伊斯兰的“阿qīdah”（信条）是对真主الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ、祂的天使、祂的经典、祂的使者以及末日的信仰，也包括对“盖达尔”（前定）的信仰，即顺境与逆境都出自真主الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ。“伊玛尼”（信仰）的含义是符合实际、并以证据为基础的确定性确认［tasdeeq jazim］，因为没有证据支撑的确认不是伊玛尼。没有证据，就不可能有确定性（jazm）；那样的确认只是对众多传闻中某一则报道的认可，不能被视为伊玛尼。因此，以证据为基础的确认是使某事成为确定之事、即构成伊玛尼的必要条件。凡是想要成为伊玛尼一部分的事物，都必须有证据存在，所以证据的存在是伊玛尼的根本条件，无论该证据是正确的还是错误的。

The Islamic ‘aqīdah (creed) is imān (positive belief) in Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ, His Angels, His Books, His Messengers and the Day of Resurrection and in al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar, the favourable and unfavourable being from Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. The meaning of imān is definitive confirmation [tasdeeq jazim] which conforms to the reality and results from evidence, because confirmation which has no evidence is not imān. There can be no definitive confirmation except on the basis of evidence. Thus if there is no evidence there can be no definitiveness [jazm]; it will be confirmation only of a report from amongst the reports, and will not be considered imān. Hence, confirmation on the basis of evidence is indispensable for something to be definitive, that is, for it to constitute imān. The presence of evidence is thus indispensable for everything all that seeks to be (a part of) imān, making the presence of evidence a foundational condition for imān, irrespective of it being sound or corrupt.

证据（دليل，dalīl）可分为理性的（عقلي，aqlī）和传闻的（نقلي，naqlī，字面意为“传承而来的”）。决定证据性质的，是待考察的对象：需要确定穆斯林是否应当对其信仰（īmān）。如果对象能够被感官所感知，那么它的证据必然是理性的，而不是传闻的。如果对象不能被感官所感知，那么它的证据就是传闻的。由于传闻证据本身是通过感官确立的，即它作为证据这一点是通过感官确认的，它也就归入感官感知的范畴。因此，将某一传闻证据归类为可供信仰之用的证明，必然依赖于先通过理性证明来确立它作为证据的地位。

Evidence [dalīl] can be either rational [aqlī] or textual [naqlī: lit. transmitted]. What determines the nature of the evidence is the subject to be examined to confirm whether or not the Muslim should have imān in it. If the subject is sensorially perceivable by the senses, its evidence will definitely be rational and not textual. If it is not sensorially perceivable then its evidence will be textual. Since the textual evidence itself is established through the senses, i.e, that it is evidence, it too falls under sense-perception. Then the categorisation of evidence as a textual proof fit for imān is invariably dependent upon proving it as evidence through rational proof.

在考察伊斯兰教义学(‘aqīdah)所要求信仰的事项时,可以发现:对真主الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的信仰是通过理性证据获得的,因为其对象——可感知的有形存在物有一位创造者——是可以感知并能够通过感官认识的。与此相反,对天使的信仰是通过经训证据获得的,因为天使的存在无法通过感官体会,无论天使本身还是能够表明其存在的任何迹象,都不是感官可以察觉的。至于对天经的信仰,则需要分别考察:如果所指的是对《古兰经》的信仰,那么其证据是理性的,因为《古兰经》在各个时代都是可以被感官感知的,其奇迹性(i'jāz)也是如此。如果所指的是对其他天经的信仰,如《讨拉特》《引支勒》和《宰布尔》,那么其证据是经训的,因为这些经典来自真主الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ这一点,并非在各个时代都可以察觉:它只在这些经典所降示给的使者在世期间才能通过他们所带来的奇迹被察觉。这些奇迹在使者的时代结束时便已终止;也就是说,在与他们同行者之后的时代,它们已不能被感官感知。相反,关于它们源自真主الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ并降示给使者的消息是以传述流传下来的。因此,它们的证据是经训性的而非理性的,因为理智无法在各个时代通过感官领会它们作为真主الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ之言语的奇迹性。

Upon examining the matters that the Islamic ‘aqīdah (creed) demands imān in, one finds that imān in Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ, is achieved through rational proof, because its subject: the existence of a Creator for the tangible perceivable beings, is perceivable and accessible by the senses. As opposed to this, imān in the angels is achieved through textual proof because the existence of angels cannot be appreciated by the senses, neither the angels themselves nor anything that indicates their existence is sensorially perceivable. As for imān in the Books, they are examined: if what is meant is imān in the Qur’ān, then its evidence is rational because the Qur’ān is sensorially-perceivable as is its miraculousness [i’jāz], in all ages. If it is imān in the other Books such as the Taurāh, the Injīl and the Zabūr, then its evidence is textual because the fact that these Books are (revelation) from Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is not perceiveable in all ages: it was only perceivable during the life of the Messengers to whom it was revealed, through the miracles they brought. These miracles terminated at the end of their time; i.e they are not (sensorially) perceivable after the time of those who accompanied them. Rather the report informing that they were from Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ and were revealed onto the Messengers was transmitted. So their evidence is textual and not rational because of the intellect’s inability to comprehend in all ages their miraculousness sensorially that they were the speech of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ.

