“AQSh tarixida hech qachon bir prezident — va men aslida ikkala Prezident Bushni nazarda tutyapman — boshqa xorijiy davlat bilan bunchalik yaqin munosabatda bo‘lmagan... Saudiya Arabistoni bilan 40 yildan beri davom etib kelayotgan munosabatlarimiz asosida tuzilgan kelishuvimiz bor edi...”

“Never before in history has a president of the United States— and I'm really referring to both President Bushes—has had such a close relationship with another foreign power... we had a pact with Saudi Arabia in a relationship that's gone back 40 years...

"Biz neft olamiz, ular uchun qurol sotamiz, va shartnomaning bir qismi shu edi: Saudiya Arabistonida haqiqatda nima bo‘layotganiga juda diqqat bilan qaramaymiz." — Kreyg Ugnar 2005-yil 25-aprelda shahzoda Abdulloh Jorj Bushga bir qator masalalarni, Yaqin Sharqdagi tinchlik jarayonidan tortib terrorizmga qarshi kurashgacha bo‘lgan masalalarni muhokama qilish uchun tashrif buyurdi. Biroq Abdullohning tashrifining asosiy maqsadi Prezident Bushga neft ishlab chiqarishni oshirishga qaratilgan yangi taklifni taqdim etish edi, bu esa xom neft narxiga bosimni qisman yengillashtirishga xizmat qilardi.

we get oil, we sell them weapons, and part of the pact was we didn't look too closely at what was really going on in Saudi Arabia.” -- Craig Ugnar n April 25 2005, Crown Prince Abdullah visited George Bush to discuss a number of issues ranging from the Middle East peace process to fighting terrorism. However, the centrepiece of Abdullah’ s visit was to present President Bush with a fresh proposal to boost Saudi oil production that would go some way towards easing pressure on the price of crude oil.

Tashrif Bushning yangi energetika strategiyasini e'lon qilishi bilan bir vaqtga to'g'ri kelishi uchun ehtiyotkorlik bilan rejalashtirilgan edi. Bu strategiya neft kompaniyalari va oddiy amerikaliklar orasida ma'muriyatning neft siyosati barbod bo'layotgani va AQSH iqtisodiyotiga zarar yetkazayotgani haqidagi kuchayib borayotgan xavotirlarga javob berish uchun mo'ljallangan edi.

The visit was carefully scripted to coincide with Bush’ s announcement of a new energy strategy to counter growing concerns amongst oil companies and ordinary Americans that the administration’ s oil policy was faltering and hurting the US economy.

Neft kompaniyalarining tanqidlari Iroq neftini qo‘lga kiritishdagi sust natijalar tufayli kuchaydi. $16

Criticism from oil companies has been fuelled by the lack of progress made in securing Iraq’ s oil. Despite devoting $1.6

…milliard dollarlik Kongress yordami Iroq neft infratuzilmasini rivojlantirishga ajratilgan bo‘lsa-da, Iroq hali ham 2003-yil boshidagi, AQSh Saddam Husaynni ag‘darish uchun bosqin qilishdan oldingi darajadan 25 foiz past ishlab chiqarmoqda. Mashhur Iroq qarshilik harakati neft oqimini tomchiga aylantirib qo‘ydi. Turkiyaga olib boradigan quvurning buzib tashlanishi Kirkuk atrofidagi shimoliy konlardan eksportni cheklab qo‘ydi, zo‘ravonlik esa janubdagi yirik konlarni zamonaviylashtirish sa’y-harakatlariga to‘sqinlik qildi. Natijada, Iroq o‘tgan oy 1,43 million barrel xom neft eksport qildi, bu mart oyidagiga nisbatan 30 ming barrelga kam. Bu urushdan keyin ba’zi tahlilchilar bashorat qilgan 4 million barreldan ancha uzoqda.

billion of Congressional aid to develop Iraqi oil infrastructure, Iraq is still producing 25 percent lower than levels in early 2003, before the U.S. invasion to topple Saddam Hussein. The popular Iraqi insurgency has reduced the flow of oil to a trickle. The sabotage of a pipeline to Turkey has restricted exports from Iraq's northern fields, around Kirkuk, and violence has hampered efforts to modernize the larger southern fields. The result is that Iraq exported 1.43 million barrels of crude oil last month, down 30,000 barrels from March. This is nowhere near the 4 million barrels forecasted by some analysts in the aftermath of the war.

