语言是为意义而设定的表达方式,因此,表达式对意义的所指,得益于创制者的设定;于是,要知道表达式所指的意义,就必须先知道这一设定。设定,就是为某一意义指定一个表达式,使得一旦说出第一项,第二项即被理解。 设定语言的原因在于,人需要人类中的其他人。他无法独自拥有生活所需的一切——食物、衣物、住所、武器,以及维持身体、抵御炎热、寒冷和侵害的种种所需。因此,他必须与人类中的其他人聚在一起。由此,人与人相遇便是自然的事,所以人天生是群居的社会性动物。 人与人之间的这种相遇,若彼此不了解对方内心所想,便无法合作,也无法达成满足各自需要的目的。因此,需要有某种东西来促成这种相互了解。语言的设定正由此而来,因为这种对内心所想的了解,若没有表达式、符号或例子,就无法实现。 在这三者中,表达式比符号和例子更有益处,因为它具有普遍性:表达式既包括可感知的存在和可理解的存在,也包括可能与不可能的事物,因为对于人们想要表达的各种意义,都可以为其设定表达式。而符号则不同,它无法用于可理解之物、缺席之物或不存在之物。例子也与此不同,因为要为一切事物找到相应的例子,要么不可能,要么十分困难:实体的例子不足以表示不存在之物,即便假设其足够,也是很难做到的。 此外，这种表达比符号和例子更简便，因为表达由声音所发出的字母组合而成，是人自然而然就会发出的，所以将其用作表达内心所想的手段，更为明显，也更为恰当。因此，设立语言的目的在于表达心中所想，而语言的对象正是由字母组合而成的表达。至于这些表达所指代的对象，则是心中的意义，而非外在的意义，因为为某物设立一个表达，本身就是其想象的一个分支，所以在为人设立"人"这一表达时，必然要在心中想象人的形象，而表达"人"所设定指代的，正是这一心中的形象，而非外在的实体，因为表达是为了表达心中所想而设定的，而不是为了实体而设定的，所以它不同于思想。思想是对现实作出判断，因为它通过感官将现实传递到大脑，并借助先前的信息来解释现实。表达则与此相反，它并非为了指称现实的实际情况而设立，也不是为了对其作出判断而设立，而是为了表达心中所想，无论它是否与现实相符，因为发出表达的行为是围绕心中的意义而展开的，而非外在的意义。如果我们看到某个东西，以为它是一块石头，我们就对它说出"石头"这一表达；如果我们走近它，以为它是一棵树，我们就对它说出"树"这一表达；如果我们又以为它是一个人，我们就对它说出"人"这一表达。外在的意义并没有因表达的改变而改变，由此可见，所设定的表达并非为外在之物而设，而是为心中所想而设。 还有，如果我们说“زيد قائم”（zaid is standing up，即“زيد正在站着”），并以此表达外在存在的Zaid的站立，而之后Zaid坐下了，或走了，或睡了，我们的话语并不因此变为无效，尽管它并非无效，这表明语言形式的设定并非针对外在存在的实际情况，而是对心中所想之物的表达，它可能与实际相符，也可能不相符。而且，这些表达式的设定，是为了表示归属、限定，或通过将词语相互组合来支配词语的关系，例如主语与宾语等名词，以及其他情况，同时也为了表示复合词的意义，例如“站立”与“坐下”。例如，“زيد قائم”这一表达式之所以被设定，是为了让听者从它所表示的意义中获得信息，比如站立之类的意义。设定这一表达式的目的，并不在于表达式中各个单独词语的意义（即在心中想象那些意义），而在于获得归属关系，使表达得以实现，也就是说，设定的目的是让表达式提供归属，从而表达心中所想。

The languages are the expressions set (made) for the meanings, so since the expressions' denotation for the meanings is benefited from the set up of the composer; it is inevitable to know the set (expression), then to know the denotation of the expressions. The setting is specifying an expression for a meaning in a way that if or when the first is uttered; the second is understood. The reason behind setting the language is that the human is in need of others of the humankind, because he can not independently possess all that he needs for his life of food, clothing, housing, weapon, for maintaining the body and protecting it from the heat, the cold and the aggression, therefore it was inevitable for him to get together with others of the humankind, and from here it was natural that the human meets with the other human, so the human is social by his nature. And this meeting between the people could not be cooperative, nor could it achieve the aim of fulfilling the satisfaction without knowing one another what is in them selves, so there was a need for something by which this acquainting occurs. And from here the setting of the languages came, because this acquainting to what is in the mind does not occur without an expression, a sign or a example. The expression is more beneficial than the sign and the example for its generality, since the expression includes the tangible and intelligible existents, and it includes the possible and impossible information, for the possibility of setting the expression for what is wanted from those meanings. It is different from the sign which can not be set for the intelligible, nor the absent, or the nonexistent. And it is different from the example, for it is impossible or difficult to have compatible examples for everything, because the solid examples are not adequate for the nonexistent, and supposedly it is adequate; it is difficult. Moreover the expression is