立法者(Ash-Shari')将权力赋予了乌玛(Ummah),并规定哈里发的任命由全体穆斯林来完成。他(SWT)并未将其限定于某一群体而排斥另一群体,也未限定于某一阶层而排斥另一阶层,因此效忠誓约(Bay'ah)是所有穆斯林的义务:

The Legislator (Ash-Shari’) has given the authority to the Ummah, and made the appointment of the Khaleefah by all Muslims. He (swt) has not confined it to a particular group to the exclusion of another group, nor to a particular section to the exclusion of another section, thus the Bay’ah is an obligation on all Muslims:

“谁死时颈上没有效忠之约（Bay’ah），他就是死于蒙昧时代（Jahiliyyah）的死亡。”［穆斯林圣训实录辑录，传自阿卜杜拉·本·欧麦尔］这一规定适用于每一位穆斯林。因此，并不是只有显要人物才有权任命哈里发，从而排除其他穆斯林。有权任命哈里发的人并非某个特定群体，而是这一权利属于所有穆斯林，毫无例外，甚至包括伪信者（Munafiqeen）和作恶者（Fujjar），只要他们是已成年的穆斯林。这是因为相关经文是以普遍的形式出现的，除了拒绝未成年儿童的效忠之外，没有任何其他记载对其加以限定，因此它们的适用范围仍然是普遍的。

“Whoever dies while there was no allegiance (Bay’ah) on his neck He dies a death of the days of ignorance (Jahiliyyah).” [Narrated by Muslim from ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Umar] This applies to every Muslim. It therefore, follows that the prominent figures are not the only people eligible to appoint the Khaleefah to the exclusion of other Muslims. Those eligible to appoint the Khaleefah are not a specific group of people; rather this right belongs to all Muslims without exception, even to the hypocrites (Munafiqeen) and the wrongdoers (Fujjar), so long as they are mature Muslims. This is because the relevant texts came in a general form, nothing else has been reported to specify them except the rejection of the Bay’ah of the child who is under the age of maturity, and therefore they remain general in their scope.

虽然并非所有穆斯林都必须行使这一权利，尽管这是他们的权利。虽然这对他们而言是一项义务，因为效忠（Bay'ah）是必须的，但这一义务属于集体义务（Fard Kifayah），而非个人义务（Fard 'Ayn）。因此，如果部分穆斯林履行了这一义务，其余的乌玛（Ummah）便可免除责任。尽管如此，整个乌玛都应当有能力行使其任命哈里发（Khaleefah）的权利，无论他们是否实际行使了这一权利。换言之，每位穆斯林都应能够参与哈里发的任命，并且切实地使其有此可能。因此，争论的焦点在于使穆斯林能够履行真主（swt）所命定于他们的任命哈里发的义务，从而使他们免除这一责任，而不在于所有穆斯林都实际行使这一责任。这是因为真主（swt）所命定于他们的义务，是由穆斯林以其同意来任命哈里发，而并非要求所有穆斯林都去任命他。由此可能产生两种情况：一是全体穆斯林对其任命表示了同意；另一是全体穆斯林对这一任命的同意并未达成，尽管在这两种情况下，穆斯林都切实地获得了行使这一权利的能力。

Although, it is not a condition for all the Muslims to exercise this right, eventhough it is their right. Although it is an obligation on them, since the Bay’ah is obligatory, the obligation is one of sufficiency (Fard Kifayah) and not an individual obligation (Fard ‘Ayn). Accordingly, if some of the Muslims performed it the rest of the Ummah would be exempted. Nevertheless, the whole of the Ummah should be enabled to exercise their right of appointing the Khaleefah, regardless of whether they utilised this right or not. In other words, every Muslim should be able to participate in appointing the Khaleefah, by genuinely enabling him to do so. Therefore, the point at issue is in enabling the Muslims to perform that which Allah (swt) has ordained upon them of appointing the Khaleefah in a way that would exempt them of this duty and not the actual exercise of that duty by all the Muslims. This is because the obligation that Allah (swt) ordained on them is to appoint the Khaleefah by the Muslims and by their consent, and not obliged upon all Muslims to appoint him. Two issues could actually arise from this matter: One is that the consent of all the Muslims of his appointment was realised; the other is that the consent of all the Muslims of this appointment was not achieved, although, in both cases, the Muslims were genuinely enabled to exercise this right.

