36.2 Vahiy kelishidan oldin hech qanday hukm yo'q

36.2 Vahiy kelishidan oldin hech qanday hukm yo'q - Islomiy shaxsiyat | Quran Course

(an-Nisā’: 165); va hukm faqat ikki narsadan biri bilan o‘rnatilgani uchun: shar’ yoki aql. Aqlga kelsak, bu masalada uning o‘rni yo‘q, chunki masala farz va harom qilish masalasi bo‘lib, aqlning farz qilishi yoki harom qilishi joiz emas, bu uning sohasi emas. Balki bu shar’ning sohasi, shuning uchun hukm shar’ga bog‘liqdir. Shar’ kelguncha shar’ bo‘lmagani uchun, hukm Allohdan shar’ning kelishiga, ya’ni butun shariat uchun elchining kelishiga va muayyan masala uchun izlanayotgan shar’iy dalilning kelishiga bog‘liqdir. Elchining kelishiga kelsak, bu āyatning ochiq ma’nosidan (sarīh) ravshan, chunki elchi kelishidan oldin odamlarga azob berilmasligi ularning hech bir hukm yoki e’tiqod uchun mukallaf emasligini bildiradi, ya’ni ularning hech narsa uchun mas’ul emasligini. Bu, Alloh ularga elchi yuborguncha, odamlar uchun hukmning to‘liq inkor etilishidan boshqa narsa emas. Shunday qilib, ahl al-fatra, ya’ni xabar uzilgan va yangi xabar kelgan oraliqda yashaganlar, masalan, Muhammad (s.a.v.) kelishidan oldin yashaganlar (va Iso (a.s.) xabarining buzilganidan keyin), azobdan saqlanadilar va ularning hukmi xabar yetmagan kishilarning hukmidir. Xuddi shunday, Muhammad (s.a.v.) xabari o‘zining to‘g‘ri shaklida yetib bormagan kishilar ham ahl al-fatra kabi azobdan saqlanadilar, chunki āyat ularga taalluqlidir va ularga elchi yuborilmagandek hisoblanadilar, chunki xabar ularga yetmagan, xabarning yetmaganining gunohi esa uni ularga yetkaza olgan, lekin yetkazmagan kishilarning zimmasidadir. Shuning uchun elchi kelishidan oldin narsalarning halol yoki harom ekani aytilmaydi, chunki ularning hukmi yo‘q edi; amallar haqida ham shunday. Balki, Alloh biror elchi yubormaguncha, inson hukm ostida bo‘lmasdan, o‘zi xohlagancha harakat qilishda erkin bo‘ladi va unga Allohdan hech narsa majburiy emas. Elchi yuborilganda esa inson elchi unga yetkazgan Allohning ahkomlariga bo‘ysunishga majbur bo‘ladi, xuddi elchining o‘ziga Allohdan yetkazilgani kabi.

(al-Nisā’: 165); and because the hukm is not established except by one of two: the shar’ or the intellect. As for the intellect, it has no place here because the matter is one of obligation and prohibition, and it is not permissible for the intellect to obligate or prohibit, for this is not its realm. Rather this is the realm of the shar’, thus the hukm depends on the shar’. Because there is no shar’ before the coming of the shar’, the hukm thus depends on the coming of the shar’ from Allah, that is, on the coming of a messenger with regards to a whole shari’ah, and the shar’i evidence with regards to a given issue for which evidence is sought. With respect to (the coming of) a messenger, then this is clear from the explicit meaning [sarīh] of the āyah, because the negation of punishment on the people prior to the advent of a messenger indicates upon their not having responsibility [taklīf] for any rules or beliefs, that is, their not having responsibility for anything. This means naught but a complete negation of the hukm for the people prior to Allah raising for them a messenger. Thus the ahl al-fatrah – those who lived between the loss of a message and the advent of a message, like those who lived before the advent of Muhammad (saw) (and after the corruption of the message of Isa (as)) – are saved from punishment and their judgment is the judgment of those to whom the message does not reach. Similarly those to whom the message of Muhammad (saw) does not reach in its correct form, are saved from punishment like the ahl al fatrah, because the āyah applies to them and they are considered as if no messenger was sent to them, because the message did not reach them and the sin of it not reaching them is upon those who were able to take it to them but did not. Therefore, prior to the advent of the Messenger it is not said that the hukm of things is halāl or harām, because they had no hukm; the same with the actions. Rather, until Allah does not send a messenger, man is free to act as he wishes, without being under any hukm, and nothing is upon him from Allah. When a messenger is sent then man is obliged by the ahkām of Allah which the messenger communicates to him, as communicated to him (the messenger) from Allah

