Tun daga kafuwarta a shekarar 1948, gaskiyar karfin sojan Isra'ila ta kasance a boye cikin wani yanayi na tatsuniya na rashin cin nasara. Abin mamaki, Isra'ila ba ta yada irin wadannan tatsuniyoyi da kanta ba, sai dai ayyukan shugabannin Musulmi masu cin amana ne suka rayar da su.

Since its formation in 1948, the reality of Israel’s military strength has been shrouded by a mythical aura of invincibility. Interestingly such myths have not been actively expressed by Israel, but have been given life by the actions of the treacherous Muslim rulers.

Yaƙe-yaƙen da aka yi a shekarun 1948, 1956, 1967 da 1973 tsakanin Isra'ila da Musulmi a yankin sun daɗe ana ganin su a matsayin tabbaci na babbar ƙarfin sojan Isra'ila. Saboda wannan bayyananniyar babbar ƙarfi da kuma kwace ƙasashen Musulmi da ta yi, ana ganin cewa yaƙi kai tsaye da Isra'ila ba hanya ce mai amfani ga ƙasashen Larabawa ba, don haka ya zama wajibi a shiga shawarwari. Sakamakon kai tsaye na irin wannan matakin shi ne karɓar ikon mulkin Isra'ila ta hanyar tsare-tsare irin su tsarin zaman lafiya.

Israel’s performance in the wars of 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 against the Muslims in the region has long been seen as confirmation of Israel’s military superiority. In light of this apparent superiority and its seizure of Muslim lands, it is argued that direct military conflict with Israel is not a viable course of action for the Arab states, creating the necessity of entering into negotiations. The direct consequence of such a move has been the acceptance of Israel’s sovereignty through plans such as the peace process.

Lokacin da ake nazarin ƙarfin sojan Isra'ila da ake cewa tana da shi, dole ne a tuna da wannan: Wace manufa ce ginin wannan tatsuniya ke yi?

In reviewing Israel’s supposed military might one must keep in mind: What purpose does the construction of this myth serve?

Yaƙin 1948 ya kai ga kafuwar ƙasar Isra'ila. A kallon farko yana da wuya a fahimci yadda Larabawa miliyan 40 ba za su iya kai ƙarfin yaƙin Yahudawa 600,000 kaɗai ba. Idan aka yi nazari sosai kan masu kare sabon Falasɗinu, za a ga cewa ayyukansu ne a zahiri suka kai kai tsaye ga kafuwar Isra'ila.

The war of 1948 led to the establishment of the state of Israel. On the surface it’s difficult to understand how 40 million Arabs could not match the fighting strength of just 600,000 Jews. A closer study of the defenders of the Palestinian cause shows how their actions in fact led directly to the establishment of Israel.

Manyan wakilan dalilin Falasdinawa su ne Sarki Abdullah na Transjordan, Sarki Farook na Masar, da Mufti na Falasdinu. Dukansu sarakuna ne masu rauni sosai, koyaushe Birtaniya na yi musu magudi. Yadda Sarki Abdullah ya nuna kansa a matsayin mai kare dalilin Falasdinawa ba gaskiya ba ne, rufa-rufa ne kawai. An san cewa shi da Ben Gurion (Firaministan Isra'ila na farko)

The primary representatives of the Palestinian cause were King Abdullah of Transjordan, King Farook of Egypt and the Mufti of Palestine, all of them were extremely weak rulers subject to constant manipulation by the British. King Abdullah’s portrayal of himself as a defender of the Palestinian cause was a façade. It was known that he and Ben Gurion (Israel’s first Prime Minister)

Sun kasance ɗalibai tare a Istanbul, kuma a cikin tarurruka na sirri Abdullah ya bayar da shawarar amincewa da kafa Isra'ila a madadin ikon Jordan a yankunan Falasɗinu da Larabawa ke zaune.

were students together in Istanbul and that in clandestine meetings Abdullah had offered to accept the establishment of Israel in return for Jordanian control of the Arab populated parts of Palestine.