关于第一个问题，法律并没有规定推举哈里发的人数必须达到特定数目。实际上，任何一群向哈里发效忠宣誓（Bay'ah）的穆斯林，都可以推举哈里发——只要穆斯林的同意得以实现，无论是通过他们保持沉默，还是通过宣誓效忠和服从，或通过其他表明认可的类似迹象。于是，被推举的哈里发便成为全体穆斯林的哈里发，并且根据伊斯兰教法他就是合法的哈里发，即使只有五个人推举了他。这是因为这五人会被视为有效的、能够推举哈里发的群体。穆斯林的同意可以通过他们保持沉默并宣誓效忠或类似方式来实现，但条件是这必须在绝对自由选择的前提下进行，并采取必要措施，使每个人在愿意时都能表达自己的意见。如果未能取得全体穆斯林的同意，哈里发的推举便不能成立，除非有一群穆斯林承担起推举的任务，并且通过这样做获得了民众的同意，即大多数人的同意，而无论该群体的人数多少。在这方面，一些博学的学者得出结论：如果哈里发获得了Ahlul Hall Wal Aqd（解决与缔约者，即有权与见识之人）的效忠宣誓，哈里发的推举便可以进行，因为学者们认为他们是代表广大穆斯林意见的群体，并且有权向符合契约条件的任何人效忠宣誓。然而，Ahlul Hall Wal 'Aqd的效忠宣誓并不意味着哈里发的推举已成定局。他们的效忠宣誓绝不是使哈里发推举合法的前提条件。 拜阿（Bay'ah）仅仅是一个标志，表明必须获得穆斯林的同意，因为（主持拜阿的人）被视为穆斯林的代表。任何表明通过对哈里发的拜阿已经实现了穆斯林同意的迹象，都会使这一任命合法且具有约束力。

As far as the first issue is concerned, it is not stipulated to have a specific number of those who appoint the Khaleefah. In Actuality any number of Muslims who give their Bay’ah to the Khaleefah, whereby the consent of the Muslims is achieved by their remaining silent, or by pledging allegiance and obedience to him, or by any other similar sign which indicates their approval, can appoint the Khaleefah. Thereupon, the appointed Khaleefah becomes the Khaleefah of all the Muslims and He would be the lawful Khaleefah according to the Shari’ah, even if only five people appointed him. This is because they would be regarded as a valid group able to appoint a Khaleefah. Consent would be achieved through the Muslims remaining silent and pledging obedience or the like, on condition that this should be carried out with absolute flexibility of choice and with the necessary steps taken to enable everyone to voice his (or her) opinion should they wish to do so. If the consent of all the Muslims was not achieved then the appointment of the Khaleefah would not take place unless a group of Muslims undertook the task of appointing him and in so doing the consent of the populace is achieved, i.e. the majority, regardless of the number of that group. In this context, some learned scholars have concluded that: The appointment of the Khaleefah can be carried out if He is given the Bay’ah by the Ahlul Hall Wal Aqd because they - the scholars - regard them as being the group which represents the opinion of the Muslims at large, and those who are able to give the Bay’ah to any man who satisfies the contractual conditions. However, the Bay’ah of the Ahlul Hall Wal ‘Aqd does not actually make the appointment of the Khaleefah a forgone conclusion. Their Bay’ah is by no means a precondition which makes the appointment of the Khaleefah lawful. The Bay’ah is merely a sign indicating that the consent of the Muslims has to be achieved, since they are regarded as the representatives of the Muslims. Any indication that the consent of the Muslims has been realised by the Bay’ah of a Khaleefah makes the appointment legal and binding.

