"穆沙拉夫或许是美国在巴基斯坦最后的希望，如果他失败了，原教旨主义者就会掌握伊斯兰的炸弹。"——安东尼·齐尼 红色清真寺（Lal Masjid）学生与巴基斯坦军队之间的交火不断升级，已造成数百人死亡，许多人受伤。穆沙拉夫总统因此发表了如下挑衅性声明："如果他们不投降，我今天在此宣布，他们将被杀死。他们不应逼迫我们使用武力。他们应当自愿出来，否则就会被杀死……" 甚至在穆沙拉夫发出最后通牒之前，他的政府就迅速将当前危机的全部责任归咎于阿卜杜勒·拉希德·加齐——该神学院的院长。然而，仔细审视对峙之前发生的事件，便会发现整个事件似乎是由巴基斯坦政府一手策划的。

"Musharraf may be America's last hope in Pakistan, and if he fails, the fundamentalists would get hold of the Islamic bomb." -- Anthony Zinni The intensification of fighting between the students of Lal Masjid and the Pakistani army has left hundreds dead and many injured. This has prompted President Musharraf to issue the following provocative statement: “If they do not surrender so I am saying here today that they will be killed. They should not force us to use force. They should come out voluntarily; otherwise they will be killed…” Even before Musharraf’ s ultimatum, his government was swift to attribute the entire blame for the current crisis on Abdul Rashid Ghazi—the principal of the seminary. However, a close examination of the events preceding the standoff, suggests that the entire saga has been engineered by the Pakistani government.

在过去六个月里,穆沙拉夫政府每当这些学生挑战其权威时,都对他们的行为采取容忍态度。非法武器的囤积、巴基斯坦社会名流和警察的绑架,以及六名中国妇女被扣押,都只招致政府官员温和的批评。此外,这些活动并非秘密进行,而是在靠近红色清真寺范围的ISI总部眼皮底下策划并实施的。ISI官员和政府代表的频繁来访,也与政府声称其在探索和平解决方案的说法相矛盾——尤其是与巴基斯坦政府在部落地区和俾路支省其他地方对类似事件的强硬应对相比之下。那么,巴基斯坦政府为何迟迟不肯在清真寺周围布置足以发动压倒性进攻的军事装备呢?

For the past six months the Musharraf government has tolerated the behaviour of the students whenever they chose to challenge its writ. The accumulation of illegal arms, the abduction of Pakistani socialites and policemen, and the seizure of six Chinese women was met with muted criticism from government officials. Furthermore, these activities were not clandestine, and were planned and executed in full view of ISI’ s headquarters located in close proximity to the confines of the Lal Masjid. The frequent visit of ISI officials and government representatives negates government claims that it was exploring an amicable outcome— especially when measured against the ferocity of the Pakistani government’ s response to similar incidents in tribal agencies and elsewhere in Baluchistan. So why has the Pakistani government waited so long to barricade the Masjid with military hardware fit for an overwhelming assault.

要回答这个问题，必须将其置于穆沙拉夫政权所面临挑战的更广阔背景之中。目前，穆沙拉夫政府既要应对世俗反对派，也要应对呼吁其下台的伊斯兰势力。

This question can only be answered in the broader context of the challenges facing Musharraf’ s rule. At present the Musharraf government has had to contend with both the secular opposition and Islamic forces calling for his removal.

由民主恢复联盟（ARD）和首席大法官伊夫蒂哈尔所倡导的世俗力量声势日增，挫败了美国力图让穆沙拉夫连任的计划。为化解这一威胁，穆沙拉夫在美国的支持下，已与世俗反对派的部分领导人进行秘密会谈，并对另一些人动用武力。卡拉奇的死亡事件正是后一种做法的体现。 就谈判而言，美国代表穆沙拉夫，已与贝娜齐尔·布托进入深入的会谈，目的是瓦解世俗反对派，并确保穆沙拉夫连任第二届总统。这也解释了布托近来对伦敦全党会议（APC）所持的模棱两可的立场，她至今仍对该会议避而不见。