Sarki Abdullah yana da Rundunar Larabawa a hannunsa, wata runduna mai horo sosai wadda take da mutum 4,500, tare da Janar John Glubb, wani Bature, a matsayin kwamandanta. Glubb a cikin tarihin rayuwarsa ya bayyana cewa yana karkashin umarni mai tsauri daga Turawan Ingila, cewa kada ya shiga yankunan da Yahudawa ke iko da su.21 Masar ta kara raunana harin da aka kai wa Isra'ila lokacin da Nakrashi Pasha, Firayim Minista, da farko bai yi amfani da sojojin da ke akwai ba, sai ya aika da rundunar sa-kai wadda aka kafa ta ne kawai a watan Janairu na waccan shekarar. Haka kuma Jordan ta jinkirta wucewar sojojin Iraki ta cikin yankinta, don haka ta kawo cikas ga duk wani hari kan Isra'ila. Saboda haka ne wani makaho Imam da aka kawo domin ya tada hankalin sojojin Jordan kafin yakin ya kunyata Abdullah lokacin da ya ce: "Ya ku sojoji, da ma ina so ku kasance namu!" (yana nufin cewa Rundunar Larabawa na Turawan Ingila ce).

King Abdullah had the Arab Legion at his disposal, a highly trained unit of 4,500 men, with General John Glubb an Englishman as its commanding officer. Glubb in his memoirs recounted that he was under strict orders from the British, not to enter areas under Jewish control.21 Egypt further weakened the attack against Israel when Nakrashi Pasha, the Prime Minister, initially did not use existing military units but sent an army of volunteers that had only been organised in January of that year. Jordan also delayed the passage of Iraqi troops across its territory thus thwarting any attack on Israel. This is why a blind Imam brought to rouse the Jordanian army prior to the battle embarrassed Abdullah when he said: “O army I wish you were ours” (referring to the Arab Legion being British).

Wannan rikici bai taba zama yaƙi don 'yantar da Falasdinu ba, sai dai gwagwarmaya tsakanin Amurka da Birtaniya don iko da Mashigar Suez mai muhimmancin dabaru.

This conflict was never a war for the liberation of Palestine but rather a struggle between America and Britain for control over the strategically important Suez Canal.

Amurka ta ga Masar a matsayin abokiyar kawance mai muhimmanci idan har za ta samu tasiri a Gabas ta Tsakiya. Ta hanyar CIA, ta yi shirin hambarar da Sarki Farook mai goyon bayan Birtaniya a juyin mulki a shekarar 1952, inda ta kawo ga mulki Jami'an Juyin Juya Hali, waɗanda Gamal Abdul-Nasser zai jagoranta. CIA ta yi aiki a kan wani shiri a shekarar 1951.

The US saw Egypt as a critical ally if America was to gain influence in the Middle East. Through the CIA, she moved to depose the Pro-British King Farook in a coup in 1952, bringing into power the Free Officers who were to be led by Gamal Abdul-Nasser. The CIA worked on a project in 1951

"Neman Wanda Ake Nema Billy Graham na Musulmi." Mike Copeland, jami'in CIA, ya buga bayanan sirri a cikin tarihin rayuwarsa a shekarar 1989, "The Game Player," game da juyin mulkin da CIA ta goya baya wanda ya kifar da Sarki Farook, dan tsanar Birtaniya. Copeland, wanda ya kaddamar da aikin, ya bayyana cewa "CIA na bukatar wani shugaba mai karfin hali wanda zai iya karkatar da kiyayyar Amurka da ke karuwa a yankin." Ya bayyana cewa CIA da Nasser sun yi daidai kan batun Isra'ila. A wajen Nasser, maganar yaki da Isra'ila ba ta da muhimmanci. Abin da ya fi muhimmanci shi ne mamayar Birtaniya a yankin Canal na Suez. Makiyin Nasser shi ne Birtaniya.

known as “The Search for a Moslem Billy Graham.” Mike Copeland the CIA operative, published classified information in his memoirs in 1989, ‘The Game Player,’ about the CIA backed coup d’etat that ousted the British puppet King Farook. Copeland, who activated the project, explains that ‘the CIA needed a charismatic leader who would be able to divert the growing anti-American hostility that was building up in the area.’ He explains both the CIA and Nasser were in agreement on Israel. For Nasser talk of war with Israel was irrelevant. Much more of a priority was British occupation of the Suez Canal Zone. Nasser’s enemy was Britain.

