不允许对事物和行为作出任何裁决，除非有该裁决的沙里尔证据；因为在沙里尔降临之前，对于事物和理智之人的行为并不存在任何裁决。至高者说：

It is not permissible that a hukm be given upon things and actions except if there is a shar’i evidence for that hukm, because there is no hukm for things and for actions of the sane, before the coming of the shar’; the Exalted says,

(al-Nisā’: 165);因为只有两种途径能确立裁决(hukm):一是沙里尔(shar’)，二是理智(’aql)。至于理智，在此并无作用，因为此事涉及义务与禁止，而理智不得以之使人负有义务或加以禁止，这不属于它的范围。这乃是沙里尔的领域，因此裁决取决于沙里尔。由于在沙里尔降临之前不存在沙里尔，裁决便取决于来自安拉的沙里尔之降临，即就整个伊斯兰教法而言取决于使者的降临，就某一具体待求证的问题而言取决于沙里尔的证据。关于（使者的降临），由经文的明确含义（sarīh）可知：经文否定了在使者降临之前对人施以惩罚，这表明人在此前不负有任何律法或信仰上的责任（taklīf），即对任何事物都不负责任。这无非意味着，在安拉为他们降下使者之前，对人们的裁决是完全否定的。因此，ahl al-fatrah——即处在启示断绝与新启示降临之间的人，如穆罕默德（愿主福安之）降临之前的人（以及尔撒（愿主福安之）的讯息被歪曲之后的人）——免于惩罚，他们的判决与未曾接到讯息的人相同。同样，未曾以正确形式接到穆罕默德（愿主福安之）讯息的人，也如ahl al-fatrah一样免于惩罚，因为经文适用于他们，他们被视为未曾有使者被派遣给他们，因为讯息未曾到达他们；而讯息未能到达他们的罪过，落在那些本能将讯息传达给他们却未传达的人身上。因此，在使者降临之前，不能说事物的裁决是合法（halāl）或非法（harām），因为它们没有裁决；行为亦然。 相反，在真主未派遣使者之前，人是自由的，可以随心所欲地行事，不受任何判断（ḥukm）的约束，真主也不会因此对他有任何要求。当使者被派遣之后，人便有义务遵循真主的诸律例（aḥkām），这些律例由使者传达给他，正如使者从真主那里所接受的那样。

(al-Nisā’: 165); and because the hukm is not established except by one of two: the shar’ or the intellect. As for the intellect, it has no place here because the matter is one of obligation and prohibition, and it is not permissible for the intellect to obligate or prohibit, for this is not its realm. Rather this is the realm of the shar’, thus the hukm depends on the shar’. Because there is no shar’ before the coming of the shar’, the hukm thus depends on the coming of the shar’ from Allah, that is, on the coming of a messenger with regards to a whole shari’ah, and the shar’i evidence with regards to a given issue for which evidence is sought. With respect to (the coming of) a messenger, then this is clear from the explicit meaning [sarīh] of the āyah, because the negation of punishment on the people prior to the advent of a messenger indicates upon their not having responsibility [taklīf] for any rules or beliefs, that is, their not having responsibility for anything. This means naught but a complete negation of the hukm for the people prior to Allah raising for them a messenger. Thus the ahl al-fatrah – those who lived between the loss of a message and the advent of a message, like those who lived before the advent of Muhammad (saw) (and after the corruption of the message of Isa (as)) – are saved from punishment and their judgment is the judgment of those to whom the message does not reach. Similarly those to whom the message of Muhammad (saw) does not reach in its correct form, are saved from punishment like the ahl al fatrah, because the āyah applies to them and they are considered as if no messenger was sent to them, because the message did not reach them and the sin of it not reaching them is upon those who were able to take it to them but did not. Therefore, prior to the advent of the Messenger it is not said that the hukm of things is halāl or harām, because they had no hukm; the same with the actions. Rather, until Allah does not send a messenger, man is free to act as he wishes, without being under any hukm, and nothing is upon him from Allah. When a messenger is sent then man is obliged by the ahkām of Allah which the messenger communicates to him, as communicated to him (the messenger) from Allah