The secular forces championed by the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) and Chief Justice Iftikhar have gained momentum and have frustrated America’ s initiative to get Musharraf re-elected. To diffuse this threat, Musharraf under US auspices has held secret talks with certain leaders of the secular opposition and has deployed force against others. The deaths in Karachi are a manifestation of the latter approach. As far as negotiations are concerned, the US on Musharraf’ s behalf is already engaged in advanced talks with Benazir Bhutto with aim to break the back of the secular opposition and secure a second presidential term for Musharraf. This also explains Bhutto’ s recent ambiguous stance on the All Parties Conference (APC) in Londonxv, which she has shunned so far.

尽管伊斯兰反对派对穆沙拉夫的亲美政策和新自由主义立场心怀不满,并已自行承担起将其赶下台的任务,但仍有一些人诉诸武装斗争,另一些人则通过抗议来宣泄愤怒。然而,他们怨恨的源头,是美国已将其列为世俗化或关闭对象的宗教学校(伊斯兰学院)所煽动的。与世俗反对派不同——美国曾热衷于与之妥协并促成协议——在美国决策者眼中,伊斯兰力量必须在枪口下被世俗化,任何抵抗都必须被镇压。因此,在并未实行戒严的情况下,军队包围红色清真寺(Lal Masjid),阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹·哈齐(Abdul Aziz Ghazi)在巴基斯坦电视台上受辱,会谈被突然取消,媒体遭到封锁,以及以"投降或死亡"作为危机的解决方案,这些都对巴基斯坦宗教学校的未来预示着不祥之兆。

Whilst the Islamic opposition unhappy with Musharraf’ s pro- American policies and his neo-liberal attitudes have taken upon themselves to oust him from power. Some have resorted to militancy and others have engaged in protests to vent their anger. But the wellspring of their resentment is fuelled by the religious seminaries which America has identified for secularisation or closure. Unlike the secular opposition—where America was keen to compromise and broker a deal— the Islamic forces in the eyes of American policy makers must be secularised at gun point, and any resistance must be crushed. Hence the surrounding of Lal Masjid by the military in the absence of martial law, the humiliation of Abdul Aziz Ghazi on Pakistan television, the abrupt cancellation of talks, the media blackout and the announcement of ‘surrender or die’ as a solution to the crisis is an ominous sign for the future of religious seminaries in Pakistan.

发生在拉勒清真寺的事件，显然有可能成为穆沙拉夫处理其他宗教学校和机构的模板，这将是一份内战的配方。更何况，此次危机的时机对穆沙拉夫十分有利：它转移了公众对世俗反对派以及政府在俾路支洪灾中糟糕应对的注意力。

What transpired at Lal Masjid has all the hallmarks of becoming a template for Musharraf to deal with other religious schools and institutions— a recipe for civil war. Not to mention that the timing of the crisis suits Musharraf, as it deflects the public’ s attention away from the secular opposition and the government’ s disastrous response to the floods in Baluchistan.

显而易见的是，政府动用武力应对世俗势力和伊斯兰势力，暴露了穆沙拉夫“开明温和”口号的思想破产。穆沙拉夫没有用思想去回应反对派的观点，而是诉诸武力。穆沙拉夫的盟友——美国、北约和以色列——也以“争取人心”之名重复了同样的做法，但两者都未能粉碎伊拉克、阿富汗和巴勒斯坦的伊斯兰运动。那么，穆沙拉夫又有什么机会呢？

What is evident is that the utilisation of force by the government to deal with both secular and Islamic forces exposes the intellectual bankruptcy of Musharraf’ s mantra of enlightened moderation. Instead of employing thoughts to battle the ideas of the opposition, Musharraf has resorted to force. The same method has been repeated by Musharraf’ s allies—America, NATO and Israel— under the guise of ‘battle of hearts and minds’ and both have failed to crush the Islamic movements in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine. So what chance does Musharraf have?

2007年7月9日

July 9, 2007