沙里亚证据是表明其所指示之裁决为沙里亚裁决的证明。因此，将某一裁决视为沙里亚规定，取决于对其证据的认定。由此可见，对证据之判定的讨论，是考虑沙里亚规定的基础。当某事件有一个适当的证据证明其裁决为如此如此时，依据对该证据的认定，此裁决即被视为该事件的沙里亚规定。然而，如果某一事件有两个适当的证据：一个指示某种裁决，例如禁止（hurma）；另一个指示不同的裁决，例如许可（ibaha）。那么我们必须在两个证据之间进行权衡取舍（tarjeeh），直到能够依据其中较强的证据来采纳一个裁决。因此，必须了解用作证明的适当证据之间进行权衡取舍的各种角度，以便通过将较强的证据置于其他证据之上而便于采纳它。关于进行权衡取舍并依据较强证据行事之义务的证据，即较强的证据，是圣门弟子的公议（ijma'）（愿真主喜悦他们）。因此，他们（圣门弟子）在触摸两个割礼部位的问题上，将阿伊莎的传述置于优先地位。她的话是：

The Sharī’ah evidence is a proof that the hukm it denotes is a hukm shar’i. Therefore, the consideration of a hukm as a Sharī’ah rule depends on the consideration of its evidence. Consequently, the discussion about the judgement of an evidence is the basis in considering the Sharī’ah rules. When there is a suitable evidence for an incident to prove that its hukm is such and such, then this hukm is considered a Sharī’ah rule for that incident based on the consideration of its evidence. However, if there are two appropriate evidences for an incident; one indicates a certain hukm, a prohibition (hurma) for example and the other indicates a different hukm such as permissibility (ibaha). Then we must outweigh (tarjeeh) one of the evidences over the other until it becomes possible to adopt a hukm on the premise that its evidence is stronger than the other. Therefore, one must know the angles of outweighing (tarjeeh) the appropriate evidences that are used as proof so as to facilitate adopting the strongest evidence by outweighing it over other evidences. The evidence for the obligation of outweighing and acting upon the strongest evidence, that is, the strongest evidence, is the ijma’ of the Sahabah (May Allah be pleased with them for that). So, they (the Sahabah) outweighed the report of ‘A'isha  with regards to the touching of the two circumcised parts. Her statement:

他们以此为由而压过了她的话，依据是艾卜·赛义德·胡德里的传述：他说，先知ﷺ说：

They outweighed her saying over the report of Abu Sa’id al-Khudri who said that the Prophet PBUH said:

这是因为先知的妻子们比男人更熟悉这些事务。圣门弟子们也认为，先知的一位妻子所传述的一则圣训——她说先知清晨醒来时处于大净（janaba）状态——应当优先于艾布·胡莱赖所传述、来自阿拔斯之子法德尔的圣训，后者称先知ﷺ说：

This is because the wives of the Prophet PBUH were more versed about these matters than the men. The Sahabah also outweighed the report of one of his PBUH wives who narrated that he used to wake up in the morning in a state of janaba (major ritual impurity) against what Abu Hurairah  reported from al-Fadl ibn ‘Abbas that the Prophet PBUH said:

同样地,阿里·本·阿比·塔利卜认为艾卜·伯克尔的传述更为有力,因此他没有像对待其他人那样让他宣誓。同样地,艾卜·伯克尔认为穆吉拉关于祖母继承权的传述更为有力,因为穆罕默德·本·麦斯莱马还有另外的传述与之相印证。另外,欧麦尔认为艾卜·穆萨·艾什尔里关于请求许可(isti'zan)的传述更为有力,因为艾卜·赛义德·胡德里的传述与之相印证。圣门弟子只有在将经文研究到无法再深入的程度时,才会权衡各种意见和类比。任何人若审视他们的情况,观察他们伊吉提哈德的实际状况,便会毫无疑问地知道:他们一向要求采用较有力的证据,而舍弃两个或然(zanni)证据中较弱的一个。先知ﷺ派穆阿兹前往也门任法官时,对他的接受,也说明了这一点:即证据的次序,以及一个证据优先于另一个证据。

In a similar way ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib found the report of Abu Bakr stronger, thus he did not put him to oath as he did with others. In a similar way abu Bakr found the report of al-Mughira about the inheritance of the grandmother stronger due to what was narrated in addition to it by Muhammad ibn Maslama. Also, ‘Umar found the report of Abu Musa al-Ash’ari about the isti’zan (seeking permission) stronger after it has been corroborated by Abu Sa’id al-Khudri’s narration. The Sahabah did not outweigh opinions and analogies except after studying the texts up to the point that it was not possible to go (in study) any further. Whoever scrutinises their situation and observes the facts of their Ijtihādat will come to know without any doubt whatsoever that they used to oblige the use of a preponderant evidence as opposed to a weaker one from two speculative (zanni) evidences. This is also indicated by the Prophet’s  acceptance of Mu’az, when he sent him to Yemen as a judge, on the order of evidences and the precedence of one evidence over the other.

