Тўрт буюк давлат сионизмга содиқ. Ва сионизм, тўғри бўлсин ёки нотўғри, яхши бўлсин ёки ёмон, асрлар давомида шаклланган анъаналарга, ҳозирги эҳтиёжларга, келажакдаги умидларга асосланади ва бу ҳозир ўша қадимий ерда яшаётган 700 000 [Фаластин] араб аҳолисининг истак ва ҳукмларидан анча муҳимроқдир. (Артур Жеймс Балфур, Нуттинг 2013 да келтирилган)

The four Great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far greater import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 [Palestine] Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land. (Arthur James Balfour, cited in Nutting 2013)

Sionistik kolonializm Falastindagi nizoning markazida turadi; kolonializm esa tarixiy epizod emas, balki tuzilmadir (Wolfe 2006). Sionistik kolonializm Yevropa mustamlakachiligiga chuqur borib taqaladi. Mahalliy xalqlarning mavjudligi va huquqlarini e'tiborsiz qoldirgan holda, ingliz mustamlakachilari dunyoning katta qismlarini ko'pincha terra nullius, ya'ni "hech kimning yeri" deb hisoblashgan. Bu ibora (dastlab Rim huquqidan olingan) hech bir Yevropa davlatining suverenitetiga bo'ysunmaydigan hududni ifodalash uchun ishlatilgan; terra nullius hisoblangan hudud ustidan suverenitet esa bosib olish va/yoki ko'chmanchi-mustamlakachilik orqali qo'lga kiritilishi mumkin edi.

Zionist settler-colonialism is at the heart of the conflict in Palestine; settler-colonialism is a structure not an episode (Wolfe 2006). Zionist settler-colonialism is deeply rooted in European colonialism. Ignoring the existence and rights of indigenous peoples, British colonialists often saw large parts of the earth as terra nullius, ‘nobody’s land’. This (originally Roman legal) expression was used to describe territory which was not subject to the sovereignty of any European state – sovereignty over territory which is terra nullius may be acquired through occupation and/ or settler-colonisation.

XIX asrning oxiri-da Yevropada "sionizm millatchiligi" settler-mustamlakachilik orqali Falastinni egallash va "barcha yahudiylarni to'plash" chaqirig'ini ko'targan siyosiy kuch sifatida paydo bo'lganida, Falastinning allaqachon aholi yashaydigan joy ekanligiga kam e'tibor berildi. Darhaqiqat, 1897 yilda siyosiy sionizmni boshlab bergan Birinchi Sion kongressida qabul qilingan Bazel dasturi harakatning maqsadini bayon qilganda, Falastinning mahalliy aholisi haqida hech narsa demagan: "yahudiy xalqi uchun Falastinda jamoat va huquqiy jihatdan himoyalangan vatan barpo etish".

When in the late 19th century European ‘Zionism nationalism’ arose as a political force calling for the settler-colonisation of Palestine and the ‘gathering of all Jews’, little attention was paid to the fact that Palestine was already populated. Indeed, the Basel Programme adopted at the First Zionist Congress, which launched political Zionism in 1897, made no mention of a Palestinian indigenous population when it spelled out the movement’s objective: ‘the establishment of a publicly and legally secured home in Palestine for the Jewish people’.

Bundan tashqari, Sion tarafdorlari o'z loyihalari uchun qo'llab-quvvatlash izlagan dastlabki yillarda G'arbda "odamsiz yer – yersiz xalq uchun" degan irqchi afsonani targ'ib qildilar. Bu shior Isroil Zangvill tomonidan ommalashtirilgan edi. U taniqli ingliz-yahudiy yozuvchisi bo'lib, Britaniya matbuotida Sionizm vakili sifatida tez-tez keltirilar, shuningdek, Britaniyada Sion harakatining eng dastlabki tashkilotchilaridan biri edi. 1914 yilgacha ham Xaim Veyzman – keyinchalik Isroilning birinchi Prezidenti bo'lgan, Teodor Gertsl va Devid Ben-Gurion bilan birga Sion orzusini haqiqatga aylantirishda eng katta mas'uliyatga ega uchta kishidan biri bo'lgan shaxs – shunday degan edi:

Moreover, in the early years of their efforts to secure support for their enterprise, the Zionists propagated in the West the racist myth of ‘a land without a people for a people without a land’, a slogan popularised by Israel Zangwill, a prominent Anglo-Jewish writer often quoted in the British press as a spokesman for Zionism and one of the earliest organisers of the Zionist movement in Britain. Even as late as 1914, Chaim Weizmann, who was to become the first President of Israel and who, along with Theodor Herzl and David Ben-Gurion, was one of the three men most responsible for turning the Zionist dream into reality, stated:

Дастлабки босқичда сионизмни унинг пешқадамлари тўлиқ равишда механик омилларга боғлиқ бир ҳаракат сифатида тасаввур қилишган: Фаластин деб аталган бир мамлакат бор, ва унда халқ йўқ; бошқа томондан эса яҳудий халқи бор, унинг эса ўз мамлакати йўқ. Унда бу халқни бу мамлакат билан бирлаштириш учун узукка кўзни жойлаштиришдан бошқа нима керак? Демак, мамлакат эгалари [туркларга] бу никоҳнафақат [яҳудий] халқ ва мамлакат учун, балки ўзлари учун ҳам фойдали эканига ишонтирилиши ва инонтирилиши керак эди.1

In its initial stage, Zionism was conceived by its pioneers as a movement wholly depending on mechanical factors: there is a country which happens to be called Palestine, a country without a people, and, on the other hand, there exists the Jewish people, and it has no country. What else is necessary, then, than to fit the gem into the ring, to unite this people with this country? The owners of the country [the Turks] must, therefore, be persuaded and convinced that this marriage is advantageous, not only for the [Jewish] people and for the country, but also for themselves.1

Na Zangvill, na Vaysman bu demografik baholarni so'zma-so'z ma'noda nazarda tutmagan. Ular Falastinda odamlar yo'q degani emas edi, balki o'sha paytda hukmronlik qilayotgan Yevropa irqchilik ustunligi tushunchalari doirasida hisobga olishga arziydigan odamlar yo'q degani edi. Shu munosabat bilan, Yahudiy agentligining kolonizatsiya bo'limi boshlig'i Artur Ruppinga Vaysman bildirgan bir izoh ayniqsa ochib beruvchidir.

Neither Zangwill nor Weizmann intended these demographic assessments in a literal fashion. They did not mean that there were no people in Palestine, but that there were no people worth considering within the framework of the notions of racist European supremacy that then held sway. In this connection, a comment by Weizmann to Arthur Ruppin, the head of the colonisation department of the Jewish Agency, is particularly revealing.

