Serikali ya Uingereza iliahidi kutoa hadi pauni bilioni 50 ili kuboresha mizania ya benki zilizokuwa katika hali mbaya, kupitia uwekezaji wa moja kwa moja ikiwa ni pamoja na hisa za upendeleo. Kifurushi hicho cha uokoaji pia kilijumuisha pauni bilioni 200 za fedha za dharura kupitia upanuzi wa Mpango Maalum wa Ukwasi, ambao huziwezesha benki kukopa kwa mahitaji ya ukwasi wa "muda mfupi", na pauni bilioni 250 za utoaji wa deni zilizodhaminiwa na serikali.

The UK government committed to pay up to £50 billion to improve the balance sheets of stricken banks, by way of direct investment including preference shares. The bailout package also included £200 billion to provide emergency funding via extension of the Special Liquidity Scheme which enables banks to borrow for “short term” liquidity needs and £250 billion for debt issuance backed by the government.

Sindano ya dharura ya mtaji katika Royal Bank of Scotland na Halifax Bank of Scotland haiwezi kuchukuliwa kuwa uwekezaji wa mtaji, kwa sababu serikali ya Uingereza haikuwa na mtaji wa kuwekeza. Kwa hiyo fedha hizo zitaongezwa kwenye madeni yake ya mikopo. Ukijumlisha hilo na kutaifishwa kwa Northern Rock na Bradford and Bingley, serikali imevunja kanuni yake ya dhahabu ya kukopa tu kwa ajili ya uwekezaji katika mzunguko mzima wa uchumi, na sio kwa ajili ya kufadhili mahitaji ya matumizi ya kila siku.

The emergency injection of capital into the Royal Bank of Scotland and Halifax Bank of Scotland, could not be seen as an investment of capital because the UK government did not have the capital available to invest. Consequently the money will be added to their borrowings. When coupled with the nationalisation of Northern Rock and Bradford and Bingley the government has broken its golden rule of only borrowing to invest over the economic cycle and not for funding day to day spending needs.

Kwa kulinganisha, Marekani mnamo tarehe 2 Oktoba iliahidi dola bilioni 700 kununua mali "zenye sumu" za mashirika ya kifedha yaliyoathirika, ili kutoa fedha taslimu za kutosha hadi bei za mali zitakapopanda tena. Mpango huo baadaye ulirekebishwa ili kujumuisha serikali ya Marekani kuchukua hisa katika kuongeza mtaji wa baadhi ya taasisi.

In comparison the US on the 2nd of October committed to $700 billion to buy “toxic” assets of stricken financial organisations to provide liquidity until asset prices recover, a plan which was amended later to include the US government taking positions in the recapitalisation of some institutions.

Matumizi ya neno la kihisia "toxic" yanaibua picha za aina fulani ya janga la Chernobyl, na ingawa hilo linaweza kuwa mfano unaofaa, si picha pekee inayohusishwa na neno toxic. Itakuwa vigumu kupata thamani chanya au bei kwa kitu chenye sumu, isipokuwa mtu akitumie kumdhuru mtu mwingine. Sababu inayoonekana ya mpango wa uokoaji ni kwamba, ingawa kuingiza fedha za walipa kodi kwenye kasino ya Wall Street huenda isiwe haki, ni uovu wa lazima utakaoziachilia "mali zenye matatizo" na kuunda ukwasi katika masoko ya fedha, hivyo kuchochea wimbi jipya linalohitajika sana la kukopesha, kukopa na mzunguko unaofuata wa ukuaji. Mbinu hii ina matatizo kadhaa.

The use of the emotive word “toxic” conjures up images of some form of Chernobyl disaster, and whilst that may be an appropriate analogy, that’s not the only imagery associated with toxic. It would be difficult to find a positive value or price for something toxic, unless one was using it to injure someone. The apparent rationale for the bailout plan is that while the injection of tax payers' money into the Wall Street casino may not be fair, it is a necessary evil that will free up the “troubled assets” and create liquidity in the financial markets, thereby triggering a much-needed new wave of lending, borrowing and the next round of growth. There are several problems with this approach.

1. Kushindwa kupata wanunuzi wa "mali sumu" (jina ambalo lenyewe linapingana na maana yake) si tatizo la ukwasi bali ni tatizo la bei. Soko lipo, lakini tatizo ni kwamba bei iliyopo sokoni haikubaliki kwa benki na mifuko ya uwekezaji ambayo inataka kuendelea kuwepo. Kama soko linazipa bei ya takataka, serikali ni nani kuzipa bei nyingine? Hili linaonyesha tatizo halisi la imani. Tatizo ni ukosefu wa imani na uaminifu, na hili linatokana na mali nyingi mno za takataka au zilizopanda thamani kupita kiasi ikilinganishwa na mali halisi. Mgogoro wa ukwasi si kwamba hakuna fedha zinazopatikana, bali ni kwamba wale wanaozimiliki hawatazitumia wakati wa kudorora kali kwa uchumi na wakati bei za mali zimepanda kupita kiasi. Wamiliki wa fedha hawako tayari kuzikopesha kwa wamiliki wa mali za takataka, hasa wanapoweza kufilisika.

