Khalifah shi ne shugaban gaba ɗaya na Musulmai domin kafa hukunce-hukuncen Shari'ar Musulunci, da ɗaukar da'awar Musulunci zuwa duniya. Don haka kafa Shari'a da ɗaukar da'awa zuwa duniya su ne abubuwa biyu da matsayin Khilafah ya kasance saboda su; dukkansu biyu aikin matsayin Khilafah ne. Ba daidai ba ne ga kowa ya sa ido a kansu banda Khalifah, kuma ba a halatta wa Khalifah ya kafa wani wanda zai sa ido a kansu biyun a madadinsa ba, domin su ne abubuwa biyu da ake ba da bai'ah a kansu, kuma kwangilar bai'ah ta tabbata a kan mutumin Khalifah. Don haka ba a halatta masa ya wakilta wani ya yi aikin da kwangilar ta tabbata a kansa ba. Wannan saboda kowace kwangila da ta tabbata a kan mutumin mai kwangilar, kamar ma'aikaci, wakili da abokin hulɗa, ba a halatta masa ya wakilta wani ya yi aikin da kwangilar ta tabbata a kansa ba. Idan kwangilar Khilafah ta tabbata a kan wani takamaiman mutum, ba a halatta wannan mutum ya wakilta wani ya tsaya a madadinsa ba a cikin abin da kwangilar Khilafah ta tabbata a kan mutumin nasa, wato shugabancin gaba ɗaya na Musulmai domin kafa hukunce-hukuncen Shari'a da ɗaukar da'awa.

The Khalifah is the general leader of the Muslims in order to establish the Islamic Shar’a rules, and carry the Islamic da’wah to the world. So establishing the Shar’a and carrying the da’wah to the world are the two matters for the sake of which the post of the Khilafah exists; so both of them are the work of the post of the Khilafah. It is not correct for anyone to supervise them other than the Khalifah nor is it allowed for the Khalifah to establish someone who would supervise both of them instead of him because they are the two matters upon which the bay’ah is given and the bay’ah contract takes place upon his person. So he is not allowed to delegate someone else to perform the work upon which the contract took place. This is because each contract which occurred upon the contractor’s person like the employee, agent and partner it is not permitted for him to delegate someone else to perform the work over which the contract took place. When the Khilafah contract occurs upon a specific person, it is not allowed for this person to delegate someone else to stand in his place in what the Khilafah contract occurred upon his person, which is the general leadership of Muslims to establish the Shar’a rules and carry the da’wah.

Bisa haka wannan ya bayyana cewa ɗaukar da'wa ne abin da aka kafa Khilafah saboda shi, wato wanzuwar Khilafah, kamar yadda take, tana wanzuwa ne domin aiwatar da shi. Ba a halatta ga wanda ba Khalifah ba ya jagorantar shi, ko da yake yana halatta ga kowane Musulmi ya aiwatar da shi. Saboda haka, ɗaukar da'wa, ko da yake wajibi ne ga dukkan Musulmai kuma kowane mutum zai iya aiwatar da ita; duk da haka, babu wanda zai iya jagorantar ta sai Khalifah.

Accordingly this clarifies that carrying the da’wah is what the Khilafah was established for i.e. the existence of the Khilafah, as it is, exists in order to perform. It is not permitted for other than the Khalifah to supervise it even though it is valid for each Muslim to perform it. Therefore the carrying of the da’wah, even if it is obligatory upon all Muslims and every individual can perform it; nevertheless, none can supervise it except the Khalifah.

Kulawalin Khalifah na kula da isar da da'wah yana da wata hanya ta musamman, wato jihadi; kuma jihadi ba ya wanzuwa sai da kasancewar mujahidai, da ƙarfin da aka shirya don yaƙi, da kuma yakin kanta. Saboda haka, kasancewar sojoji, shirya su, da aikin da suke yi, su ne hanyar isar da da'wah ga duniya. Saboda haka Khalifah ne ke kula da jagorancin sojoji, tun da shi ne ke kula da isar da da'wah, don haka shi ne ke kula da jihadi. Shi, ba wani ba, ke kula da jagorancin sojoji. Kula da jagorancin sojoji ba yana nufin gudanar da mulkinsu, horar da su, ko shiga kowane aikin fasaha a cikinsa ba; waɗannan dukkansu hanyoyi ne da kayan aiki. Khalifah, duk da cewa yana kula da al'amuransu ta hanyar kulawa gabaɗaya, ba ya aiwatar da hakan da kansa. Hakika, kula da sojoji yana nufin kula da samuwarsu, shirye-shiryensu, da kula da batun aiwatar da aikinsu. Wannan ya faru ne saboda soja da aka sadaukar don jihadi (wato mujahid), ƙarfin da aka shirya don tsoratar da abokan gaba, da yaƙin kanta, duk ana ɗaukar su a matsayin ayyukan jihadi; saboda haka Allah (SWT) ya umurce su lokacin da Ya umurci jihadi; kuma yaƙin kanta shi ne jihadi. Saboda haka kula da mujahidai, horar da su, da kuma aiwatar da yaƙin, na Khalifah ne kaɗai, ba wani ba. Ma'anar jagorancin Khalifah ga sojoji shi ne: yana kula da tsara manufofin da suka shafi samar da sojoji, shirya su da ƙarfafa su, da manufofin da suka shafi aiwatar da aikinsu, wato yaƙi. Haka kuma yana kula da kai tsaye da aiwatar da wannan manufa, ba wani ba. Saboda haka Khalifah ne ke kula da tsara dukkan manufofin soji, na cikin gida da na waje, da tsara manufofin yaƙi, na cikin gida da na waje; kuma ba daidai ba ne ko kaɗan wani ya kula da hakan. Haka ne, ana halatta gare shi ya nemi taimako daga duk wanda ya so wajen tsara wannan manufofi da kuma sa ido kan aiwatar da shi, amma babu shakka ba a halatta masa ya bar wani ya sa ido a kansa ba. Wannan shi ne ma'anar sa ido na Khalifa kan shugabancin sojoji. Ba a halatta wani ba face Khalifa ya sa ido kan wannan shugabanci ta kowace hanya.