Ruppin Ruppin savoliga javoban Veyczman mahalliy falastinlik arablar haqida shunday dedi: "Inglizlar bizga u yerda bir necha yuz ming negrlar [ibroniy tilida: kushim, qora tanlilar] borligini aytishdi va ular uchun hech qanday qadr yo'q."2

When asked by Ruppin about the indigenous Palestinian Arabs, Weizmann replied: ‘The British told us that there are there some hundred thousand niggers [Hebrew: kushim, negroes] and for those there is no value.’2

Ingliz tilida "nigger" so'zi Oq tanlilarning qora tanli va afrikalik odamlarga qaratilgan irqchi haqoratidir. Uning kamsituvchi ma'nolari ingliz tilidagi yana bir haqoratli so'z, "philistine"ni eslatadi; Buyuk Britaniyadagi oq tanlilar uni Injildagi xurofotlardan olib, kundalik nutqda keng tarqatganlar. Biroq Veyzman va uning hamkorlari faoliyat yuritgan oq tanli irqchi mustamlakachilik muhitida Falastin aholisiga nisbatan "nigger" deb murojaat qilish ularga tabiiy va odatiy tuyulgan bo'lardi. Veyzmanning demografik irqchiligi va Shaftsberining Injildagi sharqshunoslik qarashlarini aks ettirgan holda, Zengvill o'zining shiorining haqiqiy ma'nosini 1920-yilda ajoyib aniqlik bilan ochiq aytib bergan.

In the English language, the word nigger is a White racist slur directed at Black and African people. Its derogatory connotations echo another pejorative English word, philistine, which White Britain borrowed from biblical prejudices and popularised in daily parlance. However, in the White racist colonial culture within which Weizmann and co. operated, the reference to the indigenous people of Palestine as nigger would have been instinctive and natural. Echoing Weizmann’s demographic racism and Shaftesbury’s biblical Orientalism, Zangwill himself spelled out the actual meaning of his slogan with admirable clarity in 1920:

Agar Lord Shaftesbury Falastinni "odamsiz mamlakat" deb tasvirlashda so'zma-so'z aniq bo'lmagan bo'lsa ham, u mohiyatan to'g'ri edi, chunki mamlakat bilan chambarchas birlashgan, uning resurslaridan foydalanadigan va unga o'ziga xos iz qoldiradigan arab xalqi yo'q: u yerda, eng yaxshi holda, arablarning chodirlari bor, xolos. (Zangvill 1920: 104; qarang: Kamel 2015)

If Lord Shaftesbury was literally inexact in describing Palestine as a country without a people, he was essentially correct, for there is no Arab people living in intimate fusion with the country, utilising its resources and stamping it with a characteristic impress: there is at best an Arab encampment. (Zangwill 1920: 104; see also Kamel 2015)

Britaniyaning ichki va imperiya manfaatlari, yahudiy sionistlarining lobbichilari (ayniqsa Xaim Vaysman, 1874‒1952) va xristian sionistlarining payg'ambarlik siyosati o'zaro ta'sir etib, 1917 yilgi Balfur deklaratsiyasiga olib keldi. Bu deklaratsiya Falastinda "yahudiy vatani" berilishini va'da qildi (Anderson, I. 2005: 1, 57‒58). Shunda dunyo imperiyasi sifatida Britaniya birinchi marta Falastinni egallash bo'yicha sionistlar harakatiga rasmiy ruxsat berdi. 2 noyabr sanasi bilan belgilangan bu juda bahsli hujjat Tashqi ishlar vaziri Artur Jeyms Balfur (keyinchalik lord Balfur) tomonidan, sionistlar harakatining taniqli britaniyalik yahudiy tarafdori Lionel Uolter (lord) Rotshildga yozilgan xat shaklida e'lon qilindi va siyosiy sionizmga Britaniya qo'llab-quvvatlashini bildirdi.

The interplay between British domestic and imperial considerations, Jewish Zionist lobbyists (especially Chaim Weizmann, 1874‒1952) and Christian Zionist prophetic politics would lead to the Balfour Declaration of 1917 which promised a ‘Jewish homeland’ in Palestine (Anderson, I. 2005: 1, 57‒58). Then an imperial world power, Britain gave sanction for the first time to the Zionist campaign for possession of Palestine. This highly controversial document, dated 2 November, was issued by Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour (later Lord Balfour), in the form of a letter to a prominent British Jewish supporter of the Zionist movement, Lionel Walter (Lord) Rothschild, declaring British support for political Zionism:

Hukumat Ko'pchilik Hazrati (Oliy Hukumat) Falastinda yahudiy xalqi uchun milliy vatan barpo etilishini ma'qullaydi va bu maqsadga erishishni osonlashtirish uchun barcha sa'y-harakatlarini sarflaydi, shu bilan birga aniq tushuniladiki, Falastindagi mavjud yahudiy bo'lmagan jamoalarning fuqarolik va diniy huquqlariga, shuningdek boshqa har qanday mamlakatda yahudiylar tomonidan bahramand bo'lingan huquqlar va siyosiy mavqega zarar yetkazadigan hech narsa qilinmaydi. (Said 1980: 3 dan keltirilgan)

Her Majesty’s Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done to prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. (Quoted in Said 1980: 3)

Garchi sionistik yahudiy harakati XX asr boshlarida Falastinda bir qator xalqaro kongresslar o'tkazgan va kichik yahudiy koloniyalariga asos solgan bo'lsa-da, loyihani Falastinda yirik Yevropa mustamlakachi-ko'chmanchi loyihasiga aylantirgan narsa zamonning yetakchi imperiya davlatining sionizmni homiylik qilishi bo'ldi.

Although the Zionist Jewish movement had already initiated a series of international congresses and established small Jewish colonies in the early 20th century Palestine, it was the sponsorship of Zionism by the leading imperial power of the age that would transform the Zionist project into a major European settler-colonial project in Palestine.

Balfourning merosi pro-sionistik Deklaratsiyasi bilan ajralmas bo‘lib qoldi, uni u 1917 yilda e’lon qilgan edi. Deklaratsiyaning sabablari murakkab edi. Balfourning xristian sionizmi katta darajadagi yahudiylarga nisbatan nafrat (Judeophobia), “sionistik yahudiy kuchi”ga oid mubolag‘ali tasavvurlar va Sharqiy Yevropadan Britaniyaga yahudiylarning ommaviy ko‘chib kelishidan qo‘rqish bilan izohlanardi. Bosh vazir sifatida Balfour 1905 yilgi Chet elliklar to‘g‘risidagi qonunni qabul qilgan edi, uning asosiy maqsadi Sharqiy Yevropadan Britaniyaga yahudiylarning kirishini cheklash edi. Brayan Klug buni ancha shubha bilan bayon etgan: “Yahudiylarni Britaniyadan chetda tutish va ularni Falastinga jo‘natish bir antisemitik tanganing ikki tomoni edi”.3 Shu o‘rinda sionistik tarixchilar ko‘pincha turtki/motivlar bilan asoslash o‘rtasidagi farqni e’tibordan chetda qoldirib, Deklaratsiyani oqlash uchun Balfourning urushdan keyingi xristian sionistik ritorikasiga tayanishadi. Holbuki, Balfourning strategik va millatchilik xarakteridagi ichki motivlari va tashvishlari, ayniqsa Sharqiy Yevropa yahudiylarining Buyuk Britaniyaga oqib kelishini to‘xtatishga qaratilgan, yaxshi hujjatlashtirilgan harakatlari va siyosati, Deklaratsiyaning orqasidagi sabablarni baholashda, shuningdek, Balfour majburiyatining Falastin uchun uzoq muddatli halokatli oqibatlarini baholashda albatta hisobga olinishi kerak.

Balfour’s legacy became inseparable from the pro-Zionist Declaration he issued in 1917. The reasons for the declaration were complex. Balfour’s brand of Christian Zionism was driven by a great deal of Judeophobia, hyped perceptions of ‘Zionist Jewish power’ and of fears of mass immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe to Britain. As Prime Minister, Balfour had passed the 1905 Aliens Act, the main object of which was to restrict the entry into Britain of Jews from Eastern Europe. Brian Klug put it rather sceptically: ‘Keeping Jews out of Britain and packing them off to Palestine were just two sides of the same antisemitic coin’.3 Here Zionist historians often chose to ignore the distinction between drivers/motives and justification and seize upon Balfour’s own post-war Christian Zionist rhetoric to justify his Declaration. Yet Balfour’s strategic and nationalist domestic motives and concerns, especially his well-documented efforts and policies to stop the influx of Eastern European Jewry into the UK, must be taken into consideration in any attempt to assess the motives behind the Declaration as well as the long-term catastrophic consequences for Palestine of that Balfour commitment.

Ushbu Britaniyaning sionistlarni qo‘llashdagi diniy-siyosiy ildizlari 1830-yillarda Londonda Lord Shaftsberi (Entoni Eshli Kuper; 1801‒1885) tomonidan tashkil etilgan protestant xristian sionistlar guruhiga borib taqaladi. Shaftsberi Britaniya aristokratik hukmron elitasidan chiqqan bo‘lib, o‘nlab yillar davomida Viktoriya davri istablishmentining markazida turgan. U, shuningdek, Viktoriya davrining eng yuqori cho‘qqisida ijtimoiy islohotchi siyosatlarni targ‘ib qilishi bilan ham mashhur bo‘ldi. Shaftsberi Avamlar palatasining tori a’zosi, keyinroq esa Britaniya parlamentining yuqori palatasi bo‘lgan Lordlar palatasining a’zosi bo‘ldi. U 1834‒1841 yillar davrining ko‘p qismida Bosh vazir bo‘lgan Lord Melburnning kuyovi va 1840-yillarning ko‘p qismida Tashqi ishlar vaziri, 1855‒1865 yillar davrining ko‘p qismida esa Bosh vazir bo‘lgan Lord Palmerstonning o‘gay kuyovi edi (Merkley 1998:

The religio-political roots of this British pro-Zionist commitment go all the way back to the Protestant Christian Zionist lobby which was established in London in the 1830s by Lord Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley Cooper; 1801‒1885). Shaftesbury came from the British aristocratic ruling elite and was for decades at the heart of the Victorian establishment. He also became well known for advocating socially reformist policies at the height of the Victorian era. Shaftesbury was a Tory member of the Commons, and later a member of the Lords, the upper house of Parliament in the United Kingdom. He was the nephew-in-law of Lord Melbourne (Prime Minister through most of the period from 1834 to 1841), and the stepson-in-law of Lord Palmerston (Foreign Minister for most of the 1840s and early 1850s, and then Prime Minister for most of the period 1855‒1865) (Merkley 1998:

13). Palmerston (1784–1865) ikki marta Bosh vazir bo‘lib ishlagan, XIX asr o‘rtalarida. 1830 yildan 1865 yilgacha bo‘lgan davrning katta qismida u Britaniya tashqi siyosatini belgilagan, o‘sha paytda Britaniya imperializmi o‘z cho‘qqisida edi. Shaftsberiga turli hukumatlar ketma-ket yuqori lavozimlar taklif qilgan; Palmerston uni ruhlantirib, moliyaviy jihatdan qo‘llab-quvvatlagan. Ikkala kishi ham 1838 yilda Quddusda Britaniya konsulligi tashkil etilishida muhim rol o‘ynagan. Bu konsullik XIX asrda masihiy siyonistlar hukmronligida bo‘lgan va Falastindagi Balfur siyosatiga olib kelgan Britaniya imperiya rejalarining markazida turgan (Schölch 1992).

13). Palmerston (1784–1865) served twice as Prime Minister in the mid-19th century. For most of 1830 to 1865 he dominated British foreign policy when Britain was at the height of its imperialist power. Shaftesbury was offered positions of power by successive British governments, Palmerston encouraged and financially supported him and both men were instrumental in the establishment of the British Consulate in Jerusalem in 1838 – a Consulate which in the 19th century was dominated by Christian Zionists and was at the centre of British imperial schemes which led to the Balfour policy in Palestine (Schölch 1992).

Xususan, salibchi protestant xristian sionisti Shaftesberi yahudiylarni — uning o‘zi aytganidek, «Xudoning qadimiy xalqini» — tiklanishining eng qat’iy targ‘ibotchisi va lobbichisi edi (Tuchman 1982). U va uning ta’siri ostida bo‘lgan nufuzli doira «oxirgi zamon» payg‘ambarlik siyosati — Eski Ahd Kitobi Doniyor kitobiga asoslangan, xushxabar targ‘ib qiladigan siyosat ta’siri ostida edi. Ular bu siyosat yahudiylarning Falastinga «so‘zma-so‘z qaytishi» va «Tiklanishi» orqali amalga oshadi, deb ishonardilar. Usmonli imperiyasining inqirozi yaqinlashib kelayotgandek tuyulgan paytda, Buyuk Britaniyada protestantlarning «yahudiy tiklanishchiligi»ni targ‘ib qilishi va Falastinni mustamlaka sifatida o‘zlashtirishni qo‘llab-quvvatlashi kuchaydi; bu Yaqin Sharqda kengayib borayotgan Britaniya imperiyasi uchun juda foydali deb hisoblanardi. XIX asrning o‘rtalari va oxirlarida Shaftesberi britaniyalik xristian sionistlar lobbisiga rahbarlik qildi. Bu lobbiga Lord Lindsey (Crawford 1847: 71), Lord Manchester, Jorj Eliot, Xolman Xant va Xoll Keyn kabi hukmron doiralar vakillari kirardi.

In particular, crusading Protestant Christian Zionist Shaftesbury was the most ardent propagator and lobbyist of the restoration of ‘God’s ancient people’, as he styled the Jews (Tuchman 1982). He and the influential circle he dominated were under the influence of the ‘End of Times’ prophetic politics – evangelising politics based on the Old Testament’s Book of Daniel – which they believed would be fulfilled by the ‘literal return’ and ‘Restoration’ of the Jews to Palestine. As the demise of the Ottoman Empire appeared to be approaching, the Protestant advocacy of ‘Jewish restorationism’ and settler-colonisation of Palestine increased in the UK and was seen as highly beneficial to the expanding British Empire in the Middle East. In the mid-to-late 19th century Shaftesbury led the British Christian Zionist lobby which included establishment figures such as Lord Lindsay (Crawford 1847: 71), Lord Manchester, George Eliot, Holman Hunt and Hall Caine.

Viktoriya davridagi protestant imperializmining timsoli bo‘lgan, Bibliyani qattiq targ‘ib qilgan Shaftsberi afsonalar yaratuvchisi ham edi. U yahudiylarning doimiy va hamma joyda uchraydigan diasporadagi «qaytish» orzusi haqidagi afsonani g‘ayrat bilan targ‘ib qildi va 1840-yil 4-noyabrda

Epitomising Victorian Protestant imperialism, Bible-bashing Shaftesbury was also a myth-maker. He pushed zealously the myth of ubiquitous and perennial Jewish diaspora longing to ‘return’, and on 4 November 1840

U u Londondagi "Times" gazetasiga e'lon berdi:

he placed an advertisement in the Times (London):

QAYTA TIKLANISH (RESTORATION) — YAHUDIYLARNING: Evropaning protestant monarxlariga Falastin yeriga Yahudiy xalqini qaytarish masalasi haqida memorandum yuborilgan. Mazkur hujjat Sharqdagi o‘ziga xos ishlar birikmasi va boshqa diqqatga sazovor "zamon alomatlari" ta’sirida yozilgan bo‘lib, o‘sha yerni Ibrohim avlodiga, ya’ni [yahudiylarga] kafolatlab bergan qadimgi ahdga qaytadi. (Vagner 1995: 91 dan keltirilgan)

RESTORATION OF THE JEWS: A memorandum has been addressed to the Protestant monarchs of Europe on the subject of the restoration of the Jewish people to the land of Palestine. The document in question, dictated by a peculiar conjunction of affairs in the East, and other striking ‘signs of the times’, reverts to the original covenant which secures that land to the [Jewish] descendant of Abraham. (Quoted in Wagner 1995: 91)

Shaftesbury bevosita ravishda "Mamlakatsiz millat uchun millatsiz mamlakat" degan targ'ibiy shiorga mas'ul bo'lgan,⁴ keyinchalik bu shior yahudiy-sionistlarning asosiy afsonasiga aylangan: "Xalqsiz yer xalq uchun, yersiz xalq uchun" (Masalha 1997; Hyamson 1950: 10, 12; Kamel 2015).

Shaftesbury was directly responsible for the propagandistic slogan ‘A country without a nation for a nation without a country’,4 later to be become a key Zionist Jewish myth: ‘A land without a people for a people without a land’ (Masalha 1997; Hyamson 1950: 10, 12; Kamel 2015).

Donald Wagner ingliz tilidagi Britaniyadagi protestant sionistik harakatining taqdirida uning lobbichilik harakatlarining ahamiyatini baholar ekan, shunday yozadi:

Assessing the significance of his lobbying efforts on the fortunes of the Protestant Zionist movement in Britain, Donald Wagner writes:

Невозможно переоценить влияние лорда Шефтсбери на британские политические элиты, church leaders и обычных христиан-мирян. Его усилия и религиозно-политическая мысль, возможно, задали тон колониальному подходу Англии к Ближнему Востоку и, в частности, к Святой земле на протяжении следующих ста лет. Он единолично перевёл богословские позиции Брайтмана, Генри Финча и Джона Нельсона Дарби [отца современного премиллениалистского диспенсационализма]:5 см. ниже]5 в политическую стратегию. Его высокие политические связи, сочетавшиеся с безошибочным чутьём, вместе способствовали продвижению христианско-сионистского видения. (Wagner 1995: 92)

One cannot overstate the influence of Lord Shaftesbury on the British political elites, church leaders, and the average Christian layperson. His efforts and religious political thought may have set the tone for England’s colonial approach to the Near East and in particular the holy land during the next one hundred years. He singularly translated the theological positions of Brightman, Henry Finch, and John Nelson Darby [the father of modern premillennial dispensationalism]:5 see below]5 into a political strategy. His high political connections, matched by his uncanny instincts, combined to advance the Christian Zionist vision. (Wagner 1995: 92)

1880-yilda F. Lourens Oliphant (1829–1888), parlament a'zosi, romanchi va evangelist nasroniy, Shaftsberi tarafdori, "Gilead yurti" (Injildagi "Gilead yurti" nomi bilan atalgan) kitobini nashr etdi. Unda u "yahudiylarning tiklanishi" rejasini va Iordan daryosining sharqiy tomonida yahudiy aholi joylashtirish bo'yicha batafsil loyihani taqdim etdi. U Britaniya parlamentini Rossiya va Sharqiy Yevropadan Falastinga yahudiy muhojirligini qo'llab-quvvatlashga chaqirdi. Hayron qolarli joyi yo'q, u mahalliy falastinlik arablarni Shimoliy Amerika mahalliy aholisi uchun yaratilgan rezervatsiyalarga ko'chirishni ham ma'qulladi.7

In 1880 F. Laurence Oliphant (1829‒1888), MP, novelist and evangelical Christian, a follower of Shaftesbury, published a book entitled The Land of Gilead (named after the biblical ‘land of Gilead’),6 in which he presented a plan of ‘Jewish restoration’ and a detailed project for Jewish settlement east of the River Jordan. He urged the British parliament to assist Jewish immigration from Russia and Eastern Europe to Palestine. Not surprisingly he also advocated that indigenous Palestinian Arabs be removed to reservations like those of the indigenous inhabitants of North America7

(Sharif 1983: 68) yoki keyinchalik Janubiy Afrika tomonidan ishlab chiqilgan bantustan mafkurasiga ishora qilib (Sharif 1983: 68; Wagner 1995: 93).

(Sharif 1983: 68), or hinting at the Bantustan ideology later developed by South Africa (Sharif 1983: 68; Wagner 1995: 93).

Protestant religious and imperialist considerations led some Britons to produce Christian Zionist novels, to set up exploration societies, and to advocate the "restoration of the Jews to Palestine" both in public and in private.8 Furthermore, a succession of archaeological discoveries in the Near East, military adventurism, and the growing number of travelogues fired the imagination of Protestant missionaries, European officials, and Arabist scholars, and led to the direct involvement of European powers in the Holy Land (Shepherd 1987; Osband 1989). This European obsession with the archaeological past was marked by a decided contempt for the indigenous people of Palestine and for life in modern Palestinian villages and towns. At the height of the British Empire and the Victorian era, the prophetic politics of "biblical restorationism" went hand in hand with increasing British colonial involvement in the "Orient". The Holy Land in the nineteenth century was an attractive target for several European nations that were flexing their colonial muscles around the globe. The region was ready for Western penetration, particularly while the Ottoman Empire was showing signs of political and economic disintegration. The race for a European national presence and colonial commercial interests in the East, and in the Holy Land in particular, was masked by scholarly activities and Oriental Studies (Said 1978). Coinciding with the European "scramble for Palestine", various sectors of the Western academy, and most of the Western Christian churches, displayed a growing interest in Palestine. Foreign interest invariably took the form of establishing Christian institutions. The Ottoman reforms after the Crimean War (1853–1856) granted equal rights, including property rights, to non-Muslims, thereby uniting Christian missionary endeavour with national influence. The interests of God and country ran in parallel. The British moved early,9 and were soon emulated by the Russians,10

A combination of Protestant religious and imperialist considerations drove some Britons to produce Christian Zionist novels, to set up exploration societies and to advocate the ‘restoration of the Jews to Palestine’ in public and in private.8 Furthermore, a succession of archaeological discoveries in the Near East, military adventurism and the growing number of travelogues fired the imagination of Protestant missionaries, European officials and Arabist scholars and led to the direct involvement European powers in the Holy Land (Shepherd 1987; Osband 1989). This European obsession with the archaeological past was marked by a decided contempt for the indigenous people of Palestine and life in modern Palestinian villages and towns At the height of the British Empire and the Victorian era prophetic politics of ‘biblical restorationism’ went hand in hand with increasing British colonial involvement in the ‘Orient’. The Holy Land in the 19th century was an attractive target for several European nations which were flexing their colonial muscles around the globe. The region was ready for Western penetration, particularly while the Ottoman Empire was showing signs of political and economic disintegration. The race for a European national presence and colonial commercial interests in the East, and in the Holy Land in particular, was masked by scholarly activities and Oriental Studies (Said 1978). Coinciding with the European ‘scramble for Palestine’, various sectors of the Western academy, and most of the Western Christian churches, displayed an increasing interest in Palestine. Invariably foreign interest took the form of establishing Christian institutions – the Ottoman reforms after the Crimean War (1853‒1856) granted equal rights, including property rights, to non-Muslims – thereby uniting Christian missionary endeavour with national influence. The interests of God and country ran in parallel. The British moved early,9 and were soon emulated by the Russians,10

