哈里发在采纳法律时受到真主律例的约束。因此，他不得采纳未从真主的经据中正确推导出的律例。他还有义务限定于自己所采纳的律例，以及他所承诺遵循的伊志提哈德（推导律例）的方法。因此，他不得采纳以与他所采纳的方法相违背的方法推导出的律例，也不得发布与他所采纳的律例相矛盾的命令。

The Khaleefah is restricted in the adoption by the divine rules. He is thus forbidden from adopting a rule that has not been correctly extracted from the divine evidences. He is also obliged to restrict himself to the rules He has adopted, and to the method of Ijtihad (extracting rules) He committed himself to. Therefore, He is forbidden from adopting a rule that has been extracted by a method contrary to the one He had adopted, nor to issue an order that contradicts the rules that He has adopted.

关于这两个问题，需要进一步仔细审视。第一个问题是，伊斯兰教法（Ahkam Shari'ah）对哈里发采纳律例的限制。这种限制使他在立法和制定法律方面受伊斯兰教法约束。他被禁止采纳任何与教法相抵触的法律，因为任何与教法相抵触的法律都被视为库夫尔法（Kufr law）。如果他明知某项规定并非源自教法而仍采纳它，那么就需要加以考察。如果他相信所采纳的这项规定，那么他就会成为背教者。如果他并不相信它，却采纳了它，并认为它不与伊斯兰教相抵触，正如奥斯曼家族（Banu 'Uthman）的哈里发们在其末期所做的那样，那么他这样做是哈拉姆（Haram）的，但他不会成为背教者。然而，如果他持有某种或然的证据（Shuabhat Daleel），例如对于那些制定没有证据、仅出于其所认定的利益（Maslahah）而立法的人，依据"公益原则"（Al-Masalih Al Mursala，即未经明确规定的利益）、"行为后果原则"（Maalat Al-Afa'al，即行为的后果）或"杜绝借口原则"（Sadd Ath-Thara'i，即防止借口）等类似原则，如果他将这些视为神圣的原则和证据，那么这对他并不被禁止，他也不会成为背教者，而只是犯了错误。因此，所有穆斯林都会把他所推导出的内容视为神圣的规定，如果哈里发采纳了它，他们就应当遵守。这是因为它是一项有或然证据支持的神圣规定，尽管他在证据的认定上犯了错误，因为他就像在从证据中推导（Istinbat）时出错的人一样。然而，哈里发必须约束自己在采纳伊斯兰教法时的行为，他在采纳教法规定时，应当受到从教法证据中正确推导出的神圣规定的约束。对此的证据如下：

There are two issues here that need closer examination. The first is the restriction by the Ahkam Shari’ah of the Khaleefah in his adoption of the Ahkam. This restricts him in legislation and enacting laws, with the Islamic Shari’ah. He is forbidden from adopting any law contradicting Shari’ah, for any law that contradicts Shari’ah is regarded as Kufr law. If He adopted a rule not derived from Shari’ah knowingly, then it has to be examined. If He believed in the rule that He adopted, but He would become a disbeliever. If He did not believe in it but took it, understanding that it did not contradict Islam, as the Khulafaa’ of Banu ‘Uthman did in their last days, then it would be Haram for him to do so, and He would not become a disbeliever. However, if He has a probable evidence (Shuabhat Daleel), as is the case for the one who puts a law that has no evidence, but only due to an interest (Maslahah) He conceives, referring to the principle of Al-Masalih Al Mursala, the undefined interests, or the principle of Maalat Al-Afa’al, the consequences of the actions, or the principle of Sadd Ath-Thara’i, averting the pretext, or the like. If He deems these as divine principles and evidences, then it would not be prohibited for him and He would not become a disbeliever, but simply mistaken. Accordingly, all the Muslims would regard what He extracted as a divine rule, and they should abide by it if the Khaleefah adopted it. This is because it is a divine rule that had probable evidence, though He was mistaken in the Daleel (evidence) for He is like the one who is mistaken in the extraction from the evidence (Istinbat). However, the Khaleefah must restrict himself in the adoption by the Islamic Shari’ah, and He should be restricted in the adoption from the Shari’ah by the divine rules which are correctly extracted from the Shari’ah evidences. The evidence on that is:

