ويمكن للمرء أن يجادل بسهولة بأنه إذا كان الرجال الكبار (والنساء) يرضون بالمراهنة على اتجاه أسعار الفائدة، وقوة سوق الإسكان الأمريكي، وعلى من سينجح ومن سيفشل في عالم الشركات (كما في مبادلات مخاطر الائتمان)، فينبغي أن يُتركوا وشأنهم. فبعد كل شيء، هناك دائمًا رابح وخاسر، وربما يتعلم الخاسر من أخطائه ويعود إنسانًا أفضل. وكحال المقامر الذي يفشل باستمرار ثم يعود مدمنًا لكنه متطلع إلى جائزة كبرى، كان الافتراض أن الأسواق كفؤة وأن الخاسرين سيسددون ديونهم كاملةً وفي موعدها، كما سيجني الرابحون أرباحهم بابتهاج. وهذا تصور عبثي، إذ يغفل عدم كفاءة أولئك الذين يدخلون ما يفوق قدرتهم، فيعجزون عن سداد ديونهم، والذين تمحقهم خسائر المراهنة محقًا تامًا. وهذه الأزمة لا تختلف عن ذلك.

It would be easy for one to argue that if grown men (and women) are happy to gamble on the direction of interest rates, the strength of the US housing market and over who will, and who will not fail in the corporate world (for example with Credit Default Swaps), they should be allowed to get on with it. After all there is always a winner and a loser, and maybe the loser will learn from his mistakes and come back a better person. Like the perpetually failing gambler who always returns addicted yet expectant for a big payout, the assumption was that the markets are efficient and losers will pay out fully and on time just as the winners will gleefully pocket their gains. This is an absurd notion, which fails to take note of the inefficiency of those that get in out of their depth who will struggle to meet their debts and those that are completely wiped out by their gambling losses. This crisis is no different.

ونحن شهدنا كيف راهنت الشركات بـ«الشركة» نفسها، أو بعبارة أدق، عبر الرفع المالي (القروض) راهنت بأضعاف كثيرة من قيمتها. ورغم جيوش المحاسبين وخبراء المخاطر وموظفي الامتثال، لم تنتبه أكبر البنوك في العالم للعاصفة التي كانت تقترب، بل دخلت فيها دون تحسب. فقد أعمتها أحلام تراكم الأرباح باستمرار من خلال رهانات أكبر وأكثر خطورة، فظنت أنها لن تخسر أبدًا. ومن الرؤساء التنفيذيين وصولًا إلى المتداولين، جميعهم يتحملون المسؤولية عن النتائج. ومع ذلك، باستثناء قلة من الحالات، لم يرتكبوا أي عمل غير قانوني. فالنظام والقانون أجازا ما فعلوه. وجوهر المشكلة يكمن في النظام (الرأسمالية) ونهجه في المعاملات والمقامرة بوجه عام. فقد أُفيد مؤخرًا، وفقًا لتقاريرهما المنشورة وحساباتهما، بأن كلًّا من بنك رويال بنك أوف سكوتلاند وبنك باركليز، وهما من أكبر البنوك وأعرقها، يحتفظان بعقود مبادلة مخاطر الائتمان (Credit Default Swaps) بقيمة 2.4 تريليون دولار أمريكي لكل منهما، أي ما يقارب ضعف إجمالي الناتج المحلي لبريطانيا. ولا عجب أن يكونا في قلب مباحثات الإنقاذ مع الحكومة البريطانية، وقد استسلم بنك RBS لذلك.

We’ve watched companies bet “the firm”, or to be more accurate through leveraging (loans) bet many multiples of the firm. Despite armies of accountants, risk experts and compliance staff the world’s largest banks did not see it coming and walked into the storm. Blinded by dreams of constantly accumulating profits on ever larger and riskier bets they just assumed they would never lose. And from the chief executives all the way down to the traders they are all culpable for the results. Yet, with only a few exceptions, they did nothing illegal. The system and the law endorsed what they did. The heart of the problem lies with the system (Capitalism) and its approach to transactions and gambling in general. Both the Royal Bank of Scotland and Barclays two of the largest and most prestigious banks have recently been reported to be each holding (according to their published report and accounts) $2.4 trillion dollars of Credit Default Swaps, nearly twice the size of Britain’s total Gross Domestic Product. Little wonder they have both been at the centre of bailout discussions with the British government with the RBS succumbing.