因此,若有一群人推举了一位哈里发,并且通过任何迹象达成了穆斯林的同意,那么依据沙里亚的裁决,该推举即为有效。这种迹象也可以是多数"解决与约束者"(Ahlul Hall Wal 'Aqd)的宣誓效忠,或由他们自己作为穆斯林的代表,或穆斯林对其所效忠的哈里发的宣誓保持沉默,也可以是穆斯林争先恐后地基于这一宣誓而宣示效忠与服从,或者通过其他任何方式或迹象,只要穆斯林已被充分赋予表达意见的能力即可。沙里亚的裁决并未规定这种迹象必须通过"解决与约束者"来达成,也未规定他们必须是五人、五百人或更多或更少,更未规定他们必须是首都或各省的居民。沙里亚的规则仅仅指出:通过他们的宣誓效忠,依据任何能够反映这种同意的迹象,即达成了穆斯林多数的同意。这意味着投票权已得到保障,而他们表达意见的能力并未受到限制。

Therefore, the Shar’ai verdict is executed if a group of people appointed a Khaleefah and in so doing the consent of the Muslims was achieved by any indication. It could also be by the Bay’ah of the majority of the Ahlul Hall Wal ‘Aqd or by themselves being the representatives of the Muslims, or by the silence of the Muslims about the Bay’ah of the Khaleefah whom they had given the Bay’ah to. It could also be by the Muslims rushing to pledge allegiance and obedience on the strength of such a Bay’ah, or by any other means or indications so long as they had been fully enabled to voice their opinion. The Shari’ah verdict does not contain any provisions maintaining that such an indication must be arrived at through the Ahlul Hall Wal’Aqd or that they should constitute five or 500 people or more or less, nor that they need be the inhabitants of the capital or the provinces. The Shari’ah rule merely states that with their Bay’ah the consent of the majority of the Muslims is achieved according to any indication that reflects such consent. This means that the right to vote has been guaranteed, and their ability to voice an opinion has not been curtailed.

在此语境中,“所有穆斯林”指的是生活在伊斯兰国统治之下的那个国家的穆斯林,即前任哈里发的臣民(若哈里发制度已经建立),或是将通过他们重新建立伊斯兰国的人(若伊斯兰国尚未建立,而他们为重建伊斯兰生活方式而努力),哈里发将凭他们的拜亚(效忠)而订立。其他穆斯林的拜亚不被视为条件,他们的同意也不被视为条件。原因在于,他们要么处于伊斯兰权威之外,要么居住在伊斯兰之地以外的异教徒之地(Dar-ul Kufr),无法加入伊斯兰之地(Dar-ul Islam)。无论哪种情况,他们都没有订立契约的拜亚权利,但应当给予服从的拜亚。不服从伊斯兰权威者被视为叛乱者(Bughat)。居住在异教徒之地的人显然无法实现伊斯兰权威的建立,因此他们现在无法在实际中建立它,也无法立即加入其中。由此可见,拥有订立契约拜亚之权利、其同意为哈里发合法任命之条件的穆斯林,正是伊斯兰权威得以实际建立的途径。若说这是一个缺乏沙里亚证据支撑的理论问题,那是不对的,因为这属于判决的对象(Manat-ul Hukm),而非判决本身。因此,有必要阐明其实际情况,而不是为其提供沙里亚证据。例如,食用腐肉是被禁止的,这是判决(Hukm)。而考察并确定什么构成腐肉,则是判决的对象,即Manat,也就是该判决所关联的事物。 因此,穆斯林必须建立哈里发,这构成沙里亚的律例;而此任命必须通过同意与选择来完成,这同样是律例;这些都需要证据来证明。然而,如果我们问:由谁来构成穆斯林,由他们来进行任命;以及是什么使得同意与选择得以实现,这些便构成了律例的对象(Manat-ul Hukm),即该“Hukm”(律例)所要处理的事项。律例与其对象相符,律例便得以实现和完成。因此,沙里亚律例所针对的对象应当通过阐明其实际情况来加以考察。