The Khalifah’s supervision of the carrying of the da’wah has a specific method which is jihad; and jihad only exists with the presence of the mujahideen, the power which is prepared for fighting and the fighting itself. Therefore the existence of the army, its preparation and the work which it performs is the method of carrying of the da’wah to the world. Accordingly it is the Khalifah who supervises the leadership of the army since he is the one who supervises the carrying of the da’wah so he is the one who supervises the jihad. So he, not any other, supervises the leadership of the army. The supervision of the army leadership is not undertaking its administration, training or undertaking any technical matter within this rather these are all styles and means. The Khalifah, even though he supervises its affairs with a general supervision, does not perform this. Rather supervising the army is supervising its formation, preparation and supervising the matter of undertaking its work. This is because the soldier who is attached to jihad (i.e.) the mujahid, the strength prepared to terrorise the enemy and the fighting are considered of the actions of jihad so accordingly Allah (swt) commanded them when He commanded the jihad; and the fighting itself is jihad. Therefore the supervision of the mujahideen, their training, and their performing the fighting is only for the Khalifah and no one else. So the meaning of the Khalifah’s leadership of the army is that he supervises, not anyone else, the planning of policy related to creating the army, preparing and strengthening it, and the policy related to its performing its work i.e. fighting. And (also) that he supervises, not anyone else, the direct supervision of the execution of this policy. Therefore it is the Khalifah who supervises planning all military policy, internal and external, and planning the war policy, internally and externally; and it is absolutely not correct for anyone else to supervise this. Yes, it is permitted for him to seek assistance from whoever he wishes in planning this policy and supervising its execution, but he is absolutely not allowed to leave someone else to supervise it. This is the meaning of the Khalifah’s supervision of the army’s leadership. It is not allowed for other than the Khalifah to supervise this leadership in any way whatsoever.

Akwai tambayoyi guda biyu da ke tasowa game da matsayin sojoji kansa, ta fuskar kasancewarsa ƙarfin da ake aiwatar da jihadi da shi a matsayin hanya kaɗai da Khalifah ke sa ido a kanta wajen ɗaukar da'awa, da kuma ta fuskar kasancewarsa ƙarfin da ke tsaron ikon Khilafah, watau Daula, a cikin gida da waje. Amma tambayar da ke tasowa daga matsayin sojoji ta fuskar kasancewarsa ƙarfin da ake aiwatar da jihadi da shi, a matsayin hanyar da Khalifah ke sa ido a kanta wajen ɗaukar da'awa, wannan tambaya ce da ta shafi manufar harkokin wajen Daula, wadda sojoji da al'amuran soja ba su da wuri a cikinta. Wannan saboda manufar harkokin wajen Daular Musulunci tana kan ɗaukar da'awa zuwa ga duniya, kuma tunda hanyar da Khalifah ke sa ido a kan ɗaukar da'awa tana cikin jihadi kaɗai, to Daular Musulunci tana cikin halin jihadi na har abada. Saboda haka dukkan Al'ummar Musulunci tana imani cewa yaƙi tsakaninta da sauran Daulolin yana yiwuwa a kowane lokaci, kuma manufar Daula dole ne ta dogara ne akan shiri mai ci gaba domin jihadi. Tunda yaƙi a aikace ba a halatta shi ba sai bayan an riga an isar musu da da'awar Musulunci ta hanyar da ke jawo hankali, saboda haka manufar Daular Musulunci tana nufin ƙirƙirar yanayi tsakaninta da sauran Daulolin da zai ba da damar isar da Musulunci ga mutane da al'ummomi ta hanyar da ke jawo hankali; kuma hakan ya dogara ne akan shiri don shiga yaƙi a kowane lokaci idan ɗaukar da'awa ya buƙaci hakan. Ƙirƙirar yanayin da zai ba da damar isar da tunanin Musulunci da hukunce-hukuncensa ta hanyar da ke jawo hankali al'amari ne da babu makawa, domin yana ɗaya daga cikin ƙa'idojin jihadi da sharaɗin asali na fara yaƙi a aikace. Saboda haka wajibi ne a kan Khalifah ya ƙirƙiri wannan yanayi, kuma ya zama wajibi a kansa ya yi iyakar ƙoƙarinsa a hanyar ƙirƙirarsa. Dole ne ya kashe duk kuɗin da ake buƙata don samar da ita, kamar yadda dole ne ya ratsa ta cikin haɗari domin ya ci nasara, ya kare ƙarfin Musulunci, ko kuma ya kiyaye amanar Musulmi mai tsarki. Saboda haka, ƙara ƙarfin soji, kula da shirye-shiryen soji, da cikakken kulawa ga kimanta harkokin soji sune muhimman abubuwa wajen samar da wannan yanayi da kuma kiyaye shi, domin ƙarfin soji shi kaɗai ne garkuwa daga ƙarfin kafirci da ƙasashen kafirai. Wannan ne yake ba wa sojoji ko ƙarfin soji tasiri a cikin kula da Khalifa wajen ɗaukar da'awa; wato sojoji da ƙarfin makamai suna da tasiri a cikin manufofin waje domin su ne ginshiƙansa, daga inda hatsari ga manufofin waje ke fitowa, watau a kan kula da Khalifa wajen ɗaukar da'awa. Saboda haka wajibi ne a fahimci gaskiyar al'amarin dangane da tasirin sojoji a kan kula da Khalifa wajen ɗaukar da'awa, watau dangane da hatsarin hakan ga manufofin waje na Daula. Idan ba a fahimci wannan hatsari a hakikaninsa ba, hakan zai haifar ko dai da tsayawar ɗaukar da'awa zuwa ga duniya, ko kuma ruɗani da faɗuwa a cikin manufofin waje. Gina ƙarfin soji na Daular Musulunci ba shirye-shiryen kariya kawai ba ne; a'a, al'amari ne na wajibi wanda babu makawa domin Khalifa ya aiwatar da abin da Musulmi suka yi masa mubaya'a a kansa, watau Daula ta aiwatar da abin da Allah (swt) ya wajabta mata, wato ɗaukar da'awa. Ko kuma, a wasu kalmomin, Daula ta aiwatar da manufofinta na waje yadda Allah (swt) ya wajabta mata, da kuma kiyaye wannan manufa ta ci gaba da tafiya daidai kuma cikin amfani. Saboda haka gina ƙarfin soji, baya ga kasancewarsa garkuwa ɗaya tilo da Ummah ke da ita a kan firgicin kafirai masu yaƙi da kuma harin da za su iya kaiwa, hanya ce kaɗai ta sa manufofin waje na Daula su zama manufa ta Musulunci.