一位使者降临并传达其讯息之后，需要考虑这样一个问题：如果该讯息带来了特定的内容，并要求人们遵循另一位使者（另一个讯息）所带来的其他规定，就如我们的主人尔撒（阿莱赫赛俩姆）的情况，那么在该讯息被废止之前，所传达给人们的教法（ahkām）对他们有约束力，人们有义务遵行，若不依之而行则将受到惩罚。如果使者的讯息只包含某些内容而不包括其他内容，那么人们只受其所带来内容的约束，对于未曾带来的内容则不受惩罚。另一方面，如果讯息涵盖了一切事物，并且是为阐明一切事物而降临，那么人们就须遵行这讯息中的一切，正如我们的主人穆罕默德ﷺ的情况一样；他的讯息涵盖一切事物，并为阐明一切事物而降临，因此除了其中所载之外，不存在任何教法裁定。这是因为真主的这句话的隐含之义（mafhūm）……

After the advent of a messenger and his deliverance of his message, the matter is considered: if the message came with specific things and commanded the following of a different message (of another messenger) for other things, as in the case with our master ‘Isā (as) then until this message is abrogated the people are responsible for the ahkām communicated to them and are obligated to follow them and will be punished for not living by them. If the message of the messenger came with some things and not others, then the people are obligated only by what came and are not punished for what did not come. On the other hand, if the message covers all things and came explaining all things, then the people are obligated with everything in this message, as is the case with our master Muhammad (saw); his message covers all things and came explaining all things; therefore there is no hukm except what came in it. This is because the mafhūm [implied meaning] of His saying

不应当说事物与行为的本来状态是禁止（tahrim），理由是：在真主的主权之下，人的任意处置（tasarruf）若未经祂的许可便是被禁止的，并以此类比被造物。因为经文的明确含义是：真主不予惩罚，直到祂派遣使者；所以在祂阐明教法裁决（hukm）之前，祂也不予追责。此外，被造物是可能受到伤害的，而真主至高无上，超越于获益或受害之上。

It should not be said then that the ‘asl [original state] of things and actions is prohibition [tahrim], by the argument that it is free disposal [tasarruf] in the dominion of Allah the Exalted without his permission so it is prohibited, drawing analogy upon the created beings, because the explicit meaning of the āyah is that Allah does not punish until he raises a messenger, so He does not account until he clarifies the hukm. Further the creation is able to be harmed, but Allah the Exalted is above being benefited or harmed.

同样,也不应说事物与行为的原则(asl)是许可(ibāḥah),理由是其利用并无任何败坏之迹象,亦不会对所有者造成损害,因此是被允许的。不应这样说,因为该经文(āyah)的隐含之义(mafhūm)是:人负有遵从使者所带来之物的义务;违背者将受到惩罚。因此,其原则(asl)是遵循(ittibā')使者,并受其所传信息中的律例(aḥkām)约束;其原则并非许可,而许可乃是不受约束的状态。由于律例经文的普遍性表明,必须回归沙里亚(shar'),并必须受其律例的约束,真主至高说:

Similarly it should not be said that the ‘asl of actions and things is permissibility, by the argument that it is utilisation that is free from any sign of corruption or harm to the owner and so it is permissible. This should not be said because the implied meaning [mafhūm] of the āyah is that man is obligated with what the messenger comes with; he is punished for contravening this; thus the ‘asl becomes following [ittibā’] the messenger and being bound by the ahkām of his message; the ‘asl is not permissibility, which is the absence of being bound. Since the generality of the verses of ahkām indicate upon the necessity of referring back to the shar’ and the necessity of being bound by its ahkām; the Exalted says

不应当说事物与行为的本来状态是禁止（tahrim），理由是：在真主的主权之下，人的任意处置（tasarruf）若未经祂的许可便是被禁止的，并以此类比被造物。因为经文的明确含义是：真主不予惩罚，直到祂派遣使者；所以在祂阐明教法裁决（hukm）之前，祂也不予追责。此外，被造物是可能受到伤害的，而真主至高无上，超越于获益或受害之上。

It should not be said then that the ‘asl [original state] of things and actions is prohibition [tahrim], by the argument that it is free disposal [tasarruf] in the dominion of Allah the Exalted without his permission so it is prohibited, drawing analogy upon the created beings, because the explicit meaning of the āyah is that Allah does not punish until he raises a messenger, so He does not account until he clarifies the hukm. Further the creation is able to be harmed, but Allah the Exalted is above being benefited or harmed.

