"عزيمة" (al-azeemah，原则性律例)是指作为一般性立法所确立的规定，众仆人都有义务遵守。"رخصة" (al-rokhsah，许可性律例)则是为减轻原则性规定而因某种借口而立法的规定，并不强制仆人去执行，但原则性规定依然有效。例如，斋戒是"عزيمة"，病人可以不封斋，这是"رخصة"；在拜前洗净肢体是"عزيمة"，擦拭受伤或断裂的肢体是"رخصة"；站立拜是"عزيمة"，因虚弱而坐着拜是"رخصة"，诸如此类。 因此，"عزيمة"是普遍立法的规定，并非只针对部分成年负责的人而排除其他人，它也不允许在遵行它与遵行其他规定之间作选择，而是唯一要求人们遵行它。而"رخصة"是为某种非常规的借口而立法的规定，只要借口存在，其立法便有效；借口消失，它便不再有效，并且它特别针对具有该借口特征的成年负责的人。 据此，作为一般性文本例外的规定不是"رخصة"，而是"عزيمة"；同样，只适用于某些特定情形的规定也不是"رخصة"，而是"عزيمة"，因为这些是情形而非借口。例如：丈夫去世的妇女的待婚期（即寡妇在此期间不得再嫁）是四个月零十天，而丈夫去世的孕妇的待婚期则是直到分娩。这一规定是对一般规则的例外，所以它不是"رخصة"。 此外，买卖如果满足了其条件且不被禁止，则是有效的（صحيح）；如果买卖是在"الغبن الفاحش"（极度欺诈性的过高或过低价格）下成交的，即使其条件全部满足且不被禁止，它也是无效的（فاسد）。 它的买方有退货的选择权，但这并非“رخصة”（拉赫赛，即宽限/特许）。出售未收到之物是“باطل”（无效的），而出售未收到的牲畜则是“صحيح”（有效的），这也不是“رخصة”。依此类推，预付款买卖（先付价款、延期交货的“سلم”）、“العرايا”（将棕榈树赠予无法等到果实成熟的贫者，允许他以干枣之物出售）、“المساقاة”（一人允许工人浇灌树木并照料，以约定比例的果实作为报酬）以及类似的契约，都属于“عزيمة”（坚定的常规），而非“رخصة”。因此一切许可之事都是确定的律例，而非让步。所谓要求仆人依其行事，是指依照该律例而行，无论其为“واجب”、“مندوب”、“مباح”、“حرام”还是“مكروه”。你可以看到，食用“الميتة”（未经宰杀的死物之肉）是“حرام”，但对于被迫者而言则是被允许的，因此这是“رخصة”。可见，所考量的是依律例而行的行为，而非行为本身。至于先知ﷺ关于“العرايا”的说法：“他允许出售‘العرايا’作为一种‘رخصة’”，见于马立克的记述，其意指的是该词的语言学含义（即“أرخص”，使之便利），也就是说，他为你们提供了便利。与此相似，凡是真主至高无上使人们得以便利的一切契约，都属于确定的律例，因为它们并非因某种借口而对原本禁止之事的例外，所以当借口消失时，其例外也随之消失；而这些律例是作为对仆人的便利而立法的，其立法具有普遍性和永久性。 关于此事还有一个区别:如果有人无法站立礼拜,或者虽能站立但十分艰难,于是坐着礼拜,即便他因此违反了拜功的一个支柱,站立对他而言也已不是义务,这就是一种宽免(رخصة)。而当一个人为了养家糊口,用估算的棕榈树果实去换取椰枣,并以棕榈树果实的估算价格进行交换时,这并不是宽免,因为它不是因某种借口而设的例外,而是允许以干果换取鲜果的一种情形。它虽属例外,却不是为了借口而立法,使之被视为宽免,而是为了便利民众而立法,因此它属于伊斯兰法的便利措施,而非因借口而产生的宽免,所以它不是 rukhsah(宽免)。 宽免必须有沙里亚证据来表明它是沙里亚的宽免。安拉至尊曾因某种借口而立法,因此借口就是将该条律例视为沙里亚律例的原因。宽免被视为沙里亚的因由之一,它属于情境性律例之一,是立法者针对仆人在特定情境下的行为所作的言说;既然它是立法者的言说,就必然需要一项沙里亚证据。因此,盲目、跛足和疾病都是不参加圣战而坐守的借口。安拉至尊说:"瞎子没有罪,跛子没有罪,病人没有罪(如果他们不参战)……"(《胜利章》17节)。旅行则是斋月中破斋的借口,安拉至尊说:"你们中若有病的,或在旅途中,则应在其他日子补足。"(《黄牛章》185节)。遗忘、错误和被迫也是借口,它们免除了陷入禁令者的罪过。 “使者（SAW）说：真主已经免除了我的穆斯林社群因错误、遗忘以及被迫所做之事而承担的罪责。”由伊本·马哲记录。有些人对于可以免除的事情所持的无知，也可以作为借口，因为拉苏尔·安拉（SAW）曾听到穆阿维叶·伊本·哈凯姆在礼拜中打喷嚏的人时说了“愿真主赐福你”（tashmeet），礼拜结束后，使者（SAW）教导他说，在礼拜中说话会使礼拜无效，并对他说，正如穆斯林所记录的那样：“礼拜中不允许有任何人的谈话，礼拜只是赞颂、赞美真主和诵读《古兰经》”，他也没有命令他重新礼拜。因此，这些都是沙里亚证据中出现的借口，所以它们被视为借口；而凡是在证据中作为特定规定的特定借口所出现的，就被视为借口，凡是没有出现在证据中的，就毫无价值，根本不会被视为沙里亚上的借口。这些借口是就其本身而言被视为借口的，而不是因为其中的伊莱（理由）：因为表明它们是借口的沙里亚证据并没有为将它们视为借口设定推理（ta'leel），而是让它们没有理由，所以我们不为它们制造伊莱（理由），因为沙里亚没有为它们设定理由；并且沙里亚使它们每一项借口都只针对其所适用的那条规定，而不针对其他规定，因此它被视为针对其所适用规定的特殊借口，而不是对每条规定都适用的普遍借口。因此，失明是放弃圣战的借口，而不是放弃礼拜的借口。 此外,这些托词——疾病、跛行、旅行、遗忘、被迫和错误——尽管它们是某种属性,但它们属于一类不能用于设定理由(ta'leel)的属性,也不表明可据此进行推理。因此,我们不会用其他托词去衡量它们,也不会为其寻找原因以设定理由,即寻找一个理由将其视为illah(效因),从而对其适用效因规则。所以,我们不说旅行的效因是其艰辛,而是旅行本身就是效因,因为安拉至高无上将其视为效因,而非因为其艰辛,也就是说它是不充分的效因。因此,旅行者可以在达到缩短距离(qasr)时缩短拜功,即使他乘坐飞机旅行;而即使他在酷热的沙漠中旅行,但未达到缩短距离,也不得缩短拜功,因为允许缩短拜功的托词不是艰辛,而是旅行,因为无论是否艰辛,它都是旅行。所有使沙里亚经文颁布优惠(rukhas)的托词都是如此。这是就实际情况而言,优惠(rukhsah)与原则(azeemah)都是从沙里亚的角度来说的。至于遵行优惠或原则:遵行其中任何一种都是允许的(mubah),因为优惠经文中已表明,人可以遵行优惠,也可以遵行原则。安拉至高无上说:"若有人因饥饿而被迫,并非存心犯罪,那么安拉确是至赦的,至慈的。"(第5章《筵席》第3节)。又说:"但如果有人因迫不得已,并非故意违抗,也未越界,那么他就无罪。" “安拉是至为宽恕、至为慈悯的”（第2章《黄牛》第173节），于是至尊的真主以允许（rokhsah）的方式解除了进食的罪责，这就是允许（ibahah），并赦免了其行为的罪过，这也是允许。至尊的真主说：“你们在大地上旅行的时候，如果你们害怕不信道者会侵扰你们，那么你们缩短拜功，你们并无罪过。不信道者确是你们的明显的仇敌。”（第4章《妇女》第101节）解除罪责即是允许。安拉至高无上地说：“……但你们中如果有人患病，或者在旅途中，那么应当在其他的日子里补还（所缺的斋戒）……”（第2章《黄牛》第185节）这也是允许。因此，允许（rokhsah）本身的经文只赋予人依照允许行事的许可（ibahah），而不是义务（wujoub），也不是提倡（nadb）。此外，穆斯林圣训辑录家（穆斯林）引述哈姆扎·伊本·阿穆鲁的话，他说：“安拉的使者啊，我在旅途中有能力斋戒，这是否是我所犯的过错？”安拉的使者ﷺ说：“这是安拉的允许（rokhsah），谁采取它，便是善行；谁喜欢斋戒，他也没有罪过。”又据艾卜·赛义德的记载，他说：“我们曾与安拉的使者ﷺ同行，禁食者便禁食，破斋者便破斋，他们彼此都不互相指责。”此段也由穆斯林辑录。这些文本明确表明，允许（rokhsah）与坚持（azeemah）都是可以选择的（mubaah），因此人可以自由地选择其中任何一种，随其所愿。