Duk da cewa Dawlah ta Musulunci dole ce ta gina ƙarfin soja ta hanyar kafa ƙwararriyar rundunar soja, hakan ba ya nufin cewa al'amuran soja sun mamaye siyasar harkokin wajen Dawlah, ko kuma rundunar soja tana da tasiri, ko kadan ko mai yawa, a kan siyasar harkokin wajen. Wannan kuwa saboda ra'ayin soja ra'ayi ne na wata sana'a ta musamman, wanda ke fitowa daga waɗanda aikinsu shi ne tabbatar wa Dawlah ƙwarewar soja idan yaƙi ya tashi tsakaninta da wasu ƙasashe. Ta yanayi da kuma a aikace, ra'ayinsu yana ƙunshe da dukkan matakan kariya; amma ba a halatta ya wuce a yi la'akari da shi a matsayin shawara kawai ba; haka kuma ba a halatta ya wuce zama shawarar mutane na wata sana'a ta musamman wadda tunaninsu bai wuce wani bangare na musamman a wannan maudu'i ba. Saboda haka ba daidai ba ne a bi wannan shawara a kowane abu, ƙanana ko manya; haka kuma ba daidai ba ne a yi nazarinta sai dai a matsayin da take da shi a cikin babban nazarin siyasar harkokin waje. Ana karɓar ta a fannin ƙwarewarta ta fasaha kawai, don haka ana ɗaukar abin da ke cikin ƙwarewarta ta fasaha da kuma abin da ake ɗauka a cikinta a matsayinsa a cikin siyasar harkokin waje; shawara ce, ba tuntuɓa ba. Wato, Khalifah yana neman ta yayin da yake nazarin siyasar harkokin waje, kuma an halatta ya saurare ta idan aka faɗa ta don kawai sauraro, bisa sharaɗin cewa yana cikin yanayin kula sosai da siyasar harkokin waje da kuma kula sosai da matsayin wannan shawara cikin shawarwarin siyasar harkokin waje. Ba a halatta ya ba ta fiye da haka ba. Domin idan bai yi haka ba, ya ba ta muhimmanci fiye da yadda ya kamata shawara ta kasance, to babu shakka za a sami haɗari ga siyasar harkokin waje; ko dai rikicewa ko rugujewa a siyasar harkokin waje ko kuma dakatar da ɗaukar da'awah. Ma'ana, za a iya samun fiye da haka, domin kuma yana iya haifar da rugujewar Dawlah da kewayewa daga yankin da ikonta ke yaɗuwa. Saboda haka ba a halatta a ba wa ra'ayin soja fifiko fiye da kasancewa kawai shawara ba.

However even though the Islamic State is inevitably obliged to build military strength via a strong military apparatus, this does not mean that military considerations dominate over the State’s foreign policy nor that the military apparatus has influence, whether big or small, over the foreign policy. This is because the military opinion is an opinion by a specific profession emanating from those whose job is to guarantee the State a military excellence if war occurs between it and other States. Naturally and practically, their opinion encompasses all precautions; but it is not permitted that it exceeds in its consideration as being advice only; nor is it permitted to exceed being the advice of persons in a specific profession whose thought does not exceed a specific aspect in this subject. Accordingly it is not correct to follow this advice in everything, small or large; nor is it correct to study it except in the place it occupies in a general study of foreign policy. It is adopted in its technical expertise only, so it is taken when it is its technical expertise and what is taken within it in its place in the foreign policy; it is advice and not consultation. That is, the Khalifah seeks it when he studies foreign policy and it is permitted to listen to it when it is said for mere listening on condition that it is in the situation of careful attention to the foreign policy and careful attention to the place of this advice in the resolutions of the foreign policy. It is it allowed to give it more (regard) than that. This is because if he does not do this, and gives it greater consideration than it being mere advice, there will without any doubt be danger to the foreign policy; either confusion or tumbling down in the foreign policy or the halting of the carrying of the da’wah. Infact, there could be more than that as there could result tumbling down of the State and siege from the area upon which its authority is spread. Therefore it is not allowed to give the military opinion more (regard) than being merely advice.