同样,也不应说事物与行为的原则(asl)是许可(ibāḥah),理由是其利用并无任何败坏之迹象,亦不会对所有者造成损害,因此是被允许的。不应这样说,因为该经文(āyah)的隐含之义(mafhūm)是:人负有遵从使者所带来之物的义务;违背者将受到惩罚。因此,其原则(asl)是遵循(ittibā')使者,并受其所传信息中的律例(aḥkām)约束;其原则并非许可,而许可乃是不受约束的状态。由于律例经文的普遍性表明,必须回归沙里亚(shar'),并必须受其律例的约束,真主至高说:

Similarly it should not be said that the ‘asl of actions and things is permissibility, by the argument that it is utilisation that is free from any sign of corruption or harm to the owner and so it is permissible. This should not be said because the implied meaning [mafhūm] of the āyah is that man is obligated with what the messenger comes with; he is punished for contravening this; thus the ‘asl becomes following [ittibā’] the messenger and being bound by the ahkām of his message; the ‘asl is not permissibility, which is the absence of being bound. Since the generality of the verses of ahkām indicate upon the necessity of referring back to the shar’ and the necessity of being bound by its ahkām; the Exalted says

和

and

"在没有任何腐败迹象、也不会对所有者造成伤害的情况下利用某物，并不能证明其为允许。并不明显的是，与一名没有亲属的未婚女子通奸，构成了没有任何腐败迹象或对所有者造成伤害的利用，然而它是被禁止的。同样，为了使人发笑而开玩笑说谎，对说谎者和被欺骗者而言都没有任何腐败或伤害的迹象，然而它也是被禁止的。因此，在沙里亚降临之后，事物与行为都有其哈昆（判决）；所以，根本原则是在沙里亚中寻找这些事物与行为：是否已有判决降临于它们？根本原则不是以推测为允许，也不应在存在沙里亚经文的情况下，直接由理性给出允许的判决。"

Further utilisation that is free from any sign of corruption or bringing harm to the owner is not a proof for permissibility. It is not evident that adultery with an unmarried female who has no relatives constitutes utilisation that is free from any sign of corruption or harm to the owner, yet it is prohibited. Similarly lying in jest to make someone laugh is free from any indication of corruption or harm with regards to both the one who lies and the one who is lied to, yet it is prohibited. Therefore the things and actions have a hukm after the coming of the shar’; so the ‘asl is to search in the Shari’ah for the things and actions: has a hukm come for them or not? The ‘asl is not permissibility by assumption nor should the hukm of permissibility by given by the intellect straight away in the presence of the shar’.

同样，也应当说，事物的本源是停止（tawaqquf）并且没有判决（hukm）。因为停止意味着行为被搁置，或判决被搁置，而这是不允许的，因为《古兰经》和圣训所确立的准则是：在不知道的情况下，应当探求判决，而不是停止与没有判决。至高者说：

Similarly it should be said that the ‘asl of things is cessation [tawaqquf] and the absence of the hukm. Since cessation means the action is suspended or the hukm is suspended and this is impermissible, because the established (rule) in the Qur’an and Hadith for the lack of knowledge is inquiring about the hukm and not the cessation and absence of the hukm. The Exalted says

因此,只有在使者到来之后,律法的裁定(hukm)才成立;在沙里尔(shar')降临之前,并不存在任何裁定。所以裁定取决于沙里尔的降临,也就是说,取决于针对某一具体问题存在一个沙里尔的证据。因此,除非有证据,否则不能作出任何裁定,正如除非沙里尔降临之后,也不能作出裁定一样。那么,原则是:应当在沙里尔之中寻找裁定,也就是说,原则是从沙里尔之中寻找支持某一沙里尔裁定的沙里尔证据。