首先：安拉（愿其安宁）规定每一位穆斯林，包括哈里发，都必须依照神圣的律法行事。安拉（SWT）说：

Firstly: Allah (pbuh) has obliged every Muslim, including the Khaleefah to conduct his actions according to the divine rules. Allah (swt) says:

“但不然！以你的主发誓，他们直到让你裁决他们之间的纷争，并且在自己心中对你的裁决毫无芥蒂，顺从接受，才算真正信道。” [TMQ An-Nisa: 65]

“But no, by your lord, they will not believe (truly) until they make you judge of what is in dispute between them.” [TMQ An-Nisa: 65]

依照伊斯兰教法的律例行事，要求穆斯林在对立法者（Ash-Shaari'）的言辞理解有所不同、即律例有所不同时，采纳其中一条特定的律例。因此，当他想要采取某项行动、即想要执行某条律例时，从多条律例中采纳一条特定的律例便成为穆斯林的义务。哈里发在履行其职责即施政时，同样负有此项义务。

Conducting actions according to the divine rules obliges the Muslim to adopt a specific rule when the understanding of the Legislator’s speech varies i.e. when the divine rule varies. So adopting a specific rule from amongst various rules becomes obligatory upon the Muslim, when He wants to carry out an action, i.e. when He wants to implement the rule. This is obligatory upon the Khaleefah as well, when He performs his duty that is the ruling.

其次：哈里发所接受的效忠誓约（Bay’ah）之内容，要求他遵守伊斯兰教法（Shari’ah），因为这是一份以《古兰经》和逊奈为依据的效忠誓约。因此，他被禁止违背它；如果他怀着信念违背教法，他甚至会犯下叛教之罪；而如果他并非出于信念而违背教法，他则是违抗者、不义者和叛乱者。

Secondly: The content of the text of the Bay’ah which the Khaleefah is given obliges him to abide by the Islamic Shari’ah, for it is a Bay’ah on the Book and the Sunnah. He is thus forbidden from violating it and would even commit an act of disbelief if He did so with conviction, while He would be disobedient, a wrongdoer and a rebel if He violated the Shari’ah without conviction.

第三：哈里发的职责是执行伊斯兰教法，因此他禁止在统治穆斯林时引用伊斯兰教法之外的任何东西。这是因为伊斯兰教法已经明确禁止此事，甚至否认了任何以非伊斯兰教法进行统治者的信仰，而这一点本身就含有确定性的意味。这意味着，哈里发在采纳法律规定时受到限制，即在制定法律方面，仅限于依据真主的律法。如果他制定了任何出自伊斯兰教法之外的法律：若他是出于信以为真而这样做，那就构成了不信之举；若他并不信以为真，那则构成了违抗、不义和叛逆之举。

Thirdly: The Khaleefah is appointed to implement the Shar’a, therefore He is forbidden to refer to anything other than Shar’a in ruling the Muslims. This is because Shar’a has made this decisively unlawful, to the point where belief is denied of anyone who rules by other than Islam, a matter which is a connotation of decisiveness. This means that the Khaleefah is restricted in his adoption of the rules, namely in his enacting of laws, solely by the divine rules. If He enacts any law from other than Shar’a, He would commit an act of disbelief if He did so with conviction, and an act of disobedience, wrongdoing and rebellion, if He did not believe in that.

这三项证据是关于第一个问题的证据。至于第二个问题，哈里发受其所采纳的律法以及其所承诺遵循的推导方法的约束。其证据在于：哈里发所执行的天启律例，正是压在他颈上的天启律例，而不是任何律例。换言之，它是他为管理事务而采纳的天启（Shar'ai）律例，而非任何一条天启律例。这意味着，如果哈里发推导出某条律例，或效仿某条律例，那么这条天启律例便成为压在他颈上的真主的律例。他也因此受到约束，只能将这一律例适用于所有穆斯林，并禁止采用其他任何律例。因为其他律例不是压在他颈上的真主的律例，对他而言就不是天启律例，相应地，对穆斯林而言也就不是天启律例。因此，他在所颁布的命令上受到其所采纳的天启律例的约束，禁止颁布与其所采纳的天启律例相冲突的命令，因为此类命令不会被视为压在他颈上的真主的律例（不适用于他）。所以，它对他而言不是天启律例，对穆斯林而言也就不是天启律例。在这种情况下，就如同他颁布了一条违背天启律例的命令，因此，他被禁止颁布与其所采纳的天启律例相冲突的命令。

