"Musharraf na iya zama bege na ƙarshe na Amurka a Pakistan, kuma idan ya gaza, masu tsattsauran ra'ayi za su kama bam ɗin Musulunci." -- Anthony Zinni Tsanantar faɗa tsakanin ɗalibai na Lal Masjid da sojojin Pakistan ya bar ɗaruruwan mutane sun mutu, da yawa kuma sun ji rauni. Wannan ya sa Shugaba Musharraf ya fitar da wannan sanarwa mai tayar da hankali: "Idan ba su mika wuya ba, to ina cewa a nan yau cewa za a kashe su. Kada su tilasta mana amfani da ƙarfi. Su fito da kansu da radin kansu; in ba haka ba za a kashe su..." Ko kafin gargaɗin Musharraf, gwamnatinsa ta yi saurin ɗora duk laifin wannan rikici a kan Abdul Rashid Ghazi, shugaban makarantar. Duk da haka, bincike mai zurfi a kan abubuwan da suka faru kafin wannan takun-saƙa ya nuna cewa gwamnatin Pakistan ce ta shirya dukan wannan lamari.

"Musharraf may be America's last hope in Pakistan, and if he fails, the fundamentalists would get hold of the Islamic bomb." -- Anthony Zinni The intensification of fighting between the students of Lal Masjid and the Pakistani army has left hundreds dead and many injured. This has prompted President Musharraf to issue the following provocative statement: “If they do not surrender so I am saying here today that they will be killed. They should not force us to use force. They should come out voluntarily; otherwise they will be killed…” Even before Musharraf’ s ultimatum, his government was swift to attribute the entire blame for the current crisis on Abdul Rashid Ghazi—the principal of the seminary. However, a close examination of the events preceding the standoff, suggests that the entire saga has been engineered by the Pakistani government.

Tsawon watanni shida da suka wuce gwamnatin Musharraf ta yi shiru game da halayen ɗalibai duk lokacin da suka ƙalubalanci ikonta. Tarin makamai ba bisa ƙa'ida ba, sace-sacen manyan mutane da 'yan sanda na Pakistan, da kuma kama mata shida 'yan China, duk jami'an gwamnati sun amsa su da sukar da ba ta da ƙarfi. Haka kuma, waɗannan ayyuka ba a yi su a ɓoye ba; an tsara su aka aiwatar da su a gaban idon hedikwatar ISI, wadda take kusa da iyakar Lal Masjid. Yawan ziyarar jami'an ISI da wakilan gwamnati ya karyata ikirarin gwamnati cewa tana neman mafita cikin lumana, musamman idan aka kwatanta shi da tsananin martanin gwamnatin Pakistan ga irin waɗannan abubuwa a yankunan kabilu da kuma sauran wurare a Baluchistan. To me ya sa gwamnatin Pakistan ta jira tsawon lokaci kafin ta kewaye masallacin da kayan yaƙi na soja da suka isa farmaki mai ƙarfi?

For the past six months the Musharraf government has tolerated the behaviour of the students whenever they chose to challenge its writ. The accumulation of illegal arms, the abduction of Pakistani socialites and policemen, and the seizure of six Chinese women was met with muted criticism from government officials. Furthermore, these activities were not clandestine, and were planned and executed in full view of ISI’ s headquarters located in close proximity to the confines of the Lal Masjid. The frequent visit of ISI officials and government representatives negates government claims that it was exploring an amicable outcome— especially when measured against the ferocity of the Pakistani government’ s response to similar incidents in tribal agencies and elsewhere in Baluchistan. So why has the Pakistani government waited so long to barricade the Masjid with military hardware fit for an overwhelming assault.

Ba za a iya amsa wannan tambaya ba sai an duba ta a cikin faffadan yanayin ƙalubalen da ke fuskantar mulkin Musharraf. A yanzu gwamnatin Musharraf na fuskantar matsin lamba daga duka bangaren adawa na boko da kuma ƙungiyoyin Musulunci waɗanda ke kira da a tsige shi.

This question can only be answered in the broader context of the challenges facing Musharraf’ s rule. At present the Musharraf government has had to contend with both the secular opposition and Islamic forces calling for his removal.

Ƙungiyoyin sekula da Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) da Babban Alkalin Alkalai Iftikhar suka jagoranta sun samu ƙarfi kuma sun hana shirin Amurka na sake zaɓen Musharraf. Domin kawar da wannan barazana, Musharraf, a ƙarƙashin kulawar Amurka, ya yi tattaunawa a asirce da wasu shugabannin ƙungiyar adawa ta sekula, kuma ya tura jami'an tsaro su kai wa wasu hari. Mutuwar mutanen Karachi na nuna wannan hanya ta biyu. Dangane da tattaunawa kuwa, Amurka tana cikin tattaunawa mai zurfi da Benazir Bhutto a madadin Musharraf, da nufin karya ƙarfin ƙungiyar adawa ta sekula da tabbatar wa Musharraf wa'adi na biyu a matsayin shugaban ƙasa. Wannan kuma ya bayyana dalilin da ya sa Bhutto ta nuna shakku kwanan nan game da taron Duk Jam'iyyu (APC) a London, wanda ta ƙi halarta har zuwa yanzu.

The secular forces championed by the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) and Chief Justice Iftikhar have gained momentum and have frustrated America’ s initiative to get Musharraf re-elected. To diffuse this threat, Musharraf under US auspices has held secret talks with certain leaders of the secular opposition and has deployed force against others. The deaths in Karachi are a manifestation of the latter approach. As far as negotiations are concerned, the US on Musharraf’ s behalf is already engaged in advanced talks with Benazir Bhutto with aim to break the back of the secular opposition and secure a second presidential term for Musharraf. This also explains Bhutto’ s recent ambiguous stance on the All Parties Conference (APC) in Londonxv, which she has shunned so far.

Yayin da ƙungiyoyin adawa na Musulunci waɗanda ba su gamsu da manufofin Musharraf masu goyon bayan Amurka da kuma tsarin tattalin arzikinsa na neo-liberal ba, suka ɗauki alhakin kawar da shi daga mulki. Wasu sun koma ga tashin hankali, wasu kuma sun shiga zanga-zanga don nuna fushinsu. Amma tushen fushinsu yana samun ƙarfi daga makarantun addini (madrasa) waɗanda Amurka ta tsara su don a mayar da su na zamani ko a rufe su. Ba kamar ƙungiyoyin adawa na boko ba, waɗanda Amurka take son yin sulhu da su tare da cimma yarjejeniya, a idon masu tsara manufofin Amurka, dole ne a mayar da ƙungiyoyin Musulunci na zamani da ƙarfin bindiga, kuma duk wata turjiya dole a murkushe ta. Saboda haka, kewaye Lal Masjid da sojoji ba tare da dokar soja ba, wulakanta Abdul Aziz Ghazi a talabijin na Pakistan, dakatar da tattaunawa ba zato ba tsammani, rufe kafafen watsa labarai, da sanarwar "miƙa wuya ko mutuwa" a matsayin mafita ga rikicin, alama ce mai ban tsoro ga makomar makarantun addini a Pakistan.

Whilst the Islamic opposition unhappy with Musharraf’ s pro- American policies and his neo-liberal attitudes have taken upon themselves to oust him from power. Some have resorted to militancy and others have engaged in protests to vent their anger. But the wellspring of their resentment is fuelled by the religious seminaries which America has identified for secularisation or closure. Unlike the secular opposition—where America was keen to compromise and broker a deal— the Islamic forces in the eyes of American policy makers must be secularised at gun point, and any resistance must be crushed. Hence the surrounding of Lal Masjid by the military in the absence of martial law, the humiliation of Abdul Aziz Ghazi on Pakistan television, the abrupt cancellation of talks, the media blackout and the announcement of ‘surrender or die’ as a solution to the crisis is an ominous sign for the future of religious seminaries in Pakistan.

Abin da ya faru a Lal Masjid yana da duk alamun zama tsari da Musharraf zai bi wajen magance sauran makarantu da cibiyoyin addini - abin da zai iya haifar da yakin basasa. Bugu da kari, lokacin da rikicin ya faru ya dace da Musharraf, domin ya karkatar da hankalin jama'a daga 'yan adawar sakulare da kuma mummunan martanin gwamnati ga ambaliyar ruwa a Baluchistan.

What transpired at Lal Masjid has all the hallmarks of becoming a template for Musharraf to deal with other religious schools and institutions— a recipe for civil war. Not to mention that the timing of the crisis suits Musharraf, as it deflects the public’ s attention away from the secular opposition and the government’ s disastrous response to the floods in Baluchistan.

Abin da ke bayyane shi ne cewa amfani da ƙarfi da gwamnati ke yi wajen magance duka ƙungiyoyin masu tsatsauran ra'ayin addini da na boko yana fallasa rashin ƙarfin hankali na taken Musharraf na "matsakaicin ci gaba" (enlightened moderation). Maimakon amfani da hujjoji wajen yaƙar ra'ayoyin 'yan adawa, Musharraf ya koma ga ƙarfi. Irin wannan hanya ce abokan haɗin gwiwarsa—Amurka, NATO da Isra'ila—suka sake maimaitawa, a ƙarƙashin taken "yaƙin zukata da hankula", kuma dukkansu sun kasa murkushe ƙungiyoyin Musulunci a Iraki, Afganistan da Falasdinu. To wane dama Musharraf yake da ita?

What is evident is that the utilisation of force by the government to deal with both secular and Islamic forces exposes the intellectual bankruptcy of Musharraf’ s mantra of enlightened moderation. Instead of employing thoughts to battle the ideas of the opposition, Musharraf has resorted to force. The same method has been repeated by Musharraf’ s allies—America, NATO and Israel— under the guise of ‘battle of hearts and minds’ and both have failed to crush the Islamic movements in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine. So what chance does Musharraf have?

Yuli 9, 2007

July 9, 2007