Har yanzu fyaɗe tsakanin 'yan uwa (incest) haramun ne a ƙasashen Yamma. Amma duk lokacin da aka kama wata ma'aurata ta 'yan uwa, martanin da ake yi a shafukan sada zumunta yana nuna wani sauyi a ra'ayoyin mutane game da wannan mummunan aiki.

Incest is still illegal in the West. But whenever an incestuous couple is arrested, the reactions on social media represent a shift in attitudes on this descpicable act:

Ga, mutane biyu manya masu yarda! Suna son juna kuma wannan shi ne kawai abin da ya fi muhimmanci! Kawai saboda abin yana bata mana rai ba yana nufin ya zama haramun ba, balle a hana shi bisa doka! Ba sa cutar da kowa!” Amma bari mu tsaya mu tambayi: Me ya sa rashin cutar da kowa ya zama sharadi ga abin da za a iya ɗauka halal ne a ɗabi'a? Me ya sa cutar da wasu take da muni? Lallai, idan muka yi tunanin cutar da wasu, hakan na iya sa mu ji baƙin ciki ko ma ƙyama. Yana iya jawo mana fushi, amma hakan ba ya nufin cewa abin haramun ne.

“These are two consenting adults! They love each other and that’s all that matters! Just because it’s disgusting to us doesn’t mean it should be considered immoral, much less illegal! They are not harming anyone!” But let’s stop and ask: Why is not harming anyone required for something to be morally permissible? What’s so bad about harming others? Sure, if we think about harming others, that might make us feel bad or even disgusted. It might cause us anger, but that doesn’t mean that it is immoral.

A cikin falsafar ɗabi'a, akwai wata ka'ida ta ɗabi'a da ake kira emotivism. Emotivism ta ce hukuncin ɗabi'armu ba komai ba ne illa bayyana motsin rai. Idan muka ce, "X haramun ne," abin da hakan ke nufi a zahiri, saboda haka ma abin da yake nufi a gaskiya, shi ne kawai, "X yana sa ni jin zafi!" Tabbas, ji abu ne na zuciya, mutane daban-daban na iya jin abubuwa daban-daban game da X. Saboda haka, duk wanda ya yi ƙoƙarin yin da'awar gaskiya kamar, "X haramun ne a zahiri," kamar dai hakan gaskiya ne ga kowa ko kuma a zahiri, to kawai yana yin kuskuren rarrabe abubuwa ne (category error). Misali kawai: domin ba na son ɗanɗanon kwakwa, hakan ba ya nufin cin kwakwa haramun ne.

In moral philosophy, there is a theory of morality called emotivism. Emotivism says that our moral judgments are nothing but expressions of emotion. When we say, “X is wrong,” what that really amounts to and, hence, what it really means is just, “X makes me feel bad!” Of course, feelings are subjective — different people can and will feel different things about X. As such, anyone who attempts to make a factual claim like, “X is wrong as a matter of fact,” as if that is universally or objectively the case is simply making a category error. As an analogy, just because I don’t like the taste of coconut, for example, that doesn’t mean that eating coconut is wrong.

Akwai matsaloli da yawa game da emotivism, amma abin sha'awa ne yadda masu sassaucin ra'ayi ke amfani da shi don manufofinsu, kuma suna amfani da shi cikin zaɓi. Ga hukunce-hukuncen ɗabi'a da ba su yarda da su ba, masu sassaucin ra'ayi sukan yi nan da nan zuwa emotivism, misali: "Zina da 'yar uwa ba ta zama haramun ba kawai saboda tana sa mutum ya ji kyama." Amma ga hukunce-hukuncen da suka yi imani da su, emotivism ba ya aiki, misali: "Cutar da wasu ita ce tushen rashin ɗabi'a kuma wani abu ne da dole ne mu yi amfani da ƙarfin doka don hana shi." Tambayar a sauƙaƙe ita ce: me ya sa wannan zaɓin? Me ya sa za a tsaya a wannan ra'ayin "cutarwa" (wanda kansa ba a bayyana shi sosai ba, kuma ana amfani da shi cikin zaɓi)?

There are obviously many problems with emotivism. But it is interesting how liberals use emotivism for their purposes and use it selectively. For those moral proscriptions they disagree with, liberals jump straight to emotivism, e.g., “Incest is not wrong just because it makes you feel icky.” But for those moral proscriptions that they believe in, emotivism goes out the window, e.g., “Harming others is the very essence of immorality and something that we have to use the force of law to prevent.” The simple question is, why the selectivity? Why draw the line at this notion of “harm” (which itself is loosely defined and selectively applied)?

Idan ka matsa wa masu ra'ayin sassaucin ra'ayi lamba su bayyana dalilin da ya sa cutar da wasu abu ne da ba a yarda da shi ba, hakan zai tilasta su shiga cikin al'amuran ɗabi'a da na falsafar bayan-ilimin-jiki (meta-ethical da metaphysical) waɗanda suke kai wa masu imani hari a kansu. Ko dai su manne da cewa ba a yarda da shi ba ne "saboda kawai haka yake," ko kuma su karɓi cewa babu ɗabi'a kwata-kwata su rungumi abin da ke zama wani nau'i na nihilism. Ana iya mayar da martani ga hakan bisa sharuɗɗansa, amma ko ba tare da hakan ba, samun mai ra'ayin sassaucin ra'ayi ya yarda cewa shi a zahiri nihilist ne abu ne da kansa nasara ce da za a iya amfani da ita wajen ci gaba da muhawara da shi.

If you press liberals to explain why harming others is immoral, this forces them to get into the meta-ethical and metaphysical issues that they attack theists for. Either they have to dig in their heels and say it’s immoral because “it just is,” or they will just bite the bullet, reject the notion of morality in its entirety, and embrace what amounts to some form of nihilism. This can be responded to on its own terms but even absent that, to simply get a liberal to admit he is essentially a nihilist is itself a win that can be leveraged in further arguing against him.

Wannan ita ce hanyar buga dara da waɗannan masu ra'ayin 'yantacce na ɗan Adam. A kira su a kan zaɓin da suke yi na son rai mai muni, sannan mat ɗin ya kusa.

This is how you play chess with these liberal humanists. Call them out for their atrocious selectivity and the checkmate will be close at hand.