1. The inability to find buyers for the “toxic assets” (such a contradiction in terms) is not a liquidity problem but a price problem. There is a market for them, but the problem is that the price in the market is unpalatable to banks and investment funds that want to survive. If the market prices them as junk, who is the government to price them otherwise? This betrays the real problem of confidence. The problem is one of a lack of faith and trust, and this is because of too much junk/overblown assets relative to real assets. The liquidity crisis is not that there is no liquidity available, simply that those with it will not spend in a serious downturn and with overblown asset prices. Owners of liquidity are not willing to lend it to owners of junk, particularly if they may fail.

2. Ingawa dola bilioni 700 ni kiasi kikubwa sana, hakiwezi kutosha kabisa. Ni sehemu tu ya madeni mabaya yaliyokusanyika na madeni yanayowezekana siku zijazo. Gazeti la The Washington Post liliripoti tarehe 29 Septemba kwamba taasisi 20 kubwa zaidi za kifedha nchini Marekani zilimiliki dola trilioni 4.7 za rehani na dhamana zilizofungamana na rehani (pamoja na CDO ambazo hazikurekodiwa juu ya hizo). Hasara za CDS pia sasa zinaanza kuumiza, na hili nalo halidhibitiwi, halitolewi taarifa, na ni kubwa mno. Sasa ni jambo lenye shaka kubwa kama misaada ya dharura, mikopo na dhamana mbalimbali kutoka serikali za Marekani, Uingereza na Ulaya zitawahi kulipwa, kwani kufikia tarehe 4 Desemba 2008 kiasi hicho kilizidi dola trilioni 10.

2. Although $700 billion is a really large number, it is no way large enough. It is only a fraction of the accumulated bad debts and likely debts moving forward. The Washington Post reported on the 29th of September that 20 of the US’s largest financial institutions owned $4.7 trillion in mortgages and mortgage backed securities (with non recorded CDOs on top of that). CDS losses are also now beginning to hurt and this too is unregulated, unreported, and huge. It is now very questionable as to whether the assorted bailout, loans, and guarantees from the US/UK/European governments will ever be paid. Amounts which as of December 4, 2008 were in excess of $10 trillion.

3. Tatizo kuu la msingi la mdororo wa soko la nyumba na mikopo ya sub prime halijashughulikiwa. Kwa sababu hiyo, mamilioni ya watu nchini Marekani watapoteza nyumba zao na kusukumwa zaidi katika umaskini. Wakati huo huo, serikali inaokoa taasisi kubwa za kifedha, licha ya kwamba taasisi hizo hizo ndizo zilizofanya mauzo makali ya mikopo ya nyumba. Kuna mamilioni ya watu ambao watapoteza kila kitu (nyumba zao, mali zao na kazi zao). Katika mipango hii ya uokoaji hakuna kifungu chochote kwa waathirika wa mdororo wa soko la nyumba, na vyombo vya habari vinakimbilia kuwalaumu kwa "kujiingiza kupita kiasi" au kuchukua mikopo ya nyumba ambayo hawakuweza kuimudu. Hata hivyo, sera za mauzo za ukali zinazofanywa na taasisi hizo hazichukuliwi hatua yoyote. Kwa nini waathirika hawasaidiwi ili waweze kuendelea kuwa na paa juu ya vichwa vyao? Kama serikali zingefanya hivyo, angalau zingekuwa zinachukua mali halisi (nyumba).

3. The main underlying problem of the housing bubble and sub prime lending is not addressed. Consequently millions in the US will lose their homes and be driven even further into poverty. At the same time that the government is bailing out major financial institutions, following aggressive mortgage selling by those same institutions there are millions who will lose everything (their homes, wealth, and jobs). There is no provision in these bailouts for the victims of the housing bubble and the media is quick to point blame at them for “over-extending” or taking out mortgages they couldn’t afford. Yet the aggressive sales policies are not punished. Why are the victims not being bailed out to enable them to keep a roof over their heads? If the governments did this then they would at least be taking on real assets (houses).

4. Vifurushi vya kuchochea uchumi ni nyongeza tu isiyofaa. Sekta ya magari ilisihi ipewe msaada wa dola bilioni 25 kutokana na hali mbaya ya jumla ya uchumi na kudorora kwa sekta yao yenyewe. Msaada wa kifedha utatuma pesa nzuri (kutoka kwa walipa kodi, au kupitia ongezeko la fedha zinazozunguka – kuchapishwa kwa dola zaidi) ili kufidia hasara zenye sumu za wafanyabiashara wa kubahatisha. Pesa hiyo itaingia kwenye shimo jeusi ili kufunika hasara zao (za benki) na haitawasaidia wamiliki wa nyumba wala umma kwa ujumla.