The determination (al-azeemah) is (a quality of) what was legislated of rules as a general legislation, and the servants are obliged by it. And the concession (al-rokhsah) is what was legislated of rules to lighten the determination because of an excuse, without obliging the servants to act upon it, with the remaining of the determination rule. As an example, the sawm is azeemah (determination) and the fitr (fast breaking) for the sick person is rokhsah (concession). Washing the organ in the wudhoo' is azeemah, and wiping the wounded or broken organ is rokhsah. Praying standing up is azeemah, and sitting down in the prayer in case of weakness is rokhsah, and as such. So the azeemah is what was generally legislated, it is not specific for some mukallafeen without the others, and it does not enable to choose between acting according to it or according to something else, but it obliges to act according to it solely. And the rokhsah is what was legislated for an unusual excuse, so its legislation is considered as long as the excuse exists, and it is not considered if the excuse vanishes, and it is especially for the mukallafeen that are characterized by this excuse. Accordingly, the rule that is an exception from a general text is not rokhsah, but it is azeemah, also the rule that is special for some situations is not rokhsah, but it is azeemah, because these are situations not excuses. An example for that is: the iddah of the women (period a widow should not remarry in it) that her husband died is four months and ten days, and the iddah of the pregnant women that her husband died is until she gives birth to her baby. This rule is an exception from the general rule so it is not a rokhsah. And also the sale, if its conditions are fulfilled and it is not forbidden; it is sahih (valid), and if the sale happened at al-ghobn al-faahish (excessive price), even if all its conditions are fulfilled and it is not forbidden; it is corrupted. Its buyer has the option about it (to return it), but it is not a rokhsah. Selling what is not received is baatil (invalid), and selling the animal that is not received is sahih (valid) and that is not a rokhsah. Accordingly the salam sale (forwarding the price and delaying the good), the araaya (palm trees given to the needy who could not wait until they are ripen so he is allowed to sell them by dates), the musaaqaat (a man allows a worker to water the trees and serve them for a known portion of the fruit), and the likes of the agreements are azeemah not rokhsah. And thus all the permissibles are determinations not concessions. And what is meant by obliging the servants to act according to it; is according to the rule, whether it is waajib or mandoub, mubaah, haraam or makrouh. Can you see that eating the maytah (dead not slaughtered