These three evidences are evidences of the first matter. As for the second matter, the Khaleefah is restricted to the rules that He adopted, and to the method of deduction He committed himself to. The evidence for this is that the divine rule that the Khaleefah executes is the divine rule that is upon his neck, and not anybody. In other words it is the divine (Shar’ai) rule that He adopted to conduct his affairs and not just any divine rule. This means that if the Khaleefah extracted a rule or imitated in a rule, this divine rule would become Allah’s rule on his neck. He would be restricted also in adopting this rule for all the Muslims, and forbidden from adopting any other rule. This is because any other rule would not be Allah’s rule upon his neck, and it would not thus be a divine rule to him, and accordingly it would not be a divine rule to the Muslims. Therefore, He is restricted in the orders that He decrees to the subjects by the divine rule, which He adopted. He is forbidden from issuing an order that conflict with what He had adopted in terms of divine rules, because such an order would not be considered as Allah’s rule on his neck (does not apply to him). Therefore, it would not be a divine rule for him, and thus not a divine rule to the Muslims. In such a case it would be as if He issued an order contrary to the divine rule, hence, He is forbidden to issue an order conflicting with what He had adopted in terms of divine rules.

对神圣律例的理解,会因推导(Istinbat)方法的不同而有所差异。如果哈里发认为,只有从神圣经文中提取的“事由”(Illah)才被视为神圣的事由,并且他不认为“公益”(Maslaha)是神圣的事由,也不认为“未经限定的公益”(Masalih Mursala)是神圣的证据,那么他就已为自己确定了推导的方法。据此,他必须遵守这一方法。若他采纳一条以未经限定的公益为证据的律例,或以未从神圣经文中提取的事由为依据进行类比(Qiyas),则是不被允许的。因为在他看来,这样的证据并非神圣证据,因而这一律例也就不是他所认可的神圣法律义务,自然也就不能视为神圣的律例。既然这样的律例对哈里发而言不被视为神圣律例,那么对穆斯林而言也同样不应被视为神圣律例。这就如同哈里发采纳了一条与伊斯兰教法律例相悖的规定,而这是被禁止的。 如果哈里发是一个效仿者(Muqallid),或是仅在某一具体问题上的专家型穆查希德(Mujtahid Mas'ala),并且没有特定的推导方法,那么在这种情况下,他可以采纳任何神圣律例,无论其证据为何,只要该证据具有或然性,并且他在采纳律例时没有受到任何方法的限制。他唯一的限制只在于发布命令时:不得发布与他所采纳的律例不相符的命令。

The understanding of the divine rule varies according to the method of extraction (Istinbat). If the Khaleefah considers that the reason (Illah) of the rule is considered a divine reason if taken from a divine text, and He does not consider that interest (Maslaha) is a divine reason, or that the Masalih Mursala (undefined interests) are a divine evidence, then He would have defined for himself the method of Istinbat. Accordingly, He must restrict himself to it, and it would be wrong for him to adopt a rule that had its evidence as Masalih Mursala, or to use an analogy (Qiyas) based on an ‘Illah that was not extracted from a divine text. For such a rule would not be considered a divine Shari’a rule upon his neck, because He considers its evidence not divine evidence, therefore it would not in his view be a divine rule. Since such a rule is not considered a divine rule regarding the Khaleefah, it would not also be a divine rule regarding the Muslims. This would be as if the Khaleefah has adopted a rule alien to the Shari’ah rules and this is forbidden. If the Khaleefah is a Muqallid (imitator) or a Mujtahid Mas’ala (Jurist in a single matter), and has no specific method of Istinbat, in this case, He is allowed to adopt any divine rule whatever its evidence, as long as He has a probable evidence, and He has not been restricted by any method in adopting the rules. He is only restricted, when He issues orders, not to issue them except in accordance with the rules He has adopted.