Germanlar,11 avstriyaliklar (Wrba 1996) va boshqalar, Falastinda G'arbning keng ko'lamli ta'siri boshlanganini belgilagan holda, bu ta'sirdan Usmonlilar Falastinni xristian davlati sifatida qayta egallashga urinishning dastlabki bosqichi bo'lishidan qo'rqishgan.12 G'arb kirib borishi shu darajada kuchli ediki, Avstriya konsuli graf de Kaboga 1880-yilda Quddus Yevropa shahriga aylanganini xabar qildi. Britaniya Qirollik muhandislar korpusining kapitani (keyinchalik general ser) Charlz Uoren (1840‒1927) esa, Britaniya Falastin tadqiqot fondining asosiy arboblaridan bo'lib, Quddusning Eski Ahd topografiyasini xaritalash va "ibodatxona joyi"ni tekshirish uchun yuborilgan edi. U shunday deb yozgan: "[Britaniyalik] qirol konsuli [Jeyms Finn] hukmronlik qiladi, shahar mahalliy aholisi ustidan emas, balki begonalar ustidan; ammo bu begonalar ko'pincha haqiqiy egalari, mahalliy aholi esa ko'pincha bosqinchilardir" (Shepherd 1987: 127‒128).

Germans,11 Austrians (Wrba 1996) and others, marking the beginning of extensive Western influence in Palestine, an influence which the Ottomans feared might be a prelude to attempting to recover Palestine as a Christian state.12 Such was the degree of Western penetration that the Austrian consul, the Count de Caboga, reported in 1880 that Jerusalem had become a European city, and Captain (later General Sir) Charles Warren (1840‒1927) of the British Royal Engineers and one of the key officers of the British Palestine Exploration Fund, who was sent to map the Old Testament topography of Jerusalem and investigate ‘the site of the temple’, noted: ‘[British] King Consul [James Finn] rules supreme, not over the natives of the city, but over strangers; but yet these strangers for the most part are the rightful owners, the natives, for the most part, are usurpers’ (Shepherd 1987: 127‒128).

Protestant Zionistlar va Britaniya imperialistlari "Yahudiy Falastini" Britaniya protektoratining Hindistonga boradigan asosiy yo‘li bo‘yida qulay bo‘lishini o‘ylashgan. XIX asr oxiridan XX asr o‘rtalarigacha Britaniyada "xristian Zionizmi" bilan yaqindan bog‘liq bo‘lgan uchta mashhur Britaniya Bosh vaziri bo‘lgan: imperator Britaniyaning Suvaysh kanali ustidan nazoratni ta’minlagan Benjamin Disraeli (1804‒1881), 1917-yilgi Balfur deklaratsiyasini e’lon qilgan hukumatning rahbari David Lloyd George (1863‒1945) va hokimiyatda bo‘lgan-bo‘lmagan deyarli yarim asr davomida siyosiy Zionizm va Britaniya imperiyasiga sadoqat bilan xizmat qilgan Ser Uinston Cherchill (Sykes 1973: 45, 52, 207). Disraeli ham, Lloyd George ham xristianlik va iudaizm o‘rtasidagi qo‘shilish yoki yaqinlik nazariyalariga qiziqqan edilar (Anderson, I.

Protestant Zionists and British imperialists believed that a ‘Jewish Palestine’ would be convenient for a British protectorate there along the main route to India. From the late 19th century to the middle of the 20th century three famous British prime ministers were closely associated with ‘Gentile Zionism’ in Britain: Benjamin Disraeli (1804‒1881), who was successful in securing for imperial Britain control of the Suez Canal, David Lloyd George (1863‒1945), whose government issued the Balfour Declaration of 1917, and Sir Winston Churchill, who for nearly half a century in and out of office was devoted to political Zionism and the British Empire (Sykes 1973: 45, 52, 207). Both Disraeli and Lloyd George were fascinated by the theories of amalgamation or affinity between Christianity and Judaism (Anderson, I.

2005: 60). Lloyd George, protestant sionist, bir marta shunday degani keltiriladi:

2005: 60). Lloyd George, a Protestant Zionist, was once quoted as saying:

“Men yahudiylar tarixi haqida o‘z xalqimning tarixiga qaraganda ancha ko‘p o‘qitilganman”, deb yozadi Stein (1961: 142); Disraeli esa protestant sifatida suvga cho‘mdirilgan bo‘lsa-da, o‘zining yahudiy kelib chiqishiga qiziqishini saqlab qolgan. Protestant nasroniylikni “to‘ldirilgan yahudiylik” deb ta’riflab, u – ko‘plab xristian sionistlar kabi – o‘zini Eski va Yangi Ahd o‘rtasidagi “yo‘qolgan sahifa” deb atashdan zavqlangan (Johnson, P. 1993: 324). Disraelining tamaddunlashtiruvchi xristian imperializmi yahudiylarga nisbatan homiylik qiluvchi munosabatni Yaqin Sharqqa nisbatan imperialistik tashqi siyosat bilan birlashtirgan. U bu siyosatni paternalistik va irqchi nazariyalarga tayanib oqlagan, bu nazariyalar imperializmni Britaniyaning imperiya shoiri Rudyard Kipling “oq tanlilarning yuki” deb ataydigan narsaning namoyoni sifatida ko‘rgan.13

‘I was taught far more history about the Jews than about the history of my own people’ (quoted by Stein 1961: 142); and Disraeli was baptised a Protestant, but he remained fascinated by his Jewish background. Describing Protestant Christianity as ‘completed Judaism’, he – like many Christian Zionists – delighted in describing himself as the ‘missing page’ between the Old and New Testaments (Johnson, P. 1993: 324). Disraeli’s civilising Christian imperialism combined patronising attitudes towards the Jews with imperialist foreign policies towards the Middle East, policies which he justified by invoking paternalistic and racist theories which saw imperialism as a manifestation of what Britain’s imperial poet, Rudyard Kipling, would refer to as ‘the white man’s burden’.13

Asrlar davomida, siyosiy sionizm mavjud bo‘lgan sakson yildan ortiq vaqt davomida ham, Falastinda arab falastinliklar mutlaq ko‘pchilikni tashkil etar edi. Balfur bu haqiqatni yaxshi bilar edi, 1919-yil 11-avgustda u o‘zining odatdagi mustamlakachilik qarashlarini ochiqdan-ochiq bayon qilib, quyidagilarni yozdi:

For centuries, and for more than eighty years of political Zionism, the Palestinian Arabs were an absolute majority in Palestine. Balfour was fully aware of this fact when, on 11 August 1919, he frankly expressed his typically colonialist views and wrote:

Sionizm, to'g'ri yoki noto'g'ri, yaxshi yoki yomon bo'lishidan qat'i nazar, asrlar davomida shakllangan an'analarga, bugungi ehtiyojlarga va kelajakdagi umidlarga asoslangan bo'lib, o'sha qadimiy yerda hozir yashayotgan 700 000 arabning istak va e'tirozlaridan ancha chuqurroq ahamiyatga ega … Mahalliy ko'pchilik aholiga maslahat solmasdan, uning ustiga [Yevropalik] ozchilik begonalarni joylashtirish fikri Sesil Rodos bilan birga ishlagan yoki Keniyada Yevropalik joylashuvni targ'ib qilgan odamlarni dahshatga solishi uchun hisoblab chiqilmagan edi. (Talmon 1965: 248, 250 dan keltirilgan)

Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land … The idea of planting a [European] minority of outsiders upon an indigenous majority population, without consulting it, was not calculated to horrify men who had worked with Cecil Rhodes or promoted European settlement in Kenya. (Quoted in Talmon 1965: 248, 250)

1925-yilda Balfur Falastinga tashrif buyurdi va Quddusdagi Ibroniy universitetining ochilish marosimida asosiy mehmon sifatida qatnashdi. Uni kichik Yevropa sionistik Yishuv (aholi punkti) rahbariyati qizg'in kutib oldi.