Therefore it is after the advent of a Messenger that it that the hukm becomes for the shar’ and there is no hukm prior to the coming of the shar’, so the hukm depends on the coming of the shar’, that is, on the presence of a shar’i evidence for a single issue. Thus no hukm can be given except on the basis of an evidence, just as no hukm can be given except after the coming of the shar’. The ‘asl, then, is to search for the hukm in the shar’, that is, the ‘asl is to search for the shar’i evidence for a shar’i hukm from the shar’.

仍有一个问题：伊斯兰教法是否涵盖了所有已经发生的事情的裁决、所有当下的问题，以及所有将来可能出现的事情？答案是：没有任何事件发生、任何问题出现、任何事情发生，而不具有其裁决（hukm）。伊斯兰教法全面涵盖了人的一切行为。过去所发生的，现在存在的，以及将来可能发生的，都没有例外，全都在教法中有其裁决。至高无上的真主说：

One issue remains: does the Islamic Shari’ah encompass the rulings of all matters that have passed, all the present problems, as well as all those matters that may occur in the future? The answer to this is that there is no event which occurs, issue which arises, or incident which takes place but that it has a hukm. The Islamic Shari’ah has encompassed all the actions of man entirely. Nothing occurred in the past, nor is there anything in the present or possible thing occurring in the future except that all these have a hukm in the Shari’ah. Allah the Exalted says:

即使有一些单独传述的圣训，其传述经证实来自使者（愿主赐福并使其平安），其中含有这样的意思：人的某些行为，法律未曾为其规定判断（hukm），但这些圣训的含义（dirayah）因与《古兰经》中一段在传述（thubūt）和含义（dalalah）上均属确定（qat'i）的经文相矛盾而被弃置。因为上述两段经文在传述和含义上都是确定的，所以任何与之相抵触的单独传述，其含义都被弃置。因此，一个穆斯林在理解了这两段确定的经文之后，从任何角度来看，难道不是不允许说人的行为中存在哪怕一件事，是立法者没有为其规定判断的吗？

Even if there are solitary ahadith, whose narration from the Messenger (saw) is authenticated, which carry this meaning, namely, that there exists some actions of the servants for which the Shari’ah has not given a hukm; the meaning [dirayah] of such ahadith is discarded because of its contradiction to a text of the Qur’an which is definitive [qat’i] in transmission [thubūt] and meaning [dalalah], because the two above-mentioned āyāt are definitive in transmission and meaning, so any solitary report which contradicts them, its meaning is discarded. Therefore is it not permissible, from any perspective, for a Muslim after understanding these two definitive āyāt to say that there exists even one reality from the actions of man that the shar’ has not clarified for it a hukm.

至于伊本·马哲和提尔米兹从萨勒曼·法里斯所传的圣训，他说：“使者（ﷺ）被问及酥油、奶酪和皮毛，于是他说：‘合法的（halāl）是安拉在祂的经典中使之合法的，非法的（harām）是安拉在祂的经典中使之非法的；而祂所沉默不提的，则是为你们所宽免的（‘afa lakum）。’”还有拜宰尔从艾卜·达尔达’所传，他引述先知（ﷺ）说：“安拉在祂的经典中使之合法的就是合法的，使之非法的就是非法的，而祂所沉默不提的就是宽免，所以你们要接受安拉对你们的宽免，因为安拉绝不忘记任何事——”并诵读经文：“你的主绝不遗忘。”（《麦尔彦章》：64）还有拜海各从太阿拉白的传述链所传的圣训，先知（ﷺ）说：“安拉已经使一些义务成为义务，所以不要忽视它们；祂设定了界限（hudūd），所以不要逾越它们；祂对一些事物保持沉默，是出于对你们的慈悯，而不是出于遗忘，所以不要追问它们。” 那么，从一个角度看，这些圣训是孤立的传述（āhād），因此不能与确定性的经文相抵触。从另一个角度看，这些圣训并不表明存在着伊斯兰法（Shari'ah）未曾阐明的事物；它们只表明存在着安拉出于对你们的慈悯而未加禁止、并对其禁令保持沉默的事物。因此，这些圣训所说的并非是对这些事物的律例立法保持沉默，而是对其禁令保持沉默。 “沉默于其禁令”的含义，并非对所有未加阐明之事都立法许可（ibaha）；相反，这种沉默是立法者在禁令方面的沉默。他对禁令的沉默即是（立法的）许可（halal），其范围包括义务（wajib）、推荐（mandub）、允许（mubah）和应当避免的（makruh）。而这一点仅适用于他所沉默的事项，而不适用于所有未经阐明的事物。