信仰诸位使者,与此相似:对穆罕默德صلى الله عليه وسلمﷺ的信仰,其证据是理性的,因为《古兰经》是安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ(SWT)的言辞,而它由穆罕默德ﷺ传达给我们,这一事实是可以通过感官知觉到的;因此,人对《古兰经》的感知会使他认识到穆罕默德ﷺ是安拉的使者。这在所有时代和所有世代都是可行的。至于对其他所有先知的信仰,其证据是经文性的,因为他们先知身份的证据是他们的神迹,而这些神迹只有生活在他们时代的人才能感知。至于在他们之后直到今天、直到末日来临的人,他们无法感知那些神迹,因此关于他们的先知身份,不存在可以通过感官感知的证明;所以其证据不是理性的,而是经文性的。我们的主人穆罕默德ﷺ的先知身份的证据,即他的神迹《古兰经》,是可以通过感官感知和接触的;因此其证据是理性的。 至于末日审判的证据,它是经文性的,因为复活日不是可以通过感官感知的。没有任何可以被感官接触到的事物指向它;因此它没有理性的证明,其证明只能是经文性的。 至于"盖达尔与盖德尔"(al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar),其证据是理性的,因为"盖达"与两件事相关:第一,现存体系中已被确定的事物,其证据是理性的,因为它与造物主相关联;第二,人的行为,这些行为源自他或在他身上发生,并违背他的意愿。这是可以被感官接触和感知的事物,因此其证据是理性的。"盖德尔"则是事物的属性,由人启动,例如火的燃烧和刀的切割。 这些属性是可以通过感官获得的，是可以被感知的。因此，关于"al-qadar"（前定）的证据是理性的。

Imān in all of the Messengers is comparable to this: the evidence for the imān in the Messenger Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلم is rational because the fact that the Qur’ān is the speech of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ and that it was conveyed to us by Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلم is accessible to the senses; thus one’s perception of the Qur’ān leads to the realisation that Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلم is the Messenger of Allah صلى الله عليه وسلم. This is viable in all ages and for all generations. As for the Imān in all the other Prophets, its evidence is textual because the evidence of their prophethood are their miracles which are not perceivable to other than those who lived in their times. As for those who came after them until the present and until the establishment of the Hour, they cannot perceive those miracles and thus no sensorially-perceivable proof of their prophethood is available regarding them; thus the evidence of their prophethood is not rational but textual. The evidence of the prophethood of our Master Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلم, his miracle, is perceivable by and accessible to the senses: the Qur’ān; thus the evidence is rational. 14 The Islamic ‘Aqīdah As for the evidence for the Day of judgement, it is textual, because the Day of Resurrection is not sensorially perceivable. Nothing accessible to the senses indicates it; thus no rational proof is available for it, rather its proof is textual. As for al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar its evidence is rational because al-qadā’ is associated with two matters: first, that which is determined of the existing system and its evidence is rational since it is linked with the Creator, and the second matter being man’s action that originate from him or occur to him against his will. It is a thing accessible to the senses and is sensorially perceivable; thus its evidence is rational. Al-qadar is the attributes of things, activated by man, such as burning by fire and cutting of a knife. These attributes are accessible to the senses and are sensorially-perceivable. Thus the evidence of al-qadar is rational.

关于伊斯兰“阿克ида”（信条）所需证据的类型，此前已有论述。至于“阿克ida”各项要素的具体证据，那么真主 سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ 的存在，在万物之中都有所显现。可以用感官感知、可被理解的事物确实存在，这是一个确定无疑的事实。这些事物依赖于自身之外的其他事物，这也是一个确定无疑的事实。因此，它们是由一位造物主所创造的，这同样是确定无疑的，因为它们的需要表明它们是被造的：它们的贫乏需要indicates着在它们之前存在某种事物；所以它们不是永恒的（阿扎利）。这里不应当说，一物依赖于另一物，而不是依赖于“非物”，因此万物相互补充，而就其整体而言是独立的；这种说法是不应当的，因为证据所针对的是一个具体的事物，比如一支笔、一个水罐或一张纸等；证据的目的在于证明这支笔、这个水罐或这张纸是由一位造物主所创造的。很明显，事物本身依赖于自身之外的某物，无论它所依赖的那个“他者”是什么。通过感官观察可以确定，事物所依赖的这个“他者”与该事物不同。当一物依赖于某个“他者”时，便可确定它不是永恒的：因而它是被造的。也不应当说，事物本身是物质，并依赖于物质，因而它依赖的是自身，而非自身之外的某物，因此（实际上）是独立的。这种说法同样是不应当的，因为即便我们承认一物是物质并依赖于物质，这种物质的依赖也是依赖于物质之外的某物，而不是依赖于物质本身。 这样说是因为，一个物质实体本身无法补足另一个物质实体的依赖性；相反，需要某种非物质的东西来补足这种依赖性，因此物质所依赖的是其他东西，而不是它自身。例如，水要转化为水蒸气，需要热量。即使我们承认热量是物质，水也是物质，仅仅有热量的存在并不足以使水发生转化；转化需要一定量的热量。因此，水依赖于这一特定量的热量。这一热量的大小是由水以外、热量以外的东西决定的，也就是由非物质的东西决定的，而物质被迫按照它来运作。于是，物质依赖于为其规定这一大小的东西，所以它依赖于非物质的东西。由此可见，物质对非物质的依赖是确定无疑的事实；因此物质是有所需求的，是被一位造物主所创造的。所以，一切可以被感官感知、可以被理解的事物，都是被造物主所创造的。

