9.2 Rashin Daidaiton Ci Gaban Ɗabi'a
9.2 The Incoherence Of Moral Progress
Masu ci gaba na sakaci na zamani (ciki har da masu ɗan adam, masu kafirci, masu gyara, da sauransu) suna ganin babu laifi a ce ɗabi'a tana canzawa a kan lokaci, kuma suna ɗaukar hakan a matsayin tafiya ta halitta da babu makawa wadda ya kamata dukanmu mu rungumi. Abin takaici a gare su, sun ruɗe sosai game da ainihin yanayin ɗabi'a.
Liberal secular progressives (including humanists, atheists, reformists, etc.) think there is nothing wrong with morality changing over time and view it as a natural, inevitable process that we should all embrace. Unfortunately for them, they are deeply confused about the very nature of morality.
Waɗannan mutane ba su damu da cire ɗabi'ar addini a hankali ba, domin ba sa ɗaukar ƙa'idodin addini a matsayin abin da ya wajaba a ɗabi'a tun farko. Suna cewa abubuwa kamar, "To, a da, saboda tunanin addini, saduwa a waje da aure, misali, ana ɗaukarta a matsayin ba daidai ba, amma zamani ya canza, kuma ba ma ganin laifinta sosai saboda mun ci gaba." Yana da sauƙi a nuna yadda wannan tunanin yake ruɗani. Bari mu yi la'akari da wata ƙima da waɗannan mutane suke ganin tana da muhimmanci a ɗabi'a, misali daidaiton launin fata. Ka tambaye su, shin za su yarda idan wata rana an ɗauki fifikon farar fata a matsayin abin karɓa a ɗabi'a? Shin zai yi ma'ana a ce ɗabi'a za ta iya canzawa har wata rana fifikon farar fata ya zama ƙa'idar ɗabi'a da kowa zai buƙaci ya yi koyi da ita? Me zai hana? Idan kuma babu wani abu mara kyau a fifikon farar fata, amma mu kawai ba mu gane hakan ba tukuna, kuma mutanen nan gaba ne kawai za su iya gane shi, kamar yadda a wani lokaci zina ana ɗaukarta a matsayin abu mara kyau, amma mutanen nan gaba suka "gano" cewa ba ta da girma haka fa? Menene bambancin? Me zai hana ɗabi'a ta canza ta haka?
These individuals have no problem with religious morality being discarded over time because they do not view religious norms as morally compelling in the first place. They say things like, “Well, in the past, due to religious sentiment, sex outside of marriage, for example, was considered wrong, but times have changed and we don’t find it so bad anymore because we have progressed.” It is very easy to show how muddled this thinking is. Simply consider a value that these people do find morally compelling, e.g., racial equality. Ask them, would they be OK with white supremacy being considered morally acceptable one day? Would it make sense to say that morality could evolve such that, one day, white supremacy is the ethical norm that all are expected to aspire to? Why not? What if there really isn’t anything wrong with white supremacy but we just don’t realize it yet and only future people will be able to realize it, similar to how at one point, fornication was considered wrong, but future people “discovered” that it’s not so bad? What’s the difference? Why couldn’t morality evolve in that way?
Sakamako ga wannan zai iya zama: "Ɗabi'a ba ta sauyawa ba tare da tsari ba. Tana sauyawa a wata takamaiman hanya. Ɗabi'armu tana ƙara zama daidai yayin da take kawar da camfi da gano cutarwa. Abin da kawai ya zama haramun a ɗabi'a shi ne cutar da wani mutum, kuma ana kiran wannan da 'Ka'idar Cutarwa.'" Waɗanda 'yanci na boko (liberal secularism) ya koyar da su suna da wannan ra'ayi: Ka'ida ta gaskiya tilo a ɗabi'a ita ce Ka'idar Cutarwa. Ta amfani da wannan hujja, suna iƙirarin (duk da shaidu masu yawa da ke adawa da hakan) cewa mun gano cewa zina ba ta cutar da mutane da gaske ba, saboda haka bai kamata a ɗauke ta a matsayin haramun ba. Haka kuma, mun gano cewa wariyar launin fata ta fararen fata cutarwa ce, saboda haka ya kamata a ɗauke ta a matsayin haramun.
Now the response to this might be: “Morality does not evolve haphazardly. It evolves in a specific direction. Our morality becomes increasingly accurate as it sheds superstitions and identifies harms. The only truly immoral act is to harm another person and this is called the ‘Harm Principle.’” Those indoctrinated by liberal secularism tend to have this view: The only true moral principle is the Harm Principle. Using this logic, they claim (despite plenty of countervailing evidence) that we have discovered that fornication doesn’t really harm people, so it should not be considered immoral. Furthermore, we have discovered that white supremacy is harmful, therefore it should be considered immoral.