Bundan tashqari, AQSh neft kompaniyalari rahbarlari neokonservatorlardan ham norozi bo‘lib, ularni Iroqning neft sanoatini qayta milliylashtirish o‘rniga xususiylashtirish orqali qo‘zg‘olonni rag‘batlantirishda ayblamoqda. AQSh neft sanoati tomonidan ilgari surilgan Iroq neftini milliylashtirish rejasi so‘nggi daqiqada neokonservatorlarning Iroq neftini xususiylashtirish va OPEC’ni barbod qilish rejasi bilan almashtirildi.

In addition, US oil executives have been further aggrieved by the neo-conservatives whom they blame for encouraging the insurgency through the privatization of Iraq’ s oil industry as opposed to its re-nationalization. The plan to nationalize Iraqi oil, which was put forward by the US oil industry, was superseded at the last minute by a neoconservative plan to privatize Iraq’ s oil and destroy OPEC.

Saddam'dan keyingi davrdagi tartibsizlik natijasida AQSh neft kompaniyalari Iroq neft konlaridan foydalanishdan mahrum qilindi va bu ularning Iroq neft ta'minotini oshirish harakatlariga to'siq bo'ldi.

In the ensuing chaos of the post Saddam era, the US oil companies were prevented from exploiting Iraq’ s oil fields thereby hindering their efforts to increase Iraqi oil supply.

Iroqning neft konlari bilan ishlay olmaslik Amerika neft kompaniyalari uchun katta zarba bo‘ldi. Amerika Qo‘shma Shtatlari Energetika vazirligining ma’lumotiga ko‘ra, Iroqda yangi ishlab chiqarishni yo‘lga qo‘yish xarajatlari dunyodagi eng past xarajatlar qatoriga kiradi. Hozircha uning 74 ta konidan atigi 15 tasi o‘zlashtirilgan; ma’lum zaxiralar 112 milliard barrel, ammo ba’zilarning bashoratiga ko‘ra, ular 300 milliard barreldan ham oshishi mumkin. Qazib olish darajasi esa 50

Failure to work with Iraq’ s oil fields was a huge blow to American oil companies. According to the United States Department of Energy the costs of bringing new production on line in Iraq are among the lowest in the world. As of yet only 15 of its 74 fields have been developed; known reserves are 112 billion barrels, but some predict it may turn out to exceed 300 billion barrels. With recovery rates of 50

...foiz va 250 milliard barrel zaxira, Iroq neftining qiymati 3 trillion dollardan oshishi mumkin.

per cent and reserves of 250 billion barrels, Iraqi oil could be worth more than $3 trillion.

Ichki masalalarga kelsak, iste'molchilar benzin kolonkalarida ko'tarilgan narxlarga chidashga majbur bo'lmoqda va Amerikadagi energetika muammolarining ko'p qismi uchun Bushni ayblamoqda. Yaqinda o'tkazilgan Associated Press-AOL so'rovnomasi jamoatchilikning prezidentning energetika muammolarini hal etishdagi faoliyatiga past baho berayotganini ko'rsatdi: respondentlarning 62 foizi bu faoliyatni ma'qullamasligini bildirgan. Demokratlar past reytinglardan foydalanib, Bush ma'muriyati yuqori neft narxlaridan azob chekayotgan jamoatchilikni qutqarish uchun deyarli hech narsa qilmagani haqidagi fikrni ta'kidlamoqda. "Besh yil o'tdi, lekin rekord darajadagi benzin narxlaridan azob chekayotgan amerikaliklar hali ham prezidentning OPEC'ni ishontirish borasidagi va'dasini bajarishini kutishmoqda", dedi senator Jon Kerri.

