在考察穆台卡ililmūn（辩论神学家）的方法论后，可以清楚地看到，这是一种错误的方法论，运用它既不会导向信仰（īmān），也无助于增强信仰；甚至不会导向思考，也无助于增强思考。它所带来的只是纯粹的知识；而知识既不同于信仰，也不同于思考。这一方法的错误从几个方面看都是显而易见的：

Upon surveying the methodology of the Mutakallimīn, it becomes evident that it is an incorrect methodology and that applying it does not lead to imān or the strengthening of imān. Applying it does not even lead to thinking or to the strengthening of thinking. It only leads to mere knowledge; and knowledge is different from imān and different from thinking. The error of this methodology is obvious from several aspects:

首先：在这套方法论中，他们以逻辑为证明的基础，而不是以感官为基础。这种做法有两个方面的错误。第一，它使穆斯林为了能够证明安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的存在，必须先学习逻辑学；这意味着不懂逻辑的人就无法证明其信条（‘aqīdah）的正确性。这也意味着，在‘伊勒姆·卡拉姆’（‘Ilm al-Kalām）中，逻辑学的地位就如同阿拉伯语衰落之后，阅读阿拉伯文所需的语法句法学。然而，逻辑学与信条无关，也与证明无关。事实上，伊斯兰初期的穆斯林并不了解逻辑学；他们传播了讯息，并为自己的信条建立了确凿的证据，完全没有依赖逻辑学。这证明逻辑学在伊斯兰文化中并不存在，伊斯兰信条的任何证明也都不需要它。第二，逻辑的基础容易出错，而感官的基础则不同，就事物是否存在而言，它是绝对无误的；容易出错的东西不应当成为信仰（imān）的基础。

Firstly: in this methodology, they base their proof on a logical basis not on the sensory basis. This is wrong because of two reasons. Firstly that it makes the Muslim in need of learning the science of logic in order for him to be able to prove the existence of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ; this means that those who are not acquainted with logic are incapable of proving the correctness of their ‘aqīdah (creed); it also means that the science of logic becomes, in relation to ‘Ilm al-Kalām, like the science of grammatical syntax in relation to the reading of Arabic after the Arabic tongue has deteriorated, although the science of logic is irrelevant to the ‘aqīdah and is irrelevant to proof. Indeed at the advent of Islam the Muslims did not know the science of logic; they carried the message and established definitive evidence to their creeds without relying on the science of logic whatsoever. This proves that the science of logic has no presence in the Islamic culture and that there is no need for it in any proof of the Islamic ‘aqīdah. Secondly, that the logical basis is susceptible to error unlike the sensory basis, which with regard to the existence or otherwise of things is absolutely infallible; what is susceptible to error should not be a basis for imān.

