4.3 Kutokuwa Imara Kwa Asili
4.3 Inherent Instability
Kutokuwa na utulivu ni ukosefu wa usawa – uhusiano wa wastani kati ya thamani ya fedha na bidhaa. Mtazamo mashuhuri ni nadharia ya kutokuwa na utulivu wa kifedha, ambayo inasema kwamba uchumi una mifumo ya kifedha ambayo chini yake uko thabiti, na mifumo ya ufadhili ambayo chini yake hauko thabiti, na kwamba, katika vipindi vya ustawi wa muda mrefu, uchumi hubadilika kutoka mahusiano ya kifedha yanayoleta mfumo thabiti kwenda mahusiano ya kifedha yanayoleta mfumo usio thabiti. Zaidi ya hayo, ikiwa uchumi wenye kundi kubwa la vitengo vya kifedha vya kubahatisha uko katika hali ya mfumuko wa bei, na mamlaka zinajaribu kuondoa mfumuko wa bei kwa kubana fedha, basi vitengo hivyo vya kubahatisha vitatoweka haraka, na kusababisha kuanguka kwa thamani ya mali. Nadharia ya kutokuwa na utulivu wa kifedha ni mfano wa uchumi wa kibepari, ambao hautegemei mshtuko wa nje kuzalisha mizunguko ya biashara ya viwango mbalimbali vya ukali.
Instability is a lack of balance – a reasonable relationship between value of money and goods. A prominent view is the financial instability hypothesis, which states that the economy has financial regimes under which it is stable, and financing regimes in which it is unstable, and that, in periods of prolonged prosperity, the economy transits from financial relations that make for a stable system to financial relations that make for an unstable system10. Furthermore, if an economy with a sizeable body of speculative financial units is in an inflationary state, and the authorities attempt to exorcise inflation by monetary constraint, then the speculative units will quickly evaporate leading to a collapse of asset values. The financial instability hypothesis is a model of capitalist economy, which does not rely upon exogenous shocks to generate business cycles of varying severity.
Waustria wanaikubali nadharia ya kutokuwa imara (instability hypothesis) kama maelezo ya kile kinachotokea, lakini pia wanahisi kuwa haitoi maelezo ya kuridhisha, hivyo hawawezi kuilaumu ubepari wenyewe. Wanahitimisha kwamba kutokuwa imara huku ni kushindwa nyingine kwa uingiliaji wa serikali kubwa kupitia benki kuu. Kwa mfano: ikiwa Jack anaweka pauni 100 za akiba halisi (sema kutoka kilimo) benki. Jack ana haki ya kudai pauni zake 100 wakati wowote. Hebu tuseme kwamba benki kisha inakopesha pauni 50 kwa Jill. Kufikia hatua hii, tuna pauni 150 zilizoungwa mkono na pauni 100 (desturi ya kawaida katika benki za kisasa inayoitwa benki ya akiba ya sehemu, fractional reserve banking). Ili kuwa wazi, hebu tuseme Jack na Jill wananunua bidhaa zenye thamani ya pauni 100 na pauni 50 kutoka duka kwa malipo ya hundi. Benki sasa inakabiliwa na upungufu wa pauni 50. Waustria wanasema kwamba katika soko huria, ikiwa benki inafanya upanuzi wa mikopo usioungwa mkono, inakabiliwa na hatari ya kukamatwa, na hivyo tishio la kufilisika huenda likatumika kama kizuizi. Kwa hiyo nadharia ya kutokuwa imara ya Minsky inatumika tu kwa uchumi wa kisasa wa kibepari wenye muundo wake wa kitaasisi, si kwa ubepari wa soko huria usio na serikali kubwa.
The Austrians accept the instability hypothesis as describing what is happening, but also feel it does not provide a satisfactory explanation, hence cannot indict capitalism as such. They conclude that the instability is yet another failure of big government intervention through central banks. For example: if Jack deposits £100 of real savings (say from farming) in a bank. Jack has the right to demand his £100 at any time. Let us say that the bank then lends £50 out to Jill. At this stage, we have £150 backed by £100 (a universal practice in modern banking called fractional reserve banking). To make it clear, let us say Jack and Jill purchase £100 and £50 worth of goods with cheque payments from a shop. The bank now faces a shortfall of £50. The Austrians argue that in a free market, if a bank engages in unbacked expansion of credit, it runs the risk of being caught, and therefore the threat of bankruptcy is likely to serve as a deterrent. Hence Minsky’s instability hypothesis only applies to the modern capitalist economy with its institutional setup and not free market capitalism devoid of big governments11.