On the domestic front, consumers have had to put up with soaring gas prices at the pump and blame Bush for much of America’ s energy woes. A recent Associated Press-AOL poll found the public giving the president low marks for his handling of energy problems, with 62 percent saying they disapproved. The democrats have seized on the poor approval ratings to drive home the point that the Bush administration has done next to nothing to rescue the beleaguered public from high oil prices. “Five years later, and Americans suffering under record-high gas prices are still waiting to see the president keep his promise to jawbone OPEC,”ix said Senator John Kerry.

Bush ma'muriyati ortib borayotgan tanqidlar bosimi ostida ta'sirchan neokonservatorlar — Volfovits va Boltonni — siyosat ishlab chiqarish vazifalaridan siyosatni amalga oshirish vazifalariga o'tkazish yo'li bilan javob berdi. Ma'muriyat, shuningdek, Saudiyaliklardan neft ishlab chiqarish quvvatini keskin oshiradigan reja tuzishni so'radi. Saudiya neft vaziri Ali Naimi Abdullohning Texasga tashrifidan oldin e'lon qilgan rejaga ko'ra, besh yil davomida 50 milliard dollar sarflanib, Saudiya ishlab chiqarish quvvatini hozirgi 11 million barrel kunlik chegaradan 2009-yilga kelib kuniga 12,5 million barrelgacha oshirish ko'zda tutilgan. Zarur bo'lsa, Saudiya Arabistoni oxir-oqibat kuniga 15 million barrel quvvat yaratishini aytdi. AQShning Milliy xavfsizlik bo'yicha maslahatchisi Stiven Xedli Saudiya rejasini katta yutuq deb ta'rifladi. U shunday dedi: "Haqiqatan ham taklif qilingan narsa — vaqt o'tishi bilan taxminan 50 milliard dollarlik katta investitsiya orqali ishlab chiqarishni oshirish rejasi edi. Bu ular amalga oshirayotgan katta tashabbusdir." Amerika iqtisodiyotini qo'llab-quvvatlashga qaratilgan ushbu ulkan investitsiyaga qaramay, Saudiyaliklar AQShning energetika kompaniyalariga Saudiya Arabistonining boshqa energetika sohalariga sarmoya kiritishga taklif qilish orqali ularga katta foyda berishni ham rejalashtirmoqda. Saudiya-Amerika biznes kengashi (SABC) tomonidan Fairmont mehmonxonasida tashkil etilgan amerikalik tadbirkorlar auditoriyasiga murojaat qilgan shahzoda Abdulloh 2005-yilning oxirgi choragida Xalqaro energetika forumi (IEF) konferensiyasini o'tkazish niyatini e'lon qildi. U shunday dedi: "Biz sizni kon va gaz sohalarida biz bilan hamkorlikni davom ettirishga taklif qilamiz, bu yerda ko'plab investitsiya imkoniyatlari mavjud. Imkoniyatlar ko'p va Xudo xohlasa, muvaffaqiyat kafolatlangan. Siz to'g'ridan-to'g'ri investitsiya yoki qo'shma loyihalar tashkil etishni tanlashingiz mumkin." Shahzoda Abdulloh shuningdek, endi rivojlanayotgan Saudiya iqtisodiyotini himoya qiluvchi qonunlarni yumshatishni taklif qilish orqali Amerika tadbirkorlariga mamlakatdan boylikni olib chiqib ketishni osonlashtirishni rejalashtirmoqda. Iqtisodiy islohotlar haqida gapirar ekan, Abdulloh shunday dedi: “Biz aniq va moslashuvchan soliq qonunini qabul qildik, moliya bozorini xalqaro standartlarga mos keladigan tarzda qayta tashkil etdik va xususiylashtirish jarayonini tezlashtirdik.” Shubhasiz, Abdullohning rejasidan haqiqiy foydalanuvchilar amerikaliklar bo‘ladi. Birinchidan, saudiyaliklar xom neft ishlab chiqarishni oshirish uchun 50 milliard dollar sarflaydi, faqat buning natijasida xalqaro neft bozori to‘lib-toshadi va uning narxi tushib ketadi. Bu Saudiya foydasini keskin kamaytiradi va mamlakat iqtisodiyotiga jiddiy zarar yetkazadi. Boshqa tomondan, arzon xom neft hozirda yuqori neft narxlari bilan qiynalayotgan Amerika iqtisodiyoti uchun xudo bergan ne’mat bo‘ladi.