然而，当两条证据相互冲突时，除非两者无法同时采用，否则不应诉诸于以一条证据压倒另一条证据。如果能够同时遵循两条证据，那是更好的，因为同时遵循两条证据，要好过完全弃置其中一条，因为证据的原则在于遵循而非弃置。此外，不应借助托词和借口来同时遵循两条证据，而应依照文本所指示的意义来处理。两条相互冲突的证据得以运用的一个例子，便是先知ﷺ的这句话：

However, when two evidences conflict it will not be correct to resort to the outweighing of one evidence over the other except in the event when it not possible to use both of them together. If it is possible to act upon both of them that is better, since it is better to act upon both evidences than to disregard one of them altogether because an evidence in principle is to act upon and not to disregard. Furthermore, it is not correct to act upon both evidences through excuses and pretexts but according to the indication of the text. An example of using two conflicting evidences is the saying of the Prophet :

以及他的话：

And his saying :

所以,使者ﷺ赞扬了在被召唤作证之前就主动作证的人,也批评了在被召唤作证之前就主动作证的人。因此,先知ﷺ对在被要求作证之前就主动作证者的赞扬,表明这是立法者所命令的;而先知ﷺ对在被要求作证之前就作证者的批评,表明这是立法者所禁止的。这便是两条证据之间的矛盾。二者的调和之道在于:关于安拉的权利的作证,伊斯兰教法命令无需被要求即应主动提供;而关于仆人权利的作证,伊斯兰教法禁止证人在被要求之前便作证。 必须尽力使两条证据都得到遵行。如果无法同时实践两者,而它们在力度和普遍性上相等却又相互矛盾,则必须加以考察。如果已知后出的证据,那么它就废止了先前的证据,无论两条证据是确定的(qat'i)还是推测的(zanni),无论它们来自《古兰经》还是《圣训》。两条证据不可能同时一条来自《古兰经》、一条来自《圣训》,因为《圣训》不能废止《古兰经》,即便是传闻普遍的(mutawatir)圣训也不能。至于后出的证据不为人知的情况,那么两者必定都是推测性的,因为确定性的证据之间不会相互矛盾。如果两者都是推测性的,则应当权衡取舍,采用较强的证据。证据的强弱,指其在证据等级上的强弱,以及在各类推测性证据中推理考量的层次上的强弱。就证据等级而言,《古兰经》比《圣训》更强,即便该圣训是传闻普遍的(mutawatir)。 mutawatir（积累传述）的逊奈比公议更有力，而经积累传述的公议又比孤立的圣训（khabar al-ahad）更有力。若孤立的圣训是通过暗示（dalāla）、推论或类比而取得其法理依据（‘illah），则它比类比（qiyas）更有力。至于当其法理依据是明确取得时，它被视同明确标示该依据的经文，并依据证据的强度而获得相应的判决。若该经文是古兰经文，则其判决即为古兰经的判决；若是逊奈，则其判决即为逊奈的判决。若它由公议所指明，则采用公议的判决。 在考虑各类推测性证据中的推论时，推测性证据分为两类：第一类是逊奈，第二类是类比。每一类在权衡证据时都有其特定的考虑，即依据证据的强度而定。至于逊奈，证据的强度是指其传述链（sanad）的强度、其文本的强度以及其含义的强度。至于逊奈证据在传述链方面的强度，将依据以下几个问题而定。

