8.7 Kusoma Historia ya Palestina ya Kisasa kwa Macho ya Wenyeji
8.7 Reading The History Of Modern Palestine Through The Eyes Of The Indigenous People
Kusoma historia ya Palestina ya kisasa kupitia macho ya wenyeji asilia kunaweza kuhamisha mkazo kutoka kwa mtazamo na mpangilio wa matukio wa kitawala wa Waothmani, Waingereza na Wazayuni, na kutoa mitazamo mipya ya wenyeji asilia.
Reading the history of modern Palestine through the eyes of the indigenous people can shift the emphasis away from hegemonic Ottoman, British and Zionist gaze and chronologies and provide new indigenous perspectives.
Acre ya kisasa (mpya) inaweza kutumika kama mfano wa uchunguzi wa mtazamo huu. Mji huu mzuri na maarufu, mji mkuu wa dola ya al-ʿUmar, ulifufuka kutoka majivu na kuwa mojawapo ya vituo muhimu zaidi vya mijini vya Wapalestina wa kisasa kwa karibu karne mbili. Hili lilihusiana kidogo na mahesabu ya kifalme ya Waothmani au "urithi wa Kiothmani", na zaidi lilitokana na azma thabiti na kujitambulisha kwa wenyeji wenyewe.
Modern (new) Acre can be a case study of this perspective. This beautiful and iconic capital of al-ʿUmar’s state rose from the ashes to become one the most important modern Palestinian urban centres for nearly two centuries. This was less to do with imperial Ottoman calculations or the ‘Ottoman heritage’, and more the result of sheer indigenous determination and self-definition.
Hata hivyo, kufikia mwishoni mwa karne ya 19 hadhi ya Akka ilikuwa imepungua kwa faida ya mji wa pwani ulio karibu wa Haifa, kwa kuwa injini mpya zenye nguvu za mvuke zilikuwa zimeendelezwa Magharibi, zikiendesha meli kubwa zaidi; njia mpya za biashara zilifunguliwa, na pwani ya Palestina ikawa sehemu ya njia ya kawaida ya kampuni kubwa za meli za mvuke za Ulaya (Seikaly 2002b: 97).
However, by the end of the 19th century Acre’s standing had declined to the advantage of the nearby coastal town of Haifa, as new powerful steam engines were developed in the West, powering bigger ships; new trade routes were opened up and the coast of Palestine became part of the regular route of the major European steamship companies (Seikaly 2002b: 97).
Kwa kuongezeka kwa uzalendo wa Kipalestina unaopinga ukoloni, kuibuka kwa mbinu mpya za kuandika historia ya watu, na kupungua kwa simulizi za wasomi, al-ʿUmar amejitokeza miongoni mwa Wapalestina leo kama shujaa wa ‘kizalendo’ (Joudah 1987, 2015). Hata hivyo, serikali yake huru inapaswa kueleweka ndani ya muktadha wa zama zake; ni wazi kwamba malengo yake yalikuwa ya kinasaba (kisultani) na si ya kizalendo.
With the rise of anti-colonialist Palestinian nationalism, the emergence of new approaches to people’s history and the decline of elite narratives, al-ʿUmar has emerged as a ‘nationalist’ hero among Palestinians today (Joudah 1987, 2015). Yet al-ʿUmar’s self-governing entity should be seen within the context of his age; clearly his aims were dynastic not nationalist:
Kwa hamu ya kuthibitisha msingi wa kihistoria wa uhuru wa Wapalestina, Wapalestina mara nyingi hutaja juhudi za kiongozi wa Kipalestina Dhaher al-Umar za kuchukua udhibiti wa sehemu kubwa ya Palestina kutoka kwa Waothmani mwishoni mwa karne ya kumi na nane … Lakini kuhusisha changamoto hizi na "fahamu ya kitaifa yenye msingi wa eneo" ni suala tofauti kabisa na lenye utata. (Abu Lughod 1988: 203)
Anxious to ‘prove’ a historical basis for Palestinian Independence, Palestinians often refer to the effort of the Palestinian leader Dhaher al-Umar to wrest control of much of Palestine from the Ottomans in the late eighteenth century … But to attribute these challenges to ‘national, territorially-based consciousness’ is an altogether different and murky issue. (Abu Lughod 1988: 203)
Hata hivyo, kupanda kwa al-ʿUmar kutoka katika asili yake ya unyenyekevu kiasi kutoka "ndani ya Palestina", uongozi wake madhubuti, umaarufu wake miongoni mwa wakulima wa Kipalestina kutokana na kuondoa mfumo dhalimu wa Iltizam wa Ottoman – angalau chini ya utawala wake – ushindi wake wa kustaajabisha wa kijeshi, upinzani wake madhubuti dhidi ya utawala wa moja kwa moja wa himaya ya Ottoman huko Palestina, na sera zake za kuvumiliana kidini kwa Wakristo, Mayahudi, Druze na Washia, vyote kwa pamoja vilimpa hadhi ya kizushi miongoni mwa Wapalestina. Kweli na kwa kufikirika, al-ʿUmar aliwapa Wapalestina wa kisasa mfano wa kuigwa.