The Bush administration faced with the growing tide of criticism has responded by removing influential neoconservatives like Wolfowitz and Bolton away from policy making to policy execution. The administration has also asked the Saudi’ s to come up with a plan that dramatically increases its oil production capacity. The plan outlined by Saudi Oil Minister Ali Naimi before Abdullah’ s visit to Texas, proposes to spend $50 billion over a five–year period to increase Saudi production capacity to 12.5 million barrels per day by 2009 from the current 11 million limit. If necessary, Saudi Arabia says it will eventually develop a capacity of 15 million barrels a day. US National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley described the Saudi plan as a major breakthrough. He said, “What really came was a plan for increasing production through substantial investment — to the tune of about $50 billion over time. So it's a major initiative that they've undertaken."x Notwithstanding this huge investment to supplement America’ s economy, the Saudi’ s also plan to give US energy companies a huge bonanza by inviting them to invest in Saudi Arabia’ s other energy sectors. Addressing an audience of American businessmen organized by the Saudi-American Business Council (SABC) at the Fairmont Hotel, Prince Abdullah announced his intention to host a conference of the International Energy Forum (IEF) in the last quarter of 2005. He said, “We invite you to continue to cooperate with us in the mining and gas sectors which offer a number of investment opportunities. There are many opportunities and success is guaranteed, God willing. You can choose direct investment or establish joint projects.” Crown Prince Abdullah also plans to make it easier for American businessmen to take wealth out of the country by proposing to relax the laws protecting the fledging Saudi economy. Speaking about the economic reforms, Abdullah said, “We have enacted a clear and flexible taxation law, reorganized the financial market so that it matches international standards and have expedited the privatization process.” Clearly the Americans will be the real beneficiaries of Abdullah’ s plan. Firstly, the Saudi’ s will spend $50 billion to increase the production of crude oil only to flood the international oil market and have its price reduced. This will sharply diminish Saudi profits and significantly damage the country’ s economy. On the other hand, cheap crude oil will be a godsend to the American economy, which at present is reeling from high oil prices.

Ikkinchidan, Saudiyaliklar neft ishlab chiqarish quvvatini oshirish uchun zarur ishlarni bajarish maqsadida amerikalik neft kompaniyalariga milliardlab dollar to'laydi. Bu texnologiya uzatilishiga olib kelmaydi va Saudiya Arabistonining tez o'sayotgan ishsizlik ko'rsatkichlarini kamaytirish uchun yetarli ish o'rinlarini yaratmaydi. Hozirda ishsizlik darajasi 20% ni tashkil etadi (haqiqiy ko'rsatkich 30% gacha bo'lishi mumkin). Biroq bu ko'rsatkich yanada oshishi mumkin, chunki Saudiya aholisi 2020 yilga borib 20 milliondan 40 millionga ikki baravar ko'payishi kutilmoqda. Shu sababli, yaqin kelajakda Saudiyalik ishsizlarning ish topish istiqboli juda qorong'u ko'rinmoqda.

Secondly, the Saudi’ s will be paying American oil companies billions of dollars to carry out the necessary work to increase the capacity of oil production. It will neither result in transfer of technology nor create sufficient jobs to lessen Saudi Arabia’ s burgeoning unemployment figures. At present, the unemployment rate is at 20% (the real figure could be as high as 30%). But this figure could increase even further, given that the Saudi population is going to double from 20 million to 40 million by 2020. Hence the outlook for Saudi’ s seeking employment in the near future looks extremely bleak.

Uchinchidan, xususiylashtirish harakati va bo‘sh soliq qonunchiligi Saudiya Arabistonining muhim aktivlari, masalan, Saudi Telecom Company’ning Amerika mulkiga o‘tishiga olib keladi. Bundan tashqari, yaxshiroq jamoat xizmatlarini taqdim etish bahonasida Amerika ko‘p millatli kompaniyalari yuqori narxlarni belgilaydi va katta foyda oladi, bu foydaning juda oz qismi Saudiya iqtisodiyotiga qayta sarflanadi. Asosiy qismi AQShga qaytarib olib ketiladi, bir qismi esa Saudiya shahzodalarining xorijdagi hisobvaraqlariga tushadi.