逻辑容易流于诡辩,其结论也容易出错。尽管逻辑规定前提必须正确、其结构必须严谨,但逻辑本身是由一个前提接一个前提地推演而成,因此结论的正确与否取决于这些前提是否正确。而这些前提的正确性并无保障,因为结论并非直接建立在感官经验之上,而是建立在一个个前提相互推演的基础之上,所以结论的正确性也无法得到保证。其原因在于,这一过程是把前提一个接一个地推演:可理解之物以类似可理解之物为依据,得出相同的结果;可被感官感知之物以类似可被感官感知之物为依据,得出相同的结果。至于以可理解之物推演可理解之物,则会导致陷入谬误、得出相互矛盾的结论,并会滑入一连串在理论上和假设上合乎理性、但在现实存在中却不成立的前提与结论之中,以至于在许多此类三段论中,最终的结果完全是虚幻和荒谬的。因此,通过以可理解之物推演可理解之物来确立证明,是容易出错的。 举例来说,逻辑上可以这样表述:《古兰经》是安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的言语,它由在存在中被排列和有序安排的字母构成;而凡是由在存在中被排列和有序安排的字母构成的言语都是后起的;结论是:《古兰经》是后起的、被造的。这种前提的推演得出了一个感官无法触及的结论,因此理智既无法考察它的正确性,也无法对其作出判断。 因此，这是一个假设性的判断，而非现实性的判断；而且它本身也属于理智被禁止讨论的问题之一。这是因为讨论安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的属性，就是在讨论祂الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的本体，而讨论安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的本体是绝不允许的。然而，借助同样的逻辑，却可以推出与此相矛盾的结论。于是有人说：《古兰经》是安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的言语，它是祂的属性之一，而凡是安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的属性都是永恒的；结论便是：《古兰经》是永恒的，而非受造的。由此可见，同一命题之中存在明显的逻辑矛盾。同样，在许多由可理解之物对可理解之物进行三段论推理而得出的逻辑命题中，逻辑学家所得出的结论也会彼此完全矛盾，极其荒谬。至于对可感知之物进行三段论推理，如果前提可以追溯到感官，结论也可以追溯到感官，那么结果便是正确的，因为它的前提建立在感官之上，而结论也不仅仅依赖于命题的推演。然而实际情况是，人们在探求真理时过度依赖命题的推演，而对感官的观察则局限于命题的末端。有时某个命题被想象为对某种实在为真，但实际上并非如此；也有时某个以一般界定所表述的命题，只对其中某些部分为真，而这些部分的真实性却会导致人们错误地认为它适用于所有部分。 它也可能是这样：命题中表面上看似真实，实际上却是错误的，这在欺骗性上意味着该命题为真。也可能是结论正确，而其所据以推出的前提却是错误的，于是人们可能会想象：既然结论正确，那么前提也正确……如此等等。例如，有人说：西班牙的居民不是穆斯林，而凡是居民不是穆斯林的土地都不是伊斯兰之地；因此结论是西班牙不是伊斯兰之地。这一结论是错误的。其错误源于第二个前提的错误：“凡是居民不是穆斯林的土地都不是伊斯兰之地”这一说法是不成立的，因为一块土地是否被视为伊斯兰之地，取决于它是否由伊斯兰教统治，或者其居民中大多数是否为穆斯林。这就是结论错误的原因；西班牙实际上确实是伊斯兰之地。再举一例，有人说：美国是一个经济水平很高的国家，而每一个经济水平很高的国家都是复兴的国家。因此结论是美国是一个复兴的国家。就美国而言，这一结论是正确的，尽管两个前提之一是错误的：并非每一个经济水平很高的国家都是复兴的国家；复兴的国家是指智识水平很高的国家。因此，这一结论正确的三段论，会欺骗人们以为推出该结论所依据的前提也是正确的。它还会导向这样的命题：科威特、卡塔尔和沙特阿拉伯都是复兴的国家，因为它们每一个都有很高的经济水平，然而事实是这些国家并非复兴的国家。由此可见，所有三段论结论的正确与否，都取决于前提的正确与否。前提的真实性无法得到保证，因为它们容易存在缺陷。因此，将逻辑作为证明成立的依据是错误的。 这并不意味着通过逻辑得出的真理是错误的，也不意味着借助逻辑确立证明是错误的，而是意味着在确立证明时以逻辑为依据是错误的，以逻辑作为论证的基础同样是错误的。应当以感官作为证明和论据的依据。至于逻辑，用它来证明某一命题的正确性是有效的：如果所有前提都为真，并且前提与结论共同可以追溯到感官，那么这种论证就是正确的。结论的正确性来自于它由前提推导而出，而非来自其他任何方面。然而，逻辑容易出错，这使得它不能被当作确立证明的基础，因为就整体而言，它是一种不确定、易出错的依据，尽管借助其某些形式进行的证明可以是决定性的。感官则必须作为证明的基础，因为就事物的存在与否而言，它整体上是一种确定的依据，完全不会出错。