Sababu zilizotajwa na nadharia ya kutokuwa na uthabiti ni za kisaikolojia na kiafya kwa asili yake, na sababu inayotajwa na Waustria ni ya kitaasisi kwa asili yake. Hakuna upande kati ya hizi mbili unaotoa njia mbadala zenye msingi thabiti zinazoleta uthabiti. Uanarchia kamili wa soko huria hauwezi kudumu kamwe, haungekubaliwa na jamii yoyote, na unajipinga wenyewe, kwa sababu yule anayelazimisha soko huria kufuatwa tayari anaingilia kati kwa maana yake yenyewe. Kuhusu Wakeynesia na wale wa baada ya Keynes, daima kungekuwa na mabishano juu ya kanuni na mipaka ipi inafaa. Soko lingebadilika bila kukoma, likikabiliwa na mgogoro baada ya mgogoro, kadiri linavyoendana na mawazo yake yaliyojengwa juu ya uhalisia (mara nyingi kwa uchache), hali inayoifanya uchumi kuwa hatarini kwa mabadiliko ya ndani na ya nje.
The causes cited by the instability hypothesis is psychological and pathological in nature, and the cause cited by the Austrians is institutional in nature. Both do not provide founded alternatives that provide stability. Absolute free market anarchy could never be sustainable, would never be accepted by any community and is self-contradictory, for the one who enforces the free market is intervening by definition. As for the Keynesians and the post Keynesians, there would always be disputes on what regulations and limits are appropriate. The market would evolve perpetually, facing crisis after crisis, as it suits its ideas based in reality (often parsimoniously) rendering the economy vulnerable to internal and external fluctuations.
Haiwezekani kukana kwamba mfumo wa benki kuu ndio kitovu cha tatizo linaloikabili uchumi. Kwani unaiwezesha benki kukopa moja kwa moja au kuuza baadhi ya mali zake kwa fedha taslimu. Swali kuu ni benki kuu inapata wapi fedha zake za kioevu? Jibu ni kwamba inazichapisha tu bila msingi wowote wa kuziunga mkono. Benki hiyo pia inaweza kukopa kutoka benki nyingine, lakini hilo linaweza kuongeza viwango vya riba, jambo linalopunguza mahitaji ya wakopaji. Mfumo wa kisasa wa benki unasimamiwa na kuratibiwa na benki kuu, ambayo huhakikisha kuna fedha za kutosha za kioevu kwa ajili ya uwekezaji na matumizi, kwa kuingiza fedha kupitia upanuzi wa pamoja wa mikopo isiyo na msingi.
It is undeniable that the central bank model is central to the problem facing the economy. For it allows the bank to directly borrow or sell some of its assets for cash. The key question is where does the central bank get its liquidity? – it just prints it with no backing. The bank could also borrow from other banks, but that could increase interest rates, which slows down demand from borrowers. The modern banking system is guided and coordinated by the central bank, which ensures sufficient liquidity for investments and expenditures by injecting money through a joint expansion of unbacked credit.
Kwa wazi, ilikuwa sera ya fedha isiyo ngumu ya Fed kati ya Desemba 2000 na Juni 2004, yaani kupunguza kiwango cha riba cha mikopo ya fedha za shirikisho (federal funds rate) kutoka 6.5% hadi 1%, ndiyo iliyoweka msingi wa kuibuka kwa shughuli za kiputo (bubble). Kisha kati ya Juni 2004 na Septemba 2007, Fed iliongeza kiwango hicho cha federal funds kutoka 1% hadi 5.25%. Kubana huku kwa ukwasi kuliudhoofisha soko la nyumba lililokuwa kwenye kiputo (ambacho kilikuwa na tahadhari nyingi), na kufikia mwisho wa 2007 kikawa kimeshika shinikizo la kiwango cha kuanguka. Kiwango cha federal funds ni mojawapo ya zana za soko huria za kudhibiti uchumi. Ukubwa wa jambo lenyewe, utandawazi, upaketishaji wa madeni (securitisation) na mlipuko halisi wa bidhaa changamano za kifedha (derivatives) vimeunganika kwa namna iliyosababisha anguko la janga, linaloweza kulinganishwa na Mdororo Mkuu wa 1929. Yaliyotangulia yanatoa msingi wa kuridhisha wa kuangazia vipengele viwili vya msingi vya kimfumo, ambavyo ndivyo vinavyosimama nyuma ya sababu za kupanda na kuanguka kwa uchumi.