Lokacin da sojoji ke gudanar da aikinsu a matsayinsu na sojoji, suna yin sa ne a matsayin mutane masu ƙwarewa. Ba sa barin cikin tunaninsu amfanuwa da ra'ayin jama'ar duniya, ko ko an isar da kira zuwa Musulunci ta hanyar da ke jan hankali; haka nan ba sa lissafin tasirin da suke da shi wajen fuskantar abokan gaba. Ba sa ƙoƙarin sanya cikin awunansu ƙarfin ruhi da ɗabi'a mai girma; haka nan ba sa damuwa wajen fahimtar ayyukan masu da'wah da ke zaune a ƙasashen abokan gaba ko waɗanda ke zuwa can domin da'wah. Ba su fahimtar hanyoyin diflomasiyya ko babbar darajar tasirin ayyukan siyasa. Saboda haka, tunanin soja tunani ne na son zuciya, ba cikakken tunanin siyasa ba. Idan aka karɓi shawararsu, shawara ce mai amfani a fagen da take, amma idan aka ba su ikon aiki da yanke hukunci, kuma shawararsu ta zama tilas ta kowace irin hanya, to babu shakka hakan zai cutar da daidaito da tsarin siyasa. Saboda haka, ba a yarda a bar rundunar soji ta yi tasiri a manufofin harkokin waje ba, kuma ra'ayoyin soja ba su wuce matsayin shawara ta fasaha kawai ba, ba shawara ta gaba ɗaya ba.

When soldiers fulfil their work in their military capacity, they fulfil it as people of expertise. They do not permit into their considerations the benefiting from world public opinion or whether the invitation to Islam has been conveyed in a manner capturing attention; and their influence in meeting the enemy. They do not attempt to take into their measurements the redoubtable possibilities in the spiritual and morale strength; nor do they take concern to understand the actions of the da’wah carriers who live in the enemy lands or who go there for da’wah. They do not understand diplomatic means or the great influencing value of political actions. Due to this, military thinking is a subjective thought and not comprehensive political thinking. If their advice is taken it is valuable advice in its subject, but if they are given the authority of action and resolution, and if their advice has any type of compulsion this will without doubt cause harm to political steadiness and conduct. Therefore it is not allowed to permit the military apparatus to have influence in the foreign policy and the military opinions do not occupy a place exceeding their being no more than mere technical advice, not being general advice.

Duk da haka, takaita matsayin ra'in sojoji ga shawara ta fasaha kawai ba yana nufin yin watsi da kimantawar soji ba; ma'anarsa kawai ita ce Khalifa dole ne ya sa kimantawarsa ta fi kimantawar soji muhimmanci. Ya wajaba a kansa, idan ya tsara shirin ƙarshe, ya kasance a shirye ya ɗauki nauyin, har ya yi watsi da kimantawar soji zalla a wasu lokuta. Dole ne ya sa kimantawar waɗanda ba sojoji ba, kamar mataimakan (mua'winin), gwamnoni, mutane masu tasiri da malamai, ta fi (daraja) kimantawar soji; duk da haka Khalifa dole ne ya girmama matsayin manyan sojoji a cikin Dawla, ko dai wajen kare ƙasa ko fara jihadi da kafirai. Saboda haka ya wajaba a kansa da dukkan Ummah su kiyaye ƙarfin soji kamar yadda mutum yake kiyaye baiwar idanunsa. Sai dai 'yan siyasa, ba sojoji ba, ne ke mamaye tsara manufofin ƙasashen waje, su ne kuma za su yanke shawarar yadda za a shirya don fuskantar hatsarin yaƙi, yaushe za a shiga yaƙi idan ya faru, da kuma yadda da lokacin da abin zai faru cikin gaggawa. Ya wajaba a kan Khalifa ya sa ƙarfin soji koyaushe ya zama sashe mai biyayya, kuma kada ya bar tsarin soji, ko wani mutum, ya wuce matsayin manufar da take bi.

However, restricting the place of soldiers’ opinions to being mere technical advice does not mean neglecting military evaluations; rather its meaning is only that the Khalifah must make his evaluations dominant over military evaluations. It is upon him, when he plans the final plan to be ready in bearing the responsibility by ignoring purely military evaluations at certain times. He must make the evaluations of non-soldiers such as the assistants (mua’winin), governors, people of influence and scholars as more (worthy) than military evaluations; nevertheless the Khalifah must value the position of high ranking soldiers in the State, whether in respect of defending the land or initiating jihad with the disbelievers. Therefore it is obligatory upon him and the whole Ummah to preserve military strength just like the individual preserves the gift of his eye(s). However it is the politicians, not the soldiers, who dominate the planning of foreign policy and they are the ones to resolve how to prepare to face the dangers of war, when should they enter into war if it occurs and when this occurs how quickly and when. It is obligatory upon the Khalifah to always make the military power a following department and also not to allow the military apparatus, or any individual, to exceed the role of the following policy.

Wannan yana da alaƙa da matsayin hukumar soji da ra'ayoyinta. Game da yadda Khalifah ke tantance kimantawar soji, ba ya isa a karɓe su a matsayin shawarwarin fasaha kawai sannan a ba kimantawar soji tasiri a cikin shawararsa game da manufofin harkokin waje. Akasin haka, dole ne a ɗauki kimantawar soji a matsayin shawara kawai, kuma ba zai yiwu ba wannan shawara ta yi tasiri a kan manufofin harkokin waje, wato ba a halatta ya gina manufofin harkokin waje a kanta ba ko kuma ta sami tasiri mai ƙarfi a kansu. An haramta kimantawar soji ta mamaye manufofin harkokin waje; akasin haka, wajibi ne a bar kimantawar soji a gefe a cikin manufofin harkokin waje na Daula. Kimantawar soji dole ta kasance, a matsayinta na kimantawar soji, ko ta fito daga sojoji ko daga fararen hula, a wuri nesa da yin tasiri ga Khalifah lokacin da yake tsara manufofin harkokin waje.