Logic is susceptible to speciosity and its conclusions are susceptible to be incorrect, because although it stipulates that the correctness of the premises and the soundness of their structure is a condition, the fact that it consists of the syllogising of one premise upon another makes the correctness of the conclusion dependant upon the correctness of these premises. The correctness of these premises is not guaranteed because the conclusion is not directly founded on sensation, it is founded on the syllogising of premises, one upon another, and thus the correctness of the conclusion is not guaranteed. This is because what occurs in it is that premises are syllogised, one upon another: things that can be comprehended upon the like, resulting in the same, and things that can be sensorially perceived upon the like, resulting in the same. As for the syllogising of comprehensibles upon comprehensibles, it leads to slipping into error and to contradictory conclusions, and it leads to drifting into a series of premises and conclusions which are rational in theory and by assumption but not with regard to thier existence in reality, so much so that in many of those syllogisms, the end results are utter fantasies and absurdities. Thus establishing proof through the syllogising of comprehensibles upon comprehensibles is susceptible to slipping. For example, logically it is said: the Qur’ān is the speech of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ and it is comprised of letters which are arranged and sequenced in existence, and every speech made up of letters arranged and sequenced in existence is recent; the conclusion: the Qur’ān is recent and created. This syllogising of premises has lead to a conclusion which in inaccessible to the senses; so the intellect is incapable of inquiring into it (as to its correctness) or judging it. Therefore, it is a hypothetical judgement, not a realistic one over and above it being one of the issues which the intellect has been prohibited from discussing. This is because a discussion of the attributes of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is a discussion of His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ essence, and in no way is it permissible to discuss the essence of Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. Yet it is possible to reach, via the same logic, a conclusion contradictory to this one. Thus it is said: the Qur’ān is the speech of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰand it is one of its attributes, and any thing that is an attribute of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is eternal; the conclusion: that the Qur’ān is eternal and not created. Thus contradiction in logic is evident in one and the same proposition. Likewise, in many logical propositions that are resultant from the syllogising of comprehensibles upon 36 The Error in the Methodology of the Mutakallimīn comprehensibles, a logician reaches conclusions which are utterly contradictory and utterly bizarre. As for the syllogising of the sensorially accessible upon the sensorially accessible, if the premises can be traced back to the senses and the conclusion can be traced back to the senses, the result will be correct, because it is based on the senses in the premises and the conclusion is not solely based on the syllogising of propositions. However what occurs is that in arriving at truths reliance is placed on the syllogising of propositions, and the noticing of the senses is restricted to what the propositions end with. It may occur that a proposition is imagined to be true to a certain reality but in fact it is not. It may also occur that a proposition which is defined with a general demarcation will be true only to certain parts of it, and this truth of certain parts will lead to the deceptive conclusion that it applies to all parts. It may also be that in the proposition there appears apparent truth, but in reality it is incorrect, which deceptively means the truth of the proposition. It may also be that the conclusion is correct but the premises from which it is concluded are false, from which it may be imagined that because the conclusion is correct, so too are the premises…and so forth. Thus, it has been said, for example, that the inhabitants of Spain are not Muslims, and every land whose inhabitants are not Muslims is not an Islamic Land; the conclusion is that Spain is not an Islamic Land. This conclusion is wrong. Its error come from the error of the second premise: the statement that every land whose inhabitants are not Muslims is not an Islamic Land is false because a land is deemed Islamic if it were ruled by Islam or if the majority of its inhabitants are Muslims. This is why the conclusion is wrong; Spain is indeed an Islamic Land. As another example, it has been said that America is a country of high economic standard, and every country of high economic standard is a revived country. The conclusion is that America is a revived country. This conclusion is true with regards to America, although one of the two premises is false: not every country with a high economic standard is revived; a revived country is one with a high intellectual standard. Thus, this syllogism, whose conclusion is true, deceptively leads one to assume that the premises from which the conclusion was arrived at are also correct. It also leads to proposition that each of Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia is a revived country because each has a high economic standard, although the truth is that these are not revived countries. Thus, the correctness of the conclusions of all syllogisms is dependent on the correctness of the premises. The truth of the premises is not guaranteed because they are susceptible to having flaws. Therefore, it is erroneous to depend on the logical basis in the establishment of proof. This does not mean that the truths reached via logic are false or that the establishment of proof via logic is erroneous, but it means that reliance in the establishment of proof on the logical basis is erroneous and that taking logic as a basis in the establishment of arguments is erroneous. It is the senses that are to be made the basis for proof and evidence. As for logic, it is valid to use it for the establishment of the proof of the correctness of a proposition and it would be correct if all the premises are true and if they together with the conclusion were traceable back to the senses. The correctness of the conclusion comes from its being deduced from the premises, not from anything else. Yet, its susceptibility to being erroneous makes it imperative that it is not made a basis in the establishment of proof because as a whole, it is an uncertain basis which is susceptible to error, although proof by means of some forms of it can be conclusive. It is the senses that must be made the basis of proof, because as a whole this is a definite basis regarding the existence or otherwise for things; it is completely insusceptible to error.