This has been regarding the type of evidence required for the Islamic ‘aqīdah (creed). As for the specific evidence for each element of the ‘aqīdah (creed), then the evidence for the existence of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is exhibited in everything. That sensorially-perceivable comprehensible things exist is a definite matter. That these things are dependent on things other than themselves is also a definite matter. Thus that they are created by a Creator is a definite matter since their being in need means that they are created: their neediness indicates to the existence of something before them; so they are not eternal [azalī]. It should not be said here that a thing is dependent on some other thing, not on a ‘non-thing’, therefore things are complementary to each other but in their totality they are independent; this should not be said because the subject of the evidence here is a specific thing such as a pen, a jug or a piece of paper etc; the evidence is intended to prove that this pen or jug or piece of paper is created by a Creator. It is clear that the thing as it is, is dependent on something other than itself, irrespective of that ‘other’ on which it depends. That this ‘other’ on which the thing depends is other than the thing is definite through sensorial observation. When a thing is dependent on some ‘other’, it is established as not eternal: thus it is created. Nor should it be said that a thing as it is, is matter and is dependent on matter, thus being dependent on itself and not on something other than itself, and thus (in reality) is independent. This should not be said because even if we concede that a thing is matter and depends on matter, this dependence by matter is dependence on something other than matter not dependence on matter itself. This is so because an entity of matter alone cannot complement the dependence of another entity of matter; rather something other than matter is needed for this dependence to be complemented, and thus matter is dependent on something else and not on itself. For example, water in order to transform into vapour needs heat. Even if we conceded that heat is matter and water is matter, the mere availability of heat is not adequate for water to transform; a specific amount of heat is needed for transformation to take place. So water is dependent on this specific amount of heat. The magnitude of this amount is imposed by other than the water and other than the heat, that is, by other than matter, and matter is compelled to behave according to it. Thus matter is dependent on that which determines the magnitude for it and so it is dependent on other than matter. Hence the dependence of matter on non-matter is a definite fact; thus matter is needy, being created by a Creator. Therefore all sensorially perceivable comprensible things are created by a Creator.

造物主必须是永恒的、没有开始的，因为如果他不是永恒的，那他就是被造物而不是造物主；因此，成为造物主必然要求永恒。造物主必然是永恒的。考察那些可能被视为造物主的事物，很明显，唯一可能是造物主的存在只有物质、自然或安拉 الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ。

The Creator has to be eternal with no beginning, because if He were not eternal, He would be a creation not a Creator; thus being a Creator invariably requires being eternal. The Creator is necessarily eternal. Upon examining the things that might be considered as being the Creator, it is clear that the only beings which could possibly be the Creator are Matter, Nature or Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ.

至于物质是造物主,那这也是错误的,因为前面已经阐明,物质依赖于为其确定比例或分量的那一方,以使事物的转化得以发生;因此物质不是永恒的,而不是永恒的东西不可能是造物主。至于自然是造物主,那这同样是错误的,因为自然是事物的总和,以及规范它们的体系,宇宙中的每一事物都依照这一体系而运行。《伊斯兰人格》第1卷 15

As for matter being the Creator, then this is false because of what has been explained (above) that matter is dependent on the one who determines for it the proportions/magnitudes in order for the transformation of things to occur; hence it is not eternal and that which is not eternal cannot be a Creator. As for Nature being the Creator, then this too is false, because Nature is the collection of things and the system that regulates them such that every thing in the universe behaves in accordance with this system. The Islamic Personality Vol.1 15

这种规律并非仅仅来自体系本身，因为若没有被规范的事物，便不会有体系。它也不来自事物本身，因为事物的单纯存在，并不必然、自发地形成体系；其存在也不会在没有规范者的情况下使自身受到规范。它同样不来自事物与体系的总和，因为规律只能依据某种特定的情况而发生，而这种特定情况同时约束着体系与事物。正是事物与体系的这种特定情况，使规律成为可能。这种特定情况被强加于事物与体系之上，规律只能依照它而发生。它既不来自事物，也不来自体系，亦不来自二者之和；因此，它来自于它们之外的某物。由此可见，自然无法在被强加于它的某种情况之外运作，所以它是依赖性的，因而不是永恒的；而不是永恒的东西不可能是造物主。由此我们得出结论：造物主是具有永恒这一必然属性的存在者。他就是安拉 سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ。