This is in relation to the role of the military apparatus and its opinions. As for how the Khalifah evaluates military evaluations, it is not sufficient to adopt them as no more than mere technical advices then give military evaluations an influence in his decisions on the foreign policy. Rather military evaluations must be considered as mere advise, and it impossible that there is influence of this advice on the foreign policy i.e. it is not allowed for him to base the foreign policy upon it or that it has an effective impact over it. It is forbidden that military evaluations dominate the foreign policy; rather it is obligatory to leave military evaluations at the margin of the State’s foreign policy. Military evaluations must remain, in their being military evaluations whether emanating from soldiers or civilians in a place distant from influencing the Khalifah when he plans the foreign policy.

Harkokin soji suna da wani tsari na zahiri mai ganuwa. Idan mutum yana iya ganin manyan bindigogi, jiragen ruwan yaƙi, jiragen sama, sansanonin soji, bama-baman nukiliya da makamai masu linzami; kuma yana iya gamsuwa cikin sauƙi ba tare da wahala ba game da tasirinsu wajen nasara ko shan kashi a mamaye ko kewaye, ci gaba ko koma baya. Waɗannan abubuwa ne na zahiri waɗanda za a iya auna girmansu; suna da tasirin zahiri wanda sakamakonsa za a iya ji. Wannan ya sha bamban da ƙarfin ruhi da na ɗabi'a, da dabarun siyasa, da ra'ayin jama'a na yanki da na duniya, domin waɗannan ba al'amura ne na zahiri ba. Ba abu ne mai sauƙi a fahimci tasirinsu ko a ji sakamakonsu ba, domin abubuwa ne marasa ganuwa, waɗanda ba a iya ji ba, duk da cewa suna da matuƙar muhimmanci kuma suna da ƙarfi sosai a cikin manufofin ƙasashen waje, har ma a yaƙi da mamayewa. Saboda haka, kimanta harkokin soji dole ne ya kasance a gefe a cikin manufofin ƙasashen waje, don ya kasance mai matsayi na biyu a can, alhali ƙarfin ruhi shi ne a gaba, sannan ƙarfin ɗabi'a shi ne mafi rinjaye. Dabarun siyasa da hikimominta dole ne su sami wuri mai muhimmanci a cikin kimantawa, kuma duk waɗannan dole ne a haɗa su waje ɗaya a cikin ƙarfin siyasa guda ɗaya wanda ba a raba shi ba, wanda Khalifa ɗaya zai kula da shi. Daga wannan za mu iya fahimtar ma'anoni uku na kula da Khalifa ga shugabancin sojoji shi kaɗai kuma a aikace, da kuma haɗarin ba wa sojoji shugabanci na hukuma ko babban iko kamar yadda aka zo da shi a wasu kalamai.

Military matters take a distinct tangible form. If you are able to see cannons, military ships, planes, bases, nuclear bombs and missiles; and you are able to be convinced easily and without difficulty about their influence in success or defeat in conquest or siege, advance or retreat. These are material things whos dimensions can be measured; they have a material influence whose results are possible to be sensed. This is opposite to spiritual and morale strength, and political manoeuvring and regional and world public opinion as these are not material matters. It is not easy to understand their influence and sense their results since they are intangible things, unseen and unsensed though they are very important and of higher vitality in foreign policy and even in war and conquest. Therefore military evaluations must remain at the margin of foreign policy so as to remain secondary there in whereas spiritual strength comes first and then the morale strength is dominant. Political manoeuvrings and subtleties must have a prominent place in evaluation, and that all these should be collected together in a united political strength which is not subjected to separation, supervised by one Khalifah. From this we can understand three meanings of the Khalifah’s supervision of the army leadership solely and practically, and the danger of giving the army formal leadership or supreme command as has come according to some expressions.

Yin amfani da kimantawar soja a matsayin babban abin da ke jagorantar manufofin waje, kamar yadda wasu daga cikin Khulafa'u suka yi, ya yi mummunan tasiri, domin hakan ya kai ga tsayar da isar da da'wah ga duniya a zamani na biyu na daular Abbasiyya da kuma ƙarshen zamanin Daular Usmaniyya. Fitowar Musulunci a ƙasar Roman ta tsaya a iyakokin ƙasashen Turkawa a gefen Bilad ash-Sham, a Yammacin Turai kuwa sun ja da baya daga Faransa, suka tsaya a iyakokin Spain, duk da cewa ƙarfin ruhi ya ci gaba da kasancewa mai ƙarfi, kuma tunanin Musulunci yana cikin zamanin tattarawa da ƙarfafawa. Duk da haka, sa'ad da sojoji suke bayar da ra'ayinsu game da ƙarfinsu da ƙarfin abokan gaba, suka sanya waɗannan ra'ayoyin a matsayin abin da za a fara la'akari da shi kafin shiga yaƙi ko a'a, to, shawarar ƙarshe ta kasance yakin bazara da na hunturu, don haka jihadi ya ci gaba da kasancewa yana aiki bisa ƙa'idojin Shari'a ba tare da ya wuce haka zuwa ayyukan siyasa ko kimantawar siyasa ba. A zamanin Usmanawa, rundunonin Musulunci sun kai bangon birnin Vienna a ƙasar Austriya bayan sun mamaye Turai, ciki har da Girka, Bulgaria, Romania, Albaniya da Yugoslabiya, har ikon Musulunci ya bazu a dukkan waɗannan yankuna. Har ra'ayin jama'a a Turai ya kasance cewa ba za a iya cin rundunar Musulunci ba. Sa'ad da kimantawar soja ta mamaye manufofin waje sakamakon juyin juya halin masana'antu da ya faru a Turai a karni na sha takwas miladiyya, yaduwar Musulunci ta tsaya, koma baya ya fara, wanda ya kai ga lalata ikon Musulunci gaba ɗaya.