To kaɗan, bari mu koma baya. Da farko, idan Ka'idar Cutarwa ita ce ginshiƙin dukkan ɗabi'a kamar yadda masu sassaucin ra'ayi na sakulare ke ikirari, to shin za su yarda cewa ita ma za ta iya sauyawa? Idan ɗabi'a tana sauyawa tana kuma ci gaba, to ko za mu iya gano wata rana cewa ya halatta a cutar da mutane, kuma cewa Ka'idar Cutarwa tsohon abu ne da ya shuɗe? Idan masu ci gaba na sassaucin ra'ayi na sakulare suka ce hakan ba zai yiwu ba, kuma Ka'idar Cutarwa za ta kasance mai tilasta bi har abada, to ba lallai ba ne su zama masu ci gaba da gaske idan ana maganar ɗabi'a. Suna imani cewa akwai ƙa'idojin ɗabi'a marasa canzawa. To ta yaya za su zargi Musulmai masu ibada saboda suma sun yi imani da ƙa'idojin ɗabi'a marasa canzawa da ba sa sauyawa da lokaci?
But let’s step back for a moment. First of all, if the Harm Principle is the keystone of all morality as liberal secularists claim, then would they concede that it could also evolve? If morality evolves and progresses, then could we one day discover that it is morally permissible to harm people and that the Harm Principle is an obsolete relic of the past? If liberal secular progressives maintain that this is not possible and the Harm Principle will always remain normatively compelling, then they are not really progressive when it comes to morality. They believe that there are moral absolutes. So how could they fault devout Muslims for also believing in moral absolutes that are invariant with time?
Ina ta fassara wannan rubutu zuwa Hausa, ban ƙara komai ba. Yanzu, ƙaryata Ka'idar Cutarwa abu ne mai sauƙi isa a yi (kawai a tambayi abin da ainihin yake zama cutarwa da kuma wanda ke da ikon yanke hukunci a kan hakan; sannan kuma a nuna cewa cutarwa kanta ra'ayi ne mai ɗauke da daraja, wanda ya dogara da abubuwan da mutum ya yarda da su game da ɗabi'a da kuma wanzuwa, da sauransu). Amma ina so in mai da hankali kan ra'ayin ɗabi'a mai canzawa. Waɗanda suka sadaukar da kansu ga Ka'idar Cutarwa a matsayin ƙa'ida ta ɗabi'a da ba ta canzawa suna bayyana canjin halayen ɗabi'a a tsawon lokaci a matsayin sakamakon gano abin da ke ainihin cutarwa da abin da ba haka ba. To amma menene wannan tsarin gano?
Now, refuting the Harm Principle is easy enough to do (simply question what truly constitutes harm and who gets to decide that; and additionally, point out that harm itself is a value-laden concept that depends on your broader moral and ontological commitments, etc.). But I want to focus on the idea of evolving morality. Those who are dedicated to the Harm Principle as a moral absolute explain changing moral attitudes through time as a function of discovering what is or is not truly harmful. But what is this discovery process?
Ina ce, daga fuskar ilimin asali (epistemology), ganowa cutarwa tana kama da gano sabbin duniyoyi ko sabbin sinadarai? Shin abu ne na gwaji da lura? A ina ake iya ganin cutarwa? Kuma, mafi muhimmanci, yaya ikonmu na ganinta ke ci gaba a matsayin aiki na lokaci? Mun fahimci yadda gano duniyoyi a sararin samaniya ya zama mafi sauƙi tare da ingantacciyar fasahar na'urar hangen nesa. Amma me ke ba mu damar gano sabbin cutarwa a kan lokaci?
Epistemologically speaking, is discovering harms akin to discovering new planets or new chemicals? Is it an empirical thing? Where can you see harm? And, more importantly, how does our ability to see it progress as a function of time? We can understand how discovering planets in the universe has become easier with improved telescope technology. But what is allowing us to discover new harms over time?
Ṣaɓon bayani a bayyane ga abin da mai ra'ayin sakulare mai ci gaba zai iya faɗa. Da farko, a ina ne hujjar cewa wasu cutarwa an san su tun dā? Idan muka duba tarihin duniya, yawancin abubuwan da yanzu ake ɗaukar su a matsayin cutarwa mai tsanani ba a taɓa jin su ba a zamanin baya. Luwadi da kyamarsa misali ne. Kyamar masu canza jinsi wata misali ce. Ɗaukar al'adun wasu ba tare da izini ba wani misali ne. Ƙananan cin zarafi (microaggression) wani misali ne. Zalunci ta hanyar amfani da karin suna wani misali ne. Ma, idan ka halarci azuzuwan ilimin zamantakewa a sashen nazarin jinsi (Gender Studies) na jami'ar da ke kusa da kai, kusan duk abin da ake koyarwa a matsayin zalunci, rashin ƴanci, nuna bambancin jinsi da sauransu, ba a san shi ba a tarihi. Ra'ayoyin da waɗannan "laifuffukan" suka dogara a kansu ba a ƙirƙiro su ba sai shekaru ɗaya ko biyu da suka wuce. To yaya ya ke da sauƙin yarda da ra'ayin cewa yawancin manyan "cutarwar" da masu ra'ayin sakulare mai ci gaba suka gane a yau an san su a tarihi?
