沙斐仪被认为是阐明推论原则（usul al-istinbat）并以普遍而全面的原则加以规范的人，因此，他是usul al-fiqh（教法原理）学科的开创者，尽管在他之后有许多人对usul al-fiqh及其定义更有研究。在沙斐仪之前，法学家（fuqaha）进行ijtihād时并没有确定的ijtihād准则，而是依靠他们对Sharī'ah（教法）意义、诸律例的目的、其宗旨，以及经文所指示的内容和所揭示的目标（maqasid）的理解。由于这些法学家在研究Sharī'ah方面的经验，以及他们对阿拉伯语的透彻熟悉，使他们能够了解其含义，领会其旨趣（ghayat）和目标（maqasid）。他们在从经文中推导律例时，会协调其概念与目标，但并没有任何记录在案的确定准则。 是的，沙斐仪之前的法学家，从圣门弟子（Sahabah）、再传弟子（Tabi'in）及其后的人，都曾处理过usul al-fiqh的问题，并引出和比较证据。例如，有关阿里·本·阿比·塔利卜的传述，他曾谈论mutlaq（绝对的）、muqayyad（限定的）、khas（特指的）、'aamm（普遍的）、nasikh（废止者）和mansukh（被废止者）。然而，这并非以确定或系统的方式进行。那些处理过某些usul al-fiqh问题的法学家，并不具备普遍而全面的原则，以供他们参照来理解Sharī'ah的指示，或知道如何对其进行比较与权衡。但当沙斐仪出现时，他推导出了usul al-fiqh学科，并确立了全面的法则，人们借此来辨识Sharī'ah证据的层次。 人们普遍知道，沙斐仪在其著名的《Al-Risala》（《立法书》）中系统阐述了伊斯兰教法原理学（usul）。但事实是，《Al-Risala》只包含了沙斐仪所阐述的伊斯兰教法原理学的一部分。任何考察沙斐仪著作的人都会发现，《Al-Risala》只涉及伊斯兰教法原理学中的某些论题，并未包含沙斐仪关于原理学的全部论述。沙斐仪还有其他包含原理学讨论的著作，例如《驳斥istihsan之书》和《Jamma' al-'ilm》。即便是《Al-Umm》一书，其中也有关于原理学的论述。在这些论述中，他在具体的律例之中提出了综合性的原则。

Shafi’i is considered to be the one who delineated the principles of deduction (usul al-istinbat) and regulated it with general comprehensive principles. Thus, he was the originator of the science of usul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence), even though many people came after him who were more knowledgeable about usul al-fiqh and its definitions. The Fuqaha (jurists) before al-Shafi’i used to perform Ijtihād without having defined parameters for Ijtihād, rather they used to depend on their understanding of the Sharī’ah meanings and purpose of the ahkām, their aims, whatever its texts point to and whatever its objectives (maqasid) indicated. Due to the experience of those Fuqaha (jurists) in their study of the Sharī’ah and their thorough familiarity with the Arabic language, it allowed them to be acquainted with their meanings and to comprehend their aims (ghayat) and objectives (maqasid). They used to reconcile its concepts and objectives in deducing rules from the texts without having any recorded defined parameters. Yes, the Fuqaha before al Shafi’i, from the time of Sahabah, Tabi’in and those after them used to deal with issues of usul al fiqh and educe and oppose (evidences). Such as the narration about ‘Ali b’ Abi Talib  that he spoke about the mutlaq (absolute), muqayyad (restricted), khas (specific), ‘aamm (general), nasikh (abrogator) and the mansukh (abrogated). However, that was not in a defined or set out manner. And those Fuqaha who dealt with certain issues of usul al-fiqh did not possess general and comprehensive principles to which they referred in order to understand the indication of the Sharī’ah or to know how to oppose or outweigh them. But when al-Shafi’i came he derived the science of usul al-fiqh and he laid down comprehensive laws to which reference was made in knowing the levels of the Sharī’ah evidences. It has become widely known to people that al Shafi’i set out the science of usul in his book entitled al-Risala, a work which is famous. But the reality is that the al-Risala contains only a portion of the science of usul outlined by al-Shafi’i. Anyone who examines the books of al-Shafi’i will find that al-Risala contains only some of the topics in the science of usul al-fiqh and it does not contain all of Shafi’i’s discussions on usul. Shafi’i has other books which contain discussions (on usul) such as The Book of the Refutation of Istihsan and the book Jamma’ al-’ilm. Even the book al-Umm within its pages there are discussion on the science of usul. In these he has mentioned comprehensive principles amidst the detailed rules.

