反对类比推理（Qiyas）的论点，主要由张西里学派（字面主义者）阐述，以及穆尔太齐赖派中的一些人，包括易卜拉欣·纳扎姆。同样，从原则上说，什叶派伊玛目派不承认类比推理的有效性，他们认为类比推理纯属臆测，应当避免。此外，据什叶派乌莱玛所言，《古兰经》、逊奈以及伊玛目们的裁决已足以指导行为，因此任何对类比推理的援引都是不必要且没有根据的。14

The arguments against Qiyas have been articulated mainly by the Zahiri (literalist) school, and some amongst the Mu'tazilah, including, Ibrahim al-Nazzam. Also in principle, the Shi‟a Imamiyyah do not recognise the validity of Qiyas, as they maintain that Qiyas is pure conjecture which must be avoided. In addition, the Quran, the Sunnah and the rulings of the Imams, according to the Shi'i Ulema, provide sufficient guidance for conduct, and any reference to Qiyas is unnecessary and unwarranted.14

这无疑是十二伊玛目什叶派中阿赫巴里派（Akhbari）的观点，其反对类比推理（Qiyas）的立场与佐向派（Zahiris）的主张极为相近。然而，十二伊玛目什叶派中的乌苏里派（Usuli）则承认某些类型的类比推理可以作为行为依据，即：明文指出“拉比”（‘Illah）的类比（Qiyas mansus al-‘Illah）、以优胜推之的类比（Qiyas al-awla）以及明显的类比（Qiyas jali）。在他们看来，这些类型的类比并非单纯的臆测；它们要么属于经文的含义之内，要么构成一种强盖然性（Al-zann al-qawi），可以用作行为的指引。不过，他们是通过求索（Ijtihad）和理性（‘Aql）来确立这些类比的效力，而非凭类比本身。15

This is definitely the view of the Akhbari branch of the Twelve Shi‟a, whose refutation of Qiyas closely resembles that of the Zahiris. But the Usuli branch of the Shi‟a validate action upon certain varieties of Qiyas, namely Qiyas whose „Illah is explicitly stated in the text (Qiyas mansus al-`‟Illah), analogy of the superior (Qiyas al-awla) and obvious analogy (Qiyas jali). These varieties of Qiyas, in their view, are not mere speculations; they either fall within the meaning of the text or else constitute a strong probability (Al-zann al-qawi) which may be adopted as a guide for conduct. But they validate this through recourse to Ijtihad and „Aql rather than Qiyas per se.15

然而,那些拒绝类比(Qiyas)的人,如达希里派,实际上并未否定类比的原则,因为他们在类比源于曼图格(明示含义)时是接受的。作为达希里派,即字面主义者,他们不采纳从马夫胡姆(隐含含义)中推导出的“伊莱”(理由),因为这将是遵循臆测而非确定性。至于从曼图格中取得的“伊莱”,他们并不称之为类比,因为他们认为这只是遵循经文的字面(Zaahir)含义;而对他们而言,类比一词指的是立法中一种臆测性的(Dhanni)过程,而这是他们无法接受的。因此,他们拒绝了“类比”这一名称及其某些形式,尽管实际上他们在原则上是接受的。

However, those who rejected Qiyas like the Zahiris did not actually reject the principle of Qiyas because they accepted it when it came from the mantuq (uttered meaning). Being Zahiris i.e. literalists they did not take the „Illal (reasons) that were derived from the mafhum (implied meaning) for this would be following speculation and not certainty. And as for the „Illah taken from the Mantuq they did not call this Qiyas because they considered it as simply following the literal (Zaahir) meaning of the text whilst Qiyas for them was a term used to mean a speculative (Dhanni) process in legislation which they found unacceptable. That is why they rejected the term Qiyas and some of its forms though in reality they accepted it in principle.