So the Messenger  praised the one who gave witness before he was called to give testimony, and he  criticised the one who gave witness before he was called to give testimony. Thus, the Prophet’s  praise of the one who gave witness before he was asked to give it indicates that it has been ordered by the Legislator. And the Prophet’s  criticism of the one who gave witness before he was asked to give testimony indicates that it has been prohibited by the Legislator. This is a contradiction between the two evidences, and their reconciliation is: that giving testimony regarding a right of Allah , the Sharī’ah has ordered to provide it without being requested to do so. And giving testimony regarding a right of the servant, the Sharī’ah has forbade that the witness testifies before he is asked to do so. It is absolutely essential that one attempts to act upon both the evidences. If it is not possible to practise them both together and they contradict despite being equal in strength and generality, then it must be looked into. If the later evidence is known then it abrogates the earlier one whether both evidences were definite (qat’i) or speculative (zanni), whether from the Quran or Sunnah. Both evidences cannot be from the Quran and Sunnah at the same time because the Sunnah does not abrogate the Quran, even if it is mutawatir (recurrent report). As for when the later evidence is unknown; then both of them must be speculative (zanni) because definite evidences (qat’i) do not contradict each other. If they are speculative (zanni), then they should be outweighed and the stronger evidence is used. The strength of the evidence means its strength in terms of the order of the evidences and in terms of the level of considering the deduction in each type of the speculative evidences. As for the order of the evidences; the Quran is stronger than the Sunnah even if the Sunnah is mutawatir (recurrent). The mutawatir (recurrent) Sunnah is stronger than the ijma’ (consensus) and the ijma’ which has been transmitted recurrently is stronger than the isolated hadīth (khabar al-ahad). The isolated hadīth (khabar al-ahad) is stronger than the qiyas (analogy) if its ‘illah was taken by way of indication (dalāla), deduction or analogy. As for when its ‘illah is taken explicitly, it is treated as the text which has indicated the ‘illah explicitly, and it takes its rule in terms of the strength of the evidence. If the text was Qur’ānic then its hukm is that of the Qur’ān, and if it was the Sunnah then its hukm is that of the Sunnah. If it is indicated by the ijma’ then the rule of the ijma’ is taken. In terms of considering the deduction in each type of the speculative evidences, the speculative evidences are of two types; the first is the Sunnah and the second is the analogy (qiyas). Each one has specific considerations in the outweighing of evidences. i.e, based on the strength of the evidence. As for the Sunnah, the strength of the evidence with respect to it means its strength in terms of the chain (sanad) of transmission, its strength in terms of the text, and its strength in terms of the meaning. As for the strength of the Sunnah evidence in terms of the chain (sanad) it will be based on the following issues:

据伊本·阿拔斯的传述，更受推崇的是

It is preferred to the narration of Ibn ‘Abbas that

这是因为阿布·拉菲ʿ是他们二人之间的中间人，并且他是先知穆罕默德ﷺ在她与他的婚姻中的代理人。圣训的权重依据传述者的法理理解而定。由法学家（faqih）传述的言论优先于非法学家传述的言论。通过记忆传述的圣训优先于通过书面材料传述的圣训；因此，当两位传述者中，一位依靠记忆，另一位依靠书面材料时，记忆者更为可取，因为他更能免于怀疑。由知名传述者传述的圣训优先于由知名度较低的传述者传述的圣训。

This is because Abu Rafi’ was the mediator between them and he was the representative of the Messenger of Allah  in her marriage to him. And the hadīth is outweighed according to the legal comprehension of the transmitter. The report of a transmitter who is a faqih (jurist) is preferable over the report of a transmitter who is not a faqih (jurist). The hadīth which has been transmitted by a rawi through memorisation is preferred to the hadīth which has been transmitted by a rawi through the medium of written materials, So when one of the two transmitters relies on his memorisation of the hadīth and the other relies on written materials, the one who has committed it to memory is more preferable because he is more free from suspicion. The hadīth narrated by a well known transmitter is preferred to the hadīth narrated by a lesser known transmitter.

其次：就同一报道而言，连续传述的圣训（khabar mutawatir）优先于孤立传述的圣训（khabar al-ahad）。拥有完整传述链（musnad）的报道优先于mursal报道，因为我们知道musnad的传述者是谁，而mursal的传述者我们并不知道。

Second: Pertaining to the same report. The recurrent hadīth (khabar mutawatir) is preferred to the isolated hadīth (khabar al-ahad). The report which has a complete chain (musnad) is preferred to a mursal report because we know the transmitter of the musnad and we do not know the transmitter of the mursal.

第三：关于传述的时间。在成年时传述圣训的传述人，优于在幼年时即童年时传述圣训的传述人。

Third: Pertaining to the time of transmission. The transmitter who narrated the hadīth in his maturity is preferred to the hadīth which has been narrated by a transmitter at the time of his childhood that is, when he was a child.

第四：关于传述方式。在其连续上溯至先知ﷺ（raf'ihi）方面意见一致的圣训，优于在其是否连续上溯至先知ﷺ方面存在分歧的圣训。引述使者ﷺ原话的圣训，优于以意义转述的圣训。

Fourth: Pertaining to the manner of transmission. The report on which there is agreement over its continuous link (raf’ihi) to the Prophet  is preferred to the report about which there is disagreement over its continuous link to the Prophet . The report which cites the actual words of the Messenger  is better than the report which has been transmitted by meaning.