Nevertheless, al-ʿUmar’s emergence from a relatively humble background from ‘within Palestine’, his effective leadership, his popularity among the Palestinian peasantry for getting rid of the oppressive Ottoman Iltizam system – at least under his rule – his spectacular military successes, his effective resistance to Ottoman imperial direct rule in Palestine and his religiously tolerant policies towards Christians, Jews, Druze and Shiites all combined to give him a mythical status among Palestinians. Real and imagined, al-ʿUmar provided a role model for modern Palestinians.
Hata hivyo, utaifa wa Kipalestina, tofauti na usasa wa mapema wa karne ya 18 huko Palestina, ni maendeleo ya mwishoni mwa enzi ya Ottoman, na hakuna ushahidi wa kihistoria kwamba itikadi ya kizalendo ya Kipalestina ilikuwepo wakati wa al-ʿUmar, au kwamba ilibuniwa naye. Ni wazi kwamba hadithi ya ‘kizalendo’ ya Dhahir al-ʿUmar kama mwanzilishi wa “dola ya kwanza ya kitaifa ya Kipalestina” ina nguvu na msukumo mkubwa zaidi kuliko muktadha halisi wa kiongozi huyu mwenye nguvu na zama zake. Lakini urithi wa kihistoria wa chombo chake cha Kipalestina alichokijenga mwenyewe na kukiendesha mwenyewe, pamoja na athari ya kudumu ya sera zake katika Palestina ya kisasa, hauwezi kukanushwa.
However, Palestinian national consciousness, as opposed to 18th century early modernities in Palestine, is a late Ottoman development and there is no historical evidence that a nationalist Palestinian ideology existed at the time of, or was developed by, al-ʿUmar. Evidently the ‘nationalist’ myth of Dhahir al-ʿUmar as the founder of the first modern ‘Palestinian national state’ is far more powerful and inspiring than the actual context of this powerful leader and his age. Yet the historical legacy of his self-fashioned and self-governing Palestinian entity and the lasting impact of its policies on modern Palestine are undeniable.
Muhimu zaidi, kwa karne nyingi ya 18, tawala zinazojitegemea zilizoko Galilaya chini ya al-ʿUmar na al-Jazzar, pamoja na uhusiano wao wa karibu wa kibiashara na ushirikiano wa kijeshi na mamlaka za Ulaya, hasa Urusi, Uingereza na Ufaransa, ziliunganisha kisiasa na kimwili Galilaya na pwani nzima ya Palestina, kuanzia Lebanon hadi Gaza, chini ya utawala mmoja wenye makao yake Palestina. Kwa mtazamo wa kuiona Palestina kama chombo kimoja cha kijiografia na kisiasa, athari ya urithi huu wa kihistoria wa karne ya 18 ilidhihirika hivi karibuni katika jinsi taswira mpya za Palestina zilivyojitokeza katika karne ya 19.