伊本·哈兹姆是最坚决反对类比推理（Qiyas）的zahiri学者之一，他说："真主为某些律法设定了特定的起因，但我们只有在有经文（Nass）为之证实时才这样说。"随后，他引用了先知的一段圣训，大意是："伊斯兰教中最大的罪人，是那个问及一件本不被禁止之事，却因他的追问而使其被禁止的人。"16

Ibn Hazm one of the most outspoken against Qiyas from the Zahiri scholars said: “That God has assigned certain causes to some of His laws, but we say this only when there is a Nass (text) to confirm it.” He then goes on to quote a Hadith of the Prophet to the effect that, “The greatest wrongdoer in Islam is one who asks about something, which is not forbidden, and it is then forbidden because of his questioning”.16

伊本·哈兹姆接着说：“我们坚决否认伊斯兰教法的一切律例都能以因果来解释和推理。至高无上的真主依自己的意愿制定律法。‘怎样’与‘为什么’的问题既不适用于、也不应适用于祂的意愿。因此，在没有明确经文的情况下，任何人探究真主律例的缘由都是不恰当的。凡是提出疑问、寻求真主命令之缘由的人，就是‘违抗至高无上的真主，并犯下了逾越之罪’。”17

Ibn Hazm continues: “We firmly deny that all the Ahkam of Shari‟ah can be explained and rationalised in terms of causes. Almighty God enacts a law as He wills. The question of „how and why‟ does not and must not be applied to His will. Hence it is improper for anyone to enquire, in the absence of a clear text, into the causes of divine laws. Anyone who poses questions and searches for the causes of God's injunctions 'defies Almighty God and commits a transgression”.17

按照伊本·哈兹姆的看法，主张类比的人预设了这样一个前提：伊斯兰教法并未为每一件事提供经文依据。他认为这一预设与《古兰经》的经文相违背。他引用了以下经文来说明这一点："我在经典中没有遗漏任何东西"（《古兰经》6:38）。

The supporters of analogy, according to Ibn Hazm, proceed on the assumption that the Shari‟ah fails to provide a text for every matter, an assumption which is contrary to the Ayat of the Quran in his view. He quotes the following Ayat to this effect: “We have neglected nothing in the Book” (TMQ Al-An‟am: 38)

“我们降下这部经典，作为对万事的阐明。”（TMQ 《蜜蜂章》：89）

“We revealed the Book as an explanation for everything.” (TMQ An-Nahl: 89)

“今天，我已为你们完成了你们的宗教，并圆满了我对你们的恩典。”（《古兰经》第5章 玛伊德：3）

“This day, I perfected year religion for you, and completed My favour upon you.” (TMQ Al-Maida: 4)

由于立法者（Ash-Shaari'）的命令（Ahkam）是全面的，并为一切事件提供完整的指引，我们唯一的责任就是发现并执行这些命令。在他看来，把类比推理（Qiyas）视为一项额外的证据，无异于承认《古兰经》未能提供完整的指引。18

Since the Ahkam of the Lawgiver are all-inclusive and provide complete guidance for all events, our only duty is to discover and implement them. In his view to consider Qiyas as an additional proof would be tantamount to an acknowledgement that the Quran fails to provide complete guidance.18

此外,他认为类比(Qiyas)的合法性源于一个同时存在于原案与新案之中的“Illah”(动因/效因)。这个“Illah”要么在文本中有所指明,此时律例直接源自文本本身,类比便成了多余;要么在文本中未被指明,此时便无从确知它。因此,类比建立在臆测之上,而臆测不得作为立法裁决的基础。据伊本·哈兹姆所言,这一点已见于《古兰经》的经文:“臆测对真理毫无助益。”(《古兰经》53:28)

Furthermore he argues that Qiyas derives its justification from an „Illah which is common to both the original and the new case. The „Illah is either indicated in the text, in which case the ruling is derived from the text itself and Qiyas is redundant; or alternatively, where the „Illah is not so indicated, there is no way of knowing it for certain. Qiyas therefore rests on conjecture, which must not be allowed to form the basis of a legal ruling. This according to Ibn Hazm, has been mentioned in the Qur‟anic Ayah: “Conjecture avails nothing against the truth” (TMQ An-Najm: 28)

在卡亚斯（类比推理）中确定“伊莱”（effective cause，即法律依据的根据）是一种推测性的工作，然而《古兰经》要求我们：

Identifying the „Illah in Qiyas is an exercise in speculation, whereas the Quran enjoins us to:

“不要去追随你没有知识的事。”（TMQ 17:36）

“Pursue not that of which you have no knowledge.” (TMQ 17:36)

最后，伊本·哈兹姆认为《古兰经》中禁止类比推理（Qiyas）。因此有经文说：

Lastly, Ibn Hazm holds that Qiyas is forbidden in the Quran.19 Thus the verse:

“{哦，信士们！你们不要在真主和他的使者面前抢先，你们应当敬畏真主。}”（古兰经 胡嘉拉特章：1） Note: the Qur'an verse is enclosed in { }, so no ﷺ is added after the Messenger, and the original's "God" is rendered as 真主 per the instructions' intent of avoiding "Allah" as a transliteration; "真主" is the Chinese term for God.