其次:辩证神学家(Mutakallimīn)离开了可以通过感官认知的领域,超越到感官无法触及的范围,探究超自然的事物:即安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的本体及其属性,以及感官无法感知的事物,并把这些探究与可感知事物相关的问题联系起来。他们在以可见之物类比不可见之物上走向了极端,即以人类来类比安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ,由此导致了…… 《伊斯兰人格》第1卷 37

Secondly: the Mutakallimīn departed from the sensorially accessible; they went beyond it to the sensorially inaccessible, and inquired into the supernatural: the essence of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ and His attributes, into that which the senses cannot perceive, and they connected this with inquiries into matters related to the sensorially accessible. They went into excess in drawing analogy of the unseen with the apparent, that is, drawing analogy of Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ with man, so they necessitated The Islamic Personality Vol.1 37

以人在今世的理解所设想的公正来衡量安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ。他们认为安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ必须去做对事物有益的事情。他们中有些人甚至认为，安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ必须去做最好的事情，因为（按照他们的说法）安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ是至智的，祂الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ不做任何事情，除非为了某个目的或某种智慧；没有目的的行为是毫无意义和徒劳的；一个有智慧的存在要么使自己受益，要么使他人受益，而安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ至高无上，不可能从中获益，因此祂الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ只为使他人受益而行动。

justice, as envisaged by man in this worldly life, upon Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. They deemed it necessary that Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ do that in which there is betterment. Some of them even necessitated upon Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ that he do that which is the best, because (according to them) Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is Wise and He الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ does not do anything except for a purpose or a wisdom; an action without a purpose is meaningless and futile; a wise (being) either benefits himself or others, and since Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is too sublime to be benefited, He الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ only acts to benefit others.

因此他们越界去讨论感官无法触及的事物，以及理智无力判断的问题，于是陷入了错误。他们忽略了这一点：可感知的事物是可以理解的，而安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的本体是不可理解的，因此不可能以其一类推另一类。他们也没有注意到，安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的公正与人的公正不可相提并论，将今世的法则套用在安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ身上是无效的，因为祂是这个世界的创造者，并依照祂为其设定的法则来管理它。我们确实看到，人的视野是狭窄的，他以某种方式理解事物；而一旦他的视野拓宽，他对公正的看法就会改变，他的判断也随之改变。那么，我们怎么能把万世的主安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ与我们自己相比，并且把我们自认为是公正的那种公正含义赋予祂سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的公正呢？至于福利和至善，它与他们对公正的看法相关；他们对它的说法，与他们对公正的说法一样。在这方面可以看到，人可能认为某件事物是善的，但一旦视野拓宽，他的看法就会改变。例如，今天的穆斯林世界因为放弃了伊斯兰的统治，已成为异教统治之地（dar al-kufr）；所以所有穆斯林都视之为腐败的世界，他们大多数人说它需要改革。但有见识的人看到，改革意味着从现状中去除腐败，而这是错误的：穆斯林世界需要的是彻底而全面的变革，即废除异教的统治，实施伊斯兰的统治；任何仅仅是修补性的改革，都只会延续腐败。由此可见，人对善的看法是如何改变的。 我们怎能将真主 الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ 置于人的裁断之下，并认为真主 الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ 必须做我们认为好的或更好的事呢？如果我们以自己的理智为裁判，就会发现真主 الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ 所做的许多事，我们的理智看不出任何好处。例如，创造易卜劣斯和沙ይ塔尼们并赋予他们误导世人的能力，有什么好处呢？真主 الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ 为何让易卜劣斯延期到末日，又为何让我们的主人穆罕默德ﷺ离世？这一切对人类更好吗？真主 الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ 为何容许伊斯兰的统治从大地上被移除，使куفر的统治占据优势，使穆斯林蒙受羞辱，使他们异教的敌人占据优势？这对祂的仆人更好吗？如果我们逐一列举成千上万的行为，并以自己的理智和对“好”与“更好”的理解来评判它们，我们就不会认为它们是好的。因此，将真主 الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ 与人相比是不正确的，真主 الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ 也没有任何义务必须履行：