In 1925 Balfour visited Palestine and was a key guest of honour at the opening of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He was greeted enthusiastically by the leadership of the small European Zionist Yishuv (settlement)

Falastinda, Falastin aholisining aksariyati uni qora bayroqlar bilan kutib olgan holda.

in Palestine, while the majority of indigenous inhabitants of Palestine welcomed him with black flags.

Palestinian Nakba (falokat) o'rtalarida Britaniyaning ishtirokini tushunishning kaliti shundaki, ba'zi britaniyalik xristian restavratsionistlari "yahudiylar vatani" loyihasini Falastinda qay darajada qizg'in qabul qilganlarida, Injil va "ilohiy huquqlar va ilohiy va'dalar"ni Bosh vazir Lloyd Corj va uning Tashqi ishlar vaziri Artur Jeyms Balfur (Balfur deklaratsiyasini e'lon qilgan) qanday ko'rganlarida, hamda umuman olganda G'arbda siyosiy sionizm qanday katta jozibaga ega bo'lganida yotadi. Balfur deklaratsiyasi qisman Birinchi jahon urushi bilan bog'liq hisob-kitoblar tufayli chiqarilgan bo'lsa-da, u mafkuraviy bo'shliqda paydo bo'lmagan. Uning mazmuni 19-asrda imperialistik protestant Britaniyada chuqur ildiz otgan xristian sionistik bashoratli siyosatini aks ettirgan (Verete 1970).14 Bularning barchasi shuni anglatadiki, boshidanoq Falastin va falastinliklarning haqiqati G'arb va sionistlarning Falastindagi "yahudiylar vatani" haqidagi tasavvurlaridan tashqarida qolgan.

The key to understanding the contribution of Britain to the Palestinian Nakba (catastrophe) of the mid-20th century lies in the intensity with which some British Christian restorationists embraced the project of a ‘Jewish homeland’in Palestine; the way in which the Bible and ‘divine rights and divine promises’ were seen by the likes of British Prime Minister Lloyd George and his Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour (who issued the Balfour Declaration); and generally the extraordinary appeal political Zionism had in the West. Although the Balfour Declaration was partly motivated by First World War calculations, it was not issued in an ideological vacuum. Its content reflected the Christian Zionist prophetic politics which became deeply rooted in 19th century imperialist Protestant Britain (Verete 1970).14 This all meant that, from the beginning, the reality of Palestine and the Palestinians lay outside Western and Zionist representations of the ‘Jewish homeland’ in Palestine.

Bundan tashqari, Edvard Said ta'kidlaganidek, "sionistlar kurashining maydoni Falastinda faqat qisman joylashgan edi"; sionistlar kurashining hal qiluvchi maydoni 1948 yilgacha G'arbdagi poytaxt shaharlarida qolgan, Falastin haqiqati va "sionistlarga qarshi mahalliy qarshilik" esa G'arbda ya'ni kamaytirilgan yoki e'tibordan chetda qoldirilgan (Said 1980: 22‒23). Kurashni Yaqin Sharqdan olib chiqish orqali falastinliklar (va arablar) o'zlarini namoyon qilishdan mahrum etildi va buni qila olmaydigan deb hisoblandi: "[Ular] o'zlarini namoyon qila olmaydi; ularni boshqalar namoyon qilishi kerak" (Said 1980 dan keltirilgan).15 Sionistik harakatni G'arb auditoriyasi uchun jozibali qilishda uning yetakchilari nafaqat Falastinning arabtilli xalqining mavjudligini inkor etdilar; ular arablarni G'arbga aniq usullarda tushunish va boshqarish mumkin bo'lgan narsa sifatida ko'rsatdilar. Sionizm va G'arb o'rtasida til va mafkura hamjamiyati mavjud bo'lgan va hozir ham bor; arablar bu hamjamiyatning bir qismi emas edi. Ko'p jihatdan bu hamjamiyat G'arbdagi, xususan islomga va umuman Sharqqa qarshi dushmanlik an'anasiga tayanadi (Said 1979: 25‒26). Xristian va yahudiy sionistlarining asosiy yutug'i shundaki, ular arablarni G'arbga ko'rsatish va tushuntirish uchun zarur bo'lgan joyni egallay oldilar:

Furthermore, as Edward Said argued, the ‘site of the Zionist struggle was only partially in Palestine’; the crucial site of the Zionist struggle remained until 1948 in the capital cities in the West, while the reality of Palestine and ‘the native resistance to the Zionists was either played down or ignored in the West’ (Said 1980: 22‒23). By removing the struggle from the Middle East, the Palestinians (and Arabs) were prevented from representing themselves, and were deemed incapable of doing so: ‘[T]hey cannot represent themselves; they must be represented’ (quoted in Said 1980).15 In making the Zionist movement attractive to Western audiences, its leaders not only denied the existence of the Arabic-speaking people of Palestine; they represented the Arabs to the West as something that could be understood and managed in specific ways. Between Zionism and the West there was and still is a community of language and of ideology; Arabs were not part of this community. To a very great extent this community depends on a tradition in the West of enmity towards Islam in particular and the Orient in general (Said 1979: 25‒26). A major success of the Christian and Jewish Zionists has been their ability to occupy the space from which they were all to represent and explain the Arabs to the West:

Sionistlar o‘zlarini Sharqning eng yomon ortiqchaliklaridan qutulgan, qisman "sharqlik" xalq sifatida, Sharqdagi arablarni G‘arbga tushuntirishni, arablar haqiqatda qanday bo‘lganini va ular haqida nimani ifodalashni o‘z zimmalariga olishgan hamda Falastinda mavjud bo‘lgan arablarni hech qachon o‘zlari bilan teng ko‘rsatmaslikka intilishgan. Bu usul sionizmga doimo Yaqin Sharq mavjudligining mahalliy haqiqatlariga ham kirib boradigan, ham ulardan ustun turadigan ko‘rinish berishga imkon yaratgan. (Said 1980: 26)

[The] Zionists took it upon themselves as a partially ‘Eastern’ people who had emancipated themselves from the worst Eastern excesses, to explain the Oriental Arabs to the West, to assume responsibility for expressing what the Arabs were really like and about, never to let the Arabs appear equally with them as existing in Palestine. This method allowed Zionism always to seem both involved in and superior to the native realties of Middle Eastern existence. (Said 1980: 26)