正是以下几点帮助阿勒·沙斐仪奠定了乌苏勒学科：他所处的时代，伊斯兰教法学已经极为兴盛。伊斯兰土地上开始形成多个穆贾台希德（独立探究者）的法学群体，并逐渐组成各个学派（马兹哈卜）。穆贾台希德与各学派拥护者之间的争论，在教法和证据的各个方面展开了多种视角。于是他投身于与参与这些争论者的辩论之中，这些讨论引导他去思考一般性、全面性的原则，将其作为规范性的准则，作为研究与推论的基础。他把这些原则汇集为一门独立的知识体系，即乌苏勒·菲格赫学科。 阿勒·沙斐仪的乌苏勒令人钦佩之处在于，他在讨论乌苏勒时采用的是立法式的方式，而非逻辑式的方式。对于学术研究，甚至对于乌玛的复兴，尤其是在教法和乌苏勒领域，最大的危险之一便是逻辑之路。阿勒·沙斐仪明确地与逻辑之路保持距离，坚持立法之路。他不关注理论性的方法或臆测。他希望规范真实存在的问题，即他取用沙里亚的经文，并止步于经文的界限，以及经文所指示、人们亲眼所见的现实界限。 关于废止与被废止（纳斯赫与曼苏赫）的问题，他从那些在他看来已被证明含有废止的事例中，确立了废止的原则：即从经文或圣训本身所提及的内容中，从废止的指示（达拉莱）中，或从先知ﷺ所传述的、表明废止的圣训中，或从先知ﷺ的同伴们所传述的言论与裁决中，归纳出这些原则。 不同于后来许多人在看到两节经文或两段圣训之间存在矛盾时,便立即断言其中一方已被另一方废止,以至于犯下了严重的错误。当沙斐仪提出一项原则时,他并非依据逻辑前提(muqaddima mantiqiyya)来推导,而是指出其依据的来源,或来自先知ﷺ的传述,或来自圣门弟子的教法裁决(fatwa)。他在推导规范性原则(qawa'd dabita)时采用的是一种务实的方法,依靠现实、证据,并将这些内容应用于具体的事实。沙斐仪的法理学(usul)最突出的特点在于,它包含了推导律例(istinbat)的一般性原则,而不论其具体方法为何。确切地说,他的法理学适用于任何方法,无论这些方法多么不同。因此,它是一把衡量尺度,借此可以辨别哪些观点正确、哪些不正确。它是一部全面的准则,在推导新的律例时必须遵循,无论一个人采用何种方法,都可以借此评判各种观点,并以一套综合性的准则来规范律例的推论。沙斐仪的法理学并非只为其教法学派(mazhab)而设,尽管该学派遵循它。他写作此书,也不是为了捍卫其学派、阐明其观点,而是包含了推导律例的普遍性和全面性原则。其动机并非倾向于某一特定学派,而是希望规范伊吉提哈德(Ijtihād)的程序,为穆贾台黑德(mujtahidin)设立界限与准则。他心志诚恳,在创立伊斯兰法理学(usul al-fiqh)这门学科时理解端正,因此无一例外地影响了其后的穆贾台黑德与乌莱玛,无论这些人是反对还是支持他的观点。 直到后来,尽管各派倾向不同,他们仍发现自己遵循着阿尔-沙斐仪所走过的道路:确立综合性的原则(qawa'id kulliyya),并依照综合性的法则和普遍原理,有条理地进行伊斯兰教法学(fiqh)的推论与演绎(istinbat)。在他之后,伊斯兰教法学不再像他之前那样,只是零散的教令(fatwa)和个别的裁决(aqdiya)的汇集,而是建立在确定的基础之上。 尽管所有乌莱玛在usul al-fiqh(教法学原理)的概念上都追随阿尔-沙斐仪的脚步,但他们接受阿尔-沙斐仪所得出的成果的方式,因其各自不同的教法学路径而有所不同。一些人遵循他的观点,开始阐释和拓展这些观点,也有人与之有分歧,如阿尔-沙斐仪自己的追随者。另一些人则接受了阿尔-沙斐仪所提出的大部分内容,尽管他们在usul的某些细节上存在分歧,但并不反对usul的主体。由于他们在阿尔-沙斐仪usul的主体、框架和进路上没有分歧,如哈乃斐学派及其方法的追随者便是如此。也有人在这一usul上反对阿尔-沙斐仪,如扎希里学派和什叶派。 追随阿尔-沙斐仪观点的是罕百里学派。他们采用了阿尔-沙斐仪的usul,尽管他们说唯一被承认的公议(ijma')是圣门弟子的公议。在阿尔-沙斐仪之后的马立克学派,将其方法论与阿尔-沙斐仪usul的大部分内容相结合,不过他们把麦地那人的实践作为证据,并在某些细节上与他有所不同。至于那些遵循他的方法并接受他观点的人,他们就是沙斐仪学派的追随者,他们在usul al-fiqh这门学科上非常活跃,并就此主题大量著述。 这些著作是按照阿什-沙斐仪在法理学（usul al-fiqh）中的方法撰写的，这些方法过去是、现在仍是这门学科的支柱和根基。在古人所著的最重要的三部书中：第一，艾卜·侯赛因·穆罕默德·本·巴士里（卒于公元413年）的《穆尔塔马德》；第二，阿卜杜·马利克·本·阿卜杜拉·朱瓦伊尼，通称为伊玛目·哈拉曼（卒于公元478年）的《布尔罕》；第三，艾卜·哈米德·安萨里（卒于公元505年）的《穆斯塔斯法》。在他们之后，出现了通称为阿米迪的艾卜·侯赛因·阿里。他汇集了这三部书并加以扩充，写成了《法理原则中的判决》（al-ihkam fi usul al-ahkam），这是法理学领域最重要的著作之一。 至于那些采纳了阿什-沙斐仪所提出的大部分内容，只在一些细节上有所不同的人，就是哈乃斐学派。这是因为他们的推理方法（istinbat）与沙斐仪的法理原则相一致，不过他们研究法理学的方式受到了教法分支（furu'）的影响。他们研究法理原则是为了支持教法分支，因此他们以教法分支为基础，使一般原则建立在其上，并为其服务。或许促使他们采取这种方式的原因在于，他们研究法理学的目的是为了支持自己的教法学派，而不是为了制定原则，让本学派据以推导教法条规。这是因为先于沙斐仪的艾卜·哈尼法卒于沙斐仪出生的那一年，而他的推理并不依据普遍而全面的原则。同样，在他之后出现的弟子艾卜·优素福、穆罕默德和祖法尔也没有致力于撰写法理学，而是后来哈乃斐学派的学者们承担起推导原则的工作，以服务于哈乃斐学派的教法分支。原则的形成晚于教法分支，而不是先于它。 然而，哈乃斐派的法理学总体上是从沙斐仪的法理学中提炼出来的。他们与沙斐仪派在"'aamm（通用）是否像khaas（特指）一样具有确定性（qat'i）"这一问题上存在分歧。

