G'arbda hamon inses taqiqlangan. Lekin har safar inses munosabatidagi juftlik hibsga olinganida, ijtimoiy tarmoqlardagi munosabatlar bu harakatga bo'lgan qarashlarda o'zgarish borligini ko'rsatadi.

Incest is still illegal in the West. But whenever an incestuous couple is arrested, the reactions on social media represent a shift in attitudes on this descpicable act:

“Bu ikki rozi bo‘lgan kattalar! Ular bir-birlarini sevishadi, va faqat shu muhim!” “Bu bizga jirkanch tuyulgani uchun, uni axloqsiz, hatto qonunga zid deb hisoblash shart emas! Ular hech kimga zarar yetkazmayapti!” Lekin keling, to‘xtab o‘ylab ko‘raylik: Nega biror narsa axloqan ruxsat etilgan bo‘lishi uchun hech kimga zarar yetkazmasligi talab qilinadi? Boshqalarga zarar yetkazishda qanday yomonlik bor? Albatta, agar biz boshqalarga zarar yetkazish haqida o‘ylasak, bu bizga yomon his qildirishi, hatto jirkanch tuyulishi mumkin. Bu bizda g‘azab uyg‘otishi mumkin, lekin bu uni axloqsiz qiladi, degani emas.

“These are two consenting adults! They love each other and that’s all that matters! Just because it’s disgusting to us doesn’t mean it should be considered immoral, much less illegal! They are not harming anyone!” But let’s stop and ask: Why is not harming anyone required for something to be morally permissible? What’s so bad about harming others? Sure, if we think about harming others, that might make us feel bad or even disgusted. It might cause us anger, but that doesn’t mean that it is immoral.

Axloqiy falsafada axloqning emotivizm deb ataladigan nazariyasi mavjud. Emotivizm shunday deydi: bizning axloqiy hukmlarimiz hissiyotlarning shunchaki ifodasidir. Biz "X yomon" deganimizda, bu aslida nimani anglatadi va shu sababli haqiqatda nimani ifodalaydi? Faqat: "X menga yoqmaydi!" degani. Albatta, hissiyotlar subyektivdir: turli odamlar X haqida turlicha his qilishi mumkin va qiladi. Shu sababli "X haqiqatda yomon" kabi faktik da'vo qilishga urinadigan har kim, go'yo bu universal yoki obyektiv tarzda shunday bo'lganidek, shunchaki kategoriya xatosiga yo'l qo'yadi. Misol tariqasida: men qovunni yoqtirmayman, masalan, shu sababli qovun yeish yomon bo'lib qolmaydi.

In moral philosophy, there is a theory of morality called emotivism. Emotivism says that our moral judgments are nothing but expressions of emotion. When we say, “X is wrong,” what that really amounts to and, hence, what it really means is just, “X makes me feel bad!” Of course, feelings are subjective — different people can and will feel different things about X. As such, anyone who attempts to make a factual claim like, “X is wrong as a matter of fact,” as if that is universally or objectively the case is simply making a category error. As an analogy, just because I don’t like the taste of coconut, for example, that doesn’t mean that eating coconut is wrong.

Emotivizmning ko'plab kamchiliklari borligi aniq. Ammo liberallar uni o'z maqsadlari uchun qanday ishlatishi va uni tanlab qo'llashi qiziq. Ular o'zlari rad etadigan axloqiy me'yorlarga nisbatan darhol emotivizmga murojaat qiladi, masalan: "Qarindoshlar o'rtasidagi zina noto'g'ri emas, shunchaki bu sizda jirkanch his uyg'otgani uchun." Ammo ular ishongan axloqiy me'yorlarga kelganda esa emotivizm unutiladi, masalan: "Boshqalarga zarar yetkazish axloqsizlikning mohiyati bo'lib, uning oldini olish uchun qonun kuchidan foydalanishimiz kerak." Oddiy savol shundaki, nega bunday tanlovchanlik? Nega "zarar" tushunchasi chegarasida to'xtaladi? Holbuki, bu tushunchaning o'zi noaniq ta'riflangan va tanlab qo'llaniladi.

There are obviously many problems with emotivism. But it is interesting how liberals use emotivism for their purposes and use it selectively. For those moral proscriptions they disagree with, liberals jump straight to emotivism, e.g., “Incest is not wrong just because it makes you feel icky.” But for those moral proscriptions that they believe in, emotivism goes out the window, e.g., “Harming others is the very essence of immorality and something that we have to use the force of law to prevent.” The simple question is, why the selectivity? Why draw the line at this notion of “harm” (which itself is loosely defined and selectively applied)?

Agar liberallarga zarar yetkazish nega axloqsizlik ekanini tushuntirishni talab qilsangiz, bu ularni ular theistlarga qarshi qo'yadigan metaetik va metafizik masalalarga kirishga majbur qiladi. Yo ular o'z fikrida qat'iy turib, bu axloqsiz, chunki "shunday", deb aytishlari kerak bo'ladi, yoki ular shunchaki qiyinchilikni qabul qilib, axloqning umuman mavjudligini rad etadilar va nihilizmning bir turini qabul qiladilar. Bunga o'z shartlari doirasida javob berish mumkin, ammo hatto undan tashqari ham, liberalni o'zining aslida nihilist ekanini tan olishga majburlash o'zi bir g'alaba bo'lib, uni keyingi bahslarda foydalanish mumkin.

If you press liberals to explain why harming others is immoral, this forces them to get into the meta-ethical and metaphysical issues that they attack theists for. Either they have to dig in their heels and say it’s immoral because “it just is,” or they will just bite the bullet, reject the notion of morality in its entirety, and embrace what amounts to some form of nihilism. This can be responded to on its own terms but even absent that, to simply get a liberal to admit he is essentially a nihilist is itself a win that can be leveraged in further arguing against him.

Bu liberal gumanistlar bilan shaxmat o'ynashning yo'li shu. Ularning dahshatli tanlab olish xulqini fosh qiling, va mot yaqin bo'ladi.

This is how you play chess with these liberal humanists. Call them out for their atrocious selectivity and the checkmate will be close at hand.