Thirdly, the privatization drive coupled with loose taxation laws will result in American ownership of some of Saudi Arabia’ s vital assets like the Saudi Telecom Company. In addition, under the pretext of providing better public services, the American multinationals will charge higher prices and generate huge profits, very little of which will be ploughed back into the Saudi economy. Most of it will be repatriated back to the US, whilst some of it will end up in the foreign accounts of Saudi princes.

Тўртинчидан, Саудия Арабистони билан АҚШ ўртасидаги икки томонлама савдо 1970 йилдаги 160 миллион долларлик арзимас миқдордан 2004 йилга келиб 26 миллиард долларга ошган бўлса-да, шу давр мобайнида Саудия халқи тобора камбағаллашиб борди. 1999 йилда жон бошига тўғри келадиган ЯИМ нефт нархлари кескин ошишидан олдинги 1965 йилдагига нисбатан ҳам пастроқ эди. Шундай экан, Абдуллоҳ америкаликларни бошқа энергия захираларига сармоя киритишга таклиф қилиш орқали Саудия халқининг келажагини Америка қулчилигига топшираётир.

Fourthly, though the bilateral trade between Saudi Arabia and the US has increased from a measly sum of $160 million in 1970 to $26 billion in 2004, the Saudi people during this period have become increasingly poor. In 1999, the per capita GDP was less than it was in 1965, before the massive rise in oil prices. So by inviting the Americans to invest in other energy reserves, Abdullah is signing away the future of the Saudi people to American slavery.

Shubhasiz, Bush ma'muriyati Abdullohning rejasini qabul qildi va uni o'zlarining yangilangan energetika strategiyasining bir qismi sifatida kiritdi. Bu harbiy bazalarni neft zavodlariga aylantirish, AQShning neft zaxiralaridan foydalanish yo'llarini izlash va tozaroq yoqilg'ilarni o'rganishdan iborat.

Not surprisingly, the Bush administration embraced Abdullah’ s plan and included it, as part of their revitalized energy strategy. This consists of turning military bases into oil refineries, exploring ways of tapping US oil reserves and exploring cleaner fuels.

Shuning uchun Bush o‘zining yangilangan energetika siyosatini e’lon qilganda, xom neft narxini pasaytirishga muvaffaq bo‘ldi. Bu Abdullohning Texasga tashrifi sababini tushuntiradi va Milliy xavfsizlik bo‘yicha maslahatchi Stiven Xedli tomonidan tasdiqlandi, u shunday dedi: "Hozir neft bozoridagi muammo yetarli quvvat yo‘q degan tasavvurdir." Uning so‘zicha, bozorga mavjud ta’minot haqida berilgan ishonch "narxga pasaytiruvchi bosim" o‘tkazishi kerak. Xedlining bayonoti ham bu ishonchning o‘zgaruvchan tabiatiga ishora qiladi. Ko‘p narsa Bush ma’muriyatining ekologlar va Alyaskа kabi joylarda neft qazib olinishiga, shuningdek, mavjud harbiy bazalarni neft zavodlariga aylantirishga qarshi chiqayotgan boshqa bosim guruhlarining qarshiligini yengish qobiliyatiga bog‘liq.

Therefore, when Bush unveiled his rejuvenated energy policy, he succeeded in pushing down the price of crude oil. This explains the reason behind Abdullah’ s visit to Texas and was confirmed by National Security Adviser Stephen Headley who said, "The problem in the oil market now is a perception that there is inadequate capacity." Reassurance that can be given to the market on available supply, he said, should "have a downward pressure on the price." Hadley’ s statement also alludes to the fickle nature of this reassurance. Much is dependent upon the Bush administration’ s ability to overcome resistance from environmentalists and other pressure groups who are opposed to the drilling for oil in places like Alaska and also to the conversion of existing military bases into oil refineries.

