Logic is open to ornamentation and its conclusions are open to being wrong. Although it stipulates that the correctness of the premises and the soundness of their structure is a condition, the fact that it consists of building one premise upon another makes the correctness of the conclusion depend on the correctness of these premises. The correctness of these premises is not guaranteed, because the conclusion is not directly founded on sense perception; it is founded on the linking of premises, one upon another, and so the correctness of the conclusion is not guaranteed either. This is because what happens in it is that premises are linked, one upon another: things that can be comprehended linked to the like, resulting in the like, and things that can be perceived by the senses linked to the like, resulting in the like. As for linking intelligibles to intelligibles, it leads to slipping into error and to contradictory conclusions, and it leads to drifting into a chain of premises and conclusions which are rational in theory and by assumption but not in their existence in reality, so much so that in many of those syllogisms the final results are pure fantasies and absurdities. Thus establishing proof through linking intelligibles to intelligibles is open to slipping. For example, it is said logically: the Qur'an is the speech of Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ, and it is made up of letters which are arranged and ordered in existence, and every speech made up of letters arranged and ordered in existence is originated; the conclusion: the Qur'an is originated and created. This linking of premises has led to a conclusion which is beyond the reach of the senses, so the intellect is incapable of examining it (as to its correctness) or judging it. Saboda haka, hukunci ne na zato, ba na gaskiya ba, bugu da kari kuma yana cikin al'amuran da hankali aka hana tattaunawa a kansu. Wannan kuwa saboda tattaunawa a kan siffofin Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ tattaunawa ce a kan zatinSa, kuma ba ya halatta a tattauna a kan zatin Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. Amma ana iya kaiwa, ta hanyar wannan tsarin tunani guda, ga kammalawa da ta saba wannan. Ana cewa: Al-Qur'ani maganar Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ ne, kuma yana daya daga cikin siffofinSa, duk abin da yake siffar Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ kuwa madawwami ne; kammalawa: cewa Al-Qur'ani madawwami ne, ba halitta ba. Ta haka, kuskuren tunani ya bayyana a cikin magana daya kuma guda. Haka kuma, a yawancin maganganun hankali da suke fitowa daga hada abubuwan da hankali ke iya fahimta da juna, masanin dabarar tunani yakan isa ga kammalawar da ta saba gaba daya kuma ta ba da mamaki gaba daya. Amma idan aka hada abubuwan da ake iya gani da ji da juna, idan an iya komawa da sharuddan zuwa ga gabobin ji, kuma kammalawar ta iya komawa ga gabobin ji, sakamakon zai zama daidai, domin an dogara ne a kan abin da gabobin ji suka gani a cikin sharuddan, kammalawar kuma ba ta dogara kawai ga hada maganganu ba. Sai dai abin da yake faruwa shi ne, wajen isa ga gaskiya ana dogara ne ga hada maganganu, kuma kallon gabobin ji ana takaita shi ga abin da maganganun suka kare da shi. Yana iya faruwa a yi zaton cewa magana gaskiya ce ga wani hakika, alhali a zahiri ba ta zama gaskiya ba. Haka kuma yana iya faruwa cewa magana da aka bayyana ta da iyaka ta gabaya, za ta zama gaskiya ga wasu sassanta kawai, kuma gaskiyar wasu sassan za ta kai ga kammalawar yaudara cewa tana shafar dukkan sassan. Hakika kuma a cikin shawara akwai yiwuwar gaskiya ta bayyana a zahiri, alhali a hakikanin gaskiya ba daidai ba ne, wanda da ita ake yaudarar ma'anar gaskiyar shawarar. Haka kuma akwai yiwuwar ƙarshen magana ya zama daidai, amma ginshiƙan da aka cire ta daga gare su ƙarya ne, saboda haka mutum na iya zaton cewa tunda ƙarshen daidai ne, to haka ginshiƙan suma daidai suke… da sauransu. Misali, an ce mazauna Spain ba Musulmai ba ne, kuma duk ƙasar da mazaunanta ba Musulmai ba ne ba ƙasar Musulunci ba ce; sakamakon shi ne Spain ba ƙasar Musulunci ba ce. Wannan ƙarshe kuskure ne. Kuskurensa ya samo asali ne daga kuskuren ginshiƙi na biyu: magana cewa duk ƙasar da mazaunanta ba Musulmai ba ne ba ƙasar Musulunci ba ce ƙarya ce, domin ana ɗaukar ƙasa a matsayin ta Musulunci idan Musulunci ne ke mulkinta ko kuma idan mafi yawan mazaunanta Musulmai ne. Shi ya sa ƙarshen ya zama kuskure; lallai Spain ƙasar Musulunci ce.
