum na sehemu ya kiwiliwili, ilhali kampuni ya kawaida ya hisa za pamoja ni kampuni ya mtaji tu (hata Wakurugenzi ni waajiriwa). Sehemu ya "kiwiliwili" kwa kampuni ni sharti lisiloepukika kwa sababu huanzisha uwajibikaji kamili na dhamana kamili kwa vitendo vya kampuni. Hili, pamoja na kukatazwa kwa "dhima ndogo," linaondoa hali ya kutojulikana nyuma ya ambayo watu wengi hujificha katika PLC ya kawaida (Kampuni ya Dhima Ndogo ya Umma) au SA (Société Anonyme nchini Ufaransa). Kukosekana kwa chombo kinachowajibika chenye dhima ndogo kumesababisha madhara makubwa katika mgogoro wa sasa. 26.

Islam treats the formation of the company as a specific transaction requiring an offer and acceptance by all participants meaning that there must be agreement between partners for new participants. Fundamental to the transaction is also the notion that the corporate entity has a specific capital and body element, whereas the standard joint stock company is a company of capital only (even the Directors are employees). A “body” element to the company is an absolute requirement as it establishes complete accountability and responsibility for the actions of the company. This coupled with prohibition of “limited liability” means that the anonymity behind which many hide in the standard PLC (Public Limited Company) or SA (Société Anonyme in France) is avoided. This lack of an accountable body with limited liability has had disastrous consequences in the current crisis. 26.

Wakati Afisa Mkuu Mtendaji aliyeaibishwa wa benki ya uwekezaji iliyoanguka ya Lehman Brothers, Richard Fuld, alipotoa ushahidi mbele ya Bunge la Marekani tarehe 6 Oktoba 2008, alitetea mshahara wake wa dola milioni 484 huku akijua kwamba alikuwa akiliacha janga ambalo yeye na wenzake walisimamia benki hiyo. Bila dhima yoyote ya kibinafsi kwa kiwango cha mara 20 au 30 cha ukopaji wa mali katika mizania yao, kwa dau hatari kubwa walilokuwa wakiweka, wala kwa maelfu ya mikataba ya derivatives ambayo bado ilikuwa hai, Fuld angeweza kwa furaha kupuuzia maswali mengi. Katika ushahidi wake alisema alichukua "jukumu kamili" kwa kufilisika kwa Lehman Brothers na "alijisikia vibaya sana" kuhusu hilo. Hata hivyo, siku chache tu kabla ya benki kuanguka (ilishindwa kupata msaada wa Hazina), wakurugenzi wao walikuwa wakiidhinisha malipo maalum ya dola milioni 20 kwa wakurugenzi waandamizi waliokuwa wakiondoka.

When the disgraced Chief Executive officer of the failed investment Bank Lehman Brothers, Richard Fuld, gave testimony to Congress on October 6th, 2008 he defended his $484 million in salary fully aware that he was walking away from the disaster he and his colleagues oversaw at the bank. Without any personal liability for the 20 or 30 times leveraging of their balance sheet assets, the enormously risky bets they were taking nor the hundreds of thousands of derivative contracts which remain outstanding, Fuld could happily brush aside most questions. In his testimony he said he took “full responsibility” for the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and “felt horrible” about it. Yet, even days before the bank collapsed (failed to gain a Treasury bailout) their executives were endorsing $20 million in ‘special payments’ for departing senior executives27.

Mjadala kuhusu viwango vya bonasi za watendaji wakuu katika mgogoro huu, na kama zinapaswa kupunguzwa, unapuuza jambo muhimu zaidi. Pale ambapo kuna uwajibikaji mdogo au usio na kabisa wa kifedha na kisheria kwa matendo ya benki, tunaweza kutarajia aina ya ubadhirifu ambao umekuwa wa kawaida. Sheria ya kampuni katika Uislamu inahakikisha kwamba wamiliki wa kampuni hawajifichi nyuma ya dhima ndogo; wanawajibika kikamilifu kwa utekelezaji wa mikataba yao na kwa athari yoyote ya kifedha ya miamala yote wanayoingia. Zaidi ya hayo, sheria za kujibu matukio kama vile Sarbanes-Oxley, zilizoanzishwa nchini Marekani kujibu kashfa za Enron na WorldCom ambapo watendaji wakuu walikuwa wakidanganya vitabu vya hesabu, hazijakuwa na athari yoyote katika mgogoro huu kwa sababu zilishindwa kushughulikia kipengele muhimu cha dhima kwa miamala ya benki na taasisi. Katika Uislamu, wamiliki au washirika wa kampuni yoyote wanabaki na dhima ya hasara hata baada ya kampuni kufilisika. Suala hili la uwajibikaji halisi kwa matendo, badala ya kupunguza bonasi kwa namna isiyo ya uhakika, ndilo linalotoa kiwango cha busara katika mwenendo wa biashara wa watendaji wa kampuni.

The debate over levels of executive bonuses in this crisis and whether they should be curtailed neglects the most important fact. When there is little or no actual monetary and legal accountability for the actions of a bank then we can expect the type of excesses that have become common. Islamic corporate law ensures that the owners of the company are not shielded behind limited liability, they are fully accountable for the performance of their contracts and any monetary impact for all the transactions they enter into. Furthermore reactive legislation such as the Sarbannes Oxley laws introduced in the US in response to the Enron and Worldcom debacles where senior executives were effectively “cooking the books” has had virtually no effect in this crisis because it failed to address the key element of liability for the transactions of the banks/institutions. In Islam the owners/partners of any company remain liable for losses even after a company has failed. This issue of real accountability for actions, rather than potential curtailment of bonuses provides a level of sobriety to the trading practices of company executives.

Ni muhimu pia kusisitizwa kwamba, isipokuwa kwa baadhi ya tofauti chache, ukopaji wa fedha kwa kutumia mikopo mikubwa (leverage), dau za kitokanishi (derivative bets), na aina mbalimbali za miamala hatarishi, vyote hivyo vilikuwa halali kikamilifu chini ya sheria dhaifu za makampuni zinazosimamia biashara katika nchi za Magharibi. Basi haishangazi kwamba watendaji wakuu wamechukua fursa ya mazingira dhaifu ya biashara kama hayo kujipatia malipo makubwa ya fidia, bila kujali sana hatari zilizopo.

It must also be stressed that, with a few exceptions, the aggressive leveraging (borrowings), derivative bets, and array of risky transactions were all fully legal under the lax corporate laws governing business in the West. It is thus little wonder that executives have taken advantage of such a lax trading environment to drive massive compensation packets for themselves, with little concern for the risks involved.