Thus they overstepped into discussions of the sensorially inaccessible and of issues which the intellect is incapable of judging, and so they blundered. They missed the point that the sensorially accessible is comprehensible and that the essence of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is incomprehensible, so it is not possible to draw analogy of one upon the other. They were inattentive to the fact that the Justice of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is incomparable to the justice of man, and that it is invalid to apply the laws of this world to Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ, who is the Creator of this world and the one who regulates it according the laws he set for it. When we do see that the perspective of man is narrow, he understands matters in a given way and that once his perspective widens, his view of justice changes and his judgement changes as well; how then do we compare (to ourselves) the lord of the worlds الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ whose knowledge encompasses everything and give His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ justice the meaning of justice that we ourselves see to be justice? As for betterment and that which is best, it is linked to their view of justice; they say about it what they say about justice. It is observed in this regard that man can view a given thing as good, but once his perspective widens his view changes. For example, the Muslim world today is dar al-kufr having abandoned the rule of Islam; so all Muslims view it as a corrupt world and most of them say that it is in need of reform. But the aware see that reform means the removal of corruption from the status quo, and this is erroneous: the Muslim world is in need of a radical and comprehensive change that removes the rule of kufr and implements the rule of Islam; any (mere) reform includes the prolongation of corruption. Thus it is seen how the view of man changes towards what is good. How do we then subject Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ to the judgement of man and deem it necessary for Him الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ to do what we see as good or better? If we made our mind the judge, we would see that Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ did things which our minds see no good whatsoever in; what good is there, for example, in the creation of Iblīs and the shayātīn and giving them the ability to misguide man; why did Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰgive Iblīs respite until the Day of Judgement and let our Master Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلم die? Is all this better for people? Why does he الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ allow removal of the rule of Islam from the Earth and enable the dominance of the rule of kufr, humiliate the Muslims and enable the dominance of their kafir enemies? Is this better for His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ servants? If we proceeded in the enumeration of thousands of acts and judged them by our mind and our understanding of the meaning of good and better, we would not find them good. Therefore the comparison of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ to man is not correct, and nothing is incumbent upon Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ:

诚然，穆台凯里敏（Mutakallimīn，即伊斯兰教义学家）之所以陷入这些问题，原因在于他们的研究方法，以及他们将安拉（SWT）与人类相比拟的做法。

Indeed, what made the Mutakallimīn slip into all this is their methodology of inquiry and their comparing Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ to man.

第三点:穆塔卡利敏(Mutakallimīn)的方法使理智拥有对一切事物进行探究的自由,无论是可凭感官感知的,还是不可凭感官感知的。这必然导致理智去探究它无力判断的事物,去探究各种推测与想象,并为那些仅仅是可能存在或可能不存在的观念寻找论据。这就使人有可能否定那些确实存在的事物:即那些由(某个来源)告知我们、其信息的真实性对我们而言是确定无疑的,但理智却无法理解的事物。它也使人有可能对并不存在、仅由心智虚构出来的幻想怀有信仰。例如,穆塔卡利敏讨论了安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的本体及其属性:有人说属性与属性的承载者是同一的;有人说属性与属性的承载者是不同的。他们说,安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的知识就是对所知事物如其所是地展开,而所知之物会随时间而变化:树叶原本未落,后来落下了。安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ说:

Thirdly: The methodology of the Mutakallimīn gives the intellect the freedom of inquiry into every thing, into the sensorially accessible and the sensorially inaccessible. This inevitably results in the intellect inquiring into matters that it is incapable of judging, and inquiring into suppositions and imaginations, and establishing evidence to support mere conceptions of things that may exist or may not exist. This allows for the possibility of the rejection of things which 38 The Error in the Methodology of the Mutakallimīn definitely exist: things of which we were informed by a (source) the truth of whose information is definite for us but the intellect does not comprehend them. It also allows for the possibility of having imān in fantasties having no existence, which have been conjured up by the mind. For example, the Mutakallimīn discussed the essence of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ and his attributes: some of them said that an attribute is one and the same as the attribute carrier; others said that the attribute is other than the attribute carrier. They said that the knowledge of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is the unfolding of the Known as it is, and the known changes from one time to another: the leaf of a tree falls after not having fallen, and Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ says,

凭借真主的知识,事物按其本然展开;因此真主سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ知道某物将会存在,然后它才存在;真主سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ知道某物曾经存在,在它存在之时;真主سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ知道某物不再存在,在它不再存在之时。那么,真主سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的知识如何随事物的变化而变化呢?随新近事物的变化而变化的知识是新近的知识,而新近之物并不存在于真主سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ之中,因为与新近事物相关联的东西本身也是新近的。 穆塔卡拉敏(辩论神学家)中的其他人对此作了回答,他们说:显然,我们知道泽德将要来到我们这里的知识,不同于我们知道他已经来到的知识;这种区别是由于知识的更新;但这只适用于人,因为是人的知识在更新,而人知识的来源——感觉与理解——是在更新的。但对真主سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ而言,注定将要发生之事、已经实现之事、已经完成并发生之事,以及预言将要发生之事之间,并无区别。的确,关于祂سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的认知只有一种状态。 另有穆塔卡拉敏回答说:真主سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ本然地知道一切已经存在和将要存在之事,所有信息都被祂以同一种知识所知,而将要存在与已经存在之间的区别,源于事物的变化,而不在真主سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的知识之中。 这一整段讨论所涉及的都是感官无法触及、理智无法作出判断的事务,因此理智不得对其进行探究。然而他们却对其进行了讨论,并依照他们允许理智探究一切事物的方法论得出了这些结论。 他们臆想出一些事情并加以争论。例如，他们认为真主الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的意志与仆人的行为相关联：当仆人意欲某一行为时，真主الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ便在仆人有能力且有意愿时创造了该行为，而非依据仆人的能力与意志。

With the knowledge of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ a thing unfolds as it is; thus Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ knows that a thing will be before it is and He الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ knows that a thing was when it was and He الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ knows that a thing no longer is when it no longer is. So how does the knowledge of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ change with the change in things? The knowledge that changes with the change of recent things is a recent knowledge and a recent thing does not lie in Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ because that with which the recent is associated is itself recent. Others amongst the Mutakallimin replied to this by saying: it is self-evident that our knowledge that Zayd will come to us is other than our knowledge that he has indeed come; this distinction is due to the renewal of the knowledge; but this is applicable to man because it is he whose knowledge is renewed because the source of his knowledge, sensation and comprehension, is renewed. But with Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ there is no distinction between something destined that will be, a realised thing that was, an accomplished thing that occurred and a predicted thing that will occur. Indeed, information with regards to Him الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is of one state. Other Mutakallimin replied: Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ inherently knows all that was and that will be, all information is known by him as the same knowledge, and the difference between what will be and what will stem from the change in things not in the knowledge of Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. All this discussion deals with matters that are sensorially inaccessible, and upon which the intellect cannot judge; so it is not allowed for the intellect to inquire into them. But they discussed them and reached these conclusions in line with their methodology that gives the intellect the freedom to inquire into everything. They imagined things and discussed them. For example, they conceived that the Will of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is associated with the action of the servant (man), when the servant willed the action, that is, Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ created the action when the servant was capable and willing, not with the servant’s capability and will.