Also, crucially, for much of the 18th century the Galilee-based autonomous regimes of al-ʿUmar and al-Jazzar, with their close trade links and military alliances with European powers, Russia, Britain and France in particular, politically and physically linked the Galilee with the entire Palestinian coast from Lebanon to Gaza under a Palestine-based single administration. From the perspective of viewing Palestine as a single geo-political entity, the impact of this historic legacy of the 18th century would soon become evident in the way new representations of Palestine evolved in the 19th century.
Ushawishi wa Ulaya juu ya utawala wa "kisasa" na wa kistaarabu wa Dhaher al-ʿUmar ulionekana wazi sana. Juhudi hizi za awali za kisasa ziliwezeshwa na ukweli kwamba mamlaka ya kidini ya kihafidhina nchini, ambayo ilikuwa mikononi mwa mufti wa miji ya Palestina, daima ilikuwa chini ya mamlaka ya kisiasa. Mtaalamu wa mambo ya kale, mwanasayansi na msafiri wa Kiitaliano Giovanni Filippo Mariti, aliyewasili Acre mwaka 1760 na kuishi katika robo ya Kifaransa kwa miaka miwili, anaandika katika kitabu chake *Travels Through Cyprus, Syria, and Palestine* kuhusu ushawishi wa mawazo ya Ulaya katika mji mkuu wa Dhaher al-ʿUmar, Acre. Anaeleza mwitikio wa haraka wa Gavana wa Acre kwa tauni iliyokuwa ikienea wakati huo, ambayo iliathiri si Palestina pekee bali pia Misri na Syria. Milipuko mikubwa na midogo ya magonjwa (mara nyingine pamoja na njaa) ilikuwa jambo la kujirudia katika Palestina ya zama za kati, ikiwa na madhara makubwa kutokana na idadi kubwa ya vifo nchini. Milipuko midogo pia ilitokea katika miji ya bandari ya Mediterania ya Palestina wakati wa Vita vya Kwanza na vya Pili vya Dunia. Hata hivyo mwaka 1760 al-ʿUmar mwenye mawazo ya kisasa alichukua hatua madhubuti, akiyapuuza ushirikina wa kidini na kuweka tahadhari, zikiwemo karantini kali huko Acre na hatua zilizowaathiri wafanyabiashara wanaoingia na kutoka mjini; hatua hizi zilisaidia kupunguza athari za mlipuko huo katika mji uliojaa watu, na kuokoa maisha mengi.
European influences on the ‘modernising’ and enlightened administration of Dhaher al-ʿUmar were much in evidence. These early modernisation efforts were facilitated by the fact the conservative religious authority in the country, which rested with the muftis in the cities of Palestine, was always subordinate to the political authority. Italian antiquarian, scientist and traveller Giovanni Filippo Mariti, who arrived in Acre in 1760 and resided in the French quarter for two years, writes in Travels Through Cyprus, Syria, and Palestine about the influence of European ideas on the capital of Dhaher al-ʿUmar, Acre. He describes the swift response of the Governor of Acre to the then raging plague which was affecting not only Palestine but also Egypt and Syria. Large and small epidemics (occasionally combined with famine) had been a recurrent feature of medieval Palestine with devastating effects in terms of the high death toll in the country. Small epidemics also occurred in the Mediterranean port cities of Palestine during the First and Second World War. Yet in 1760 the enlightened al-ʿUmar acted decisively, brushing aside religious superstitions and imposing precautionary measures including a strict quarantine in Acre and measures affecting traders entering and leaving the city; these measures helped to minimise the effect of the epidemic on the crowded city and saved many lives:
Gavana wa Akka alidhibiti maendeleo ya tauni hii kwa kuwapa wakazi njia za kujiepusha na maafa yake; na njia hizi, ingawa zilipingana na mafundisho ya dini ya Kiislamu, zilikubaliwa kwa shauku. Wazungu wakawa mifano yao; na gavana, baada ya kupata kutoka kwao kila taarifa iliyohitajika, alijifungia, kwa kufuata mfano wao, pamoja na familia yake kubwa. Mufti peke yake, aliyezaliwa kuwa mlinzi wa sheria ya Kiislamu, hakuweza kuiga mwenendo ambao sheria hiyo inaulaani. Badala ya kujifungia kimya kimya katika kifungo cha busara, alipiga kelele kali dhidi ya njia hii mpya; alimlaumu gavana kwa mwenendo wake … Hata hivyo, gavana alicheka tu upumbavu huu wa kidini wa Mufti na akatuma kikosi cha askari kumtoza faini ya sequins mia mbili na hamsini.6
The governor of Acre checked the progress of this plague, by giving the inhabitants the means of withdrawing from its ravages; and these means, though contrary to the dogmas of the Mohametan religion, were eagerly embraced. The Europeans became their models; and the governor, after deriving them from every necessary information, shut himself up, after their example, together with his numerous family. The Muphti [mufti, top religious judge of Acre] alone, born the protector of the Mohametan law, cannot imitate a conduct which that law condemns. Instead of shutting himself up with silence in a prudent confinement, he thundered forth against this new method; reproached the governor for his conduct … The governor, however, only laughed at this pious folly of the Muphti and sent a detachment of soldiers to impose a fine on him of two hundred and fifty sequins.6
(Mariti 1792: 200‒201, 203‒204)
(Mariti 1792: 200‒201, 203‒204)
Al-ʿUmar, kama Muhammad ‘Ali wa Misri (1769–1849) na tofauti na wasomi wa mijini wa Kipalestina wa Kiottoman wa Nablus na Jerusalem, alikuwa mvunjaji wa kanuni na mtengenezaji wa watawala, si mfuasi wa kanuni. Wasomi hao wa mijini walikuwa katika hali ya utegemezi ambapo mienendo ya madaraka iliwaweka katika nafasi ya ushawishi, mamlaka na umuhimu mdogo kuliko "mtengenezaji wa kanuni" wao, yaani Mkuu wa Kiottoman. Kwa upande mwingine, utawala wa al-ʿUmar, uliokuwa huru kwa vitendo, uliundwa kinyume na moja kwa moja kama changamoto kwa mamlaka ya utawala wa Kiottoman huko Palestina, huku ukikubali kwa jina uhalali wa Khalifa wa Kiottoman. Mamlaka ya al-ʿUmar yalifanya kazi ndani ya muktadha wa uhalali na nguvu za Kiislamu, na historia ya Kiislamu ya Palestina ilizaa aina mbalimbali za dhana za madaraka, mamlaka na uhalali. Utawala wa al-ʿUmar umewahi kuitwa na wapinzani wake "ushekhe", huku marehemu Albert Hourani akiuita "ufalme mdogo" (alinukuliwa katika Joudeh 2015), lakini ingefaa zaidi kuuelezea kama "dola huru ya mpakani" katika sehemu kubwa ya Palestina kwa zaidi ya robo karne. Hata hivyo, unaweza kuelezwa kama "imara" ndani ya muktadha mpana wa kihistoria wa Kiislamu wa madaraka na uhalali. Kihistoria, imara (emirate) lilikuwa chombo cha kijiografia au dola iliyotawaliwa na amiri wa Kiislamu, sultani, shekhe, kamanda wa kijeshi, gavana au mkuu. Kwa asili ya lugha, imara au amirate (Kiarabu: imarah) ni utawala wa eneo la kimaeneo la amiri. Neno la Kiarabu pia linaweza kumaanisha ufalme mdogo. Chini ya Uislamu, na hadi hivi karibuni, imara zilikuwa aina ya kawaida ya utawala na dola halisi. Aina mbalimbali za imara zilijumuisha Imara maarufu ya Córdoba, ambayo ilikuwa dola huru huko Andalusia kati ya 756 na 929, ikiwa na Córdoba kama mji mkuu wake. Kwanza, kwa kukubali uhalali wa Makhalifa wa Umayyad huko Damascus, kwa kweli Emirate ya Córdoba haikukua tu kwa kupingana moja kwa moja na dola ya Abbasid na kukataa Makhalifa wa Abbasid huko Baghdad, bali pia ilibadilika na kuwa Ukhalifa wa Córdoba. Ukiwa na mji mkuu wake Córdoba, dola hii ilikuwepo kuanzia mwaka 929 hadi 1031, na wakati huo ilikuwa mojawapo ya nchi zilizoendelea zaidi duniani. Pia huko Andalusia, Emirate ya Granada (inayojulikana pia kama Ufalme wa Nasrid wa Granada; Kihispania: Reino Nazarí de Granada) ilianzishwa mwaka 1248 na ikajiunga na Ufalme wa Kikristo wa Castile, na ikabaki