Making military evaluations dominant over foreign policy as was done by some Khulafaa had a terrible influence leading to halting the carrying of the da’wah to the world in the second period of the Abbasid age and the end of the Ottoman age. Islamic conquests stopped in the Roman land at the limits of Turkish lands in the side of Bilad AsSham, and in Western Europe they retreated from France and stopped at the Spanish borders despite the fact that the spiritual energy remained strong and Islamic thoughts were in the age of concentration and consolidation. However, when soldiers would give their opinions about their strength and the enemy’s strength, and made these opinions the first consideration in entering war or not, the deciding decision was the summer and winter campaigns so that jihad remained existing in working according to the Shar’a rules without going beyond this to be political actions or political evaluations. In the days of the Ottomans, the Islamic armies reached the walls of Vienna in Austria after sweeping Europe including Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and Yugoslavia so that the authority of Islam spread over all these quarters. Until the public opinion in Europe was that the Islamic army could not be conquered. When military evaluations dominated foreign policy as an effect of the industrial revolution which occurred in Europe in the eighteenth century CE, the spread of Islam stopped and the ebb began which led to the complete destruction of the authority of Islam.

Wannan yana nufin cewa sojoji sune ƙarfin da ake aiwatar da jihadi da shi. Amma kasancewarsu ƙarfin da ke tsayawa wajen kare iko a cikin ƙasa da waje, wannan yana da alaƙa da ƙarfin abin duniya ta fuskar cewa shi ne rayuwar iko, watau mulki. Shi ne yake kare shi, kuma yana da ikon hallaka shi da ikon kafa shi, amma na ɗan lokaci kawai. Saboda haka matsayin sojoji da rundunonin tsaro muhimmin matsayi ne a cikin iko, a cikin ainihinsa a matsayin iko. Wannan yana sa mutum ya yi tunanin cewa sojoji suna da babban tasiri a cikin iko; sai dai gaskiyar magana ita ce, koda an yarda a sa ra'ayoyin soja a cikin manufofin waje ta hanyar karɓar shawararsu, ba a yarda a kowane hali ba cewa rundunar soji ko wani mutum a cikinta ya sami wani matsayi a cikin iko fiye da kasancewarsa soja. Wannan saboda iko, koda rundunar soji ce ke kare shi, babu wani matsayi ga sojoji a cikinsa. Iko ba ƙarfi ne na zahiri ko wanda ya dogara da ƙarfin abin duniya ba; a maimakon haka, yana aiwatar da tsarin dangantaka a cikin al'umma kawai, kuma ya dogara ga Ummah ko mutane, tun da a zahiri yana ɓoye a cikinsu, ko a cikin ɓangaren da ya fi ƙarfi daga cikinsu. Sojoji da rundunar soji ba su da wata alaƙa da su. Eh, sojoji suna aiwatar da aikin, kuma ba zai yiwu ya wanzu ba tare da ƙarfin abin duniya ba, watau ba tare da sojoji ba, amma matsayinsu a cikinsa shi ne matsayin kayan aiki kawai, ba wani abu ba. Ba a yarda rawar da suke takawa wajen aiwatarwa ta wuce rawar bindiga a hannun soja lokacin da yake harbi a kan maƙiyi; watau (bindigar) ba ta da wani nufi ko ra'ayinta a kan hakan. Yana da haɗari ga hukunci (hukm) ya kasance sojoji suna cikin iko, watau mulki, a kowane hali. Lalle duk wani matsayi a gare su a cikinta, komai karami, zai mayar da ita jiha ta 'yan sanda, kamar matsayin jami'an 'yan sanda ga fursunoni, ba hukuma da ke aiwatar da tsara alaka ba.

This is in as far as the army is the power with which jihad is performed. As for it being the power which stands to preserve the authority internally and externally, this is related to the material power in respect of it being the authority’s life i.e. the rule. It is the one which protects it, and it has the potential to destroy it and the potential to establish it, though only temporarily. Therefore the place of the army and armed forces is an important place in the authority in its essence as an authority. This inspires (one) that the army has a large influence in the authority; however, the reality is that even if it allowed for the military evaluations to have a presence in foreign policy in relation to taking their advice, it is not allowed in any situation for the military apparatus nor for any individual within it to have a presence in the authority more than his being a soldier. This is because the authority, even if it is preserved by the military apparatus, there is no presence for soldiers within it. The authority is not a tangible material power or dependent upon material power; rather it only executes (tanfeedh) the system of relationships in the society and depends upon the Ummah or people since it is concealed in reality within them, or the stronger section among them. Soldiers and the military apparatus have no relationship with them. Yes, soldiers do undertake the execution and it cannot possibly exist without material power i.e. without soldiers, but their role in it is the role of a tool and nothing else. It is not allowed for their role in execution to exceed the role of a gun in a soldier’s hand when he fires upon the enemy; i.e. (the gun) has absolutely no will nor its own opinion regarding that. It is dangerous for the rule (hukm) to have soldiers in the authority i.e. the rule in any situation whatsoever. Verily any role for them within it, however little, will make it a police state like the role of the police officers (in relation) to prisoners, not an authority which executes the organising of relationships.