In this context, “all the of Muslims” means those Muslims living in that country under the rule of the Islamic State, i.e. those who were the subjects of the previous Khaleefah, if the Khilafah was (already) established, or those through whom the Islamic State would be reestablished, and by whose Bay’ah the Khilafah would be contracted if the Islamic State was not established and they had worked towards establishing it so as to resume the Islamic way of life. The Bay’ah of the other Muslims would not be considered as a condition, nor would their consent be considered as such. This is because they would either be outside the authority of Islam, or living in Dar-ul Kufr and unable to join Dar-ul Islam. In either case, they would not have the right to give the Bay’ah of contract but they should give the Bay’ah of obedience. Those who do not submit to the authority of Islam would be considered rebels (Bughat). Those living in Dar-ul Kufr were thus evidently unable to achieve the establishment of the Islamic authority and therefore they cannot now establish it practically or join it immediately. Thus, the Muslims who possess the right to excercise the Bay’ah of contract and those whose consent is conditional for the Khaleefah to be lawfully appointed are the ones through whom the authority of Islam effectively gains its establishment. It would be wrong to say that this is an intellectual matter that has no Shari’ah evidence to back it up with. One cannot say this because this is related to the subject of the verdict (Manat-ul Hukm) and not the verdict itself. Therefore, it is necessary to explain its reality, rather than bring a Shari’ah evidence for it. For instance, the eating of carrion meat is forbidden, now that is the verdict (Hukm). To investigate and determine what constitutes carrion meat would be the subject of the verdict, i.e. the Manat or the subject that the verdict is related to. Thus the Muslims have to establish a Khaleefah constitutes the Shari’ah verdict, and this appointment has to be carried out by consent and choice would be the verdict too, these are what require evidence. Whereas, if we were to ask who constitutes the Muslims by whom the appointment would be carried out and what constitutes the matter which makes consent and choice achievable these would constitute the subject of the verdict (Manat-ul Hukm), i.e. the subject for which the ‘Hukm’ (verdict) had come to deal with. The conformity of the Shari’ah verdict with the subject makes the verdict achievable and accomplished. So the subject that the Shari’ah verdict came for should be investigated by explaining its reality.

说它是“马纳特”（ManaT，即判决所指向的对象）的理由是“哈克姆的起因”（‘illatul Hukm）从而需要证据，这种说法是不正确的。这种说法不正确，因为判决的主体（ManaT）与判决背后的理由（‘illah）是不同的，事实上，主体与理由之间有很大的区别。理由是促使判决得以产生的东西，也就是表明立法者制定该判决之意图的东西。毫无疑问，这需要沙里亚的证据来指明并理解立法者启动该判决的意图。至于判决的主体，它是判决所适用的或与判决相关的对象。换句话说，它是判决所符合的事件，而不是判决的证据，也不是它的理由（‘illa）。因此可以推出，马纳特是判决所附着的事物，即判决是为处理它或解决它而提出的。说判决是因它而提出的，从而认为它是判决的理由，这是不成立的。因此，马纳特是沙里亚判决的非文本层面。认识马纳特与认识理由并不相同，因为认识理由就是理解那些为该理由提供依据的经文，这实际上是在理解经文（Naqliyyat）。马纳特也不是经文，因为马纳特与Naqliyyat完全不同，它（即马纳特）是沙里亚判决所符合的现实。

It would be incorrect to say that the ManaT-ul Hukm is the reason behind the Hukm (‘illatul Hukm) therefore requiring evidence. This is incorrect because the subject (ManaT) of the verdict is different from the reason (‘illah) behind the verdict; in fact there is a big difference between the subject and the reason. The reason is what initiates the verdict to be initiated, i.e. it is the thing that indicates the intention of the Legislator behind the verdict. Without any doubt, this requires a Shari’ah evidence to indicate and understand the intention of the Legislator for initiating the verdict. As for the subject of the verdict, this is the subject upon which the verdict applies or to which the verdict is related. In other words, it is the issue that the verdict conforms and not its evidence nor its reason (‘illa). It therefore, follows that the ManaT is the thing that the verdict is attached to, i.e. the verdict is brought to deal with it, or solve it. It is not true to say that the verdict is brought because of it, so as to say that it is the reason behind the verdict. Thus, the ManaT of the verdict is the nontextual aspect of the Shari’ah verdict. To realise it would be other than to realise the reason, for realising the reason would be to understand the text that had come to justify the reason, and this is to actually understand the text (Naqliyyat). This is not the ManaT either, because the ManaT is completely different from the Naqliyyat, as it (ie. the ManaT) is the reality to which the Shari’ah verdict conforms.