Xabarchi kelib, o'z xabarini yetkazganidan so'ng, masala quyidagicha ko'riladi: agar xabar o'ziga xos narsalar bilan kelgan bo'lsa va boshqa narsalar uchun boshqa xabarchining (boshqa payg'ambarning) xabariga ergashishni buyurgan bo'lsa, masalan, bizning ustozimiz ʿĪsā (as) misolida, u holda bu xabar bekor qilinmaguncha, odamlarga yetkazilgan hukmlar ularning zimmasida bo'ladi, ularga amal qilish majburiy bo'ladi va ularga amal qilmagan kishi jazolanadi. Agar xabarchining xabari ba'zi narsalar bilan kelib, boshqalari bilan kelmagan bo'lsa, u holda odamlar faqat kelgan narsalar bilan mukallaf bo'ladilar va kelmagan narsalar uchun jazolanmaydilar. Boshqacha holda, agar xabar barcha narsalarni o'z ichiga olgan bo'lsa va barcha narsalarni bayon qilib kelgan bo'lsa, u holda odamlar ushbu xabardagi barcha narsalar bilan mukallaf bo'ladilar, xuddi bizning ustozimiz Muhammad ﷺ misolida bo'lganidek; uning xabari barcha narsalarni o'z ichiga oladi va barcha narsalarni bayon qilib kelgan; shuning uchun unda kelganidan boshqa hukm yo'q. Buning sababi Uning: ...so'zining mafhumidir [nazarda tutilgan ma'no].

After the advent of a messenger and his deliverance of his message, the matter is considered: if the message came with specific things and commanded the following of a different message (of another messenger) for other things, as in the case with our master ‘Isā (as) then until this message is abrogated the people are responsible for the ahkām communicated to them and are obligated to follow them and will be punished for not living by them. If the message of the messenger came with some things and not others, then the people are obligated only by what came and are not punished for what did not come. On the other hand, if the message covers all things and came explaining all things, then the people are obligated with everything in this message, as is the case with our master Muhammad (saw); his message covers all things and came explaining all things; therefore there is no hukm except what came in it. This is because the mafhūm [implied meaning] of His saying

Shuning uchun aytilmasligi kerakki, narsalar va amallarning asl holati harom bo‘lishidir [tahrim], chunki Allohning hukmronligida Uning ruxsatisiz tasarruf qilish mumkin emas, shuning uchun bu man etilgan, deb mavjudotlarga qiyos qilingan holda. Chunki oyatning ochiq ma’nosi shuki, Alloh elchi yubormaguncha azob bermaydi, shuning uchun hukmni bayon qilmaguncha hisob-kitob qilmaydi. Yana, mavjudot zarar ko‘rishi mumkin, Alloh taolo esa foyda yoki zarardan yuqoridir.

It should not be said then that the ‘asl [original state] of things and actions is prohibition [tahrim], by the argument that it is free disposal [tasarruf] in the dominion of Allah the Exalted without his permission so it is prohibited, drawing analogy upon the created beings, because the explicit meaning of the āyah is that Allah does not punish until he raises a messenger, so He does not account until he clarifies the hukm. Further the creation is able to be harmed, but Allah the Exalted is above being benefited or harmed.

Shuningdek, amal va narsalarning asli ruxsat (ruxsat berilganlik) deb aytilmasligi kerak, chunki ular egasiga zarar yoki buzg‘unchilik alomatidan xoli bo‘lgan foydalanishdir, shuning uchun u joiz deb aytish bilan. Bunday deb aytilmasligi kerak, chunki oyatning mafhumi [mafhūm] shuki, inson payg‘ambar olib kelgan narsa bilan mukallaf qilingan; u buni buzgani uchun jazolanadi. Demak, asl ittibo‘ [ergashish] payg‘ambarga ergashish va uning xabarining hukmlariga bog‘lanib qolish bo‘ladi; asl ruxsat emas, ruxsat esa bog‘lanmaslikdir. Ahkom oyatlarining umumiyligi shar’ga qaytish zarurati va uning hukmlariga bog‘lanib qolish zarurati haqida dalolat qilgani uchun, Oliy Zot aytadi:

Similarly it should not be said that the ‘asl of actions and things is permissibility, by the argument that it is utilisation that is free from any sign of corruption or harm to the owner and so it is permissible. This should not be said because the implied meaning [mafhūm] of the āyah is that man is obligated with what the messenger comes with; he is punished for contravening this; thus the ‘asl becomes following [ittibā’] the messenger and being bound by the ahkām of his message; the ‘asl is not permissibility, which is the absence of being bound. Since the generality of the verses of ahkām indicate upon the necessity of referring back to the shar’ and the necessity of being bound by its ahkām; the Exalted says