easier than the sign and the example, because the expression is compounded from the letters occurred by the voice, and it naturally occurs by the human, so using it as a means for expressing what is in oneself is more apparent and more appropriate. Therefore the reason for setting up the languages was to express what is in the mind, and their subject is the expressions compounded from the letters. As for the things which these expressions are set for; they are the meanings in the mind without the external meanings, because setting up (an expression) for something is a branch of its imagination, so it is inevitable to imagining the image of the human (as an example) in the mind when setting up an expression for him, and this mental image is what the expression (human) is set for it, not the external essence, because the expression is set to express what is in the mind and not for the essence, so it is other than the thought. The thought is judging the reality, since it is transferring the reality by the senses to the brain with previous information to explain the reality. The expression is contrary to that, it was not set to denote the actuality of the reality, nor is it set to issue the judgment on it, but it was set to express what is in the mind, whether it corresponds the reality or it differs from it, because uttering the expression revolves with the mental meanings without the external meanings. If we saw something and thought that it is a rock; we utter the expression of the rock on it, then if we get closer to it and we thought it is a tree; we utter the expression of the tree on it, then if we thought that it is a human; we utter the expression of the human on it, so the external meaning did not change with the change of the expression, so it denotes that the set expression is not made for it, but it is made for what is in the mind. And also if we say Zaid is standing up, and we make this expression for the standing up of Zaid which exists externally, then Zaid sat down, or he walked, or slept; our uttering becomes null despite that it is not void, which shows that setting the expression is not for the existing reality but it is an expression for that which is in the mind, so it may be corresponding with the reality, or not corresponding with it. And the expressions were set to denote the attribution, the restriction, or for governing the words by adding them to each other, like the subjective and objective nouns and others, and to denote the meanings of the compounded words like standing up and sitting down. For example the expression: Zaid is standing up was made so the news of its denoted meaning will be benefitted from it, like the standing up or others, and the purpose of setting the expression is not to benefit the individual meanings of the expressions, i.e. imagining those meanings, but the purpose of setting the expression is benefitting the attribution so the expressing occurs, i.e. the aim of the setting is making the expression provides the attribution for the purpose of expressing what is in the mind.

