1948-yilda tashkil topganidan beri Isroilning harbiy kuchi haqiqati yengilmaslik degan afsonaviy tus bilan o‘ralib kelmoqda. Qizig‘i shundaki, bunday afsonalarni Isroil o‘zi faol ravishda targ‘ib qilmagan, balki ularga hayot baxsh etgan narsa xoin musulmon hukmdorlarning harakatlari bo‘lgan.

Since its formation in 1948, the reality of Israel’s military strength has been shrouded by a mythical aura of invincibility. Interestingly such myths have not been actively expressed by Israel, but have been given life by the actions of the treacherous Muslim rulers.

Isroilning 1948, 1956, 1967 va 1973 yillardagi mintaqadagi musulmonlarga qarshi urushlardagi natijalari uzoq vaqt davomida uning harbiy ustunligining tasdig'i sifatida qaralib kelindi. Bu ko'rinib turgan ustunlik va uning musulmon yerlarini egallashi nuqtai nazaridan, arab davlatlari uchun Isroil bilan to'g'ridan-to'g'ri harbiy to'qnashuv maqbul yo'l emas, deb ta'kidlanadi va bu muzokaralarga kirishish zaruratini keltirib chiqaradi. Bunday qadamning to'g'ridan-to'g'ri natijasi tinchlik jarayoni kabi rejalar orqali Isroilning suverenitetini qabul qilish bo'ldi.

Israel’s performance in the wars of 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 against the Muslims in the region has long been seen as confirmation of Israel’s military superiority. In light of this apparent superiority and its seizure of Muslim lands, it is argued that direct military conflict with Israel is not a viable course of action for the Arab states, creating the necessity of entering into negotiations. The direct consequence of such a move has been the acceptance of Israel’s sovereignty through plans such as the peace process.

Isroilning go'yo harbiy qudratini ko'rib chiqishda shuni esda tutish kerak: bu afsonaning yaratilishi qanday maqsadga xizmat qiladi?

In reviewing Israel’s supposed military might one must keep in mind: What purpose does the construction of this myth serve?

1948-yilgi urush Isroil davlatining tashkil topishiga olib keldi. Birinchi qarashda, nega 40 million arab 600 000 yahudiyning harbiy kuchiga teng kela olmaganini tushunish qiyin. Falastin sababini himoya qilganlarning harakatlarini yaqindan o‘rganilsa, ularning xatti-harakatlari aslida Isroilning tashkil topishiga bevosita sabab bo‘lganligi ko‘rinadi.

The war of 1948 led to the establishment of the state of Israel. On the surface it’s difficult to understand how 40 million Arabs could not match the fighting strength of just 600,000 Jews. A closer study of the defenders of the Palestinian cause shows how their actions in fact led directly to the establishment of Israel.

Falastin masalasining asosiy vakillari Transiordaniya qiroli Abdulloh, Misr qiroli Farouk va Falastin muftiysi edi, ularning barchasi britaniyaliklar tomonidan doimiy ravishda manipulyatsiya qilinadigan juda kuchsiz hukmdorlar edi. Qirol Abdullohning o‘zini Falastin sababining himoyachisi sifatida ko‘rsatishi esa soxta edi. Ma'lum ediki, u va Ben-Gurion (Isroilning birinchi Bosh vaziri)

The primary representatives of the Palestinian cause were King Abdullah of Transjordan, King Farook of Egypt and the Mufti of Palestine, all of them were extremely weak rulers subject to constant manipulation by the British. King Abdullah’s portrayal of himself as a defender of the Palestinian cause was a façade. It was known that he and Ben Gurion (Israel’s first Prime Minister)

Biz Istanbulda birga o‘qigan edik va yashirin uchrashuvlarda Abdulloh Isroil davlatining tashkil etilishini qabul qilishga, buning evaziga esa Iordaniya Falastinning arab aholisi yashaydigan qismlarini nazorat qilishiga rozi bo‘lishni taklif qilgan edi.

were students together in Istanbul and that in clandestine meetings Abdullah had offered to accept the establishment of Israel in return for Jordanian control of the Arab populated parts of Palestine.