This regulation does not come from the system alone, because without the things to be regulated there would be no system. Nor does it come from the things because the mere existence of things does not inevitably and spontaneously result in a system; nor does their existence cause them to be regulated without a regulator. Nor does it come from the sum of the things and the system, because regulation does not happen except in accordance with a specific situation that compels both the system and the things. This specific situation of the things and the system is what makes regulation possible. The specific situation is imposed on the things and the system and regulation can happen only in accordance with it. It does not come from the things or from the system or from the sum of the two; hence it comes from something other than them. Thus Nature, which cannot function except in accordance with a situation that is imposed on it, is dependent, and thus it is not eternal and that which is not eternal cannot be a Creator. We conclude then that the Creator is He who has a necessary attribute of being Eternal. He is Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ .

真主的存在,因此是可以通过感官感知和理解的,因为可感知、可理解的事物对永恒者的依赖,表明了创造者的存在。当人深入思考真主的受造物,细究宇宙,并试图理解时间与空间时,他会看到自己在这些有生命的世界面前是极其渺小的微粒。他还会看到,这些众多的世界都依照特定的方式和既定的规律运行;由此他将充分认识到这位创造者的存在,并领悟祂的独一与伟大,祂的大能也将对他清晰显明。他会意识到,他所目睹的昼夜交替、风向的变化、海洋、河流与天体轨道的存在,无非是真主存在、独一与大能的理性证据和明确迹象。祂 الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ 说:

The existence of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ then is perceivable and comprehensible by way of the senses, because the dependence on the Eternal by the perceivable comprehensible things indicates the existence of the Creator. When man deeply reflects on the creatures of Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ and examines closely the universe and attempts to comprehend time and place, he will see that he is a very minuscule particle in relation to these animated worlds. He will also see that these many worlds are all functioning in accordance with specific ways and established laws; from this he will fully realise the existence of this Creator and comprehend His Unity and His Grandeur and Capability shall be made plain to him. He will realise that all he witnesses of the contrast between day and night, of the change of the winds, the existence of the seas, rivers and celestial orbits, are nothing but rational proofs and expressive signs of the existence of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ and of His Unity and Power. He الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ says,

和,

And,

因此，正是理智理解了安拉的存在，理智也是通往信仰（īmān）的途径。因此伊斯兰教规定必须运用理智，并把理智视为关于安拉存在的信仰的依据（ḥukm）。所以，安拉的存在之证明是理性的。

Thus it is the intellect which comprehends the existence of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ and it is the means taken to arrive at imān. Hence Islam obligated the use of the intellect and deemed it the evidence [hakm] regarding imān in the existence of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. Thus the proof of the existence of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is rational.

对于那些主张世界无始（qadm，即永恒无始）、认为世界永恒而没有开端的人，以及那些声称物质是永恒的、没有开端的人，他们说：世界并不依赖于自身之外的任何事物，而是自我维持的，因为这个世界上存在的一切事物都只是物质的不同形式；它们都是物质。世界的某一部分对另一部分的依赖，实际上并不是真正的依赖。当某物依赖于它自己时，这不是依赖，而是独立于自身之外的事物。因此，物质是永恒的、没有开端的，因为它是自我维持的；也就是说，世界是永恒的、自我维持的，并且独立于自身之外的任何事物。

As for those who advocate the timelessness [qadm] of the world and that it is eternal with no beginning, and those who claim that matter is eternal, having no beginning; they say that the 16 The Islamic ‘Aqīdah world is not dependent on other than itself but is self-sustained because all the things that exist in this world are (simply) different forms of matter; they are all matter. The dependence of some part of it upon another part is not (in reality) dependence. When something depends on itself this is not dependence but independence from other than itself. Thus matter is eternal, having no beginning, because it is self-sustained, that is, the world is eternal, self-sustained and independent of other than itself.