4. The economic stimulus packages are only an inconvenient “add-on”. The auto industry pleaded for a $25 billion bail out due to the overall economic malaise and decline in their own industry. The financial bailout will send good money (from the taxpayers, or via inflated money supply – printing of more dollars) to cover the toxic losses of the speculators. That money will fall into a black hole to cover their (bank’s) losses and will not help homeowners or the general public.

Wasiwasi kuhusu matumizi ya ovyo ya sera za uokoaji wa kifedha za serikali ya Marekani umeongezeka. Gazeti la NY Times liliripoti tarehe 27 Novemba kwamba, Jumanne tarehe 25, Benki Kuu ya Marekani (Federal Reserve) na Hazina (Treasury) zilipotangaza mpango mpya wa mikopo wenye thamani ya dola bilioni 800, zilikuwa zikituma ujumbe kwamba zitachapisha fedha kadiri zitakavyohitajika ili kuufufua mfumo wa benki wa taifa uliodhoofika.

Concerns about the profligacy of the US government’s spendthrift bailout policies have accelerated. The NY Times reported on the 27th of November that with the Federal Reserve and the Treasury announcing a new $800 billion in lending programs on Tuesday the 25th, that they were sending a message that they would print as much money as needed to revive the nation’s crippled banking system.

"Katika mwaka uliopita, serikali imechukua majukumu ya kifedha ya moja kwa moja na yasiyo ya moja kwa moja yapatayo dola trilioni 7.8. Hilo ni sawa na karibu nusu ya ukubwa wa uchumi mzima wa taifa, na linapita kwa mbali dola bilioni 700 ambazo Bunge lilizidhinisha kwa mpango wa uokoaji wa kifedha wa Hazina."

“In the last year, the government has assumed about $7.8 trillion in direct and indirect financial obligations. That is equal to about half the size of the nation’s entire economy and far eclipses the $700 billion that Congress authorized for the Treasury’s financial rescue plan.” 1

Mbali na misaada ya serikali, wakopeshaji wenye matatizo wanatazamia kusimamishwa kwa kanuni za uhasibu za "mark to market" kama njia ya kujiokoa. Kanuni hizi zilihitaji taasisi kuthamini mali zao za rehani kulingana na bei ya mwisho iliyouzwa sokoni. Hata hivyo, mabadiliko yaliyotekelezwa hivi karibuni na Bodi ya Viwango vya Uhasibu wa Kifedha (FASB), chini ya shinikizo kutoka benki kubwa, yanaruhusu uthamini unaotegemea mifano, ambao ni wa manufaa zaidi kwao, na sasa yameanza kutumika. Wakopeshaji sasa wanaweza kujifanya kwamba hasara hazipo, au kuahirisha uhasibu wa hasara hizo, na hivyo kuondoa kwa hatari uwazi ambao wawekezaji wanauhitaji sana.

In addition to the government bailouts, distressed lenders are looking to the suspension of "mark to market" accounting rules as a means of salvation. These rules required institutions to value their mortgage assets according to the most recently traded price. However, changes recently implemented by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) under pressure from the large banks to allow more advantageous model based valuations have now been brought in. Lenders are now able to pretend that the losses do not exist, or defer accounting for them, thereby dangerously removing the transparency that investors so desperately need.

"Inawapa kampuni uhuru zaidi wa kutumia makadirio na uamuzi wao wenyewe katika hali nyingi wanapoona soko linaelekea kuwa "lisilo na mpangilio" au limekumbwa na matatizo ya upatikanaji wa fedha taslimu." 2.

“It gives companies more leeway to employ estimates and their own judgment in many cases when they deem the market to be "disorderly" or seized by liquidity problems” 2.

Kwa hiyo, benki sasa zinaweza kuwasilisha thamani zilizopandishwa za mali zao za rehani, na kwamba mizania zao zina mtaji wa kutosha. Hazitahitaji kukusanya mtaji zaidi ili kufadhili mikopo mipya. Hata hivyo, kama vile mtu asiyehisi maumivu anavyokabiliwa na hatari ya majeraha makubwa, hatua hii inazihimiza taasisi hizo hizo za kifedha kuchukua hatari kubwa zaidi. Mwishowe hili huenda likasababisha hasara zaidi, na kuziruhusu kujaribu kujikwamua kwenye tatizo kwa kubahatisha bila kuripoti hali yao halisi ya kiuchumi.

As a result the banks can now present inflated values for their mortgage assets, and that their balance sheets are well capitalized. They would not need to raise more capital in order to fund new loans. However, like the person with no sensitivity to pain runs the risk of serious injury, this move encourages the same financial institutions to take greater risks. In the end this will likely lead to more losses, allowing them to try to gamble their way out of the problem without reporting their true economic position.