Clearly, the liberal secular progressive is not going to have a non-ridiculous, non-grasping-at-straws answer to this, so he will resort to this line: “Harms were always known but powerful, evil, self-serving people prevented moral sentiments from changing in order to address those harms.” A couple of notes on this. First, where is the proof that certain harms were always known? If we survey world history, much of what is considered seriously “harmful” by present standards was unheard of historically. Homophobia is one example. Transphobia is another. Cultural appropriation is another. Microagression is another. Oppression through pronoun usage is another. In fact, just attend a liberal arts class, preferably in the Gender Studies department at your nearest university, and virtually everything that is taught as oppression, disenfranchisement, sexism, etc., was historically unheard of. The very concepts upon which these “wrongs” are based were not coined prior to one or two generations ago. So how plausible is this view that many of the serious “harms” recognized by liberal secular progressives today were known historically?
Na biyu, wannan amsar kuma tana raunana tunanin ci gaban ɗabi'a gaba ɗaya. Idan Ka'idar Cutarwa tana da cikakkiyar tabbaci wadda ba ta canjawa, kuma abin da yake cutarwa ko ba cutarwa ba shi ma ba ya canjawa, kuma ilimin mutane game da abin da yake cutarwa ko ba cutarwa shi ma ba ya canjawa, to a ina ne ainihin wannan ci gaban ɗabi'a da ake ta magana a kai yake? Wanda yake jayayya da mu zai iya cewa ci gaban yana faruwa ne a lokacin da mugaye suka sha kashi kuma adalci na gaskiya ya yi nasara. Amma wannan ra'ayi ne mai rauni sosai na ci gaban ɗabi'a. Kowa yana gaskata irin wannan ci gaban! Yaƙin tsakanin nagarta da mugunta yana ci gaba ba ƙarewa, kuma wani lokaci nagarta takan yi nasara, wani lokaci kuma takan sha kashi. Ko masu tauhidi waɗanda ba masu sassaucin ra'ayi ba, ba na addini ba, suna gaskata haka! Wannan ba shi ne ra'ayin ci gaban ɗabi'a mai ci gaba ba a tsawon tarihin ɗan Adam wanda masu sassaucin ra'ayi na zamani ke yawan kira.
Secondly, again this response undermines the whole idea of moral progress. If the Harm Principle is an un-evolving absolute and what is or is not harmful is an un-evolving absolute and people’s knowledge of what is or is not harmful is an un-evolving absolute, then where exactly is all the moral progress we keep hearing so much about? Our interlocutor could say that the progress happens when the bad guys get beat and true justice triumphs. But that is a very weak idea of moral progress. Everyone believes in this kind of moral progress! The fight between good and evil is perpetual and sometimes, the good guys win. Other times they lose. Even non-liberal, non-secular theists believe this! This is hardly the notion of continuous moral progress over the course of human history that liberal secularists like to appeal to.
A cikin yanayi mai sauƙi, idan aka bincika ra'ayin ci gaban ɗabi'a da zurfi, ba ya tsayawa ko da kaɗan daga bincike. Wannan ra'ayi yana da manyan matsaloli na ilimi (epistemology), kuma wani sashi na hakan yana da alaƙa da rashin cikakkiyar fahimta a cikin Ka'idar Cutarwa (Harm Principle) kanta. Idan masu ci gaba masu ra'ayin sakulare na 'yanci suka yi amfani da ra'ayin ci gaban ɗabi'a, Musulmi waɗanda suka tabbatar da cewa ka'idojin ɗabi'a na Musulunci suna aiki a duniya baki ɗaya, ba sa canzawa, tun daga lokacin saukar wahayi har zuwa yau, ya kamata su mayar da martani. Ya kamata Musulmi su nuna waɗannan matsalolin, kuma su nemi abokan hamayyarsu na ra'ayi su magance ramummukan da ke cikin tunaninsu.
Ultimately, when this idea of moral progress is critically examined, it does not withstand the most minimal amount of scrutiny. The notion suffers from serious epistemological problems and this is partly due to the conceptual deficiencies within the Harm Principle itself. When liberal secular progressives invoke moral progress, Muslims who maintain the universal, unchanging applicability of Islamic moral principles from the time of revelation to present, should push back. Muslims should point out these problems and demand that their ideological opponents address the gaping holes in their thought.