What helped al-Shafi’i to lay down the science of usul was that he came at a time when Islamic jurisprudence had started to greatly flourish. In the Islamic lands juristical groups of mujtahidin began to take shape and they began to form into mazhabs (schools). The debate between the Mujtahidin and the proponents of mazahibs took various perspectives in fiqh and the evidences. So he plunged into debates with those who engaged in the debate, these discussions were what guided him to think about general and comprehensive principles as regulatory criterions which should be the basis of study and inference. He brought together these principles as one body of knowledge which was the science of usul al-fiqh. The impressive thing about the usul of al-Shafi’i is that he proceeds in the discussion of usul in a legislative and not in a logical manner. One of the greatest dangers for study, in fact for the Ummah’s revival especially in fiqh and usul is the path of logic. Al-Shafi’i clearly distanced himself from the course of logic and adhered to the legislative course. He was not interested in theoretical methods or suppositions. He wanted to regulate real and existing issues i.e, he took the Sharī’ah texts and stopped at the limit of the text and at the limit of the reality which the text indicated and the people themselves witnessed. Regarding the issue of abrogation (nasikh wal mansukh), he established the principles of abrogation from the issues which, for him, had been proven to contain abrogations, taken from what has been mentioned in the ayah or hadīth itself, or from the indication (dalala) of abrogation, or what has been narrated about the Messenger  in terms of hadīth which indicate abrogation or whatever has been reported about the Companions of the Messenger of Allah  in terms of reports and judgements. Not like many who came after him when they saw a contradiction between two verses or ahadīth they immediately moved to say that one has abrogated the other, to the extent that they ended up making terrible blunders. When al-Shafi’i came with a principle he did not bring it from a logical premise (muqaddima mantiqiyya) rather he showed the sources from which he took it, either from a report about the Prophet  or from legal verdicts (fatwas) of the Sahabah. His approach in deriving regulatory (qawa’d dabita) principles was a practical one in which he relied on the reality, the evidences, and on the application of those things on tangible facts. The most prominent aspect by which Shafi’is usul is distinguished is that it contains general principles for the deduction (istinbat) of rules, regardless of what his specific methodology was. Rather, his usul is suitable for any methodology however different it may be. Thus, it is a measure by which one can know which opinions are correct and which are not correct. It is a comprehensive law which must be adhered to when deducing new rules, whatever methodology a person may set himself, in order to judge opinions and regulate the inference of rules by a comprehensive law. The usul of al-Shafi’i was not intended to be an usul for his mazhab (school) only, even though the mazhab adhered to it. It