这个论证分为两个方面。第一，世界上存在的事物，无论单独还是共同，都没有能力从无中创造或产生任何东西；这个“事物”不能从无中创造或产生。即使另一事物在一个或多个方面对它有所补充，它与其他事物一起，仍然无法创造或产生。它无法从无中创造或产生，这是清楚可见的。由此可知它不是永恒的，因为永恒者不能具有无能的特征，而必须具有从无中创造和产生的能力，也就是说，被造之物必须依赖它，它才能被视为永恒。因此，世界既不是永恒的，也不是无始的，因为它无法创造或产生。某物不能从无中创造，这就是它不是永恒的确凿证据。 第二，正如我们所确认的，一个事物在补充另一事物的需要时，依赖于一个它无法超越的特定限度。下面加以说明。如果A依赖B，B依赖C，C依赖A，如此类推，那么它们相互依赖本身就证明它们每一个都不是永恒的；一者对另一者的补充，或对另一者需要的满足，并非无规律地发生，而是按照特定的比例，也就是按照特定的秩序进行。它只能按照这一秩序完成这种补充，且无法违背此秩序而运作，这表明：进行补充的事物并非独自补充，而是依照强加于它、并由它之外的他者迫使其遵循的秩序而补充。 因此,互相补足的事物与它所补足的事物,都依赖于那为它们规定了补足发生的特定秩序的存在。它们两者都无法违背这一秩序,需要的满足也只能依照这一秩序发生。由此可见,为二者施加这一秩序的,正是它们所需要的那一者。于是,万物整体上虽然相互补足,却仍然需要自身之外的东西,即需要那迫使它们遵循特定秩序的东西。例如,水要转变为冰,需要热;于是他们说水是物质,温度是物质,冰也是物质;因此,物质要转变为另一种形态,就需要物质,即需要它自身而非自身之外的东西;而实际情况与此相反。确实,水要变成冰,需要的是一定温度的热,而不只是一般的热。热是一回事,水只在一定热度下才会改变,这一性质则是另一回事,与热本身不同。也就是说,为使热能产生作用、使水能受其影响而施加于热上的那一特定量度,并不来自水;否则水就会按自己的意愿选择是否受影响。它也不来自温度;否则温度就会按自己的意愿选择其作用。也就是说,它不来自物质本身;否则物质就会按自己的意愿选择施加和承受何种作用。它必然来自物质之外的某物。因此,物质需要那为它规定其施加或承受作用所需特定量度的东西。为它规定这一量度的,是它之外的另一者。 所以物质依赖于自身之外的他物，因此它不是永恒的，因为永恒而无时间限制的存在不需要自身之外的任何东西：它不依赖于他物，万物都依赖于它。因此，物质缺乏独立性是它并非永恒、因而是被创造的确定证据。《伊斯兰人格》第一卷 17

The answer to that is twofold: first, the things that exist in this world do not have the capability of creating or originating (anything) from nothing, whether individually or collectively; the ‘thing’ is incapable of creating or originating from nothing. If another thing complements it in one or more aspects, it will still be, together with the other thing or things, incapable of creating or originating. Its inability to create or originate from nothing is clearly perceivable. This means that it is not eternal, because an eternal (thing) must not be characterised with incapability; it must be characterised with ability to create and originate from nothing, that is, the effected things must depend on it in order for it to be deemed eternal. Consequently, the world is not eternal nor is it timeless because it is incapable of creating or originating. The inability of something to create from nothing is definite evidence that it is not eternal. Second, is what we have affirmed that a thing is dependent on a specific magnitude that it cannot surpass in the process of complementing the need of another. The explanation of this follows. If A is dependent on B and B is dependent on C and C is dependent on A and so forth, their dependence on one another is evidence that each one of them is not eternal; the complementing of one to the other or the satisfication of the need of another does not occur in an unregulated manner but in accordance with a specific proportion, that is, in accordance with a specific order. The fact that it cannot fulfill this complementation except in accordance with this order and that it is incapable of functioning against it indicates that the thing which complements does not complement solitarily but complements according to an order imposed on it and compelled to conform to it by other than itself. Thus the thing which complements and that which it complemented are both dependent on that which determined for them the specific order by which the complementation is to occur. Both of them are incapable of functioning against this order, nor can the satisfaction of the need occur except in accordance with this order. Hence, that which imposed the order on both of them is the one which they need. Thus things collectively, even though complementing each other, remain in need of other than themselves, that is, in need of that what compelled them to conform to the specific order. For example water in order for it to transform into ice, needs heat; so they say that water is matter, temperature is matter and ice is matter; thus in order for matter to transform into another form, it is in need of matter, that is, in need of itself and not other than itself; the reality is contrary to this. Indeed for water to transform into ice, it needs a heat of a specific temperature not simply heat. Heat is one thing and the property of water that it does not change except at a certain level of heat is another, being different from heat itself. That is, the magnitude (of required temperature) imposed on heat in order to effect and for water to be affected does not come from water; otherwise it would have chosen to be affected as it wanted. It does not come from temperature either; otherwise it would have chosen its effect as it wanted. That is, it does not come from matter itself; otherwise it would have chosen to effect and be affected as it wanted. It has to come from something other than matter. Hence, matter needs that which determines for it the specific magnitude that it needs in order to effect or be affected. That which determines the magnitude for it is one other than it. So matter is dependent on other than itself, thus it is not eternal because that which is eternal and timeless does not need anything other than itself: it is independent of others; all things depend on it. Therefore the lack of independence of matter is definite evidence that it is not eternal and it is thus created. The Islamic Personality Vol.1 17