As for what was narrated by Ibn Majah and Tirmidhi from Salman al-Farisi that he said, “The Messenger of Allah (saw) was questioned about ghee, cheese and the fur, so he said, ‘The halāl is that which Allah has made halāl in his Book, and the harām is that which Allah has made harām in his Book, and on that which He remained silent, it has been conceded to you [‘afa lakum]’”, and what was related by al-Bazzar from Abu Darda’ from the Prophet (saw) that he said, “What Allah has made halāl in his Book is halāl, and what he has made harām is harām, and what he has remained silent about is a concession, so accept from Allah His concession for verily Allah does not forget anything – and he recited – ‘And your Lord is not forgetful’ (Maryam: 64)” and what was related by al-Baihaqi from the chain of Tha’labah from the Prophet (saw) that he said, “Allah has obligated the obligations so do not neglect them, and He has set the limits [hudūd] so do not transgress them, and He has remained silent about things as a mercy to you, not out of forgetfulness, so do not ask about them”; then from one perspective these ahādith are solitary reports so they cannot contradict the definitive text. From another perspective, these ahādith do not indicate upon there being things which the Shari’ah has not expounded; they only indicate upon there being things which Allah has not prohibited out of mercy for you and has remained silent about their prohibition. Thus the subject of these ahādīth is not silence on the legislation of rulings for these things; rather it is silence on their prohibition. The meaning of ‘silence on (their) prohibition’ is not the legislating of permissibility [ibaha] for everything which is not expounded; rather this silence is the silence of the legislator with regards to prohibition and His silence on prohibition is (the legislation of) permissibility [halal], included in the scope of which is the obligatory [wajib], the recommended [mandub], the permissible [mubah], and the reprehensible [makruh], and this applies only to that about which he is silent, not to everything which has not be expounded.

“让步”（afwu）类圣训的含义，与祂的这句话相近：

The meaning of the ahadith of concession [afwu] is similar to His saying,

阿勒-塔巴里在其《古兰经注》中引述乌拜德·本·乌迈尔的话说：“安拉至高无上，允许了某些事物和行为，禁止了某些事物和行为。凡是祂所允许的，就当作被允许；凡是祂所禁止的，就当避开。至于祂未明确允许或禁止的事物，那是安拉的一种宽恕（afwu），是祂所赦免的。” 先知ﷺ不喜欢对未有律例降示的事情过度追问，其依据是原初的宽免（al-bara'ah al-asliyya），因为此事归于这一原则。其含义是：相关的行为是被宽免的。先知ﷺ还说：“穆斯林中最恶劣的人，是那个问及一件并未被禁止的事情，结果因他的追问而使其对众人成为被禁止之事的人。”此段由穆斯林（Muslim）辑录。他又说：“你们应当让我照我留给你们的去做。那些在你们之前的人，只是因为他们过多的追问以及与他们的先知发生争执而灭亡。我所禁止你们的，你们就要远离；我所命令你们的，你们就尽力去做。”此段由艾哈迈德（Ahmad）辑录。 此外，穆斯林和艾哈迈德还从艾布·胡莱赖familiar传述：先知ﷺ的使者说：“众人啊，安拉已经为你们规定了朝觐，你们就去朝觐吧。”有人问：“安拉的使者啊，每年都要吗？”使者沉默不语，那人问了三次。安拉的使者ﷺ便说：“如果我说‘是’，那就成为必须的了，而你们也将无法承担。”接着他说：“你们应当让我照我留给你们的去做。” 因此，所有这些都表明，他所说的“对于这些事情他保持沉默”，其意思是安拉没有禁止它们，这与他在另一段圣训中所说的“你们应当让我照我留给你们的去做”相似。 这一意思得到了同一圣训的另一则传述的支持，其中说“他对你们宽免了一些事物”，即他放置了这些事物，没有禁止它们。因此，他所说的“他对事物保持沉默”或“他所沉默的事物是被宽免的”，其含义并非某些仆人行为的裁决没有被阐明，而是：某些事物未被禁止，这是对你们的慈悯；凡是对特定事物没有禁止的，便属于沉默的裁决之列，因此它不被禁止，其裁决是合法（halal）。由此可见，这一问题关联的是立法者对事物禁令的沉默，而非对事物裁决的阐明缺失。