Foydalanish, egasiga hech qanday buzuqlik belgisi yoki zarar keltirmasligi, ruxsat berilganlik uchun dalil bo‘la olmaydi. Egasiz, qarindoshsiz turmushga chiqmagan ayol bilan zino qilish egasiga buzuqlik yoki zarar keltiradigan foydalanish ekani aniq emas, shunga qaramay u harom qilingan. Xuddi shunday, odamni kuldirish uchun hazil tariqasida yolg‘on gapirish ham yolg‘on gapiruvchi va unga yolg‘on gapirilgan kishi uchun buzuqlik yoki zarar belgisidan xoli, lekin baribir harom qilingan. Demak, narsalar va amallar Shariat kelganidan keyin hukmga ega bo‘ladi; shuning uchun asl qoida shuki, narsalar va amallarni Shariatda izlash kerak: ularga hukm kelganmi yoki yo‘qmi? Asl qoida gumon bilan ruxsat berish emas, aql ham Shariat mavjud bo‘lganda darhol ruxsat berish hukmini chiqarmasligi kerak.

Further utilisation that is free from any sign of corruption or bringing harm to the owner is not a proof for permissibility. It is not evident that adultery with an unmarried female who has no relatives constitutes utilisation that is free from any sign of corruption or harm to the owner, yet it is prohibited. Similarly lying in jest to make someone laugh is free from any indication of corruption or harm with regards to both the one who lies and the one who is lied to, yet it is prohibited. Therefore the things and actions have a hukm after the coming of the shar’; so the ‘asl is to search in the Shari’ah for the things and actions: has a hukm come for them or not? The ‘asl is not permissibility by assumption nor should the hukm of permissibility by given by the intellect straight away in the presence of the shar’.

Shunga o‘xshash, narsalarning asli tavaqquf (to‘xtab turish) va hukmning yo‘qligi ekanini ham aytish kerak. Chunki tavaqquf degani ish to‘xtatilgan yoki hukm to‘xtatilgan degani bo‘lib, bu esa joiz emas. Sababi, Qur’on va Hadisda bilimsizlik holida qoida bo‘lib kelgan narsa hukmni so‘rab bilishdir, tavaqquf va hukmning yo‘qligini emas. Oliy Zot aytadi:

Similarly it should be said that the ‘asl of things is cessation [tawaqquf] and the absence of the hukm. Since cessation means the action is suspended or the hukm is suspended and this is impermissible, because the established (rule) in the Qur’an and Hadith for the lack of knowledge is inquiring about the hukm and not the cessation and absence of the hukm. The Exalted says

Shuning uchun hukm shar’ning kelganidan keyin, Payg‘ambarning kelishi bilan vujudga keladi va shar’ kelgunga qadar hech qanday hukm mavjud emas. Demak, hukm shar’ning kelishiga, ya’ni bitta masala uchun shar’iy dalilning mavjudligiga bog‘liqdir. Shu tariqa dalil asosida bo‘lmasa, hech qanday hukm berilmaydi, xuddi shar’ kelganidan keyin bo‘lmasa, hukm berilmagani kabi. Demak, asl – hukmni shar’dan izlashdir, ya’ni asl – shar’dan shar’iy hukm uchun shar’iy dalilni izlashdir.

Therefore it is after the advent of a Messenger that it that the hukm becomes for the shar’ and there is no hukm prior to the coming of the shar’, so the hukm depends on the coming of the shar’, that is, on the presence of a shar’i evidence for a single issue. Thus no hukm can be given except on the basis of an evidence, just as no hukm can be given except after the coming of the shar’. The ‘asl, then, is to search for the hukm in the shar’, that is, the ‘asl is to search for the shar’i evidence for a shar’i hukm from the shar’.

Yana bir masala qoladi: Islom shariati o'tgan barcha masalalarning, hozirgi barcha muammolarning, shuningdek kelajakda yuz berishi mumkin bo'lgan barcha ishlarning hukmlarini o'z ichiga oladimi? Bunga javob shuki, sodir bo'ladigan hech bir voqea, paydo bo'ladigan hech bir masala yoki yuz beradigan hech bir hodisa yo'qki, uning hukmi bo'lmasin. Islom shariati insonning barcha harakatlarini to'liq qamrab olgan. O'tmishda biror narsa yuz bermagan, hozirda ham, kelajakda ham mumkin bo'lgan biror narsa yo'qki, bularning barchasi shariatda hukmga ega bo'lmasin. Allohu Taolo aytadi:

One issue remains: does the Islamic Shari’ah encompass the rulings of all matters that have passed, all the present problems, as well as all those matters that may occur in the future? The answer to this is that there is no event which occurs, issue which arises, or incident which takes place but that it has a hukm. The Islamic Shari’ah has encompassed all the actions of man entirely. Nothing occurred in the past, nor is there anything in the present or possible thing occurring in the future except that all these have a hukm in the Shari’ah. Allah the Exalted says:

Hatto yakka holdagi ahodis bo‘lsa-da, ya’ni Payg‘ambar (saw)dan rivoyati sahih bo‘lib, bandalarning ayrim amallari borki, ularga Shariat hukm bermagan, degan ma’noni ifodalovchi bo‘lsa ham, bunday ahodisning ma’nosi (dirayasi) Qur’onning sub’utida ham, dalolatida ham qat’iy bo‘lgan matn bilan ziddiyati sababli rad etiladi. Chunki yuqorida zikr qilingan ikki oyat sub’ut va dalolat jihatidan qat’iydir, shuning uchun ularga zid keladigan har qanday yakka xabarning ma’nosi rad etiladi. Demak, ushbu ikki qat’iy oyatni tushunganidan keyin, musulmon kishi uchun insonning amallaridan shunday bir narsa borki, Shariat unga hukm bayon qilmagan, deyish hech qanday jihatdan joizmi?

Even if there are solitary ahadith, whose narration from the Messenger (saw) is authenticated, which carry this meaning, namely, that there exists some actions of the servants for which the Shari’ah has not given a hukm; the meaning [dirayah] of such ahadith is discarded because of its contradiction to a text of the Qur’an which is definitive [qat’i] in transmission [thubūt] and meaning [dalalah], because the two above-mentioned āyāt are definitive in transmission and meaning, so any solitary report which contradicts them, its meaning is discarded. Therefore is it not permissible, from any perspective, for a Muslim after understanding these two definitive āyāt to say that there exists even one reality from the actions of man that the shar’ has not clarified for it a hukm.

Ibn Moja va Termiziy Salmon al-Forisiydan rivoyat qilgan hadisga ko'ra, u shunday degan: "Allohning Elchisi ﷺdan sariyog', pishloq va mo'ynalar haqida so'ralganda, u shunday dedi: 'Halol — Alloh O'z Kitobida halol qilgan narsadir, harom — Alloh O'z Kitobida harom qilgan narsadir, va Alloh sukut saqlagan narsaga kelsak, u sizga ruxsat etilgandir [‘afa lakum]'". Bazzor Abu Dardodan Payg'ambar ﷺdan rivoyat qilgan hadisda ham shunday deyilgan: "Alloh O'z Kitobida halol qilgan narsa halol, harom qilgan narsa harom, va sukut saqlagan narsa ruxsatdir. Shuning uchun Allohdan Uning ruxsatini qabul qiling, chunki Alloh hech narsani unutmaydi" — so'ng u oyatni o'qidi: "Robbingiz unutuvchi emas" (Maryam: 64). Bayhaqiy Sa'laba zanjiri orqali Payg'ambar ﷺdan rivoyat qilgan hadisda esa shunday deyilgan: "Alloh farzlarni belgiladi, shuning uchun ularni tark etmang; U chegaralarni (hudud) qo'ydi, shuning uchun ulardan o'tmang; U rahmat yuzasidan ba'zi narsalar haqida sukut saqladi, unutganidan emas, shuning uchun ular haqida so'ramang". Bu hadislar bir jihatdan yakka rivoyatlar bo'lgani uchun qat'iy matnga zid kela olmaydi. Boshqa jihatdan, bu hadislar Shariat bayon qilmagan narsalar bor, degan ma'noni bildirmaydi; ular faqat Alloh sizlarga rahmat yuzasidan harom qilmagan va ularning harom ekanligi haqida sukut saqlagan narsalar borligini bildiradi. Demak, bu hadislarning mavzusi bu narsalar uchun hukmlar qonunlashtirilmagani haqida sukut emas, balki ularning harom ekanligi haqidagi sukutdir. "Ta'rifsiz narsalarni ruxsat etish" emas, balki "(ularning) man etilishi haqidagi sukut" degani, ya'ni Shaari'ning (Allohning) man etish borasidagi sukuti; bu sukut hamma bayon qilinmagan narsaga ibaha [ruxsat] berish degani emas. Uning man etish haqidagi sukuti halol qilish [halol] (ya'ni ruxsat berish) demakdir, bunga vojib, mandub, mubah va makruh kiradi. Bu hukm faqat sukut qilingan narsaga taalluqlidir, bayon qilinmagan barcha narsalarga emas.