meat) is haraam, but for the compelled one it is allowed, so it is a rokhsah, so what is considered is the action according to the rule, not the action itself. And as for the saying of the prophet (SAW) about the araaya He allowed the sale of the araaya as a rokhsah” narrated by maalik. What is meant is the linguistic meaning (of arkhasa) and that is He made it easy for you. And similar to that, all the agreements which Allah Ta’ala made easy for the people are determinations, because they are not exception from a rule that is originally forbidden for an excuse, so theire exception vanishes when the excuse vanishes, but these rules are legislated as facilitation for the servants, and their legislation is general and permanent. And there is difference in the case when someone could not stand up in the prayer, or he could with hardship so he prays sitting down, even though he violates one of the salaat’s pillars; it is not obligatory upon him to stand up, and that is a concession, and in the case when a man sells the estimated fruits of the palm trees to feed his family dates for the price of the estimated fruits of the palm trees, this is not a concession, because it is not an exception for an excuse, but it is a situation in which it is permitted to sell the ripe by the solid, even though it is an exception, but it was not legislated for an excuse to be considered as a concession, but it was legislated as a facilitation for the people, so it is of the facilitations of the shari'ah and not because of the excuses, so it is not a rokhsah. It is inevitable that the rokhsah is shown in a shari'ahi daleel to consider it as a shari'ahi concession. It is a rule Allah Ta’ala had legislated it for an excuse so the excuse is the cause for considering the rule as shari'ahi. However, the rokhsah is considered to be from the shari'ahi causes, and it is one of the circumstantial rules, and it is the legislators address related to the actions of the servants about the circumstance, and since it is a legislator’s address; it is inevitable to have a shari'ahi daleel for it. so the blindness, the limping and the illness are excuses for the sitting down (absence) from the jihaad, Allah Ta’ala is blame No :said there on the blind, nor is there blame on the lame, nor on the ill one (if he joins not the war)…), 17 Surat Al-Fath, and the traveling is an excuse for the fast breaking in ramadhaan, Allah Ta’ala said: but if any one of you is ill, or on a travel, the prescribed period (should be made up) by days later...),185 Surat Al-Baqarah, and the forgetfulness, the mistake and the compulsion are excuses which lift up the sin of the involved person that falls into a forbidden. The messenger (SAW) said: verily Allah had put down the blame of my Ummah for the mistake, the forgetfulness, and that which they are compelled to do” narrated by Ibn Maajah, and the ignorance about what can be ignored by some people is an excuse, because Rasoul Allah (SAW) heard Mu’awiah Ibn Al-Hakam saying the tashmeet (saying may Allah bless you) to a person that sneezed while in the prayer, so after they