was not written to defend his mazhab and clarify its viewpoint. Rather, it contains general and comprehensive principles for istinbat (inference). The motive was not a trend towards a particular mazhab but rather it was a desire to regulate the procedures of Ijtihād and put in place limits and guidelines for the mujtahidin. He was sincere in his intentions and he had the correct understanding when devising the science of usul al-fiqh, thereby influencing, without exception, those mujtahidin and ‘Ulamā that came after al-Shafi’i, whether they opposed or supported his opinions. Until, despite their different tendencies, they saw themselves proceeding according to the path al-Shafi’i had taken, in terms of setting out comprehensive principles (qawa’id kulliyya) and proceeding in fiqh and istinbat (inference) in a regulated manner according to comprehensive laws and general principles. Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) after him came to be based on established foundations not as an assortment of fatwas and individual judgements (aqdiya) as was the case before him. Even though all of the ‘Ulamā proceed in the footsteps of al-Shafi’i in terms of the notion of usul al-fiqh, however the way in which they received what al-Shafi’ had arrived at was different according to their different juristic approaches. Some followed his opinions and began to explain and expand on them and disagree with them, like the followers of al-Shafi’i himself. And some took the major part of what al-Shafi’i had brought despite their disagreement with certain details of usul and but not the actual body of usul. Since they had no disagreements in terms of the body, framework and course of al-Shafi’is usul, like the Hanafis and those who followed their method. And there were those who disagreed with al-Shafi’i in this usul, like the Zahiris and Shi’a. Those who followed al-Shafi’i in his opinions were the Hanbalis. They adopted the usul of al-Shafi’i even though they said the only (recognised) ijma’ (consensus) is that of the Sahabah. The Malikis who came after al-Shafi’i combined their methodology with much of what was in al-Shafi’i’s usul though they took the practise of the people of Madina as a proof and differed with him in certain details. As for those who proceeded according to his method and embraced his opinions they are the followers of his mazhab who were very active in the (study of) the science of usul al-fiqh and wrote prolifically about the subject. Books were written according to the methodology of al-Shafi’i in usul al-fiqh which were, and still are, the pillars and support of this science. Of the most important three books that are known to be written by the ancients: First, the book al-Mu’tamad of Abu al Husayn Muhammad ibn al-Basri (d.413 A.H.), Second, the book al-Burhan of ‘Abd al-Malik ibn’ Abd Allah al-Juwayni