dola ya kulipa kodi kwa miaka 250 iliyofuata. Ilikuwa dola ya mwisho katika Peninsula ya Iberia kutawaliwa na Waislamu. Karne kadhaa baadaye, wakati nguvu za al-ʿUmar zilipofikia kilele chake huko Palestina katikati ya karne ya 18, Kuwait ikawa emirate mwaka 1750, ikiongozwa na Shaykh wa Kuwait. Mwishoni mwa karne ya 19 Emirate ya Kuwait ikawa himaya ya Uingereza, na tangu wakati huo imebadilika kuwa taifa la kisasa. Kama dola ya al-ʿUmar ingeendelea kuwepo baada ya kifo cha mwanzilishi wake mwaka 1775 na kudumu hadi karne ya 19, historia ya kisasa ya Palestina ingesomwa na kuandikwa kwa macho ya wenyeji asilia wa Palestina, badala ya kupitia mitazamo ya Waothmani, Waingereza au Wazayuni.
Al-ʿUmar, like Muhammad ‘Ali of Egypt (1769–1849) and unlike the Palestinian Ottoman urban elites of Nablus and Jerusalem, was a rulebreaker and a ruler-maker, not a rule-taker, These urban elites were in a subordinate state of affairs where the power dynamic put them at a position of less influence, authority and significance than their imperial Ottoman ‘rule-maker’. By contrast, al-ʿUmar’s effectively independent regime was created in direct opposition and as a challenge to the authority of the Ottoman rule in Palestine, while nominally acknowledging the legitimacy of the Ottoman Caliph. Al-ʿUmar’s authority operated within the context of Islamic legitimacy and power and Islamic history of Palestine produced a variety of notions of power, authority and legitimacy. Al-ʿUmar’s state has been referred to by its detractors as a sheikhdom, while the late Albert Hourani referred to it as a ‘little kingdom’ (cited in Joudeh 2015), but it would be more appropriate to describe it as a sovereign ‘frontier state’ in most of Palestine for over a quarter of a century. However, it could be described as an emirate within the wider historical Islamic context of power and legitimacy. Historically an emirate was a geo-political entity or state that was ruled by a Muslim emir, sultan, sheikh, military commander, governor or prince. Etymologically emirate or amirate (Arabic: imarah) is the administration of territorial entity of an emir. The Arabic term could also imply principality. Under Islam, and until recently, emirates were a common form of governance and actual statehood. The variety of emirates included the famous Emirate of Córdoba, which was an independent state in Andalusia between 756 and 929, with Córdoba as its capital. Initially acknowledging the legitimacy of the Umayyad Caliphs in Damascus, in fact the Emirate of Córdoba not only grew in direct opposition to the Abbasid state and rejection of the Abbasid Caliphs in Baghdad, but also evolved and transformed itself into the Caliphate of Córdoba. With its capital in Córdoba, this state existed from 929 to 1031 and was at the time one of the most developed countries in the world. Also in Andalusia, the Emirate of Granada (also known as the Nasrid Kingdom of Granada; Spanish: Reino Nazarí de Granada), was established in 1248 and aligned with the Christian Kingdom of Castile, and remained a tributary state for the next 250 years. It was the last state in the Iberian Peninsula to be ruled by Muslims. Several centuries later, at the height of al-ʿUmar’s power in Palestine in the mid-18th century, Kuwait became an emirate in the 1750s, headed by the Shaykh of Kuwait. In the late 19th century the Emirate of Kuwait became a British protectorate and it has since evolved into a modern state. Had al-ʿUmar’s state survived the death of its founder in 1775 and persisted well into the 19th century, today the modern history of Palestine would be read and written with the eyes of the indigenous people of Palestine, rather than through Ottoman, British or Zionist perspectives.