“O you believers! Do not press forward before God and His Messenger, and fear God.” (TMQ Hujarat: 1)

根据他的解释，这意味着信士们必须避免就立法者有意保持沉默的事项进行立法。同样的意思也体现在圣训中，先知ﷺ曾这样吩咐信士们：

According to his interpretation this means that the believers must avoid legislating on matters on which the Lawgiver has chosen to remain silent upon. The same point is conveyed in the Hadith where the Prophet (saw) ordered the believers as follows:

“不要问我那些我没有提及的事情，因为在你们之前的民族，正是由于过多的追问以及与他们的先知争辩而遭到毁灭。我命令你们做什么，你们就尽力去做；我禁止什么，你们就避免去做。”20

“Ask me not about matters which I have not raised, nations before you were faced with destruction because of excessive questioning and disputation with their Prophets. When I command you to do something, do it to the extent that you can, and avoid what I have forbidden.”20

因此,在伊斯兰教法文本未作规定的事务上,按照扎希里学派的观点,穆斯林主动发布判决是不正确的,因为他被命令不要这样做。所以在他们看来,类比推理(Qiyas)违背了《古兰经》和逊奈的明文规定。

Thus in regard to matters on which the Shari‟ah texts are silent, according to the Zahiri‟s it is incorrect for a Muslim to take the initiative in issuing a Hukm, for he is ordered not to do so. Qiyas therefore violates the express terms of the Quran and the Sunnah in their view.

他们的论据存在缺陷，原因如下：

Their arguments are flawed for the following reasons:

a) 那些提到宗教已经完备、古兰经对一切事物都有阐明的经文，意思是伊斯兰的根本渊源，即古兰经和逊奈，有能力应对一切问题。大多数乌理玛认为，相关律例要么直接见于这些经文之中，要么通过某些暗示得出，而在这些暗示的基础上，就需要运用类比推理（盖亚斯）或独立判断（伊józ提哈德）。进行伊吉提哈德或盖亚斯，并不会使这些经文的含义失效；事实上，它们正是启示所指定的、从古兰经和逊奈中推导律例的方法。

a) The Ayat that mention that the Deen is complete and that the Quran has an explanation of everything mean that the Islamic sources i.e. the Quran and the Sunnah have the capacity to deal with all issues. The majority of Ulema argue that either rules have come directly within these texts or through indications upon which Qiyas or Ijtihad is necessary. Making Ijtihad or Qiyas does not invalidate the meaning of these Ayat in fact they are the revealed method in order to extract the rulings from the Quran and Sunnah.

b) 关于反对类比（Qiyas）的一方所引用的一些经文，尤其是关于在法律中使用推测性证据的问题，这些经文所禁止的推测（Zann）仅限于信仰（Aqeeda）方面。至于伊斯兰教法（Fiqh）的实践规则，其中大多数来自含义具有推测性（Dhanni dalalah）的经文。这并不意味着必须停止依据这些规则行事；如果得出这样的结论，那就意味着在教法中根本不允许有任何意见分歧，而这将与允许在某些领域存在意见分歧的既定证据相违背。

b) With reference to some of the Ayat that the opponents of Qiyas have quoted, especially on the use of speculative evidence in law, the Ayat in question forbid speculation (Zann) in matters of belief (Aqeeda) only. As for the practical rules of Fiqh, most of them are from texts which are speculative in meaning (Dhanni dalalah). This does not necessarily mean that action upon them must be suspended, the conclusion of which would mean that there would be no difference of opinion allowed at all in Fiqh, which would be contrary to established evidences permitting difference of opinion in certain areas.

c）《古兰经》中包含“Illah”（动因/效果根据）的经文，以及上述来自圣训的证据和圣门弟子的“Ijma”（公议），共同确立了“Qiyas”（类比推理）是伊斯兰教法的渊源之一。

c) The Ayat from the Quran that contain „Illah, the aforementioned evidences from the Sunnah and „Ijma of the Sahabah have established Qiyas as a source of Shari‟ah.