commonly known as imam al-Harāmayn (d.478 A.H.) and third, the book al-Mustasfa of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d.505 A.H). After them came Abu al-Husayn ‘Ali otherwise known as al-Amidi. He brought together all three books and expanded on them in his book al-ihkam fi usul al-ahkām, which was one of the most important works written on usul al-fiqh, as for those who adopted the major part of what al-Shafi’i brought and differed in some of the details, they are the Hanafis. That is because their method of istinbat (inference) agreed with the usul of al-Shafi’i though the way in which they approached the science of usul was influenced by the furu’ (branches of fiqh). They studied the principles of usul in order to support the furu’. So they made the furu’ the basis. The general principles were based on it and made to support it. Perhaps what pushed them towards this approach was that their study of usul was for the purpose of supporting their mazhab and not in order to produce principles according to which their school should deduce rules. That is because Abu Hanifa who had preceded al-Shafi’i, died the year in which al-Shafi’i was born. And his inferences were not according to general and comprehensive principles. Likewise after him came his students Abu Yusuf, Muhammad and Zufar. They did not concern themselves with writing about usul al-fiqh but it fell to the scholars of the Hanafi mazhab afterwards to pursue the inference of principles which would serve the furu’ of the Hanafi mazhab, The principles came later than the furu’ and did not precede it. Nevertheless, the Hanafi usul on the whole has been extracted from the usul of al-Shafi’i. And what they differed on with the Shafi’is in terms of the ‘aamm (general) being qat’i (definite) like the khas (specific),

并且由于传述者人数众多，不存在通过择优来做取舍（tarjeeh）的情况。这些属于细节问题，而非全面的原则。因此，可以将哈乃斐派与沙斐仪派的法理学（usul）视为同一套法理学体系。它们在处理具体的枝节（furu'）与某些细节上的分歧时采取的方法并不是另一种法理学，而是在其全面性、普遍性与原则上同属一套体系。你几乎看不到沙斐仪派法理学著作与哈乃斐派法理学著作之间有什么差别。实际上，它们都是在研究同一套法理学（usul al-fiqh）的原则。哈乃斐派最重要的法理学著作之一是法赫尔·伊斯兰·阿里·本·穆罕默德·阿尔-巴兹达维（Fakhr al-Islam 'Ali ibn Muhammad al-Bazdawi，卒于公元483年）所编纂的《巴兹达维法理学》（Usul al-Bazdawi）。

and that there is no tarjeeh (outweighing) due to the great number of transmitters. These are detailed issues and not comprehensive principles. That is why it is possible to consider the Hanafi and Shafi’i usuls as one usul for fiqh. Its approach towards the furu’ and disagreements in certain details is not another usul but they are one usul in its comprehensivity, generality and principles. You hardly ever see any difference between a book in shafi’i usul and a book in Hanafi usul. Rather, all of them are a study of the same principles (usul) of fiqh. One of the most important books of usul for the Hanafis is the usul al-Bazdawi compiled by Fakhr al-Islam ‘Ali ibn Muhammad al-Bazdawi (d.483 A.H.)