finished the prayer, the Messenger (SAW) taught him that speaking in the prayer invalidates it, by saying to him as narrated by Muslim: “verily nothing of the people’s talk is allowed in this prayer, it is but glorifying, praising Allah, and reciting the Quran”, and He did not command him to repeat the prayer. So these are excuses that came in the Shari'ahi daleel so they are considered excuses, and thus whatever came in the adillah (evidences) as specific excuses for specific rules will be considered as excuses, and whatever does not come in the daleel has no value, and will not be considered as a shari'ahi excuse at all. These excuses are considered for them selves, not because of the illah (reason in them), that is because the shari'ahi daleel which showed that they are excuses did not set reasoning (ta’leel) for considering them as excuses, but left them without reasons, so we don’t make ilal (reasons) for them, because the shari'ah did not set reasons for them, and made every excuse of them an excuse for the rule which it came for it, not for other rules, so it is considered as a special excuse for the rule which it came for it, not a general excuse for every rule, therefore, the blindness is an excuse to leave the jihaad, not an excuse to leave the salaat. Moreover, these excuses: the illness, he limping, the traveling, the forgetfulness, the compulsion and the mistake, even though they are qualitys; they are a kind of quality which does not indicate that it can be used for setting reasons (ta’leel), and does not show an indication for reasoning, therefore, we don’t measure other excuses to it, and we don’t seek a cause to set a reason for it, i.e. a reason to consider it as a illah for applying the illah rule on it, therefore, we don’t say that traveling is a illah because of its hardship but the travel itself is the illah because Allah Ta’ala considered it as a illah not because of its hardship, i.e. it is an insufficient illah, therefore, the traveler is allowed to shorten the salaat for the distance of the shortening (qasr), even if he travels by plane, and does not shorten for less then the shortening distance even if he travels in the desert while it is very hot, because the hardship is not the excuse that allowed the shortening, but the excuse that made the roukhsa (concession) to shorten the salaat is the travel, for it is a travel regardless of the hardship, and thus are all the excuses because of which the roukhas (concessions) are issued by the shari'ahi text. This is with regard to the reality, that the roukhsa and the azeemah are from the shari'ah perspectives. As for acting according to the rokhsah or the azeemah (determination); verily acting according to either one of them is a mubaah, so one can act according to the rokhsah or according to the azeemah, because this is shown in the texts of the concessions. Allah Ta’ala said: to inclination no with ,hunger by forced is any if But transgression, Allah is indeed Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful) 3 Surat Al Ma’idah, and He said: (…But if one is forced by necessity, without