King Abdulloh qo'l ostida Arab legioni bor edi, bu 4 500 kishidan iborat yuqori darajada tayyorlangan qism bo'lib, uning qo'mondoni ingliz general John Glubb edi. Glubb o'z xotiralarida, u inglizlardan qat'iy buyruq olgan edi, ya'ni yahudiylar nazorati ostidagi hududlarga kirmaslik kerak edi, deb hikoya qiladi.21 Misr esa Isroilga qarshi hujumni yanada zaiflashtirdi: Bosh vazir Nakrashi posho dastlab mavjud harbiy qismlardan foydalanmadi, balki o'sha yilning yanvar oyida endigina tashkil etilgan ko'ngillilar armiyasini yubordi. Iordaniya ham Iroq qo'shinlarining o'z hududidan o'tishini kechiktirdi, shu bilan Isroilga qarshi har qanday hujumga to'sqinlik qildi. Shu sababli jang oldidan Iordaniya armiyasini ruhlantirish uchun olib kelingan ko'zi ojiz imom Abdulloh uchun uyatga qoldirdi, u: “Ey armiya, keni edi sizlar bizniki bo'lsangiz” dedi (Arab legioni inglizlarniki ekanligini nazarda tutib).

Bu ziddiyat hech qachon Falastinni ozod qilish uchun urush bo‘lmagan, balki strategik jihatdan muhim Suvaysh kanali ustidan nazorat uchun Amerika va Britaniya o‘rtasidagi kurash edi.

This conflict was never a war for the liberation of Palestine but rather a struggle between America and Britain for control over the strategically important Suez Canal.

AQSh Yaqin Sharqda ta'sirga ega bo'lishni istasa, Misrni muhim ittifoqchi deb hisoblardi. CIA orqali u 1952 yilda davlat to'ntarishi natijasida Britaniyaga moyil Qirol Forukni taxtdan ag'darishga kirishdi va hokimiyatga Jamol Abdunnosir boshchiligidagi "Erkin zobitlar"ni olib keldi. CIA 1951 yilda bir loyiha ustida ishladi.

The US saw Egypt as a critical ally if America was to gain influence in the Middle East. Through the CIA, she moved to depose the Pro-British King Farook in a coup in 1952, bringing into power the Free Officers who were to be led by Gamal Abdul-Nasser. The CIA worked on a project in 1951

"Musulmon Billi Grexemni izlash" nomi bilan tanilgan. CIA xodimi Mayk Kopeland 1989-yilda "O'yinchi" nomli xotiralarida maxfiy ma'lumotlarni e'lon qildi. Bu ma'lumotlar Britaniyaning dastgoh shohi Forukni ag'darib tashlagan, CIA tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlangan davlat to'ntarishi haqida edi. Loyihani ishga tushirgan Kopeland shunday tushuntiradi: "CIA hududda o'sib borayotgan Amerikaga qarshi dushmanlikni chalg'itib yubora oladigan, karizmatik yetakchiga muhtoj edi". U shuni ham aytadiki, CIA ham, Nosir ham Isroil masalasida kelishib olgan edi. Nosir uchun Isroil bilan urush haqidagi gaplar ahamiyatsiz edi. Ancha muhimroq masala Suvayş kanali zonasining Britaniya tomonidan bosib olinishi edi. Nosirning dushmani Britaniya edi.

known as “The Search for a Moslem Billy Graham.” Mike Copeland the CIA operative, published classified information in his memoirs in 1989, ‘The Game Player,’ about the CIA backed coup d’etat that ousted the British puppet King Farook. Copeland, who activated the project, explains that ‘the CIA needed a charismatic leader who would be able to divert the growing anti-American hostility that was building up in the area.’ He explains both the CIA and Nasser were in agreement on Israel. For Nasser talk of war with Israel was irrelevant. Much more of a priority was British occupation of the Suez Canal Zone. Nasser’s enemy was Britain.

1956-yilda Nosir Amerika talablariga ko‘ra Suvaysh kanalini milliylashtirdi. Britaniyaning javobi Fransiya va Isroilni bu kurashga jalb qilish bo‘ldi. Bu haqda tarixchi Korelli Barnett o‘zining "Britaniya kuchining qulashi" kitobida Suvaysh haqida yozib, shunday bayon etgan: "Fransiya Nosirga dushman edi, chunki Misr Jazoir isyonchilariga yordam berayotgan edi va tarixiy sabablarga ko‘ra kanalga bog‘liq edi. Axir, uni bir fransuz qurgan. Isroil esa Falastin fedayinlarining hujumlari va Misrning Tiran bo‘g‘ozini blokada qilgani tufayli baribir Nosirga qarshi biror harakat qilishni orzu qilardi."

