Rubuta Falasdinu a cikin tarihin karni na sha takwas, ra'ayin cin gashin kai na zamantakewa da tattalin arziki na Falasdinawa a karkashin Daular Usmaniyya an binciko shi sosai da Beshara Doumani (1995), tare da kebantaccen magana kan tarihin zamantakewar Jabal Nablus a karni na sha takwas. Wannan an yi shi ne a cikin tsarin ka'idar Albert Hourani game da 'manyan birane' (a'ayan): masu mulki da masu arziki a biranen larduna da garuruwan Larabawa, wadanda suka zama masu shiga tsakani na 'masu daraja' tsakanin babban birnin daular a Istanbul da al'ummar larduna, kuma suka yi mulkin larduna na babbar Daular Usmaniyya. Manyan masu zamantakewa na birane a Falasdinu, kamar yadda yake a sauran yankin Larabawan Gabas, sun nemi iko da cinikayyar yankin da ta nesa, tare da mamaye mallakar filaye a karkara.

Writing Palestine into the history of the 18th century, the idea of Palestinian social and economic autonomy under the Ottomans was masterfully explored by Beshara Doumani (1995) with special reference to the social history of 18th century Jabal Nablus. This was done within the framework of Albert Hourani’s paradigm of the ‘urban notables’ (a’ayan): the political and economic elites in provincial Arab cities and towns that served as ‘patrician’ intermediaries between the imperial capital in Istanbul and provincial society and governed the provinces of the vast Ottoman Empire. The urban social elites of Palestine, as in the rest of the Arab East, sought to control regional and distant trade and dominate landownership in the countryside.

Duk da haka, a ƙarshen zamanin Daular Usmaniyya a Falasdin, garuruwa ba su da girma sosai, kuma manyan mutanen birane sun dogara ga goyon bayan Usmaniyya, suna kuma dogara da ƙauyukan da ke kewaye da su da kuma talakawan manoma na karkara.

However, in late Ottoman Palestine cities were relatively small and urban social elites were dependent on Ottoman patronage and interdependent with their surrounding villages and the mass peasantry of the countryside.

Amma tarihin Falasɗinu a zamanin Usmaniyya ba za a iya iyakance shi ga siyasar manyan birane ta Hourani ko wasu nau'o'in siyasar masu-girma ba, ko da an mayar da hankali kan mallakar filaye masu rashin imani waɗanda suka zalunci manoman Falasɗinu ta hanyar tsarin noman filaye na iltizam na Usmaniyya, ko kuma kan sarakunan dangi masu kyautatawa waɗanda suka kafa manyan gidauniyoyin sadaka na waqf a ƙasar. Duk da cewa waɗannan masu-girma na birane sun yi tsayayya da mulkin kai tsaye na Usmaniyya a Falasɗinu, galibinsu sun fito ne daga ajin zamantakewa ɗaya, siyasarsu kuma ta kasance mai mayar da hankali kan iyali, mai gasa mai tsanani, kuma mai cike da rarrabuwa (Mao'z 1968: 113), a ƙarshe kuma ba ta da tasiri. Haka kuma, dukkan tarihin Falasɗinu ba za a iya maida shi zuwa tsari ɗaya ba: tsarin ubangiji-da-bawa na daular da kuma siyasar masu-girma. Abin lura shi ne, wannan 'yancin kan zamantakewa na 'ayanai' na birane a Falasɗinu ba zai iya bayyana bullowar 'yancin kan siyasa mai ban mamaki "daga ƙasa" da "daga ciki" na wani kusan mai cin gashin kansa a Falasɗinu a karni na 18 ba, wato daular al-ʿDhaher al-ʿUmar ta Falasɗinu, wadda ita ce mafi kusanci da Falasɗinu ta taɓa zuwa ga ƙasa mai cin gashin kanta irin ta zamani. Duk da haka, wannan tsarin masu-girma na birane ya yi tasiri a kan tsararrakin masana tarihi na Gabas ta Tsakiya ta zamani. Masana tarihi sukan yi taka-tsantsan wajen ƙalubalantar tsare-tsaren da aka kafa, kuma da yake mafi yawan sana'o'in ilimi sun dogara da su, wannan a wani ɓangare ya bayyana dalilin da ya sa daular al-ʿUmar mai ƙarfi a Falasɗinu, wadda ta daɗe kusan rabin ƙarni, an yi nazarinta a ɗan ƙanƙanin lokaci kawai.

But the history of Ottoman Palestine cannot be confined to the politics of Hourani’s urban notables or other forms of elite politics, whether this is centred on greedy feudal landlords who exploited the Palestine peasantry through the Ottoman iltizan land-cultivation system or on benevolent aristocratic patricians who set up remarkable charitable waqf foundations in the country. Although these urban elites resisted direct Ottoman rule in Palestine, they were drawn for the most part from the same social classes and their politics remained family-centred, fiercely competitive and deeply fractious (Mao’z 1968: 113) and, ultimately, ineffective. Also, the entire history of Palestine cannot be reduced to one paradigm: the imperial patron‒client framework and elite politics. Crucially, this social autonomy of the urban ‘ayans’ in Palestine cannot account for the dramatic emergence political autonomy ‘from below’ and ‘from within’ of an almost independent Palestinian entity in the 18th century, the al-ʿDhaher al-ʿUmar state of Palestine, which was the closest Palestine got to a modern independent state. However, this elite paradigm of local ‘urban notables’ has influenced an entire generation of historians of the modern Middle East. Historians are often wary of challenging established paradigms and, with so many academic careers depending on them, this partly explains why al-ʿUmar’s powerful state in Palestine, which lasted for nearly half a century, has been studied only marginally.