Shunga qaramay, bunday nasroniy va yahudiy sionistik bayonotlarga ko'ra, sionistik rahbarlar boshidanoq yerda odamlar borligini, hamda ularning soni katta ekanini yaxshi bilishgan. 1897 yilda Falastinga tashrif buargan va demografik haqiqat bilan yuzma-yuz kelgan Zangvill 1905 yilda Manchesterdagi sionistik guruhga qilgan nutqida shunday deb tan olgan: ‘Falastin o'zida allaqachon aholiga ega. Quddus pashaligi allaqachon Qo'shma Shtatlarga qaraganda ikki baravar zich joylashgan, kvadrat milyaga ellik ikki kishi to'g'ri keladi va ularning yigirma besh foizi ham yahudiy emas’ (Zangvill 1937: 210). Dastlabki sionistik matnlarda Falastin aholisiga ko'plab ishoralar qilinganligi shuni ko'rsatadiki, Falastinda sionistik aholi punktlarining boshlanishidan — sionistik tarixshunoslik buni 1882 yilda rus Bilu jamiyati a'zolarining kelishi bilan bog'laydi — falastinlik arablar hech qachon ‘ko'zga ko'rinmas’ yoki ‘yashirin’ mavjudot bo'lmagan. Bundan tashqari, so'nggi tadqiqotlar shuni ko'rsatdiki, sionistik rahbarlar o'zlari ‘arab muammosi’ (ivrit: Habe’ayah Ha’arvit) yoki ‘arab masalasi’ (ivrit:) deb atagan narsa bilan jiddiy shug'ullanganlar.

Despite such Christian and Jewish Zionist statements, however, the Zionist leaders from the outset were well aware that not only were there people on the land, but that people were there in large numbers. Zangwill, who had visited Palestine in 1897 and come face to face with the demographic reality, acknowledged in 1905 in a speech to a Zionist group in Manchester that ‘Palestine proper has already its inhabitants. The pashalik of Jerusalem is already twice as thickly populated as the United States, having fifty-two souls to the square mile, and not 25 percent of them Jews’ (Zangwill 1937: 210). Abundant references to the Palestinian population in early Zionist texts show clearly that from the beginning of Zionist settlement in Palestine, which Zionist historiography dates to the arrival of the members of the Russian Bilu Society in 1882, the Palestinian Arabs were far from being an ‘unseen’ or ‘hidden’ presence. Moreover, recent studies have shown that Zionist leaders were concerned with what they termed the ‘Arab problem’ (Hebrew: Habe’ayah Ha’arvit) or the ‘Arab Question’ (Hebrew:

Hashelah Ha’arvit). Ularning yozuvlarida ko‘rinib turganidek, Zionistlar guruhlari va ko‘chib kelganlarning aksariyati orasida mahalliy falastinlik aholiga nisbatan hukmron bo‘lgan munosabat beparvolik va e’tiborsizlikdan tortib homiylik qilib yuqori turuvchi kibrga qadar bo‘lgan. Buni 1890 yilda Falastinga ko‘chib kelgan zionist yozuvchi va Mehnat harakati yetakchisi Moshe Smilanskiyning asarlarida tipik misol sifatida ko‘rish mumkin:

Hashelah Ha’arvit). As seen in their writings, the attitudes prevailing among the majority of the Zionist groups and settlers concerning the indigenous Palestinian population ranged from indifference and disregard to patronising superiority. A typical example can be found in the works of Moshe Smilansky, a Zionist writer and Labour leader who immigrated to Palestine in 1890:

Arab fellahinlar bilan juda yaqin bo‘lmaylik, toki farzandlarimiz ularning yo‘llarini qabul qilib, ularning xunuk amallaridan o‘rnak olmasin. Tavrotga sadoqatli bo‘lgan barcha kishilar xunuklikdan va unga o‘xshash narsalardan saqlansin hamda fellahinlardan va ularning past sifatlaridan uzoqda tursin.

Let us not be too familiar with the Arab fellahin lest our children adopt their ways and learn from their ugly deeds. Let all those who are loyal to the Torah avoid ugliness and that which resembles it and keep their distance from the fellahin and their base attributes.

Albatta, bunday munosabatlarga e'tiroz bildirganlar ham bo'lgan.

There were, certainly, those who took exception to such attitudes.

Ahad Ha’Am (Asher Zvi Ginzberg), liberal rus yahudiy mutafakkiri, 1891-yilda Falastinga tashrif buyurgan va Hamelitz ivriy davriy nashrida bir qator maqolalar chop etgan, ularda siyosiy sionizmning etnomarkazchiligi, shuningdek, sionistik mustamlakachi-ko‘chmanchilar tomonidan Falastin dehqonlarining ekspluatatsiya qilinishi keskin tanqid qilingan.

Ahad Ha’Am (Asher Zvi Ginzberg), a liberal Russian Jewish thinker who visited Palestine in 1891, published a series of articles in the Hebrew periodical Hamelitz that were sharply critical of the ethnocentricity of political Zionism as well as the exploitation of Palestinian peasantry by Zionist settlercolonists.

Ahad Ha’Am, u Falastin bo‘sh hudud emas ekanligiga va yerdagi boshqa xalqning mavjudligi muammolar tug‘dirishiga e’tiborni qaratmoqchi bo‘lgan, kuzatgan holda aytgan: sionistlik “pionerlar” arablar faqat kuch tilini tushunadi, deb ishonganlar ... [Ular] arablarga nisbatan dushmanlik va shafqatsizlik bilan munosabatda bo‘lib, ularning chegaralarini nohaqlik bilan bosib o‘tadilar, sababsiz ularni sharmandalarcha kaltaklaydilar va hatto bu bilan maqtanadilar, lekin bu nafratli va xavfli tendensiyani hech kim to‘xtatishga intilmaydi. (Masalha 1992: 7 dan keltirilgan)

Ahad Ha’Am, who sought to draw attention to the fact that Palestine was not an empty territory and that the presence of another people on the land posed problems, observed that the Zionist ‘pioneers’ believed that the only language that the Arabs understand is that of force ... [They] behave towards the Arabs with hostility and cruelty, trespass unjustly upon their boundaries, beat them shamefully without reason and even brag about it, and nobody stands to check this contemptible and dangerous tendency. (Cited in Masalha 1992: 7)

U u masalaning mohiyatiga to‘g‘ridan-to‘g‘ri kirib bordi, deb taxmin qilganda, mustamlakachilarning mahalliy dehqonlarga nisbatan tajovuzkor munosabati ularning «Isroil yerida hanuzgacha yashab kelayotgan va ketishni niyat qilmayotgan yana bir xalq borligini eslatganlarga» nisbatan g‘azabidan kelib chiqqan edi.

He cut to the heart of the matter when he ventured that the colonists’ aggressive attitude towards the native peasants stemmed from their anger ‘towards those who reminded them that there is still another people in the land of Israel that have been living there and does not intend to leave’.

Yana bir birinchi muhojir, 1886 yilda Rossiyadan Falastinga kelgan Yitzhak Epstein nafaqat sionistik mustamlakachilikning axloqiy oqibatlari haqida, balki bu loyihaga xos bo‘lgan siyosiy xavflar haqida ham ogohlantirdi. 1907 yilda, sionistlarning Galileyadagi yer sotib olishlari gaplar yo‘q bo‘lgan yer egalari tomonidan sotilgan yerlardan haydalgan falastinlik dehqonlar orasida norozilik uyg‘otayotgan paytda, Epstein "Yashirin masala" deb nomlangan bahsli maqolasini yozdi. Unda u sionistlarning arab yerlarini sotib olish usullarini qattiq tanqid qildi. Uning fikricha, arab dehqonlarini mahrum qilishni o‘z ichiga olgan bu usullar kelajakda albatta siyosiy to‘qnashuvga olib kelishi kerak edi.