A shekarar 1956 Nasser ya aiwatar da bukatun Amurka na mayar da Tashar Suez ta zama ta ƙasa. Martanin Birtaniya shi ne jan hankalin Faransa da Isra'ila zuwa cikin wannan rikici. Masanin tarihi Corelli Barnett ya bayyana haka, kuma ya rubuta game da Suez a littafinsa, 'The Collapse of British Power': 'Faransa ta ƙi Nasser saboda Masar tana taimakon 'yan tawayen Aljeriya, kuma tana da alaƙa da tashar saboda dalilai na tarihi. Bayan haka, wani Bafaransa ne ya gina ta. Isra'ila kuwa tana marmarin kai wa Nasser hari tun da farko saboda hare-haren fedayeen na Falasɗinawa da kuma toshe Mashigar Tiran da Masar ta yi.

Wannan yaƙin ya zama wani sabon babi ne kawai a cikin rikicin Anglo-Amurka don iko a kan yankin.

This war was again another episode in the Anglo-American conflict for control of the region.

Britain had been surpassed as the region's dominant force 11 years earlier, but still retained some influence through its agents in Jordan, Syria and Israel. In an attempt to weaken Nasser, Britain sought to lure Israel to drag Egypt into a war whereby Israel would seize territory and use it as a bargaining tool in any future peace settlement; a means through which to achieve the security which the Israelis so desperately sought. On 5th June 1967 Israel launched a pre-emptive strike destroying 60% of Egypt's grounded air force and 66% of Syrian and Jordanian combat aircraft.

Britain had been surpassed as the region's dominant force 11 years earlier, but still retained some influence through its agents in Jordan, Syria and Israel. In an attempt to weaken Nasser, Britain sought to lure Israel to drag Egypt into a war whereby Israel would seize territory and use it as a bargaining tool in any future peace settlement; a means through which to achieve the security which the Israelis so desperately sought. On 5th June 1967 Israel launched a pre-emptive strike destroying 60% of Egypt's grounded air force and 66% of Syrian and Jordanian combat aircraft.

Isra'ilawa sun kwace Gabar Kogin Jordan da Gabashin Kudus daga hannun Jordan. Sarki Hussein, kafin yakin, ya sanya sojojinsa a wurare daban-daban da ba inda babban yakin ke gudana ba. Cikin awanni 48 kacal Isra'ilawa suka kwace manyan garuruwan Gabar Kogin Jordan. Haka kuma Isra'ilawa suka kwace Tsaunukan Golan masu muhimmancin dabarun yaki a ranar shida ta yakin. Sojojin Siriya da ke mamaye Tsaunukan Golan sun ji labarin kwace tsaunukan ta gidan rediyon gwamnatinsu, duk da cewa sojojin nasu suna nan a kansu. Isra'ila ta kuma sanya wa Nasser na Amurka wani babban koma-baya ta hanyar kwace Sharm al-Sheikh da tabbatar da hanyar ruwa ta Tekun Tiran. Manufar raunana gwamnatin Nasser ta cimma nasara, don haka a kaikaice ta taimaka wa muradun Birtaniya a yankin. Isra'ila ta samu damar kwace karin filaye tare da amfani da su a matsayin wata dabarar ciniki a tattaunawar musayar filaye da zaman lafiya, wadda har yau ake amfani da ita a matsayin tushen tattaunawa maimakon matsayin shekarar 1948. Majalisar Dinkin Duniya ta kafa shirin raba kasa na 1947, wanda ya ba Isra'ila kashi 57 cikin 100 na yankin, Falasdinu kuma ta zama kashi 42 cikin 100 na ainihin yankinta. A yakin 1967 mamayar Isra'ila ta ƙara ta'azzara, inda ta kwace har kashi 78 cikin 100 na Falasdinu ta tarihi.

The Israelis seized the West Bank and east Jerusalem from Jordanian control. King Hussein, prior to the battle, had positioned his troops in different areas from where the main battle was taking place. In a matter of 48 hours the Israelis seized the major West Bank towns. In a similar manner the Israelis seized the strategically important Golan Heights on the 6th day of the war. The Syrian troops occupying the Golan Heights heard news of Israel’s capture of the heights through their own State radio despite the Syrian troops clearly occupying them. Israel also dealt America’s Nasser a blow by capturing Sharm al Sheikh and securing the waterway of the Straits of Tiran. The objective of weakening the regime of Nasser was achieved, thus indirectly aiding British interests within the region. Israel was able to seize more land and use it as a bargaining asset in any land for peace negotiations, which today is still used as a basis for negotiations rather then the status of 1948. The United Nations established the UN Partition plan in 1947, which gave 57% of territory to Israel with Palestine becoming 42% of its former self. In the 1967 war Israeli occupation increased further with its territorial gains of up to 78% of historic Palestine.