第五：关于圣训提及的时间。未注明日期而笼统流传的圣训，优于注明日期较早的圣训，因为笼统的圣训更接近后来的圣训。在先知ﷺ生命最后时日所提及的记载，优于一般的记载。因此，在先知ﷺ临终疾病期间所提及的记载，优于一般的记载。

Fifth: Pertaining to the time in which the hadīth was mentioned. The hadīth which has been transmitted generally without a date is preferred to a hadīth which is dated as early, because the general hadīth is more similar to the later hadīth. The report which is mentioned in the last days of the Prophet  is preferred. So the report mentioned during the illness when he  died is preferred to the general report.

以及祂的话语，

and His  saying,

由于他的这句话:

And due to his  saying:

“以及他的话：

“And his  saying:

其次：如果其中一则圣训表示禁止，另一则表示允许，那么表示禁止的圣训优先于表示允许的圣训，这是因为先知ﷺ所说的：

Second: If one of the reports conveys a prohibition and the other conveys a permission. The report which indicates a prohibition is preferred to the report which indicates a permission due to his  saying:

第三：如果其中一则传述表示禁止，另一则表示义务。如果不存在用以判断优先的标示（qarina），那么表示禁止的传述优先于表示义务的传述。

Third: If one of the reports conveys a prohibition and the other conveys an obligation. If an indication (qarina) for outweighing does not exist then the report which indicates a prohibition is preferred to the report which indicates an obligation.

第四：如果两条圣训中，一条表示义务，另一条表示许可，那么表示义务的圣训优先于表示许可的圣训。因为放弃义务会招致罪过，而放弃许可则不会招致任何后果。所以，远离罪过比远离一件不招致任何后果的事情更为妥当。因为，表示义务的圣训含有确定的命令，而表示许可的圣训要么是带有选择余地的命令，要么本身就是一种选择。确定的命令优先于其他命令。

Fourth: If one of the reports conveys an obligation and the other conveys permissibility, then the report which indicates an obligation is preferred to the report which indicates a permissibility. Because leaving an obligation entails a sin and leaving a permissibility does not entail anything. So, being further from the sin is more proper than being further from a thing that does not entail anything. Because, the report which indicates an obligation has a decisive request and the report which indicates a permissibility is either a request giving choice or it is itself a choice. The decisive request is preferred to other requests.

这些是关于圣训中的权衡取舍（tarjeeh）的考量。至于类比（qiyas）中的权衡取舍考量，则依据“伊莱”（‘illah，即成因）的证据。因此，若类比中对其描述性成因（‘illayat wasfihi）是由确定性文本所证明的，则优先于其成因是由非确定性文本所确立的类比。因为确定性文本不可能指示除成因之外的其他含义，而非确定性文本则不然。若类比的成因是被明确证明的，则优先于其成因是通过归纳、演绎或类比所确立的类比。若成因是通过演绎确立的，则优先于成因是通过类比确立的。由此可见，类比的权衡取舍是依据成因及其证据而定的。

This is with respect to the considerations of tarjeeh in the Sunnah. As for the considerations of tarjeeh in analogy (qiyas), they are according to the evidence of the reason (‘illah). So the analogy (qiyas) whose reasoning of its description (‘illayat wasfihi) is proved by the definite text is preferred to the one whose reasoning of its description is established by non definite text. Because the definite text is inconceivable to indicate other than reasoning (‘illah), while the indefinite text is not. The analogy whose ‘illah is proved explicitly is preferred to the one whose ‘illah is established through induction, deduction or analogy. That whose ‘illah is established by deduction is preferred to that whose ‘illah is established by analogy. Thus the outweighing (tarjeeh) of analogy is according to the ‘illah and its evidence.

以下简要列出这些占优的条件。借助它们，人们可以识别并采纳更有力的证据，从而使与之相抵的伊斯兰教法律条款失效。这种情况可能出现在两种情形中：其一，是跟随者（muttabi'）在两条证据之间作出判断时，由于他不具备推导（istinbat）的能力，也没有努力探求更为可取的见解；其二，是穆扎希德（mujtahid）面对两条证据时的情况。无论哪种情形，只要存在两条证据，就必须使其中一条占优于另一条。当某条证据占优时，他就有义务采纳证据更有力的那一条律例并依其行事，而放弃证据被证明较为薄弱的那一条律例。

These, briefly, are the preponderant qualifications. Through them the stronger evidence is known and taken so that the Sharī’ah rule is outweighed. This is possible in two cases: firstly, in the case of the muttabi’ (follower) in his judgement of two evidences without possessing the ability to deduce (istinbat) due to the absence of exerting the effort seeking the preponderant opinion. Secondly, in the case of the mujtahid when he is confronted with two evidences. In both cases, when there are two evidences then one must be outweighed over the other. When an evidence is outweighed he is obliged to adopt the hukm whose evidence is stronger and act upon it, and leave the hukm whose evidence is proven to be weak.