Bu urush mintaqa ustidan nazorat o'rnatish uchun Angliya va Amerika o'rtasidagi kurashning yana bir bosqichi edi.

This war was again another episode in the Anglo-American conflict for control of the region.

Britaniya mintaqadagi hukmron kuch sifatida 11 yil oldin o‘rnini bosgan edi, ammo Iordaniya, Suriya va Isroildagi o‘z agentlari orqali hali ham ma’lum ta’sirga ega edi. Nosirni zaiflashtirish maqsadida Britaniya Isroilni Misrni urushga tortishga undashga harakat qildi; bunda Isroil hudud egallab, uni kelajakdagi tinchlik kelishuvida savdolashish vositasi sifatida ishlatishi kerak edi – bu isroilliklar juda intiladigan xavfsizlikka erishishning vositasi edi. 1967 yil 5 iyunda Isroil oldindan zarba berib, Misr harbiy-havo kuchlarining yerdagi samolyotlarining 60 foizini, Suriya va Iordaniya jangovar samolyotlarining 66 foizini yo‘q qildi.

Britain had been surpassed as the region's dominant force 11 years earlier, but still retained some influence through its agents in Jordan, Syria and Israel. In an attempt to weaken Nasser, Britain sought to lure Israel to drag Egypt into a war whereby Israel would seize territory and use it as a bargaining tool in any future peace settlement; a means through which to achieve the security which the Israelis so desperately sought. On 5th June 1967 Israel launched a pre-emptive strike destroying 60% of Egypt's grounded air force and 66% of Syrian and Jordanian combat aircraft.

Isroilliklar G'arbiy Sohil va Sharqiy Quddusni Iordaniya nazoratidan tortib olishdi. Qirol Husayn jangdan oldin o'z qo'shinlarini asosiy jang bo'layotgan hududlardan boshqa joylarga joylashtirgan edi. Atigi 48 soat ichida isroilliklar G'arbiy Sohilning asosiy shaharlarini egallab olishdi. Xuddi shunday tarzda, urushning 6-kunida isroilliklar strategik ahamiyatga ega bo'lgan Golan tepaliklarini ham qo'lga kiritishdi. Golan tepaliklarini egallab turgan Suriya qo'shinlari, ular aniq o'zlari egallab turgan bo'lsa-da, Isroilning tepaliklarni qo'lga kiritgani haqidagi xabarni o'z davlat radiosidan eshitishdi. Isroil, shuningdek, Sharm ash-Shayxni egallab, Tiran bo'g'ozi suv yo'lini qo'lga kiritib, Amerikaning Nosiriga zarba berdi. Nosiy rejimini zaiflashtirish maqsadiga erishildi va shu tariqa mintaqadagi Britaniya manfaatlariga bilvosita yordam berildi. Isroil ko'proq yerni egallab, uni "yer evaziga tinchlik" muzokaralarida garov sifatida ishlatish imkoniga ega bo'ldi; bugungi kunda ham muzokaralar 1948-yildagi holat emas, balki shu yerlar holati asosida olib borilmoqda. Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkiloti 1947-yilda BMT taqsimot rejasini ishlab chiqdi, unga ko'ra hududning 57 foizi Isroilga berildi, Falastin esa avvalgi hududining 42 foiziga aylandi. 1967-yilgi urushda isroilliklarning bosib olgan hududlari yanada kengayib, tarixiy Falastinning 78 foiziga yetdi.

The Israelis seized the West Bank and east Jerusalem from Jordanian control. King Hussein, prior to the battle, had positioned his troops in different areas from where the main battle was taking place. In a matter of 48 hours the Israelis seized the major West Bank towns. In a similar manner the Israelis seized the strategically important Golan Heights on the 6th day of the war. The Syrian troops occupying the Golan Heights heard news of Israel’s capture of the heights through their own State radio despite the Syrian troops clearly occupying them. Israel also dealt America’s Nasser a blow by capturing Sharm al Sheikh and securing the waterway of the Straits of Tiran. The objective of weakening the regime of Nasser was achieved, thus indirectly aiding British interests within the region. Israel was able to seize more land and use it as a bargaining asset in any land for peace negotiations, which today is still used as a basis for negotiations rather then the status of 1948. The United Nations established the UN Partition plan in 1947, which gave 57% of territory to Israel with Palestine becoming 42% of its former self. In the 1967 war Israeli occupation increased further with its territorial gains of up to 78% of historic Palestine.