Shu jihatdan, Bushning energetika strategiyasi mudofaaga qaratilgan.

In this respect, Bush’ s energy strategy is a defensive one.

Iroqdagi muvaffaqiyatsizlikdan so'ng ma'muriyat AQSh neftining mahalliy ishlab chiqarishini oshirish yo'llarini izlashga majbur bo'ldi.

Having failed in Iraq, the administration has been forced into exploring ways to boost the domestic output of US oil.

Qish yaqinlashayotgan va OPEC neftni maksimal darajada chiqarayotgan bir paytda, Oq uyda keyingi inqirozning oldini olish yo‘llarini topish uchun poyga boshlangan.

With winter approaching and OPEC pumping oil to its maximum, the race is on in the White House to find ways to stymie the next crisis.

Biroq, Amerikaning hozirgi ahvoli Saudiyaliklar uchun o‘z xalqini Amerika gegemonligidan ozod qilish uchun ideal imkoniyat yaratmoqda. Agar Al Saud xonadoni bu borada samimiy bo‘lganida, ular AQShga bo‘lgan qaramligini uzish uchun bir qancha strategiyalardan foydalanishlari mumkin edi.

However, America’ s current predicament presents an ideal opportunity for the Saudi’ s to free their people from American hegemony. Had the House of Saud been sincere about this, they could have employed number of strategies to sever their dependency on the US.

Saudiyaliklar xom neftni yetkazib berishni to‘xtatishi, uni dollarga bog‘lamasdan, Yevro yoki Yuan (Xitoy valyutasi) kabi valyutalarda sotishi mumkin edi. Bu dunyoni tezda o‘zlari afzal ko‘rgan almashinuv valyutasiga qarshi dollarni sotishga majbur qilardi. Bunday harakat Yevropani va ayniqsa AQSh bilan keskin ziddiyatlari bo‘lgan Xitoyni ham Saudiya Arabistoniga qarshi AQSh qadamlariga qarshi turishga majbur qilardi.

The Saudi’ s could have cut the supply of crude oil, decoupled it from the dollar and sold it in currency like the Euro or the Yuan (Chinese currency). This would force the world to quickly sell the dollar in return for the Saudi’ s preferred currency of exchange. A move like this would also force powers like Europe and especially China, a country that has sharp differences with the US to counter any US manoeuvres against Saudi Arabia.

Saudiyaliklar, shuningdek, neftining bir qismini texnologiya va og‘ir sanoat mahsulotlariga almashtirishi mumkin edi, bu esa xorijiy ishchilarga bo‘lgan bog‘liqlikni kamaytirib, yangi ish o‘rinlari yaratardi. Shu tariqa saudiyaliklar o‘z iqtisodiyotini o‘zini o‘zi ta’minlash va iqtisodiy farovonlik yo‘liga yo‘naltirishlari mumkin edi.

The Saudi’ s could also barter some of their oil in exchange for technology and heavy industry thereby reducing dependency on foreign workers and creating new jobs. In this way the Saudi’ s could steer their economy towards a path of self–sufficiency and economic prosperity.

Abdulloh va Saud xonadoni bunday keskin g'oyalarni tanlashi juda kam ehtimolga ega, chunki ularning mavjudligi Angliya va Amerika qo'llab-quvvatlashiga bog'liq.

It is very unlikely that Abdullah and the House of Saud would opt for such radical ideas, as their very existence depends upon Anglo-American support.

Bu g'oyalarni faqat Saudiya rejimini boshqarayotgan Angliya-Amerika vakillaridan xoli muhitda amalga oshirish mumkin. Faqat Xilofat shunday muhitni yaratishi mumkin, bunda Saudiyaliklar chet el nazoratidan xoli siyosiy mustaqillik va iqtisodiy suverenitetdan bahramand bo'lishlari mumkin.

These ideas can only be pursued in an environment that is free from Anglo-American surrogates who dominate the Saudi regime. Only the Caliphate can produce an environment where the Saudi’ s can enjoy political independence and economic sovereignty free from foreign control.

2005-yil 10-may

May 10, 2005