至于那些在其法理学（usul）上与阿勒·沙菲仪持不同意见的人，他们是区希里派（Zahiris）和什叶派。他们反对沙菲仪法理学的部分基本原则，而不仅仅是细节。至于区希里派，他们完全否定类比推理（Qiyas），仅依赖经文的表面含义（zahir）。即使被称为“明显类比”（qiyas jali）的推理，他们也不视为类比的一部分，而视为经文本身。他们对经文的考量，无非是对经文表面含义的考量。该学派的领袖是艾布·苏莱曼·达乌德·伊本·赫拉夫·伊斯法哈尼（卒于伊历270年）。他出身于沙菲仪学派，曾向沙菲仪的弟子学习教法学，之后离开了沙菲仪学派，为自己选择了一条特殊的学派之路，只依赖经文。该学派被称为区希里派（字面主义派）。伊本·哈兹姆便是其中之一。某些人使他声名远扬，并对他大加赞誉，以致人们对他的著作产生了兴趣，尽管就教法讨论和推导证据的角度而言，这些著作还不及教法学和其他法理学著作的水平。至于什叶派，他们在法理学上与沙菲仪的理论有重大分歧，因为他们将其伊玛目的言论视为与《古兰经》和逊奈同等的沙里亚依据。在他们看来，它至少是紧随《古兰经》和逊奈之后的一种证据。他们允许伊玛目的言论来限定逊奈。他们说：

As for those who disagreed with al-Shafi’i in his usul, they are the Zahiris and Shi’a. They disagreed with al-Shafi’is usul in some of its basic elements and not just in the details. As for the Zahiris, they completely rejected Qiyas (analogical deduction) and depended solely on the apparent (zahir) (meaning) of the texts. Even what is termed as the qiyas jali (clear analogy) was not consider as a part of Qiyas but as text. Their consideration of the text is nothing other than a consideration of the apparent (zahir) (meaning) of the text. The imam of this mazhab is Abu Sulayman Dawud ibn Khalaf al-Isfahani (d.270 A.H.) He was from the Shafi’iyya. He learnt fiqh from the students of al-Shafi’i. Then he left the mazhab of al-Shafi’i and chose a special mazhab for himself where he would only rely on the text. It is called the Zahiri mazhab (literalists). Ibn Hazm is one of them. Certain people made him popular and gave a glowing description about him until people became interested in his books even though they were below the level of the books of fiqh and other usuls in terms of the jurisprudential discussion and angle of educing evidences. As for the Shi’a, they disagreed with al-Shafi’is usul in a significant way for they made the sayings of their imams a Sharī’ah dalīl like the Qur’ān and Sunnah. For them it is considered a proof which follows the proof of the Qur’ān and that of the Sunnah at the very least. They permitted the speech of the imams to specify the Sunnah. They say:

伊玛目派什叶派把自己的伊玛目置于接近逊奈的地位。对他们而言,伊吉提哈德(ijtihād)仅限于其教法学派之内,法学家(mujtahid)不得与该学派的观点相抵触,即不得作出与伊玛目穆罕默德·萨迪格(al-Sadiq)的言论相矛盾的伊吉提哈德。他们拒绝圣训,除非该圣训是经由他们的伊玛目传来的。他们不采用类比推理(qiyās)。据他们在各自典籍中的记载,其伊玛目们曾多次(tawātur)明确表示:若以类比推理来比照沙里亚,宗教便会被毁坏。

The Imami Shi’as place their Imams in a position close to the Sunnah. Ijtihād for them is restricted to the mazhab, it is not permitted for the mujtahid to contradict the views of the mazhab i.e, it is not permitted for the mujtahid to make Ijtihād with what contradicts the sayings of the Imam al Sadiq. They rejected ahadīth except if it came via their imams. They do not take Qiyas. It has been recurrently reported (tawatara) about their imams as they have narrated in their books that when analogy is made to the Sharī’ah the deen is destroyed.