Duk wani matsayi da sojoji za su samu a cikin hukuma, komai ƙanƙantarsa, zai zama haɗari ga mulki, ga mai mulki da kuma ga tsarin Dawla. Wannan saboda mulkin da ke cikinta ya fi dacewa da gaskiya, a cikinsa akwai takura ga Shari'a, kuma a cikinsa ne adalci yake tabbatuwa. Ba ya la'akari da ƙarfin abin duniya dangane da mulki, ba ga mai mulki ba, ba kuma ga waɗanda ake mulka ba. Ƙarfinsa yana ɓoye ne cikin fahimtarsa ga al'amuran jama'a da ’yan ƙasa, ba saboda kayan aikin tilastawa da yake da shi ba. Idan ƙarfin abin duniya ya kasance a cikinsa, zai lalata yanayinsa a matsayin mulki, ya mayar da shi kawai iko mara iyaka da mulkin kama-karya; a nan ne hakikanin mulki da hukuma za su ɓace. Saboda haka, ba a halatta sojoji da tsarin soja su kasance da wani matsayi a cikinta ba; a maimakon haka, su kasance kayan aiki a hannun mai mulki, ba tare da wani 'yanci na yanke shawara ko ra'ayi a cikin mulki ba, sai dai kayan aiki marasa magana, babu wani abu da ya shafi nufi, ra'ayi da sauransu a cikinsu. Wannan kuwa dangane da haɗarinsu ga ginshiƙin mulki ne. Dangane da haɗarinsu ga mai mulki kuwa, tsarin soja da sojoji mutane ne da ke ɗauke da ilhamar rayuwa, wadda ɗaya daga cikin manyan bayyanarta shi ne jagoranci. Idan aka bar su suna da matsayi a cikin mulki, kuma suka ga cewa suna iya hallaka mai mulki, suna kuma kiyaye shi da ikonsa, za su yi tunanin cewa su ne tushen hukuma, kuma cewa ikon mai mulki ya dogara a kansu. Wannan zai tada a cikinsu jin jagoranci, ya kuma ƙara masa ƙarfi; haka kuma ƙarfin abin duniya yana hannunsu, don haka za su ƙwace mulki daga hannunsa da ƙarfi. Saboda haka, babban haɗari ne ga mai mulki ya bar tsarin soja ko sojoji su sami wani matsayi a cikin hukuma. Wannan ya faru a Dawlar Musulunci a zamanin Abbasiyawa da Usmaniyawa. Wasu daga cikin Khulafa'u sun zama masu rauni a gaban sojoji, ba da daɗewa ba kuma suka hambarar da su, ko kuma suka mayar da su kayan aiki a hannunsu. Sakamakon haka shi ne raguwar da ya faru a mulkin Daular Musulunci a zamanin waɗannan Khulafa'u.

Any role that exists for soldiers in the authority, however small, will be a danger to the rule, the ruler and the State’s entity. This is because the rule within it is more appropriate for truth, within it there is restriction to the Shar’a and in it justice is realized. It pays no consideration to material power in relation to the rule, neither for the ruler nor the ruled. Its strength is hidden in its perception of the affairs of the people and its citizens, not due to the tools of execution it has. If the material power exists within it, it will spoil its nature as rule and transform it into mere absolute authority and domination; at this point there ceases to exist the reality of the rule and authority.. Accordingly it is not allowed for soldiers and the military apparatus to have any presence within it; rather they must remain tools in the hands of the ruler with absolutely no free will in the rule or opinion but rather mere dumb tools devoid of all that is related to will, opinion etc. This is in relation to its danger to the essence of the rule. As for its danger to the ruler, the military apparatus and soldiers are men within whom is the survival instinct, one of whose most important manifestations is leadership. If they are left to have a presence in the rule, and they see themselves as able to destroy the ruler and that they preserve him and his authority, they will imagine that they are the basis of authority and that upon them depends the ruler’s authority. This will agitate within them the sensation of leadership and add to it; also the material power is in their hands so they will take the rule by force from him. Therefore it is a calamitous danger for the ruler to allow the military apparatus or soldiers any presence in the authority. This occurred in the Islamic State in the time of the Abbasids and Ottomans. Some of the Khulafaa became weak in front of the soldiers, and it was not long before they overthrew them or made them tools in their hands. A result of this was the decline which occurred in the rule of the Islamic State in the days of these Khulafaa.

Dangai na kasancewar kowane irin matsayi ga sojoji a cikin mulki, ga ƙungiyar Ummah da ƙungiyar Dawla, shi ne cewa Dawlar Islama, saboda yanayin tunanin da take ɗauke da shi, tana kewaye da abokan gaba. Hukuncin Shari'a da Dawla da Ummah dole su bi shi shi ne cewa dukkan duniya ko dai ƙasar Musulunci ce ko kuma ƙasar yaƙi. Ƙasashen da Musulunci ke mulki da tutar Musulunci ke inuwantarsu sune ƙasar Musulunci; duk abin da ke sauran duniya shi ne Kufur ko ƙasar yaƙi. Saboda haka Dawlar Islama tana kewaye da abokan gaba a kowane lokaci, suna jiran dama su kai hari. Idan aka ba sojoji kowane irin kasancewa a cikin mulki, komai ƙanƙantar matsayinsu, za a fi sauƙin ƙulla musu makarkashiya daga abokan gaba fiye da yadda ake ƙulla wa 'yan siyasa, domin yanayin aikinsu aikin soja ne na zahiri, don haka yana da wuya su fahimci dabaru masu nisa da al'amuran siyasa a ɓoye. Saboda haka ana iya ƙulla musu su kwace mulki ko su canza shugabanni a madadin wasu amfani ga ƙasa bisa ra'ayinsu, ko kuma amfanin kansu. Anan akwai hatsari, ba ga shugabannin mulki ba, ba kuma ga mulkin kansa ba, sai dai ga ƙungiyar Ummah da ƙungiyar Dawla, domin ƙungiyar Ummah ita ce tarin mutane tare da tarin ra'ayoyi, ma'auni da akida. Ƙungiyar Dawla kuwa ita ce tarin mutanen da ke da ikon yin mulki tare da tarin ma'auni, ra'ayoyi da akida. Idan sojoji suka kwace mulki saboda ƙulla makarkashiyar waje, za su shigar da wasu ra'ayoyi, ma'auni da akidu daban da waɗanda ke cikin Dawla a cikinsu, watau sojojin. A sakamakon haka za su shigo cikin ƙungiyar Dawla da lahani, har ma tasirin ƙasashen Kafirai zai iya shiga, wanda zai haifar da watsewa da raguwa. Saboda haka, yarda da kowane irin kasancewar soja ko sojoji a cikin iko, watau mulki, babban hatsari ne abin ƙyama.