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关于经典中的信仰依据，《古兰经》的情况与其他所有启示经典不同。证明《古兰经》是安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ所降示、是安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ之言语的，是一种理性的证据。这是因为《古兰经》是可以被感官感知的实在，理智能够理解它是安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ所降示的。《古兰经》在其词语和句子上是阿拉伯语的言辞。阿拉伯人确实产生过各种言辞：其中有各种体裁的诗歌，也有各种体裁的散文。他们的言辞被保存在书籍中，并代代相传、被人背诵。因此，《古兰经》要么出自他们的表达方式，由一位能言善辩的阿拉伯人说出；要么出自一种不同的表达方式，由阿拉伯人以外的人表述。阿拉伯人要么能够写出与之相似的作品，要么无法做到，尽管它是一段阿拉伯语的言辞。如果阿拉伯人能写出与之相似的作品，那么他们就有能力创作出类似的东西，它也就是与他们一样的人的言语。如果尽管它是阿拉伯语的言辞，而他们是最精通阿拉伯语、最能言善辩的阿拉伯人，他们却未能写出与之相似的作品，那么它就不是人的言语。考察《古兰经》与阿拉伯人的言辞，可以发现《古兰经》是一种独特的表达方式，是阿拉伯人所说的任何言辞都未曾有过的。他们从未产生过属于《古兰经》这一类的作品，无论是在它降示之前还是之后，即使是模仿或戏仿其文体也没有。这证明此言辞并非阿拉伯人所作，因而它是出自阿拉伯人以外之人的言辞。 已经通过tawātur（连续传闻）得到确立——这种传闻表明确定与笃定——阿拉伯人虽然受到挑战要他们作出同样的文辞，却无法produce出与《古兰经》相似的作品。《古兰经》对他们说：

Regarding the evidence of imān in the Books, the case of the Qur’ān is different from all other revealed Books. The evidence that the Qur’ān is (revealed) from Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰand that it is the speech of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is a rational evidence. This is because the Qur’ān is a sensorially perceivable reality and the intellect can comprehend the fact that it is (revealed) from Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. The Qur’ān is Arabic speech in its words and sentences. The Arabs did produce discourse. From it is poetry in its various types and from it is prose in its various types. Their discourse is preserved in books and had been memorised and transmitted from generation to generation. Thus the Qur’ān is either from their modes of expression, being uttered by an eloquent Arab, or it is from a different mode of expression, having being expressed by someone other than the Arabs. The Arabs are either capable of producing the like of it or are incapable of this despite the fact that it is an Arabic discourse. If the Arabs produced the like of it then they are capable of bringing the like of it and it would be the speech of humans like themselves. If they failed to produce the like of it despite the fact that it is an Arabic discourse and that they were the most well-versed in the Arab tongue and the most eloquent of the Arabs, it would not be the speech of humans. Upon examining the Qur’ān and the discourse of the Arabs, one finds the Qur’ān to be a unique mode of expression, unprecedented by anything the Arabs have said. They never produced anything that belonged to the category of the Qur’ān, neither before its revelation, nor after it, not even by way of imitation or parody of its style. This proves that it was not the Arabs who produced this discourse and thus it is the discourse of other than them. It has been established through concurrent transmission [tawātur] which bespeaks definiteness and certainty that the Arabs were incapable of producing the like of the Qur’ān although it challenged them to do so. The Qur’ān addressed them:

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尽管面临这一明确的挑战,他们仍未能写出与之相类的作品。若能证明《古兰经》并非阿拉伯人所作,而阿拉伯人又无法写出与之相类的作品,那么便可证明《古兰经》出自安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ,是安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的言语。原因在于:除阿拉伯人之外的任何人都不可能写出它,因为它是阿拉伯语的言辞;而且它使阿拉伯人无力仿效。不应说它是穆罕默德صلى الله عليه وسلمﷺ的言语,因为穆罕默德ﷺ本人是阿拉伯人之一;如果连阿拉伯人中的才智之士都被证明无力做到,那么他ﷺ自己作为阿拉伯人之一,也同样被证明无力做到。此外,每个人在用词和造句方面,都受其所处时代通行的表达方式,或受前人所传之言辞的制约。当他在表达上有所创新时,也只是运用词语和表达方式来传达新的含义或新的修辞手法;他不可能表达那些在他之前未曾出现、或他从未感知过的事物。从《古兰经》的文体中可以明显看出,其中在词语和句式方面的表达,在先知ﷺ的时代以及他之前,都是阿拉伯人所不曾知晓的。

Despite this stark challenge they failed to produce the like of it. If it is proved that the Qur’ān was not produced by the Arabs and that the Arabs failed to produce the like of it, then the Qur’ān is proved to have come from Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ and that it is the speech of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. This is because it is impossible for any one other than the Arabs to have produced it, because it is an Arabic discourse, and because it rendered the Arabs incapable (of matching it). It should not be said that it is the speech of Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلم since Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلمis one of the Arabs, and if the Arabs as a genius are proved incapable, then he صلى الله عليه وسلم himself is proved incapable because he is one of the Arabs. Moreover, everyone is subject to the mode of expression, with respect to words and sentences, prevailing in his age or by the discourse reported from those who came before him. When being creative in expression, he only uses words and expressions to convey novel meanings or in new figures of speech; it is not possible for him to express (the like of) what has not preceded him or he has never sensed. It is evident in the style of the Qur’ān that the expression in it with respect to the words and sentences was not known by the Arabs in the time of the Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم nor before his time.