Wani misalin kuma, an ce Amurka ƙasa ce mai babban matsayin tattalin arziki, kuma duk ƙasar da take da babban matsayin tattalin arziki ƙasa ce da ta farfado. Sakamakon shi ne Amurka ƙasa ce da ta farfado. Wannan ƙarshe gaskiya ne game da Amurka, duk da cewa ɗaya daga cikin ginshiƙan biyu ƙarya ne: ba kowace ƙasa mai babban matsayin tattalin arziki ce ke farfadowa ba; ƙasar da ta farfado ita ce wadda take da babban matsayin ilimi. Don haka wannan tsarin hujja (syllogism), wanda ƙarshensa gaskiya ne, yana yaudarar mutum har ya ɗauka cewa ginshiƙan da aka cire ƙarshen daga gare su ma daidai ne. Har ila yau yana kai ga ƙiyasin cewa kowace daga cikin Kuwait, Qatar da Saudi Arabia ƙasa ce da ta farfado saboda kowacce tana da babban matsayin tattalin arziki, alhali gaskiyar magana ita ce waɗannan ba ƙasashe ne da suka farfado ba.
Saboda haka, daidaiton ƙarshen dukkan tsarin hujja ya dogara ne da daidaiton ginshiƙansa. Gaskiyar ginshiƙai kuma ba a tabbatar da ita ba, domin suna iya ƙunshe da lahani. Don haka, yin dogaro da tushen ma'ana (logic) wajen kafa hujja kuskure ne. Wannan ba yana nufin cewa gaskiyar da ake kaiwa ta hanyar hankali karya ce ko kuma kafa hujja ta hanyar hankali kuskure ne ba, sai dai yana nufin cewa dogaro da hankali wajen kafa hujja kuskure ne, kuma daukar hankali a matsayin tushe wajen kafa dalilai kuskure ne. Hankula ne ya kamata a mayar da su tushen hujja da shaida. Dangane da hankali kuwa, halal ne a yi amfani da shi wajen tabbatar da daidaiton wata magana, kuma zai zama daidai idan dukkan gabatarwar sun zama gaskiya, kuma idan su tare da sakamakon za a iya komawa da su zuwa ga hankula. Daidaiton sakamakon yana fitowa ne daga kasancewarsa an cire shi daga gabatarwar, ba daga wani abu ba. Duk da haka, yiwuwar kuskure a cikinsa yana sa wajibi a kada a mai da shi tushen kafa hujja, domin gaba daya tushe ne mara tabbas mai saurin kuskure, ko da yake hujja ta wasu nau'o'insa na iya zama tabbatacciya. Hankula ne dole a mayar da su tushen hujja, domin gaba daya wannan tushe ne tabbatacce game da kasancewar abubuwa ko rashin kasancewarsu; ba ya yiwuwa a yi kuskure a cikinsa kwata-kwata.