Al-Tabari narrates in his tafsir from Ubayd ibn Umayr, “Allah the exalted has permitted and prohibited (things and actions), so whatever He has permitted take it as permitted, and whatever he has prohibited refrain from it, and He has left from that some things which He has not permitted or prohibited (expressly); that is a concession (afwu) from Allah which He has conceded.” The Prophet (saw) disliked excessive questioning regarding that about which no hukm had been revealed, on the basis of the original concession [al-bara’ah al-asliyya] since it returns to this meaning. Its meaning is that the related actions are conceded. And he (saw) said, “The worst of the Muslims amongst the Muslims is the one who asks about a thing which is not prohibited on them and consequently becomes prohibited upon them due to his questioning,” related by Muslim; and he said, “Leave me with what I have left you. Verily those before you perished only on account of their excessive questioning and their disagreements with their prophets; what I have prohibited you from stay away from it, and what I have ordered you, do as much of it as you are able,” narrated by Ahmad. Further, Muslim and Ahmad related from Abu Hurayra that he said, “The Messenger of Allah (saw) addressed us saying, ‘O people, Allah has obligated the pilgrimage on you, so make the pilgrimage’, so a man asked ‘Every year O Messenger of Allah?’ He (the Messenger) remained silent until the man asked three times, so the Messenger of Allah (saw) replied, “If I said yes, it would be obligated, and you would not be able (to fulfill it)’ then he said, ‘Leave me with what I have left you.’ So all of this indicates that the intent of his saying, “and He was silent on things” is that He did not prohibit them, and it is similar to his saying, in another hadith, “leave me with what I have left you”. This (meaning) is supported by another narration of this same hadith, “and He conceded you things”, that is, he left them and did not prohibit them. Therefore the meaning of his saying, “and He was silent on things” or his saying, “and that about which He was silent, is conceded” is not that the hukm of some actions of the servants has not been expounded, rather their meaning is that (some) things have not been prohibited as a mercy to you; and that which is not prohibited of specific things comes under the hukm of silence, so it is not prohibited; its hukm is that it is halal. Thus the matter is connected to the silence of the Legislator about the prohibition of things. It is not connected to the absence of the expounding the rulings of things.

因此，所有允许事物的经文都以一般性的形式出现，它们的普遍性表明一切事物都是被允许的。所以，如果某件事物被禁止，就必须存在一段经文明确说明这种普遍性，表明这件事物是对一切事物皆允许这一原则的例外。由此可见，事物的原则（أصل）是允许。

Thus have all the ayāt which permit the things come in the general form, their generality indicating the permissibility of all things. Hence if a thing is prohibited there must exist a text specifying this generality, indicating that this thing is an exception to the permissibility of all things. From here, the ‘asl of things is permissibility.