Another early settler, Yitzhak Epstein, who arrived in Palestine from Russia in 1886, warned not only of the moral implications of Zionist colonisation but also of the political dangers inherent in the enterprise. In 1907, at a time when Zionist land purchases in the Galilee were stirring opposition among Palestinian peasants forced off land sold by absentee landlords, Epstein wrote a controversial article entitled ‘The Hidden Question’, in which he strongly criticised the methods by which Zionists had purchased Arab land. In his view, these methods entailing dispossession of Arab farmers were bound to cause political confrontation in the future.

Epstein maqolasiga Sionistlar muassasasining g‘azabli javobida ikki asosiy xususiyat aks etadi: asosiy sionistik tafakkurning ikki tamoyili. Birinchisi, yahudiylarning yer egallashi axloqiy mulohazalardan ustun turadi, degan e’tiqod; ikkinchisi esa, Falastinda ajralib chiqqan va begonalarni chetlatadigan Yishuv (koloniya)ni targ‘ib qilish.

Reflected in the Zionist establishment’s angry response to Epstein’s article are two principal features of mainstream Zionist thought: the belief that Jewish acquisition of land took precedence over moral considerations, and the advocacy of a separatist and exclusionist Yishuv (colony) in Palestine.

Европейские колонизаторы-переселенцы, Теодор Герцль и другие сионистские лидеры до Первой мировой войны, представляли себе реальность Палестины и материальную выгоду, которую принесла бы европейская еврейская колонизация Палестины, по образцу супремасистской идеологии «бремени белого человека». Однако в период британского мандата сионистскому руководству стало ясно, что систематическое вытеснение и «перемещение» коренных жителей Палестины было conditio sine qua non сионистского предприятия (Wiemer 1983: 26; Masalha 1992).

Following in the footsteps of European settler-colonialists, before the First World War some Zionist leaders (notably Theodor Herzl in his Zionist novel Altneuland), conceived the reality of Palestine, and the material benefits European Jewish colonisation would bring to Palestine, to be similar to the supremacist ideology of the ‘white man’s burden’. During the Mandatory period, however, it became clear to the Zionist leadership that a systematic dislocation and ‘transfer’ of the indigenous inhabitants of Palestine was the conditio sine qua non of the Zionist enterprise (Wiemer 1983: 26; Masalha 1992).

Edward W. Said, o‘zining muhim asari bo‘lmish "Orientalizm" (1978) kitobida G‘arbning "Sharqshunoslik" fanini qattiq tanqid qildi va bu sohaning yashirin taxminlarini fosh etdi. U, shuningdek, Injil tadqiqotlari G‘arb orientalistik diskursining bir qismi va davomi ekanligini xulosa qildi; bu diskurs hech qanday "Sharqona"/arab/musulmon o‘quvchisini nazarda tutmasdan tuzilgan edi. Said fikricha, bu injilshunoslik diskursida Falastin mahalliy aholisi birlashgan harakatga va milliy ongga qodir emasdek ko‘rsatilgan. G‘arb sharqshunoslari izidan borgan injilshunoslar tarixiy va arxeologik masalalarga e'tibor qaratgan. "Orientalizm"dan ikki yil keyin nashr etilgan "Falastin masalasi" (The Question of Palestine) kitobida Said falastinliklarning tarixdan o‘chirilishini tushuntirishga ham harakat qildi. Uning fikricha, Falastin haqiqatining yo‘qolishi uchta asosiy masalaga bog‘liq edi: birinchidan, G‘arbda Falastin, falastinliklar va Islomning tasvirlanishini tushunish. Saidning "Islomni qamrash" (Covering Islam, 1981) kitobi "Orientalizm" (1978) va "Falastin masalasi" (Said 1980; Ashcroft and Ahluwalia 2001: 125) kitoblarini o‘z ichiga olgan uch qismli asarning bir qismi sifatida qaralishi kerak. Said uchun G‘arbda Islomning tasvirlanishi Falastin masalasining muhim qismidir, chunki ular falastinliklarni, ularning ko‘pchiligi musulmon bo‘lgani uchun, jim qilish uchun ishlatiladi (Said 1980; Ashcroft and Ahluwalia 2001: 128); ikkinchidan, "tasdiq va inkor o‘rtasidagi kurashni" tushunish; uchinchidan, G‘arbning arablarga va Islomga nisbatan sharqshunoslik munosabatini tushunish; G‘arbning irqiy xurofotlari va ayniqsa, Sionistik Yevropa mustamlakachilarining "madaniylashtiruvchi" kuchlari bilan "madaniyatsiz", "xoin" va tanazzulga yuz tutgan Sharq arablari o‘rtasidagi kurash haqidagi G‘arb hikoyasi (Said 1980: 25‒28). Ushbu Injil ruhidagi nutq quyidagilarni o‘z ichiga oladi: (a) tarixni shunday shakllantirishki, «bu tarix endi Zionistlarning Falastinga bo‘lgan da’volarini tasdiqlayotganga o‘xshaydi, shu bilan falastinliklarning da’volarini kamsitadi» (Said 1980: 8), va (b) Falastindagi Zionistlar tomonidan ko‘chmanchi-mustamlakachilikni qonuniylashtirish, bu jarayon 1948-yilda Isroil davlatining tashkil topishi bilan tugamagan.

In his seminal work, Orientalism (1978), Edward W. Said subjected Western ‘Oriental Studies’ to a devastating critique and exposed the underlying presumptions of the discipline. He also concluded that Biblical Studies were part of and an extension of the Western Orientalist discourse, which had been constructed without any ‘Oriental’/Arab/Muslim reader in view. For Said, in this biblical Orientalist discourse the indigenous inhabitants of Palestine were presented as incapable of unified action and national consciousness. The biblical scholars, following in the footsteps of the Western Orientalists, concentrated on historical and archaeological questions. In The Question of Palestine, which came out two years after Orientalism, Said also tried to explain the erasure of Palestinians from history. For him, the deletion of the reality of Palestine centred on three key issues: first, understanding the representation of Palestine, the Palestinians and Islam in the West: Said’s book Covering Islam (1981) should be treated as part of a trilogy which includes Orientalism (1978) and The Question of Palestine (Said 1980; Ashcroft and Ahluwalia 2001: 125). For Said, the representations of Islam in the West are an important part of the question of Palestine because they are used to silence the Palestinians, the majority of whom are Muslims (Said 1980; Ashcroft and Ahluwalia 2001: 128); second, understanding the ‘contest between an affirmation and a denial’; third, understanding Western Orientalist attitudes towards Arabs and Islam; Western racial prejudices, and especially the Western narrative of a contest between the ‘civilising’ forces of the Zionist European settlers and the ‘uncivilised’, ‘treacherous’ and degenerate Oriental Arabs (Said 1980: 25‒28). This biblically framed discourse entails (a) the shaping of history, ‘so that this history now appears to confirm the validity of Zionist claims to Palestine, thereby denigrating Palestinians claims’ (Said 1980: 8), and (b) the Zionist legitimisation of Zionist settler-colonisation in Palestine, a process that did not end with the creation of Israel in 1948.