18-asrda Falastinni tarixga kiritishda, Usmonlilar hukmronligi davrida Falastinning ijtimoiy va iqtisodiy avtonomiyasi g'oyasini Beshara Dumani (1995) Nobulus tog'i (Jabal Nablus) ijtimoiy tarixiga alohida e'tibor qaratib mahorat bilan o'rgangan. Bu tadqiq Albert Xurani tomonidan ishlab chiqilgan "shahar notabllari" (a'yon) paradigmasi doirasida olib borilgan: arab viloyat shaharlari va qasabalaridagi siyosiy va iqtisodiy elitalar, ular Istanbul poytaxti bilan viloyat jamiyati o'rtasida "aslzoda" vositachilar bo'lib xizmat qilgan hamda keng Usmonli imperiyasining viloyatlarini boshqargan. Falastindagi shahar ijtimoiy elitalari, butun Arab Sharqidagi kabi, mintaqaviy va uzoq savdoni nazorat qilishga hamda qishloqdagi yer egaligiga hukmronlik qilishga intilgan.

Writing Palestine into the history of the 18th century, the idea of Palestinian social and economic autonomy under the Ottomans was masterfully explored by Beshara Doumani (1995) with special reference to the social history of 18th century Jabal Nablus. This was done within the framework of Albert Hourani’s paradigm of the ‘urban notables’ (a’ayan): the political and economic elites in provincial Arab cities and towns that served as ‘patrician’ intermediaries between the imperial capital in Istanbul and provincial society and governed the provinces of the vast Ottoman Empire. The urban social elites of Palestine, as in the rest of the Arab East, sought to control regional and distant trade and dominate landownership in the countryside.

Biroq, Usmonlilar hukmronligining so‘nggi davrida Falastinda shaharlar nisbatan kichik edi, shahar ijtimoiy elitasi esa Usmonlilarning homiyligiga bog‘liq bo‘lib, atrofdagi qishloqlar va qishloq joylardagi ommaviy dehqonchilik bilan o‘zaro bog‘liq edi.

However, in late Ottoman Palestine cities were relatively small and urban social elites were dependent on Ottoman patronage and interdependent with their surrounding villages and the mass peasantry of the countryside.

Biroq Usmonli Falastini tarixini Xuroniy tahlil qilgan shahar notablari siyosati yoki elita siyosatining boshqa shakllari bilan cheklab bo‘lmaydi. Bu siyosat yo ochko‘z feodal yer egalariga, ya’ni Usmonli iltizam yer ijarasi tizimi orqali Falastin dehqonlarini ekspluatatsiya qilganlarga, yo mamlakatda ajoyib xayriya vaqf fondlarini tashkil etgan saxovatli aristokratik zodagonlarga markazlashgan bo‘lsa ham shunday. Bu shahar elitalari Falastinda Usmonlilarning bevosita hukmronligiga qarshilik ko‘rsatgan bo‘lsalar-da, ular asosan bir xil ijtimoiy tabaqalardan kelib chiqqan va ularning siyosati oila markazli, shiddatli raqobatga asoslangan hamda chuqur nizoli bo‘lib qolgan (Mao’z 1968: 113) va oxir-oqibatda samarasiz bo‘lgan. Shuningdek, Falastinning butun tarixini bitta paradigmaga, ya’ni imperiya homiy‒mijoz doirasiga va elita siyosatiga keltirib bo‘lmaydi. Eng muhimi, Falastindagi shahar ‘ayanlarining bu ijtimoiy avtonomiyasi XVIII asrda Falastinda deyarli mustaqil siyosiy hokimiyatning, ya’ni Falastinning zamonaviy mustaqil davlatga eng yaqin kelgan al-ʿDhaher al-ʿUmar davlatining “pastdan” va “ichkaridan” kelgan keskin siyosiy avtonomiyasini tushuntirib bera olmaydi. Biroq mahalliy “shahar notablari”ning bu elita paradigmasi zamonaviy Yaqin Sharq tarixchilarining butun avlodiga ta’sir ko‘rsatgan. Tarixchilar ko‘pincha mavjud paradigmalarga qarshi chiqishdan ehtiyotkor bo‘ladilar va ko‘plab akademik karyeralar ularga bog‘liq bo‘lgani uchun, bu qisman nega yarim asrdan ko‘proq davom etgan al-ʿUmarning qudratli Falastin davlati kam o‘rganilganini izohlaydi.

But the history of Ottoman Palestine cannot be confined to the politics of Hourani’s urban notables or other forms of elite politics, whether this is centred on greedy feudal landlords who exploited the Palestine peasantry through the Ottoman iltizan land-cultivation system or on benevolent aristocratic patricians who set up remarkable charitable waqf foundations in the country. Although these urban elites resisted direct Ottoman rule in Palestine, they were drawn for the most part from the same social classes and their politics remained family-centred, fiercely competitive and deeply fractious (Mao’z 1968: 113) and, ultimately, ineffective. Also, the entire history of Palestine cannot be reduced to one paradigm: the imperial patron‒client framework and elite politics. Crucially, this social autonomy of the urban ‘ayans’ in Palestine cannot account for the dramatic emergence political autonomy ‘from below’ and ‘from within’ of an almost independent Palestinian entity in the 18th century, the al-ʿDhaher al-ʿUmar state of Palestine, which was the closest Palestine got to a modern independent state. However, this elite paradigm of local ‘urban notables’ has influenced an entire generation of historians of the modern Middle East. Historians are often wary of challenging established paradigms and, with so many academic careers depending on them, this partly explains why al-ʿUmar’s powerful state in Palestine, which lasted for nearly half a century, has been studied only marginally.