作为人类，他不可能创作出与自己从未亲身感知过的事物同类的东西，因为这在理性上是不可能的。穆罕默德ﷺ也不可能创作出《古兰经》在词语和句式上的表达方式，因为他从未感知过这些。因此，《古兰经》是安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的言语，穆罕默德ﷺ是从安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ那里带来它的。这在《古兰经》降示之时已通过理性得到证明，至今也依然通过理性得到证明，因为它使人类至今无法创作出与之同类的作品。这种无能为力既有感官上的证据，也能被全人类通过感官所理解。

As a human being, it is impossible for him to have produced the like of something that he had not sensed, because this is a rational impossibility. It is impossible for the Qur’ānic mode of expression with respect to words and sentences to have been produced by Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلم since he had not sensed it. Hence, the Qur’ān is the speech of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ and Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلم came with it from Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. This was proved rationally when the Qur’ān was revealed and it is proved rationally now because it continues to render human beings incapable of bringing the like of it. This incapability is proved sensorially and is sensorially comprehensible for all mankind.

总而言之,《古兰经》唯一可能的来源,要么是阿拉伯人,要么是穆罕默德ﷺ,要么是安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ,因为《古兰经》完全是阿拉伯语的,因此它不可能来自这三者之外的任何其他来源。至于它出自阿拉伯人,这是不成立的,因为他们无力creating出类似的作品,并且他们自己承认了这种无能。直到今天,他们仍然无法创作出类似的作品;这证明它并非出自阿拉伯人。因此,它要么出自穆罕默德ﷺ,要么出自安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ。至于它出自穆罕默德ﷺ,这也是不成立的,因为穆罕默德ﷺ本人是阿拉伯人,无论一个人的天赋多么高超,他都永远无法超越其所处的时代。因此,如果阿拉伯人无力做到,那么穆罕默德ﷺ也同样无力做到;他是他们中的一员。此外,还有经由多条独立传述链相互印证的圣训传自穆罕默德ﷺ,例如他的这句话:

如果将穆罕默德ﷺ的言语与《古兰经》相比较，两者之间看不出任何相似之处，这证明《古兰经》不是穆罕默德ﷺ的言语，而是安拉（SWT）的言语。

If the speech of Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلم is compared with the Qur’ān, no similarity whatsoever is seen between the two, proving that the Qur’ān is not the speech of Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلم; it is the speech of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ.

值得注意的是,人类中的诗人、作家、哲学家和思想家,其文风起初都有些薄弱;他们的文风逐步提升,直至达到自身潜力的顶峰。因此,他们的文风时强时弱,此外,其文本中还时常出现一些轻浮的思想和陈词滥调的表达。然而我们发现,自第一节经文降示之日起,《古兰经》的文风……

It is noteworthy that all poets, writers, philosophers and thinkers from the sons of man commence in a style that has some weakness; their style gradually improves until they reach the peak of their potential. Thus their style fluctuates in strength and weakness, apart from the occurrence of some frivolous thoughts and trite expressions in their texts. Yet we find that the style of the Qur’ān from the day of the revelation of the first ayah,

直到最后一节经文降示的那一天。

Until the day of the revelation of the last ayah,

在修辞的雄辩、思想的崇高和表达的遒劲方面，它都达到了顶峰。你在其中找不到一句陈词滥调，也找不到一个轻浮的念头；它浑然一体，细至每一个细节，就其文体而言，整部经文如同一个完整的句子。这便证明，它不是人类的言辞——人的言辞在表达与含义上难免参差不齐——而确确实实是众世界的主的言辞。الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ。

was uniformly at its peak with respect to eloquence and rhetoric, sublimity of thoughts and the vigour of expressions. You will never find in it a single trite expression or one frivolous thought; it is one homogeneous piece, to the smallest detail; its entirety is, in respect of style, just like a single sentence. This is the proof that it is not the speech of human beings, whose speech is susceptible to divergence in expressions and meanings, but it is indeed the speech of the Lord of the Worlds الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ.