willful disobedience, nor transgressing due limits, then is he guiltless. For Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful) 173 Surat Al-Baqarah, so He Ta’ala showed the rokhsah by lifting up the guilt of the eating and this is the ibahah (permissibility), and forgave the sin of his action and it is the ibahah. He Ta’ala said: When ye travel through the earth, there is no blame on you if ye shorten your prayers, for fear the Unbelievers may attack you: for the Unbelievers are unto you open enemies) 101 Surat Al-Nisaa’, and lifting up the blame means the ibahah. Allah Ta’ala said: ......) but if any one is ill, or on a travel, the prescribed period (should be made up) by days later...) 185 Surat Al-Baqarah, and this is the ibahah, so the evidences of the rokhas themselves give the ibahah (permissibility) to act according to the rokhsah not the wujoub (obligation), nor the nadb (preference). Also Muslim narrated on the authority of Hamzah Ibn Amrou that he said: I ,Allah Rasoul Oh find strength in myself for fasting while traveling, is it an offence I commit? Rasoul Allah (SAW) said: it is a rokhsah from Allah Ta’ala, whoever takes it, it is well done. And whoever likes to fast, there is no sin on him”, and on the authority of Abu Sa’ied that he said: َ ,” we traveled with Rasoul Allah (SAW) the faster would fast and the fast breaker would break the fast, and non of them blame the others, narrated by Muslim. These texts indicate explicitly that the rokhsah and the azeemah are mubaah (when the choice is given), so one is free to opt either one of them he wills.

可以说，真主的使者ﷺ曾说："真主喜欢人们采取祂的许可，正如祂喜欢人们遵行祂的定制。"伊本·哈巴尼（Ibn Hibbaan）记录了此段圣训，这是一种请求，因此它是这一行为属于劝励（mandoub）的证据。如果被迫者害怕死亡，他必须食用死畜的肉，若他放弃食用，则是被禁止的。如果窒息者找不到其他东西，只找到了致醉之物，若他害怕死亡，他必须饮用它以缓解窒息，若他放弃而死去，则是被禁止的。如果斋戒者疲惫到了濒临死亡的程度，他必须破斋，若他继续斋戒直至死亡，则是被禁止的。由此可见，遵行许可（rokhsah）可能是义务（fardh），也可能是劝励（mandoub），还可能是允许（mubaah）。对此的回答是：讨论的是许可，从它作为一种宽免的角度来看，依据前述的证据，它无疑是允许（mubaah）的。因此，就其立法而言，许可的判断是允许（mubaah）。至于："真主的使者ﷺ说：'……'"

It could be said that the Messenger of Allah (SAW) said: " Verily, Allah loves that His concessions are taken, as He loves that His determinations are taken”, narrated by Ibn Hibbaan, and this is a request, so it is a daleel that it is a mandoub. If the compelled one fears death; he must eat the dead meat, and it is forbidden for him to abstain from eating it. If the choked one could not find except the intoxicant; he must drink it to relief himself from the choke if he fears death, and it is forbidden that he abstain and die. If the fasting person becomes very fatigue to the extant of death; he must break his fast, and it is forbidden for him to remain fasting and die, and as such, which indicate that acting according to the rokhsah could be a fardh, a mandoub and could be a mubaah. The answer to that is: the talk (discussion) is about the rokhsah from the perspective that it is a concession; it is certainly a mubaah (permissible) because of the previous evidences. So the hukm of the concession with regard to its legislation is the mubaah. As for the :(SAW (Messenger the of saying Allah ,Verily" “...