Binciken yakin watan Oktoba na 1973 da Masar da Siriya suka kaddamar kan Isra'ila ya nuna cewa manufofinsa iyaka ne, kuma ba su taba haɗawa da 'yantar da Falasdinu ba. Manufofin ba su ma haɗa da 'yantar da tuddan Golan ba, wadanda aka shirya mayar da su a matsayin wani ɓangare na yarjejeniyar zaman lafiya tsakanin Siriya da Isra'ila. Manufofin shi ne karfafa matsayin Anwar Sadat da Hafez al-Assad, wadanda sabbin shugabanni ne a kasashen da juyin mulkin soja ya zama ruwan dare. Sadat ya fi fuskantar rauni musamman saboda ya gaji shugaba mai karfin fada-a-ji Nasser.

An examination of the October 1973 war launched by Egypt and Syria against Israel shows that the aims were limited and never included the liberation of Palestine. The aims never even included the liberation of the Golan Heights which were designed to be restored as part of a peace treaty between Syria and Israel. The aims were to solidify the positions of Anwar Sadat and Hafez al-Assad who were relatively new leaders in countries prone to military coups. Sadat in particular was vulnerable given the fact that he had succeeded the charismatic Nasser.

Muhammad Heikal, shahararren editan jaridar Al Ahram daga 1957 zuwa 1974, wanda ya shaida yakin, ya bayyana zurfin manufofin Anwar Sadat a littafinsa "The Road to Ramadhan", inda ya kawo yanayin tunanin Sadat kafin yakin. Heikal ya nakalto daya daga cikin janar-janar na Sadat, Muhammad Fouwzi, wanda ya ba da misali da wani samurai mai zana takubba biyu, daya dogo daya gajere, don shirin yaki. Fouwzi ya ce wannan yaki zai zama irin na gajeran takobi, wato yaki mai iyaka saboda wasu dalilai na musamman.

Mohammed Heikal the respected editor of Al Ahram from 1957 – 1974, who witnessed the war, explained the extent of Anwar Sadat’s underlying motives in his book ‘The Road to Ramadhan’ where he cites Sadat’s mood in the run up to the war. Heikal quotes one of Sadat’s generals, Mohammed Fouwzi who gave the analogy of a samurai drawing two swords - a long one and short one in preparation for battle. Fouwzi said that this battle would be a case of the short sword, signifying a limited battle for certain motives.

Anwar Sadat ba shi da niyyar yin yaƙin 'yanci mai tsawo da Isra'ila. Shi ya sa ya nemi zaman lafiya da Isra'ila alhali yana cikin matsayin nasara a yaƙin. A cikin sa'o'i 24 na farko na yaƙin, Masar ta karya katangar Bar-Lev da aka yi ta yabo a gabashin Canal ɗin Suez da mutum 68 kawai da suka rasu. A lokaci guda kuma, rundunoni 2 na Siriya da tankoki 500 sun shiga Tuddan Golan, suka kwato wasu daga cikin filayen da aka karɓa a 1967. A cikin kwana biyu na faɗa, Isra'ila ta rasa jiragen sama 49 da tankoki 500. A cikin wannan hali, Sadat ya aika da saƙo ga Sakataren Harkokin Wajen Amurka, Henry Kissinger, inda ya ce manufar yaƙin ita ce "cimma zaman lafiya a Gabas ta Tsakiya, ba sulhu na ɓangare-ɓangare ba." Saƙon ya ci gaba da cewa idan Isra'ila ta janye daga dukkan yankunan da ta mamaye, Masar za ta shirya shiga taron zaman lafiya ƙarƙashin kulawar Majalisar Ɗinkin Duniya ko wata ƙasa mai tsaka-tsaki. Don haka, duk da cewa yana da babbar fa'ida ta dabara, Sadat yana cikin shirin tattaunawa tun a farkon matakin. Rashin matsa lamba don amfani da fa'idarsa ta farko da jinkirin ƙaddamar da hari na biyu a Sinai sun bai wa Isra'ila damar yin shiri, tare da taimakon Amurka, kuma ta fara kwato yankunan da ta rasa. An kawo ƙarshen faɗan a hukumance a ranar 25 ga Oktoba, 1974.