关于《古兰经》，它是伊斯兰教所要求信仰的启示经典之一。关于其他启示经典的证据是经文性的，而非理性的。安拉 سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ 说：

This is regarding the Qur’ān as one of the revealed Books in which Islam requires imān. The proof of the other revealed Books is textual, not rational; Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ says,

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以安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的知识为基础,事物按其本然展开;因此,安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ知道一件事物在它存在之前将会存在,知道一件事物在它存在时已经存在,也知道一件事物在它不再存在时已经不再存在。那么,安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的知识如何随事物的变化而变化呢?随新近事物的变化而变化的知识,是新近的知识;而新近的事物并不存在于安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ之中,因为与之相关联的事物本身就是新近的。穆塔凯里姆学者中的其他人对此回答说:显而易见,我们知道宰德将要来到我们这里的知识,不同于我们知道他已经来到的知识;这种区别是由于知识的更新;但这只适用于人,因为是人的知识在更新,而人的知识来源——感觉与理解——是更新的。但是,安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ……

With the knowledge of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ a thing unfolds as it is; thus Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ knows that a thing will be before it is and He الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ knows that a thing was when it was and He الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ knows that a thing no longer is when it no longer is. So how does the knowledge of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ change with the change in things? The knowledge that changes with the change of recent things is a recent knowledge and a recent thing does not lie in Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ because that with which the recent is associated is itself recent. Others amongst the Mutakallimin replied to this by saying: it is self-evident that our knowledge that Zayd will come to us is other than our knowledge that he has indeed come; this distinction is due to the renewal of the knowledge; but this is applicable to man because it is he whose knowledge is renewed because the source of his knowledge, sensation and comprehension, is renewed. But with Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ

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至于关于末日(复活日)之信仰的证据,它是经文证据而非理性证据,因为复活日并非理智所能感知的。安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ说:

As for the evidence for the imān in the Last Day - the Day of Resurrection – it is textual evidence and not rational evidence because the Day of Resurrection is not perceivable by the mind. Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ says,

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And the Messenger of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ said,

And the Messenger of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ said,

这些是人必须信仰的事项，共有五项：信仰真主 الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ、信仰祂的天使、信仰祂的经典、信仰祂的使者，以及信仰末日；此外还须信仰前定（al-qadā'）与定命（al-qadar）。除非一个人信仰这五项以及前定与定命，否则不能被视为在伊斯兰教中有信仰（imān），也不能被视为穆斯林。真主 الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ 说：

These are the matters that one must have imān in and they are five: imān in Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ , His Angels , His Books, His Messengers and the Last Day, and to have imān also in al-qadā' and al-qadar. None is deemed to have belief (imān) in Islam or to be a Muslim unless he has imān in all of these five matters and also in al-qadā’ and al-qadar. Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ says,

《古兰经》和圣训明确提到了这五件事，逐一点明其名称与含义。除此之外，并无任何其他事项像这五件事一样，被明确、清楚地以名称和含义指明为伊玛尼（信仰）的对象。唯有这五件事，同时具有传述与语义两方面皆为确定（qat'i）的经文。

The Qur’ān and the hadīth mention these five matters explicitly, clearly naming each of them and the meaning of each. The explicit and definitive mention by name and with meaning of the referent of imān in any other matter is not found, as it is found for these matters. The texts which are definitive [qat'i] both in their transmission and in their indication are found with these five matters, and none else.

这确实是事实：关于相信“定命”（al-qadar）的信仰，在吉卜利勒圣段（hadīth of Jibrīl）的一些传述中有所提及，其中写道：

It is true that imān in al-qadar was mentioned in the hadīth of Jibrīl, in some narrations of it, where it says,

此处所说的“al-qadar”（前定），指的是安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的知识，而非那个充满争议的“al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar”（前定与天命）问题。以这一名称、并以这一所指而言的“前定与天命”信仰问题，从未在确定性的经文中被提及。然而，这一术语所指的内容属于信条（aqeedah），对其的信仰是必须的。在圣门弟子رَضِيَ اللهُ عَنْهُ的时代，人们并不以这一名称、也不以这一所指来认识它；没有任何经过严格验证的圣训（sahīh）以这一名称和这一所指提及它。它是在塔比仪（再传弟子）时代之初才广为人知的，自那时起便成为人们所知并被讨论的话题。最先提出并使其成为讨论议题的，是穆塔卡里姆主义者（伊斯兰经院神学家）。在“伊勒姆·卡拉姆”（伊斯兰经院神学）出现之前，它从未存在过，除穆塔卡里姆主义者在伊历一世纪末之后，从未以“al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar”这一名称、并以相同所指进行过讨论。

Moreover, what is intended here by ‘al-qadar’ is the knowledge of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ, not the controversial issue of al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar. The issue of imān in al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar by this name and with the referent that is a subject of controversy was never mentioned in a definitive text. Yet the referent of the term is part of the aqeedah (creed) and imān in it is obligatory. It was never known by this name and with this referent at the time of the Sahābah (Companions) رَضِيَ اللهُ عَنْهُ; no rigourously authenticated [sahīh] text mentions it by this name and with this referent. Rather it became famous only at the beginning of the era of the Tabi'īn. It became known and became a subject of discussion since that time. Those who introduced it and made it a subject of discussion are the Mutakallimūn [Muslim Scholastics]. It never existed before the emergence of ‘Ilm ul-Kalam [Islamic Scholasticism], and was never discussed under this name ‘al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar’ and with the same referent except by the Mutakallimūn after the end of the first century Hijri.