As for what was narrated by Ibn Majah and Tirmidhi from Salman al-Farisi that he said, “The Messenger of Allah (saw) was questioned about ghee, cheese and the fur, so he said, ‘The halāl is that which Allah has made halāl in his Book, and the harām is that which Allah has made harām in his Book, and on that which He remained silent, it has been conceded to you [‘afa lakum]’”, and what was related by al-Bazzar from Abu Darda’ from the Prophet (saw) that he said, “What Allah has made halāl in his Book is halāl, and what he has made harām is harām, and what he has remained silent about is a concession, so accept from Allah His concession for verily Allah does not forget anything – and he recited – ‘And your Lord is not forgetful’ (Maryam: 64)” and what was related by al-Baihaqi from the chain of Tha’labah from the Prophet (saw) that he said, “Allah has obligated the obligations so do not neglect them, and He has set the limits [hudūd] so do not transgress them, and He has remained silent about things as a mercy to you, not out of forgetfulness, so do not ask about them”; then from one perspective these ahādith are solitary reports so they cannot contradict the definitive text. From another perspective, these ahādith do not indicate upon there being things which the Shari’ah has not expounded; they only indicate upon there being things which Allah has not prohibited out of mercy for you and has remained silent about their prohibition. Thus the subject of these ahādīth is not silence on the legislation of rulings for these things; rather it is silence on their prohibition. The meaning of ‘silence on (their) prohibition’ is not the legislating of permissibility [ibaha] for everything which is not expounded; rather this silence is the silence of the legislator with regards to prohibition and His silence on prohibition is (the legislation of) permissibility [halal], included in the scope of which is the obligatory [wajib], the recommended [mandub], the permissible [mubah], and the reprehensible [makruh], and this applies only to that about which he is silent, not to everything which has not be expounded.

Al-Tabariy o‘zining tafsirida Ubayd ibn Umayrdan rivoyat qiladi: “Alloh taolo halol va haromni belgiladi. Shuning uchun U halol qilgan narsani halol deb bil, U harom qilgan narsadan saqlan. Ulardan U na halol, na harom deb aytmagan narsalar bor, bu Allohning kechirimi (afvu) bo‘lib, U buni ato etgan.” Payg‘ambar ﷺ hukm nozil qilinmagan narsalar haqida ortiqcha savol berishni yoqtirmas edilar. Bu asliy bara’a (asl ruxsat) asosida bo‘lib, bu ma’noga qaytadi. Ya’ni, tegishli ishlar mubohdir. Payg‘ambar ﷺ shunday deganlar: “Musulmonlar ichida eng yomon musulmon – o‘ziga harom qilinmagan narsani so‘rab, savoli tufayli o‘ziga harom qilib qo‘yiladigan kishidir”, bu rivoyatni Muslim keltirgan. Yana u zot ﷺ shunday degan: “Men sizlarga qoldirgan narsa bilan meni qoldiringlar. Sizdan oldingilar faqat ko‘p savol berishlari va o‘z payg‘ambarlari bilan ixtilof qilishlari sababli halok bo‘lganlar. Men sizlarni qaytargan narsadan uzoq bo‘linglar, sizlarga buyurgan narsani esa imkoningiz boricha bajaringlar”, bu rivoyatni Ahmad keltirgan. Shuningdek, Muslim va Ahmad Abu Hurayradan rivoyat qiladilar: “Allohning Elchisi ﷺ bizga murojaat qilib dedilar: ‘Ey odamlar! Alloh sizlarga hajni farz qildi, shuning uchun hajga boringlar’. Shunda bir kishi so‘radi: ‘Har yili, ey Allohning Elchisi?’ Elchi ﷺ jim turdilar, hatto o‘sha kishi uch marta so‘raganida, Allohning Elchisi ﷺ javob berdilar: ‘Agar “ha” desam, u farz bo‘lib qolardi va siz unga qodir bo‘lolmas edingiz’. So‘ng dedilar: ‘Men sizlarga qoldirgan narsa bilan meni qoldiringlar’.” Demak, bularning barchasi shuni ko‘rsatadiki, uning “va narsalar haqida jim turdi” degani, ularni harom qilmaganligini bildiradi. Bu uning boshqa hadisdagi “Men sizlarga qoldirgan narsa bilan meni qoldiringlar” degan so‘zi bilan o‘xshashdir. Bu ma'no ushbu hadisning boshqa rivoyati bilan qo'llab-quvvatlanadi: "va U sizlarga narsalarni ravo qildi", ya'ni U ularni tark etdi va man qilmadi. Shuning uchun Uning "narsalar haqida jim turdi" degan so'zi yoki "va U jim turgan narsa ravodir" degan so'zining ma'nosi bandalar amallarining ba'zilarining hukmi bayon qilinmagan degani emas, balki uning ma'nosi shuki, ba'zi narsalar sizlarga rahmat sifatida man qilinmagan; va muayyan narsalardan man qilinmagan narsa sukut hukmiga kiradi, shuning uchun u man etilmagan; uning hukmi esa halol ekanligidir. Shunday qilib, masala Qonun chiqaruvchining narsalarning man etilishi haqidagi sukutiga bog'liqdir. U narsalarning hukmlarini bayon qilmaslik bilan bog'liq emas.

