Shariat har doim adolat va rahmatning manbai bo‘lib kelgan va hozir ham shundaydir. Uni yo‘q qilishni faqat zolimlar istaydi.

The Sharia was and is the source of so much justice and mercy. Only tyrants want to do away with it.

Iqtisodchi Mark Koyama "Fikrlarning o'zi kifoya emas edi" nomli insholarida ochiq e'tirof etadi: diniy erkinlik g'arb dunyosini faqat o'zining jozibadorligi yoki fazilati tufayli bir zumda egallab olgan inqilobiy g'oya emas edi. Aksincha, turli diniy guruhlarga bag'rikenglik siyosiy va iqtisodiy jihatdan faqat amaliy masala bo'lgan.5

In his essay “Ideas Were Not Enough,” economist Mark Koyama gives an honest admission: Religious freedom is not a revolutionary idea that took the Western world by storm simply on the basis of its compellingness or virtue. Rather, tolerance for different religious groups was purely a practical matter politically and economically.5

Bu qanday sodir bo‘ldi?

How did this happen?

Koyama o'z fikricha, turli sabablarga ko'ra, Zamonaviy G'arbning dastlabki bosqichlarida Yevropa davlatlari siyosiy qonuniylik uchun Cherkovga kamroq bog'liq bo'lib qoldi. Ilgari bu davlatlar xristian ommasi nazarida qonuniylikka erishish uchun Cherkov bilan ittifoq tuzishga majbur edi, bu esa o'z navbatida siyosiy barqarorlikka olib kelardi (hukmron davlat hokimiyatlari uchun juda qadrli narsa). Biroq davlatning Cherkov bilan ittifoqi bag'rikenglik uchun zararli edi, chunki Cherkov davlatdan bid'atchilarni jazolashni talab qilardi.

Koyama argues that, for various reasons, European states in the early stages of Western modernity grew less dependent on the Church for political legitimization. Previously, these states needed to ally with the Church in order to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the Christian masses, which in turn led to political stability (something very valuable to ruling state authorities). States allying with the Church was bad for tolerance, however, since the Church required the state to punish heretics for them.

Bundan tashqari, muallif ta'kidlaydi: davlatlar jamoat tartibiga hissa qo'shish uchun diniy muassasalarga tayangan. Cherkovlar (va islom dunyosidagi vaqflar) kambag'allarga yordam berish, ta'lim berish va boshqa jamoat xizmatlarini ko'rsatish borasida zaif davlat institutlariga nisbatan qulayroq holatda va qodirroq edi. Bundan tashqari, o'sha davrning qonunlari va ijtimoiy qoidalari umumiy millatchilik o'ziga xoslik (masalan, fuqarolik) emas, balki diniy o'ziga xoslikka bog'liq edi, bu esa barcha odamlarga teng tatbiq etilardi. Bularning barchasi diniy xilma-xillikka nisbatan bag'rikenglikning pastligiga olib keldi. Bunday dunyoda "diniy erkinlikni tasavvur qilib bo'lmas edi." Nima o'zgardi?

Additionally, the author claims, states relied on the religious institutions to contribute to public order. Churches (and awqaf in the Islamic world) were better positioned and capable to help the poor, provide education, and conduct other public services relative to weak state institutions. Furthermore, laws and social rules of these times depended on religious identity as opposed to a general nationalistic identity (e.g., citizenship) that applied equally to all people. All this led to less tolerance for religious diversity. In this world, “religious freedom was inconceivable.” What changed?

Koyama argues that state institutions began taxing more and grew more powerful. This allowed them to abandon a quid pro quo arrangement with the Church. With greater power, laws and social rules could be enforced more widely without depending on religious identities to function. As far as the state was concerned, the Jew, Protestant, and Catholic were all equal sources of tax revenue, so discriminating on the basis of religious identity became unnecessary and a waste of bureaucratic resources. Ultimately, "As they relied less on religious authority, states grew less inclined to value enforcing religious conformity." The result?

State institutions started taxing more and became more powerful, claims Koyama. This allowed them to forego a quid pro quo arrangement with the Church. With increased power, laws and social rules could be enforced more broadly without depending on religious identities to function. As far as the state was concerned, the Jew, Protestant, and Catholic were all equal sources for taxes, so it became unnecessary and a waste of bureaucratic resources to discriminate based on religious identity. Ultimately, “As they relied less on religious authority, states grew less inclined to value enforcing religious conformity.” The result?

Qulaylikdan emas, tamoyildan kelib chiqqan diniy erkinlik. Shunga qaramay, bu yaxshi narsa, shundaymi?

Religious freedom born of convenience rather than principle. Still a good thing, though, right?