“真主喜爱人们采纳祂的让步（루赫萨）”——这段圣训中并没有表明这是圣行（nadb，即推荐），而是表明了允许（ibaahah），因为它说明安拉至高无上喜爱人们采纳祂的让步（rokhas），也喜爱人们采纳祂的坚定之法（azaa'im），二者都没有优先于对方，圣训原文为：“真主喜爱人们采纳祂的让步，正如祂喜爱人们采纳祂的坚定之法”。因此，圣训中并没有表明依照让步行事是圣行（mandoub）。 至于食用死物（未经宰杀之物）的问题：被迫者（modhttar）并非指那种确定会死亡的人，而仅仅是害怕死亡之人；他被视为被迫者。但如果不进食就确定会死亡，那么此时拒绝进食就变成了禁止之事，进食则成为他的义务（waajib）。这并非因为它是让步（rokhsah），而是因为进食变成了义务。原因在于：在那种情况下，依照坚定之法即拒绝进食，本是允许的（mubaah），但它必然导致哈拉姆（haraam）之事，即自我毁灭。因此，在那种情况下实行坚定之法便成为哈拉姆；依照教法原则“通往禁令的手段也是禁止的”，由于死亡确定这一紧急原因，实行让步便成为义务。这并非让步本身的规则，而是“通往禁令的手段也是禁止的”这一原则适用的情形之一。这一适用并不专属于让步，而是普遍适用于每一种允许之事。同样的情形还有：窒息者饮用酒类饮品，以及确定会死亡者破斋等其他情况。 因此,按其本来情况及其立法的角度而言,rokhsah(许可)的律例是mubaah(允许),但如果放弃它而履行azeemah(本然律例)必然导致haraam(禁止),那么履行这一mubaah就变成haraam了。

loves that His concessions are taken…”, nothing in the hadeeth indicates the nadb (preference), but it indicates the ibaahah, because it clarifies that Allah Ta’ala loves that His rokhas (concessions) to be taken (practiced), and He loves that His azaa’im (determinations) to be taken, and non of the two request has a priority over the other, and this is in the text of the hadeeth: " " Verily, Allah loves that His concessions are taken, as He loves that His determinations are taken”, therefore there is no indication in the hadeeth that acting according to the rokhsah is a mandoub. As the issue of eating the dead (not slaughtered) meat; the modhttar (compelled one) does not mean the one which is ascertained of his death, but just for fearing the death; he is considered as a compelled one, but if death becomes ascertained if he doesn’t eat, then it becomes forbidden for him to refrain from eating, and becomes a must (waajib) upon him to eat, not because it is a rokhsah, but because eating becomes a waajib. That is because acting according to the azeemah, which is refraining from eating (in that situation) is a mubaah, but it definitely leads to the haraam which is the self perishing. So it becomes haraam to carry out the azeemah in that situation according to the shari'ahi :principle " the means to the forbidden is a forbidden” and carrying out the rokhsah becomes a waajib because of the emergency cause which is the death certainty, and this is not the rule of the rokhsah (as a concession), but one of the situations on which the principle:" the means to the forbidden is a forbidden” is applicable. This application is not specially for the rokhsah, but it is general for every mubaah, and like that is the drinking of the intoxicant for the choked person, and the fast breaking for the ascertained of death person and others. Accordingly, the rule of the rokhsah as it is and with regard to its legislation is the mubaah (permissible), but if refraining from it and carrying out the azeemah lead certainly to the haraam, then carrying out the mubaah becomes haraam.