Al-Tabari narrates in his tafsir from Ubayd ibn Umayr, “Allah the exalted has permitted and prohibited (things and actions), so whatever He has permitted take it as permitted, and whatever he has prohibited refrain from it, and He has left from that some things which He has not permitted or prohibited (expressly); that is a concession (afwu) from Allah which He has conceded.” The Prophet (saw) disliked excessive questioning regarding that about which no hukm had been revealed, on the basis of the original concession [al-bara’ah al-asliyya] since it returns to this meaning. Its meaning is that the related actions are conceded. And he (saw) said, “The worst of the Muslims amongst the Muslims is the one who asks about a thing which is not prohibited on them and consequently becomes prohibited upon them due to his questioning,” related by Muslim; and he said, “Leave me with what I have left you. Verily those before you perished only on account of their excessive questioning and their disagreements with their prophets; what I have prohibited you from stay away from it, and what I have ordered you, do as much of it as you are able,” narrated by Ahmad. Further, Muslim and Ahmad related from Abu Hurayra that he said, “The Messenger of Allah (saw) addressed us saying, ‘O people, Allah has obligated the pilgrimage on you, so make the pilgrimage’, so a man asked ‘Every year O Messenger of Allah?’ He (the Messenger) remained silent until the man asked three times, so the Messenger of Allah (saw) replied, “If I said yes, it would be obligated, and you would not be able (to fulfill it)’ then he said, ‘Leave me with what I have left you.’ So all of this indicates that the intent of his saying, “and He was silent on things” is that He did not prohibit them, and it is similar to his saying, in another hadith, “leave me with what I have left you”. This (meaning) is supported by another narration of this same hadith, “and He conceded you things”, that is, he left them and did not prohibit them. Therefore the meaning of his saying, “and He was silent on things” or his saying, “and that about which He was silent, is conceded” is not that the hukm of some actions of the servants has not been expounded, rather their meaning is that (some) things have not been prohibited as a mercy to you; and that which is not prohibited of specific things comes under the hukm of silence, so it is not prohibited; its hukm is that it is halal. Thus the matter is connected to the silence of the Legislator about the prohibition of things. It is not connected to the absence of the expounding the rulings of things.

Bu hadisning ma'nosi nuqtai nazaridan. Hadisning shariat hukmi jihatidan o'rni esa shuki, mukallaf kishilarning harakatlari, ularning mukallaf ekanliklari bilan bog'liq holda, yo umuman taklif khitobi (khitab al-takleef) ostida bo'ladi — ya'ni iqtidou (buyurish yoki man qilish) yoki takhyir (ixtiyor berish) shaklida — yoki bu khitob ostida bo'lmaydi. Agar ular shu khitob ostida bo'lsa, shariatda ularga hukm bo'lishi shart, chunki ular taklif khitobi ostiga kiradi. Agar bo'lmasa, bu shuni anglatadiki, mukallaf kishilarning ba'zilari, bir vaqtda yoki bir holatda bo'lsa ham, taklif khitobi hukmidan tashqarida qoladi. Bu esa asosan botildir: agar uni mukallaf deb faraz qilsak, u taklif khitobidan tashqarida bo'la olmaydi; agar uni mukallaf emas deb faraz qilsak, bu faraz o'zi-o'zidan botildir. Chunki taklif khitobining umumiyligi tufayli mukallaflik ham umumiydir va barcha holatlar hamda vaqtlarni o'z ichiga oladi. Shuning uchun Uning ﷺ "Va U ba'zi narsalar haqida sukut saqladi" degan so'zining ma'nosi, U ularning hukmini bayon qilmadi, degani bo'la olmaydi, chunki bu ma'no ma'lum bir holatda yoki vaqtda mukallaf bo'lmagan shaxsning mavjudligini bildiradi. Demak, ma'no faqat shuki, U ba'zi narsalarning haromligi haqida sukut saqladi.

This is from the perspective of the meaning of the hadith. As for the perspective of the position of the hadith as far as the hukm of the Shariah is concerned then the actions of the legally responsible (mukallafeen) with respect to their being legally responsible are either collectively under the address of legal responsibility (khitab al-takleef) – namely the command (iqtida’) or the option (takhyīr) – or is not under this. If it is then there must be a hukm for it in the Shari’ah, as it comes under the address of legal responsibility. If it is not, this necessitates that some of the legally responsible are outside the hukm of the address of legal responsibility, even if at one time or under one situation, and this is invalid from its basis, because if we assume him to be legally responsible then he cannot be outside the address of legal responsibility, and if we assume him to not be legally responsible then this assumption is invalid in and of itself. This is because the legal responsibility is general because of the generality of the address of legal responsibility, so it includes all situations and times. Therefore it cannot be that the meaning of his (saw) saying, “and He was silent about some things” be that He did not expound their ruling, because this meaning implies the existence of an individual who in a given state or time is not legally responsible. Hence the meaning can only be that He remained silent about the prohibition of some things.