As for the danger of the presence of any role for soldiers in the rule to the Ummah’s entity and the State’s entity, the Islamic State due to the nature of the thought it carries is surrounded by enemies. The Shari’ah rule which the State and the Ummah must adhere to is that the whole world is either an Islamic homeland or a war homeland. The lands which rule by Islam and the Islamic flag shades them are the Islamic homeland; everything else throughout the world is Kufr or war homeland. Therefore the Islamic State is surrounded by enemies at all times waiting for the opportunity to attack. If soldiers are given any presence in the rule, however small their role, their incitement by the enemies is easier than the incitement of politicians since the nature of their work is material military work so it is difficult for them to understand remote manoeuvres and hidden political ramifications. Therefore they can be incited to seize the rule or change the rulers in exchange for some gains for the country according to their opinion or personal gains for them. Herein exists danger not to the ruling personalities nor upon the rule itself but upon the Ummah’s entity and the State’s entity because the Ummah’s entity is the collection of people together with the collection of concepts, measurements and convictions. The State’s entity is the collection of people with the authority to rule with the collection of measurements, concepts and convictions. If the soldiers seize the rule due to foreign incitement, there would infiltrate into them, i.e. the soldiers, concepts, measurements and convictions other than those in the State. Therein defects will enter into the State’s entity; there could even enter the influence of Kafir states which will result in dissipation and decline. Accordingly, tolerance for any presence for the military presence or soldiers in the authority i.e. rule is an abominable danger.

Al-Ummah al-Islamiyyah ta sha wahala daga hadarin kasancewar sojoji a cikin mulki, saboda abin da ya same ta na shigar lalacewa cikin jikin Dawla da Ummah, sannan halakar jikin Dawlar Islamiyyah da jikin Ummah Islamiyyah daga wanzuwa. A zamanin karshe na Daular Usmaniyya, ofisoshin jakadancin kasashen kafirai da ke Istanbul sun yi tasiri a kan sojoji har suka shiga cikin tsarin Dawla ra'ayoyi, ma'auni da akidu wadanda ba na Musulunci ba. Rawar da Madhat Pasha da jami'an da ke tare da shi suka taka wajen kirkirar wadannan ra'ayoyi, ma'auni da akidu na daga cikin fitattun rawanin da aka taka, musamman juyin mulkin da ya kawo Abdulhamid ya zama Khalifa, da juyin mulkin da ya cire Abdulhamid daga Khilafah ya kawo Muhammad Rashad a matsayin Khalifa. Kafin hakan, rawar da Muhammad Ali ya taka a Masar tana da girma wajen mayar da kansa wakilin Faransa wajen kai hari ga Khilafah ta Musulunci a Istanbul. Sannan akwai rawar Mustafa Kemal, bayan shan kayen Daular Usmaniyya a Yakin Duniya na Daya, wajen yin makirci tare da Turawan Ingila don rushe Khilafah, a madadin cire Khalifofi daga Istanbul da taimakon da ya samu a taron zaman lafiya. Wadannan rawar da sojoji suka taka sun girgiza jikin Dawlar Islamiyyah sannan suka cire ta, sannan suka cire jikin Ummah Islamiyyah daga wanzuwa. Saboda haka, ba a halatta a bar rundunar soji ko sojoji su sami kowane matsayi a cikin mulki ba.

The Islamic Ummah Suffered from the danger of the presence of a role soldiers in authority via what befell it of the infiltration of defects into the entity of the State and Ummah, and then the destruction of the entity of the Islamic State and the entity of the Islamic Ummah from existence. In the last period of the Ottomans, the embassies of the Kafir states in Istanbul influenced the soldiers until there entered in the State apparatus unIslamic concepts, measurements and convictions. The role of Madhat Pasha and the officers together with him in creating these concepts, measurements and convictions is of the most prominent roles, particularly the coup that brought Abdulhamid to be the Khalifah and the coup that removed Abdulhamid from the Khilafah and brought Muhammad Rashad as Khalifah. Before that, the role of Muhammad Ali in Egypt was great in making himself a French agent in striking the Islamic Khilafah in Istanbul. Then the role of Mustapha Kamal, following the defeat of the Ottoman State in World War One, in conspiring with the English in destroying the Khilafah in exchange for removing the Khulafaa from Istanbul and helping him in the peace conference. These roles undertaken by soldiers shook the entity of the Islamic State and then removed it, and then removed the entity of the Islamic Ummah from existence. Therefore it is not allowed to permit the military apparatus or soldiers any presence in authority.