Logic is susceptible to speciosity and its conclusions are susceptible to be incorrect, because although it stipulates that the correctness of the premises and the soundness of their structure is a condition, the fact that it consists of the syllogising of one premise upon another makes the correctness of the conclusion dependant upon the correctness of these premises. The correctness of these premises is not guaranteed because the conclusion is not directly founded on sensation, it is founded on the syllogising of premises, one upon another, and thus the correctness of the conclusion is not guaranteed. This is because what occurs in it is that premises are syllogised, one upon another: things that can be comprehended upon the like, resulting in the same, and things that can be sensorially perceived upon the like, resulting in the same. As for the syllogising of comprehensibles upon comprehensibles, it leads to slipping into error and to contradictory conclusions, and it leads to drifting into a series of premises and conclusions which are rational in theory and by assumption but not with regard to thier existence in reality, so much so that in many of those syllogisms, the end results are utter fantasies and absurdities. Thus establishing proof through the syllogising of comprehensibles upon comprehensibles is susceptible to slipping. For example, logically it is said: the Qur’ān is the speech of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ and it is comprised of letters which are arranged and sequenced in existence, and every speech made up of letters arranged and sequenced in existence is recent; the conclusion: the Qur’ān is recent and created. This syllogising of premises has lead to a conclusion which in inaccessible to the senses; so the intellect is incapable of inquiring into it (as to its correctness) or judging it. Therefore, it is a hypothetical judgement, not a realistic one over and above it being one of the issues which the intellect has been prohibited from discussing. This is because a discussion of the attributes of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is a discussion of His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ essence, and in no way is it permissible to discuss the essence of Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. Yet it is possible to reach, via the same logic, a conclusion contradictory to this one. Thus it is said: the Qur’ān is the speech of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰand it is one of its attributes, and any thing that is an attribute of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is eternal; the conclusion: that the Qur’ān is eternal and not created. Thus contradiction in logic is evident in one and the same proposition. Likewise, in many logical propositions that are resultant from the syllogising of comprehensibles upon 36 The Error in the Methodology of the Mutakallimīn comprehensibles, a logician reaches conclusions which are utterly contradictory and utterly bizarre. As for the syllogising of the sensorially accessible upon the sensorially accessible, if the premises can be traced back to the senses and the conclusion can be traced back to the senses, the result will be correct, because it is based on the senses in the premises and the conclusion is not solely based on the syllogising of propositions. However what occurs is that in arriving at truths reliance is placed on the syllogising of propositions, and the noticing of the senses is restricted to what the propositions end with. It may occur that a proposition is imagined to be true to a certain reality but in fact it is not. It may also occur that a proposition which is defined with a general demarcation will be true only to certain parts of it, and this truth of certain parts will lead to the deceptive conclusion that it applies to all parts. It may also be that in the proposition there appears apparent truth, but in reality it is incorrect, which deceptively means the truth of the proposition. It may also be that the conclusion is correct but the premises from which it is concluded are false, from which it may be imagined that because the conclusion is correct, so too are the premises…and so forth. Thus, it has been said, for example, that the inhabitants of Spain are not Muslims, and every land whose inhabitants are not Muslims is not an Islamic Land; the conclusion is that Spain is not an Islamic Land. This conclusion is wrong. Its error come from the error of the second premise: the statement that every land whose inhabitants are not Muslims is not an Islamic Land is false because a land is deemed Islamic if it were ruled by Islam or if the majority of its inhabitants are Muslims. This is why the conclusion is wrong; Spain is indeed an Islamic Land. As another example, it has been said that America is a country of high economic standard, and every country of high economic standard is a revived country. The conclusion is that America is a revived country. This conclusion is true with regards to America, although one of the two premises is false: not every country with a high economic standard is revived; a revived country is one with a high intellectual standard. Thus, this syllogism, whose conclusion is true, deceptively leads one to assume that the premises from which the conclusion was arrived at are also correct. It also leads to proposition that each of Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia is a revived country because each has a high economic standard, although the truth is that these are not revived countries. Thus, the correctness of the conclusions of all syllogisms is dependent on the correctness of the premises. The truth of the premises is not guaranteed because they are susceptible to having flaws. Therefore, it is erroneous to depend on the logical basis in the establishment of proof. This does not mean that the truths reached via logic are false or that the establishment of proof via logic is erroneous, but it means that reliance in the establishment of proof on the logical basis is erroneous and that taking logic as a basis in the establishment of arguments is erroneous. It is the senses that are to be made the basis for proof and evidence. As for logic, it is valid to use it for the establishment of the proof of the correctness of a proposition and it would be correct if all the premises are true and if they together with the conclusion were traceable back to the senses. The correctness of the conclusion comes from its being deduced from the premises, not from anything else. Yet, its susceptibility to being erroneous makes it imperative that it is not made a basis in the establishment of proof because as a whole, it is an uncertain basis which is susceptible to error, although proof by means of some forms of it can be conclusive. It is the senses that must be made the basis of proof, because as a whole this is a definite basis regarding the existence or otherwise for things; it is completely insusceptible to error.