这是关于穆斯林学者（乌拉玛）在伊斯兰教法根源学（usul al-fiqh）领域中，于沙斐仪（al-Shafi'i）之后，对其观点所持的赞同或反对立场的情况。至于该学科本身，在沙斐仪之后得到了极为广泛的讨论，出现了大量的注释者和著述者。奇怪的是，在沙斐仪所处时代之后的各个时代，伊杰提哈德（Ijtihād，独立推理）逐渐衰落，穆扎希德（mujtahidin，独立推理者）稀少，而在此之后的时代，伊杰提哈德之门被关闭。然而，伊斯兰教法根源学却蓬勃发展，对其原则的审视日益增多，其问题也变得更加繁复。但这一切都是从理论而非实践角度进行的。因此，它在培养穆扎希德、打破伊杰提哈德之门已经关闭的观念并使其终结方面并未发挥作用。其原因或许在于，这些后期时代的伊斯兰教法根源学采取了纯理论的路径，理论性讨论占据主导，并且掺入了许多与伊斯兰教法根源学毫无关系的研究。研究者的注意力转向了考察和修订支撑这些原则的论据，并选择论据最有力的一方，而不论其是否具有现实依据。他们的理论假设层出不穷，他们依照逻辑学（mantiq）学者的分类方法，研究了"达拉拉"（dalāla，文本含义）的概念并对其进行分类。他们提出了一些与伊斯兰教法根源学毫无关联的讨论，例如"善"（husn）与"恶"（qubh）的问题，即它们是理性的还是法律的？又如感恩（shukr）施恩者（mun'im）是出于沙里亚（Sharī'ah）的义务还是出于理智的义务？他们还开展了一些属于神学（Kalam）而非伊斯兰教法根源学的研究，例如先知的无过性，以及先知在传达使命相关事务上是否可能犯错或遗忘。 他们所做的研究与阿拉伯语相关,而非与usul al-fiqh(伊斯兰教法原理)相关。他们研究语言的起源,研究虚词(huruf)和名词(asma)。通过这种方式,他们使usul al-fiqh这门学科僵化,并将其从立法层面转变为一种理论性和哲学性的研究,以致学者无法推导出最简单的规则。结果,这门学科的实用性几乎丧失,对立法和推导规则(istinbat)不再产生任何作用。由于usul al-fiqh这门学科对于规则的推导和立法层面的发展不可或缺,因此必须重视将usul al-fiqh作为一门立足于现实、而非停留于理论的学科来研究。只需进行与规则推导相关的研究即可,这种研究应伴随指示规则的证据,并结合适用于其含义的现实情况来进行,从而培养出mujtahidin(专业法学家),并形成丰富的立法资源,以应对穆斯林世界乃至全世界每天出现的新问题。

This is the situation of the course of Muslim ‘Ulamā in the science of usul al-fiqh after al-Shafi’i in terms of their agreement or opposition to him. As for the science itself, after al-Shafi’i, it was discussed at great length and it had many commentators and writers. It is strange that in the ages that followed the age of al-Shafi’i, Ijtihād diminished and there was a scarcity of mujtahidin and in the ages that followed that age, the door of Ijtihād was closed. However, the science of usul al-fiqh thrived and flourished, the scrutiny of its principles increased and its issues became more elaborate. But all of this was from a theoretical and not practical perspective. As a result, it was ineffective in creating mujtahidin and breaking the notion of the closing of the door of Ijtihād and bringing it to an end. Perhaps the reason for that is that usul al-fiqh during those later periods took a purely theoretical approach where the theoretical discussion prevailed and studies were inserted into it that had no relationship to usul al-fiqh. The attention of researchers was directed to examining and revising the principles supporting them with evidences and selecting the one with the strongest evidence regardless of whether there was a reality for it or not. Their theoretical assumptions multiplied and they studied the (concept of) dalāla (textual implications) and classified it according to the classifications of the scholars of mantiq (logic). They raised discussions which had nothing to do with usul al-fiqh like husn (pretty) and qubh (ugly), or are they rational or legal? Or discussions such as; is thanking (shukr) the benefactor (mun’im) an obligation due to the Sharī’ah or the mind ? They initiated studies that were from the science of Kalam (scholastics) and not from usul al-fiqh, such as the infallibility of the Prophets, permissibility of the Prophets to make mistakes or forget in issues related to (conveying) the Message. They made studies related to the Arabic language and not to usul al-fiqh. They studied the origin of languages and studied particles (huruf) and nouns (asma). In that manner they made the science of usul al-fiqh rigid and transformed it from its legislative aspect, which produced mujtahidin and enriched fiqh into a theoretical and philosophical study in which the scholar is unable to deduce the simplest of rules, until its usefulness was almost lost and it had no effect in legislation or deduction of rules (istinbat) and since the science of usul al-fiqh is indispensable in relation to the deduction of rules and the growth of the legislative aspect, this is why it is essential to attend to the study of usul al-fiqh as a study which is based on reality and not theoretically. It is sufficient just to undertake studies that relate to the deduction of rules which is studied accompanied by evidences indicating the rules and realities which apply to their meanings until mujtahidin are produced and a legislative wealth is generated to treat new issues which come up each day in the Muslim world and in the rest of the world