1973-yil oktyabr urushini tahlil qilish shuni ko‘rsatadiki, Misr va Suriyaning Isroilga qarshi boshlagan urushi cheklangan maqsadlarni ko‘zlagan va unga Falastinni ozod qilish hech qachon kiritilmagan. Maqsadlarga hatto Golan balandliklarini ozod qilish ham kirmagan, chunki u Suriya va Isroil o‘rtasidagi tinchlik shartnomasi doirasida qaytarilishi mo‘ljallangan edi. Maqsad harbiy to‘ntarishlar ehtimoli yuqori bo‘lgan mamlakatlardagi nisbatan yangi rahbarlar — Anvar Sadot va Hofiz al-Asadning mavqeini mustahkamlash edi. Ayniqsa Sadot o‘ta zaif ahvolda edi, chunki u kuchli shaxs bo‘lgan Nosirdan keyin rahbarlikka kelgan edi.

An examination of the October 1973 war launched by Egypt and Syria against Israel shows that the aims were limited and never included the liberation of Palestine. The aims never even included the liberation of the Golan Heights which were designed to be restored as part of a peace treaty between Syria and Israel. The aims were to solidify the positions of Anwar Sadat and Hafez al-Assad who were relatively new leaders in countries prone to military coups. Sadat in particular was vulnerable given the fact that he had succeeded the charismatic Nasser.

Muhammad Heikal, muhtaram muharrir Al-Ahram gazetasining 1957–1974 yillardagi muharriri, urushga guvoh bo‘lgan, o‘zining «The Road to Ramadhan» kitobida Anvar Sadotning urush arafasidagi kayfiyatini tushuntirib bergan va Sadotning ichki niyatlarini qanchalik chuqur bo‘lganini ochib bergan. Heikal Sadotning generallaridan biri, Muhammad Favzi ning fikrini keltiradi. Favzi samuray jangga tayyorlanayotib ikki qilichni, uzun va qisqa qilichni olishiga o‘xshatish bilan misol keltirgan. Favzi bu jangning qisqa qilich holatida bo‘lishini, ya’ni ma’lum sabablarga ko‘ra cheklangan jang bo‘lishini aytgan.

Mohammed Heikal the respected editor of Al Ahram from 1957 – 1974, who witnessed the war, explained the extent of Anwar Sadat’s underlying motives in his book ‘The Road to Ramadhan’ where he cites Sadat’s mood in the run up to the war. Heikal quotes one of Sadat’s generals, Mohammed Fouwzi who gave the analogy of a samurai drawing two swords - a long one and short one in preparation for battle. Fouwzi said that this battle would be a case of the short sword, signifying a limited battle for certain motives.

Anvar Sadat urush bilan cho‘zilgan ozodlik kurashini olib borish niyatida emas edi. Shu sababli u g‘alabali vaziyatda turganida ham Isroil bilan tinchlik izladi. Urushning dastlabki 24 soatida Misr atigi 68 kishi yo‘qotib, Suvaysh kanalining sharqidagi Isroilning juda ko‘p maqtalgan Bar-Lev mudofaa istehkomlarini yorib o‘tdi. Shu bilan birga, 2 ta Suriya diviziyasi va 500 ta tank Golan tepaliklariga bostirib kirib, 1967 yilda bosib olingan yerlarning bir qismini qaytarib oldi. Ikki kunlik janglarda Isroil 49 ta samolyot va 500 ta tankini yo‘qotdi. Shu vaziyatda Sadat AQSh Tashqi ishlar vaziri Genri Kissindjerga xabar yo‘llab, urushning maqsadi "Yaqin Sharqda tinchlikka erishish, qisman kelishuvlar emas", deb ta’kidladi. Xabarda, agar Isroil barcha bosib olingan hududlardan chiqsa, Misr BMT yoki neytral homiylik ostida o‘tkaziladigan tinchlik konferensiyasida ishtirok etishga tayyor ekani ham aytilgan edi. Shunday qilib, katta strategik ustunlikka ega bo‘lishiga qaramay, Sadat hali urushning dastlabki bosqichida muzokaralarga moyil edi. Sadatning dastlabki ustunligini mustahkamlashdan bosh tortishi va ikkinchi Sinay hujumini kechiktirishi Isroilga AQSh yordami bilan safarbar bo‘lish imkonini berdi va u yo‘qotilgan hududlarni qaytarib ola boshladi. Janglar rasmiy ravishda 1974 yil 25 oktyabrda tugadi.