Shunday qilib, bu hadis insonning Shariat tomonidan bayon qilinmagan biror amali bo‘lishi mumkinligiga dalolat qilmaydi, shuning uchun uni bu masalada dalil sifatida keltirish noto‘g‘ridir. Natijada, “Insonning amallaridagi asl hukm Allohning hukmiga bog‘liq bo‘lishdir” degan fiqhiy qoida tasdiqlanadi. Shuning uchun musulmonga Allohning o‘sha amal haqidagi hukmini, Shariat Qonun chiqaruvchisining xitobidan bilmasdan turib, biror ishni qilishi joiz emas. Mubohlik (ibaha) Shariat hukmlaridan biri bo‘lib, uning dalilga muhtoj bo‘lishi zarur. Vahiy tomonidan bayon qilinmaganlik mubohlikka dalil emas; aksincha, bu Shariatning kamchiligiga ishoradir. Biror narsaning mubohligiga dalil shuki, Qonun chiqaruvchi unda ixtiyoriylik (xoh-lash) hukmini belgilagan bo‘lsin.

Thus the hadith does not indicate upon there being any action of man not expounded by the Shari’ah, so using it as evidence for this point is incorrect. Consequently the legal maxim, “The original rule [asl] for the actions of man is being bound by the hukm of Allah” is confirmed. So it is not permissible for a Muslim to perform an action except after knowing the hukm of Allah about that action, from the address of the Legislator. Permissibility [ibaha] is a hukm from the ahkam of the Shari’ah, necessarily requiring an evidence. The absence of exposition by the revelation is not an evidence for permissibility; rather it is an indication (suggesting) the deficiency of the Shari’ah. The evidence for the permissibility of a thing is that the Legislator legislate (the ruling of) an option in it.

Bu amallarga oid. Amallarga aloqador narsalarga kelsak, ularga nisbatan asl hukm shariat matni bilan man etilgan bo‘lmasa, ruxsat berilganlikdir. Shuning uchun narsaning asl hukmi ruxsat berilganlikdir; uni faqat uning harom qilinganiga shar’iy dalil bo‘lsagina harom deb bo‘ladi. Chunki shar’iy matnlar barcha narsalarni halol deb e’lon qilgan va bu matnlar umumiy holda, barcha narsalarni qamrab olgan holda kelgan; Mahmud Ulug‘ Alloh aytadi:

This is with regards to actions. As for the things, which are related to the actions, the ‘asl with regards to them is permissibility so long as no text of prohibition is present. Therefore the original rule of a thing is permissibility; it is not prohibited except if there is a shar’i evidence for its prohibition. This is because the shar’i texts have declared all the things to be permissible, and these texts have come as general, covering all things; the Exalted says,

Buni aytish to‘g‘ri emaski, narsa bandaning amalidan ajralmasdir, shuning uchun uning hukmi amal hukmidan kelib chiqadi va amal hukmini oladi. Buni aytish to‘g‘ri emas, chunki narsalar amallarga zaruriy ravishda bog‘langan bo‘lsa-da va ularning dalili amal hukmining bayonidan kelib chiqsa-da, ular amallardan farqlanadi. Bandaning amali narsaga bog‘langanda, narsaga nisbatan faqat ikki hukmni aniqlaydi: ya’ni yo ruxsat yoki taqiq. Narsaning hukmi haqida u vojib yoki mustahab, deyilmaydi. Shunday qilib, narsalarning hukmi ruxsat yoki taqiq bilan cheklanadi va shu jihatdan narsa bandaning amalidan farq qiladi, shuning uchun u amal hukmini shunchaki olmaydi, garchi uning hukmi amal hukmini bayon qilishda kelsa ham.

It should not be said that the thing is inseparable from the action of the servant, so its hukm comes from the hukm of the action, and it takes the hukm of the action. This should not be said because the things, notwithstanding that they are necessarily connected to the actions and that their evidence comes from the exposition of the hukm of the action, are different from the actions. The evidence of the action of the servant, when connected to a thing clarifies with respect to the thing two rulings alone, either permissibility or prohibition. It is not said about the hukm of a thing that it is obligatory or recommended. Thus the ruling of the things is confined to permissibility or prohibition, and in this respect the thing is different to the action of the servant, so it does not just take the hukm of the action, even if its hukm comes in the clarification of the hukm of the action.

Boshqa nuqtai nazardan qaraganda, ruxsat berilganligining dalilidagi umumiylik va man etilganligining dalilidagi aniq narsaning belgilanishi ruxsatni barcha narsalar uchun umumiy, man etishni esa faqat ochiq-oshkora taqiqlangan narsalar uchun xos qiladi. Bu ham narsaning hukmini asl hukm va unga berilgan hukm, ya'ni harakatning hukmi jihatidan farqli qiladi. Narsalarning asl hukmi, to'g'ri, taqiq dalili mavjud bo'lmagan holda ruxsat berilganligidir, harakatlarning asl hukmi esa shar'iy hukm bilan bog'liq bo'lishdir. Bundan tashqari, narsalar faqat ruxsat yoki taqiq bilan ta'riflanadi, harakatlardan farqli o'laroq, ularga nisbatan Shar'iy Qonun chiqaruvchining xitobi ikki turga bo'linadi: takleef va vad'. Birinchisi besh turga bo'linadi: vojib, mustahab, haram, makruh va mubah. Ikkinchisi ham besh turga bo'linadi: sabab, shart, mone', sahih, fosid va botil, hamda asl hukm va ruxsat. Xulosa shuki, Payg'ambarimiz Muhammad ﷺ barcha insoniyatga yuborilganidan keyin, biror harakat yoki narsaning hukmi yo'q deyish joiz emas. Vahiydan dalil bo'lmagan holda biror narsa yoki harakatning hukmi ham yo'q, chunki hukm Qonun chiqaruvchining xitobidir. Shuningdek, Qur'on hukmini bayon qilmagan barcha narsa mubah deyish ham joiz emas, chunki mubah o'zi shar'iy hukmdir, u bandalarning harakatlariga oid tanlov huquqini beruvchi Qonun chiqaruvchining xitobidir. Qonun chiqaruvchi hukmini aniqlamagan narsalar bor deyish esa Qur'on bayon qilmagan narsalar bor va Shari'at kamchilikka ega degani bo'lib, bu noto'g'ri, chunki u Qur'onning lafz va ma'no jihatidan qat'iy matniga zid keladi.

From another perspective the generality of the evidence of permissibility and the specification of the specific thing in the evidence of prohibition makes the permissibility general for all things and prohibition specific to alone those expressly prohibited. This too makes the hukm of the thing different, with respect to the original rule and the hukm with which it is described, to the hukm of the action. The original rule of things is permissibility as long as there is no evidence of prohibition, and the original rule for actions is being bound by the legal hukm. Further, things are not described except by permissibility or prohibition, contrary to the actions, with respect to which the address of the legislator is of two types: takleef and wad’. The former is of five types: the obligatory, the recommended, the prohibited, the reprehensible and the permissible. The latter is also of five types: the cause, the condition, the preventative factor, the valid, invalid and void, and the original rule and concession. The sum (of the above discussion) is that it is not permitted, after the advent of our Master Muhammad (saw) to all of mankind, to say that there is an action or thing which has no hukm. Nor is there any hukm of a thing or action without an evidence from the revelation, because a hukm is the address of the Legislator. Nor it is permissible to say that all that which the revelation has not expounded a hukm for is permissible, because the permissible is a legal hukm itself, as it is the address of the Legislator of conferring choice related to the actions of servants. The claim that there are things whose hukm has not been clarified by the Legislator means that there are things which the Qur’an has not clarified and that the Shari’ah is deficient. This is incorrect as it contradicts the definitive text, in transmission and meaning, of the Qur’an.

Shunday qilib, insonning qilishi mumkin bo‘lgan hech bir amal yo‘q, va insonning amaliga bog‘liq hech bir narsa yo‘qki, u Shariatda hukmga ega bo‘lmasin. Shariat Qonun chiqaruvchisining xitobidan biror dalil mavjud bo‘lmaguncha, bu aniq hukm bo‘lishi mumkin emas, chunki vahiy kelmaguncha hech qanday hukm yo‘q. Demak, Payg‘ambar ﷺ kelgunga qadar hech qanday hukm yo‘q, va u kelganidan keyin ham faqat u olib kelgan vahiydan shu hukmga ishora qiluvchi dalil bo‘lgandagina hukm mavjud bo‘ladi.

Thus there is no action possible of being done by man, nor a thing connected to the action of man except that it has a hukm in the Shari’ah, and there is no hukm except after the presence of an evidence from the address of the Legislator indicating upon this specific hukm, because there is no hukm before the coming of the revelation. Thus there is no hukm before the coming of the Messenger, and there is no hukm after his coming except with an evidence from the revelation he came with indicating upon that hukm