Athari za kudumu za dawlah qutriyyah ya al-ʿUmar na utawala huru wenye nguvu wa al-Jazzar, zote kwa fikra za Ulaya na za Dola ya Ottoman ya mwishoni, pamoja na nafsi na kumbukumbu za Wapalestina wa leo, haziwezi kupuuzwa. Katikati ya karne ya 18, al-ʿUmar alihamisha kitovu cha mamlaka katika Galilaya kutoka Safad (na Liwa ya Safad) kwenda Acre, mji ambao al-ʿUmar aliugeuza kuwa mmoja wa miji mikubwa, tajiri zaidi na yenye ngome imara zaidi katika eneo la al-Sham. Kwa hiyo si jambo la bahati kwamba mwaka 1799 Napoleon Bonaparte alijaribu kuuteka mji huo lakini akashindwa. Miaka sabini baadaye, mapema miaka ya 1870 – kama tutakavyoona katika sura ya tisa – Waottoman walipanga upya Palestina na kuunda sanjak ya Acre kama mojawapo ya mikoa mitatu ya kiutawala nchini. Kwa karibu karne tano, kuanzia mwaka 1266 hadi mwanzoni mwa karne ya 18, Safad ilikuwa mji mkuu wa Galilaya, na baada ya mwaka 1517 Waottoman walithibitisha nafasi yake ya kiutawala katika Galilaya kwa kuanzisha sanjak ya kiutawala ya Safad. Kwa kuzingatia kwamba Safad ilitawala Galilaya na Palestina ya kaskazini kwa karne nyingi chini ya Wamamluk na Waottoman, kuundwa kwa sanjak ya Acre katika kipindi cha mwisho cha Ottoman pia kinapaswa kuhesabiwa kuwa mojawapo ya urithi wa kudumu wa Palestina ya karne ya 18 chini ya al-ʿUmar na al-Jazzar, kwa mtazamo wa Waottoman wa mwisho kuhusu Palestina na kwa upangaji wao wa kiutawala wa nchi hiyo.
The lasting impact of al-ʿUmar’s dawlah qutriyyah and al-Jazzar’s powerful autonomous regime on both European and late Ottoman thinking as well as on the modern Palestinian psyche and memories can hardly be overstated. In the mid-18th century al-ʿUmar shifted the centre of power in Galilee from Safad (and the Liwa of Safad) to Acre, a town which al-ʿUmar transformed into one of the biggest, wealthiest and most well-fortified cities of the al-Sham region. It is hardly a coincidence, therefore, that in 1799 Napoleon Bonaparte sought but failed to conquer the city. Seventy years later, in the early 1870s – as we shall see in chapter nine – the Ottomans reorganised Palestine and created the sanjak of Acre as one of three administrative regions in the country. For nearly five centuries from 1266 until the early 18th century, Safad was the capital of the Galilee and after 1517 the Ottomans confirmed its administrative position in Galilee by creating the administrative sanjak of Safad. In view of the fact that the Safad had dominated the Galilee and northern Palestine for centuries under both the Mamluks and Ottomans, the creation of the sanjak of Acre in the late Ottoman period should also be counted as one the lasting legacies of 18th century Palestine under al-ʿUmar and al-Jazzar for the late Ottoman perception, and administrative reorganisation, of Palestine.
Zaidi ya yote, utawala wenye nguvu wa al-ʿUmar ulitoa mfano mbadala kwa siasa za wasuluhishi za wakuu na wateja wao huko Palestina, na pia kwa siasa za wasomi wa mijini zilizozingatia familia, zenye ushindani mkali na mifarakano mikubwa, ambazo ziliisumbua Palestina ya mwisho wa utawala wa Waothmani na ile ya Mamlaka ya Uingereza hadi mwaka 1948.
Above all, al-ʿUmar’s powerful regime provided an alternative model to the intermediary (patron‒client) elite politics of Palestine and to the family-oriented, fiercely competitive and deeply fractious urban elite politics which bedevilled both late Ottoman and Mandatory Palestine until 1948.