Credit default swaps (CDS) played a major role in the growing credit crisis which led to Lehman Brothers filing for bankruptcy protection. Likewise, the government rescue plan for the insurer American International Group Inc. (AIG) ($124 billion and counting) and the emergency sale of Merrill Lynch & Co. to Bank of America are rooted in the CDS bubble. AIG had become a major player in the CDS market, abandoning traditional insurance for the more exotic and supposedly more lucrative CDS market. As a major seller of CDSs, had AIG failed, it would have triggered many billions of dollars in losses at numerous other banks and financial groups that traded with AIG, sending them into failure as well. The chain of dominoes would have been well and truly set in motion. Lehman Brothers, despite its history and standing on Wall Street, was deemed expendable and was allowed to fail. Nevertheless, its failure has in many quarters been criticised because it played a key part in the current crisis.

Credit default swaps played a major role in the mushrooming credit crisis which led to Lehman Brothers filing for bankruptcy protection. Similarly the government rescue plan for insurer American International Group Inc. (AIG) ($124 billion and counting) and the emergency sale of Merryll Lynch & Co to Bank of America is rooted in the CDS bubble. AIG had become a major player in the CDS market, shunning traditional insurance for the more exotic and supposedly more lucrative CDS market. As a major seller of CDSs, had AIG failed, it would have triggered many billions of dollars in losses at numerous other banks and financial groups who traded with AIG, sending them into failure as well. The domino chain would be well and truly kicked off. Lehman Brothers despite its history and standing on Wall Street was deemed expendable, and was allowed to fail. Nevertheless its failure has in many quarters been criticised because it has played a key part in the current crisis.

بإعلان تصفية الشركة، اتضح حجم مراكزها الضخمة في المشتقات المالية وأدوات الرافعة المالية، إذ لا تزال هناك 1.5 مليون عقد مشتقات مرتبطة بليمان يكافح فريق كبير من المحامين لتصفيتها. كما أدى ذلك إلى وقوع "حدث ائتماني" يتعلق بليمان، تلاه حدوث أحداث ائتمانية مماثلة بسبب استيلاء الحكومة على أكبر شركتين لتمويل الرهن العقاري في الولايات المتحدة، وهما فريدي ماك وفاني ماي. وقد كشفت هذه الأحداث الائتمانية هشاشة النظام المالي بوضوح، فلم يعد أحد يعلم من سيفلس بعد ذلك، ومع تداول خسائر ضخمة في مقايضات الائتمان الافتراضي وغيرها من المشتقات عبر النظام، لم يكن معلوماً من يستطيع أن يسدد لمن. فإذا كانت أكبر البنوك، ومنها جميع بنوك الاستثمار الرئيسة، معرضة لاحتمال الإفلاس، فمن يُؤتمن إذن؟ لقد أفلست الآن بنوك الاستثمار الأمريكية الخمسة الكبرى كلها، أو تخلت عن نموذج أعمالها وتحولت إلى بنوك تحظى بدعم تمويلي خاص وحماية من الحكومة الأمريكية، وهي حالة: بير ستيرنز، وليمان براذرز، وميريل لينش (أفلست)، وغولدمان ساكس، ومورغان ستانلي (تحولتا إلى بنوك).

By going into liquidation the full extent of its massive derivatives and leveraged positions became clearer – there is still 1.5 million Lehman derivative contracts which a large team of lawyers are struggling through. It also triggered a “credit event” over Lehman, following the credit events of the Government takeovers of the largest US mortgage companies Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. These credit events brought the fragility of the financial system into sharp focus and no one knew who would fail next, or with such large CDS and other derivative losses washing around the system, who could pay who. If the largest of banks including all the key investment banks, were possibly insolvent who do you trust? The five core US investment banks have now all either failed (Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Meryll Lynch) or abandoned their business model and become banks with access to special funding support and protections from the US government (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley).