Os juristas muçulmanos concordaram que a água limpa e purificadora remove as impurezas desses três objetos. Também concordaram que as pedras podem remover as impurezas das duas saídas. Divergiram quanto à remoção (de impurezas) com outras substâncias, líquidas ou sólidas, além destas. Um grupo de juristas sustentou que qualquer coisa limpa pode remover impurezas, seja ela líquida ou sólida, e qualquer que seja o objeto afetado. Esta posição foi defendida por Abu Hanifa e seus discípulos. Outro grupo de juristas afirmou que as impurezas não podem ser removidas por coisas diferentes da água, exceto pelas pedras, em relação às quais há consenso. Esta posição foi defendida por Malik e al-Shafi'i.

The Muslim jurists agreed that clean purifying water removes impurities from those three objects. They also agreed that stones can remove impurities from the two outlets. They disagreed about removal (of impurities) with what is besides these from among fluids and solid substances. A group of jurists held that anything clean can remove impurities whether it is a fluid or a solid, and whatever the affected object. This was upheld by Abu HanTfa and his disciples. Another group of jurists said that impurities cannot be removed by things other than water, except for stones, which are agreed upon. This was upheld by Malik and al-Shafi T.

Eles também discordaram sobre a remoção de impurezas com ossos e excremento no caso da istinja. Um grupo de juristas proibiu isso, mas permitiu o uso de outras coisas que podem limpar, embora Malik tenha excetuado dessas coisas os alimentos estimados, como o pão. O mesmo se diz sobre coisas cujo uso seria imoderado, como o ouro e as pedras preciosas. Um grupo restringiu a limpeza às pedras, que é a opinião dos Zahiritas, enquanto outro grupo permitiu com ossos, mas não com excremento, embora isso fosse considerado abominável por eles. Al-Jubba'i divergiu de tudo isso e permitiu na istinja a limpeza com todas as coisas, limpas e impuras. A razão para a sua discordância sobre a remoção de impurezas com coisas diferentes da água, e para objetos diferentes das saídas, é a sua disputa quanto a saber se o propósito de remover impurezas com água é apenas a destruição da essência da impureza, caso em que outras coisas que destruam a essência seriam consideradas equivalentes à água, ou se a água possui um atributo adicional que não se encontra em outras coisas. Aqueles para quem nenhum atributo adicional era visível na água sustentaram a validade da limpeza com todos os líquidos e sólidos limpos. Este entendimento foi apoiado pelo consenso sobre a remoção de impurezas das saídas com coisas diferentes da água. Também é apoiado pelo que se transmite num hadith de Umm Salama, que disse ao Profeta ﷺ: "Sou uma mulher que tem um vestido longo e arrastado e ando por lugares sujos". O Mensageiro de Allah ﷺ disse-lhe (Umm Salama): "A impureza é purificada pelo que vem depois". Além disso, há hadiths sobre casos semelhantes registados por Abu Dawud, como as palavras do Profeta ﷺ: "Se algum de vocês caminhar sobre imundície com as suas sandálias, o pó é o seu purificador", bem como outros relatos semelhantes.

c They also disagreed about the removal of impurities with bones and dung in the case of istinja\ A group of jurists prohibited this, but permitted their use Wlt h other things that can clean, though Malik exempted from these esteemed stable things like bread. The same is said about things the use of which would immoderate like gold and gems. One group restricted cleaning to stones ° % which is the opinion of the Zahirites, while another group permitted it n ^th bones, but not dung, though this was considered abominable by them. Al- jg . barT deviated from all this and permitted in istinja* wiping with all things a H c|ean and unclean The reason for their disagreement about the removal of impurities with things other than water and for objects other than the outlets is their dispute as to whether the purpose of removing impurities with water is only the destruction of the essence of the impurity, in which case other things destroying the essence would be deemed equivalent to water, or whether water has an additional attribute not found in other things. Those to whom no additional attribute was visible in water, upheld the validity of cleaning with all clean fluids and solids. This meaning was supported by the agreement over the removal of impurities from the outlets with things other than water. It is also supported by what is laid down in a tradition from Umm Salama who said to the Prophet (God’s peace and blessings be upon him), “I am a woman having a long trailing dress and I walk over filthy spots”. The Messenger of Allah (God’s peace and blessings be upon him) said to her (Umm Salama), “It (the impurity) is cleansed by what follows”. In addition to this, there are traditions about similar cases recorded by Abu Dawud, like the words of the Prophet (God’s peace and blessings be upon him), “If one of you walks over filth in his sandals, the dust is their purifier”, as well as other similar reports.

Aqueles que percebiam um atributo adicional na água proibiam essa limpeza, exceto no caso excetuado, que é o dos orifícios (com pedras). Quando os Hanafitas exigiram dos Shafiitas uma explicação para tal atributo adicional da água, estes recorreram ao argumento de que se trata de um ato de culto, pois não conseguiam apresentar uma razão racional para isso. Chegaram até a admitir que a água não elimina a impureza de maneira racionalmente satisfatória, e que a remoção é reconhecida como uma determinação legal. Houve discursos extensos e polêmicas entre eles sobre a questão de saber se a remoção da impureza com água é um ato de culto ou se tem uma causa racional, decorrente de um precedente. Os Shafiitas foram obrigados a estabelecer uma virtude legal (especial) para a água, que não se encontra em outras coisas, no cumprimento dos ahkām da impureza, embora seja semelhante a outras coisas na remoção efetiva da substância (das sujidades).

Those who perceived an additional attribute in water, prohibited such cleaning except for the exempted case, which is that of the outlets (with stones). When the Hanafites demanded from the Shaficites an explanation of such an additional attribute for water, the latter resorted to the argument that it is an act of worship, for they were not able to provide a rational reason for it. They even conceded that water does not do away with impurity in a rationally satisfying way, and the removal is assigned a legal recognition. There were extended discourses and polemics between them over the question of whether the removal of impurity with water is an act of worship or has a rational cause coming down as a precedent. The Shaficites were' constrained to establish a (special) legal virtue for water, which is not found in other things, in meeting the ahkdm of uncleanliness, though it is similar to other things in the (actual) removal of the substance (of pollutions).

The purpose (as the Shafi'is added) is to meet the requirements of the ruling that singles out water as effective in removing the substance of impurities, since sometimes the impurity is already removed while the ruling still subsists. They thus relegated the purpose, although they had previously agreed with the Hanafites that purification from uncleanliness is not a legal purification, that is shar'i, and therefore did not require intention (niyya). If they had tried to distinguish themselves from them (the Hanafites) by saying that they did perceive in water a quality of dissolving impurity and contamination and of extracting them from clothes and bodies, a quality not found in other things, for which reason people rely on water for cleansing their bodies and clothes, it would have been a better statement, while others are far from convincing. Perhaps it would be necessary to believe that the Lawgiver (Ash-Shaari') has relied on water for washing in each instance because of this inherent quality. Had they said so, they would have introduced into the prevailing fiqh something consistent with its meaning. The jurist resorts to saying that a certain thing is an act of worship when his method imposes constraints upon him in arguing with the contender. Ponder over this, for it is evident from their treatment of issues on most occasions.

The purpose (the ShafWtes added) is to meet the (requirements of the) hukm that singles out water as effective in the removal of the substance of impurities, as sometimes the impurity is already removed, but the hukm subsists. They thus relegated the purpose, although they had previously agreed with the Hanafites that purification from uncleanliness is not a legal purification, that is shaft and did not therefore require intention (niyya). If they had tried to distinguish themselves from them (the Hanafites) by saying that they did perceive in water a quality of dissolving impurity and contamination and of extracting them from clothes and bodies, a quality not found in other things—for which reason people rely on water for cleansing their bodies and clothes—it would have been a better statement, while others are far from convincing. Perhaps it would be necessary to believe that the jfezr4 (law) has relied on water for washing in each instance because of this inherent quality. If they had said so, they would have introduced into the prevailing fiqh something consistent with its meaning. The jurist resorts to saying that it (a certain thing) is an act of worship when his method imposes constraints upon him in arguing with the contender. Ponder over this, for it is evident from their treatment (of issues) on most occasions.

A razão da divergência deles sobre o uso de excrementos de animais (na limpeza) baseia-se na disputa quanto ao sentido da proibição transmitida do Profeta a esse respeito, isto é, a proibição feita pelo Profeta ﷺ de que a istinja* seja realizada com ossos ou excremento. Aqueles para quem a proibição indicava a invalidade da própria coisa não o permitiam, enquanto aqueles que não a viam dessa forma, uma vez que a impureza tem um sentido racional, interpretaram-na como significando abominação, mas não consideraram que invalidasse a própria istinja#. Os que fizeram distinção entre ossos e excremento o fizeram porque consideravam o excremento como impuro.

The reason for their disagreement about (the use of) animal droppings (in cleaning) is based on their dispute about the meaning of the proscription reported from the Prophet about it, that is, the prohibition by the Prophet (God’s peace and blessings be upon him) that istinja* is not to be performed with bones or dung. Those for whom the proscription indicated the invalidity of the thing itself did not permit it while those who did not view it as such, as uncleanliness has a rational meaning, interpreted this to mean abomination, but did not consider it as invalidating istinj# itself. Those who made a distinction between bones and dung, did so because they considered dung as unclean.