因此，我们在启示中发现，当某些事物被禁止时，会有专门的经文针对这些事物，作为对一般性经文的例外；至高者说：

Accordingly we find in the revelation, when things are prohibited, specific texts about these things specifically as an exception to the general texts; so the Exalted says:

不应当说，事物与仆人的行为不可分割，因此其裁决来自行为的裁决，并且采用行为的裁决。之所以不应这样说，是因为事物虽然必然与行为相关联，其证据也来自对行为之裁决的阐明，但事物与行为是不同的。仆人行为的证据与某一事物相关联时，只会就该事物阐明两种裁决，即允许或禁止。关于事物的裁决，不会说它是必须的或推荐的。因此，事物的裁决仅限于允许或禁止，在这一点上，事物与仆人的行为不同，所以它不只是采用行为的裁决，即使其裁决是在阐明行为之裁决的过程中出现的。

It should not be said that the thing is inseparable from the action of the servant, so its hukm comes from the hukm of the action, and it takes the hukm of the action. This should not be said because the things, notwithstanding that they are necessarily connected to the actions and that their evidence comes from the exposition of the hukm of the action, are different from the actions. The evidence of the action of the servant, when connected to a thing clarifies with respect to the thing two rulings alone, either permissibility or prohibition. It is not said about the hukm of a thing that it is obligatory or recommended. Thus the ruling of the things is confined to permissibility or prohibition, and in this respect the thing is different to the action of the servant, so it does not just take the hukm of the action, even if its hukm comes in the clarification of the hukm of the action.

从另一个角度看,许可性证据的普遍性,以及禁止性证据中对具体事物的specification(限定),使得许可对一切事物都是普遍的,而禁止则仅限于明文禁止的那些事物。这一点也使事物的哮kum(判断)与行为的哮kum有所不同:就原则而言,事物的原始状态是许可的,直到有禁止的证据出现;而行为的原始状态则是受法律判断约束的。此外,事物只以许可或禁止来描述,而行为则不同,关于行为,立法者的指令分为两类:takleef(责任性指令)与wad'(设定性指令)。前者有五种:wajib(义务)、mandub(推荐)、haram(禁止)、makruh(厌恶)和mubah(许可)。后者也有五种:sabab(原因)、shart(条件)、mani'(阻碍)、sahih(有效)、batil(无效)以及原则与例外('azimah与rukhsah)。 综上所述,自穆罕默德先知ﷺ为全人类降临之后,不允许说存在某个没有判断的行为或事物,也不允许说某事物或行为的判断没有来自启示的证据,因为判断就是立法者的指令。也不允许说凡是启示中未作说明判断的事物都是许可的,因为许可本身就是一种法律判断,它是立法者赋予仆人行为选择权的指令。那种认为有些事物的判断未被立法者阐明的说法,意味着《古兰经》有未曾阐明的事物,也就意味着伊斯兰教法有所欠缺。这是错误的,因为它与《古兰经》在传述与含义上都确定无疑的经文相矛盾。

From another perspective the generality of the evidence of permissibility and the specification of the specific thing in the evidence of prohibition makes the permissibility general for all things and prohibition specific to alone those expressly prohibited. This too makes the hukm of the thing different, with respect to the original rule and the hukm with which it is described, to the hukm of the action. The original rule of things is permissibility as long as there is no evidence of prohibition, and the original rule for actions is being bound by the legal hukm. Further, things are not described except by permissibility or prohibition, contrary to the actions, with respect to which the address of the legislator is of two types: takleef and wad’. The former is of five types: the obligatory, the recommended, the prohibited, the reprehensible and the permissible. The latter is also of five types: the cause, the condition, the preventative factor, the valid, invalid and void, and the original rule and concession. The sum (of the above discussion) is that it is not permitted, after the advent of our Master Muhammad (saw) to all of mankind, to say that there is an action or thing which has no hukm. Nor is there any hukm of a thing or action without an evidence from the revelation, because a hukm is the address of the Legislator. Nor it is permissible to say that all that which the revelation has not expounded a hukm for is permissible, because the permissible is a legal hukm itself, as it is the address of the Legislator of conferring choice related to the actions of servants. The claim that there are things whose hukm has not been clarified by the Legislator means that there are things which the Qur’an has not clarified and that the Shari’ah is deficient. This is incorrect as it contradicts the definitive text, in transmission and meaning, of the Qur’an.