Evidently, it was the loose monetary policy of the Fed between Dec. 2000 and Jun. 2004 i.e. lowering Fed funds rate (interest rate of lending federal funds) from 6.5% to 1% that laid the foundation for the emergence of the bubble activities. And then between Jun. 2004 and Sep. 2007, the Fed raised the Fed funds rate from 1% to 5.25%. This tightening of liquidity undermined the bubble housing market (which had ample warnings); gaining bust-level pressure by the end of 2007. The Fed funds rate is one of the open market levers to regulate the economy. The sheer volume, globalisation, securitisation and a veritable explosion in complex derivatives have combined in a way to make for a calamitous bust, rivalling the great depression of 1929. The above provides a reasonable backdrop to highlight two fundamental systemic elements, which underlie the causes of boom and bust:
1. Ukosefu wa kiwango thabiti kama vile kiwango cha dhahabu (unaoruhusu kutengenezwa kwa sarafu zisizo na dhamana).
1. Lack of a standard such as the gold standard (allows unbacked minting).
2. Benki zinazofanya kazi kwa riba (ambazo huhimiza mkusanyiko wa madeni kwa ajili ya faida kubwa).
2. Interest based banking (which encourages debt accumulation for high returns).
Kuna wasiwasi mkubwa tayari, hata Magharibi, kuhusu yote mawili hapo juu. Kurudi kwenye kiwango cha dhahabu kunaungwa mkono na wengi, wakiwemo wafuasi wa Shule ya Austria ya Uchumi, Objectivists na Libertarians, hasa kwa sababu ya misimamo yao ya soko huria, yaani pingamizi lao dhidi ya nafasi ya serikali katika kutoa sarafu ya fiat kupitia benki kuu. Hata Alan Greenspan alikiri umuhimu wa kiwango cha dhahabu, "Kuachwa kwa kiwango cha dhahabu kulifanya iwezekane kwa wanasiasa wa ustawi wa jamii kutumia mfumo wa benki kama njia ya upanuzi usio na kikomo wa mikopo... Pasipo kiwango cha dhahabu, hakuna njia ya kulinda akiba dhidi ya kunyang'anywa kupitia mfumuko wa bei... Matumizi ya nakisi ni mpango tu wa kunyang'anya mali. Dhahabu inasimama kinyume na mchakato huu wa hila. Inasimama kama mlinzi wa haki za mali. Mtu akielewa hili, hana ugumu wowote kuelewa upinzani wa wanasiasa dhidi ya kiwango cha dhahabu." 12.
There is already considerable concern, even in the west, over both of the above. The return to the gold standard is supported by many including followers of the Austrian School of Economics, objectivists and libertarians largely because their free market ideals i.e. their objection to the role of the government in issuing fiat currency through central banks. Even Alan Greenspan had attested to the importance of the gold standard, “The abandonment of the gold standard made it possible for the welfare statists to use the banking system as a means to an unlimited expansion of credit... In the absence of the gold standard, there is no way to protect savings from confiscation through inflation… Deficit spending is simply a scheme for the confiscation of wealth. Gold stands in the way of this insidious process. It stands as a protector of property rights. If one grasps this, one has no difficulty in understanding the statists' antagonism toward the gold standard.” 12.
Mbadala wowote haupaswi kuwa na udhaifu huu. Kiwango cha sarafu kilichowekwa na benki zisizotoza riba ni miongoni mwa msingi mkuu wa taasisi kwa mfumo endelevu.
Any alternative model should not possess these weaknesses. The fixed currency standard and interest free banking form some of the key institutional basis for a sustainable system.
10 Minsky H P, 1992, The financial instability hypothesis, The Jerome Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No. 74. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=161024.
10 Minsky H P, 1992, The financial instability hypothesis, The Jerome Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No. 74. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=161024.
11 Shostak F, 2007, Je, Mgogoro wa Sasa wa Kifedha Unathibitisha Uchumi wa Hyman Minsky?, makala ya Taasisi ya Ludwig von Mises, http://mises.org/story/2787.
11 Shostak F, 2007, Does the Current Financial Crisis Vindicate the Economics of Hyman Minsky?, Ludwig von Mises Institute article, http://mises.org/story/2787.
12 Greenspan A, 1966, Gold and Economic Freedom, First appeared in The Objectivist, reprinted 1967 in Capitalism: the unknown ideal, Signet, New York.
12 Greenspan A, 1966, Gold and Economic Freedom, First appeared in The Objectivist, reprinted 1967 in Capitalism: the unknown ideal, Signet, New York.