关于语言的来源，有一种观点认为：一切语言都是约定俗成的，是由人来设定的，而不是由安拉•塔阿拉设定的，是人们共同约定的。阿拉伯语也和其他语言一样，是阿拉伯人设定并共同约定的，并非来自安拉•塔阿拉的启示。 因为如果至仁的造物主（Al-Baari'）塔阿拉曾设定语言并告知我们，那么这种告知只能通过祂的某种方式：或是通过启示，或是在一个理智健全的人心中创造一种必然的知识，使其必然知道安拉•塔阿拉为这些含义设定了这些语言。 至于通过启示告知，这是不成立的。因为这必然导致使者的派遣要先于他们对语言的了解，使他们先知道安拉•塔阿拉所设定的语言，然后祂才向他们启示使命；但使命的派遣却是在其后。安拉•塔阿拉说："我派遣的每一位使者，都只使用他本民族的语言……"（《易卜拉欣章》第4节）。由此证明，语言并非安拉的启示。 至于通过在人心中创造必然的知识来告知语言，同样不成立。因为这必然导致人是以必然的方式认识安拉•塔阿拉，而不是通过求知和思考获得认识。原因是：如果必然地产生了安拉设定语言的必然知识，就必然产生关于安拉•塔阿拉的必然知识；然而认识安拉•塔阿拉并非必然的，而是通过认知的获得而产生的。因此，关于安拉的知识不是必然的，而是通过知识的获得而来的。这证明语言并非由安拉以"天命"（tawqīfiyah）告知我们，而是由人设定的，即是人们的约定。 至于安拉•塔阿拉的经文："阿丹被教授了所有的名称……"（《黄牛章》第31节），其含义指的是所命名的事物，而不是语言本身。 他教导他事物的实相及其属性，也就是说，他给了他用来判断事物的信息。因为仅仅感知事物的实相，本身不足以判断该事物、认识其实相，还必须有预先的信息来解释其实相。所以安拉至高无上教导阿丹各种名称，指的是所命名的事物，即赐予他用以判断所感知事物的信息。至于《古兰经》用"名称"一词来表达，是以借喻的方式说出了名称，而所指的是被命名的事物，这正是其实义所示，因为阿丹认识了事物，却不懂语言。因此，凡是能够被认识、显示实相的事物，都可以被教导和认知，而语言只是表达的工具，不过如此。这段经文的语境也表明，"所有的名称……"指的是所命名的事物，即实相和属性。 至于安拉的话："在你们的语言和颜色的差异中，也有他的迹象……"（第30章《罗马人》第22节），其中的"语言"指的就是你们的语言，因此经文中并没有表明语言是安拉所设定的。这节经文的意思是：在安拉大能的证据中，有你们语言的差异，而并不是说安拉设定了不同的语言。所以，这节经文所指的证据是语言之间的差异，而不是说安拉设定了不同的语言。 至于他至高无上的话："那些只是你们和你们祖先所起的名字，安拉并未为此降示任何凭据……"（第53章《星辰》第23节），安拉并不是因为他们起名而责备他们，而是责备他们把"主"这个词用于偶像，并信奉它们为主。 既然拉特（al-Lāt）、欧泽（al-'Uzzā）和曼纳特（Manāt）是偶像的专有名词，那么经文只斥责这些名称而未提及其他名称，便是此点的证据。因此，这些经文中并没有明确指示语言是由安拉启示的（tawqīfiyyah）。所以，没有任何沙里亚的依据表明语言是由安拉至高无上者启示的（tawqīfiyyah），而可见的事实是，语言是人们约定俗成的，是人所设定的，而非来自安拉至高无上者。

As for the composer of the languages it is that all languages are conventional, they are set by the human, and not by Allah Ta'ala, and the people agreed on them. And the Arabic language is like the other languages, it is conventional and set by the Arabs and they agreed on it, and it is not divine from Allah Ta'ala. Because if Al-Baari' Ta'ala had set it and informed us about it; this informing would be thru one of His ways, i.e. by the revealing, or by creating a necessary knowledge in a sane person that Allah Ta'ala had set it for these meanings. As for the information thru the revelation; it is invalid because it necessitates that the sending of the Messengers precedes their knowledge in the languages so that they know the language that Allah Ta'ala had set, and then He reveals the mission to them, but the sending with the mission is belated, for the saying of Allah Ta'ala: We sent not a Messenger except (to teach) in the language of his (own) people…) 4 Surat Ibraaheem, so by this it gets proven that the language is not a revelation from Allah. And as for informing the language thru creating a necessary knowledge; it is also invalid, because it necessitates knowing Allah Ta'ala by the necessity not by the acquisition of the knowledge, because the occurrence of the necessary knowledge that Allah had set the language necessitates the necessary knowledge in Allah Ta'ala, but knowing Allah Ta'ala is not by the necessity, but by the occurrence of the knowledge, so the knowledge in Allah is not by the necessity, but by the acquisition of the knowledge, and that proves that the language is not (tawqifiyah) informed to us by Allah, and this is proven, so it is set by the human, i.e. it is convention from the people. As for the saying of Allah Ta'ala: taught He And Aadam all the names …) 31 Surat Al-Baqarah, the meaning of this is the named things not the languages, i.e. He taught him the realities of the things and their qualities, it means He gave him the information that he uses to judge the things, because feeling the reality is not sufficient by itself to judge the thing and perceiving its reality, but it is inevitable to have previous information by which the reality is explained. So Allah Ta'ala had taught Aadam the names means the named things, so He gave him information by which he can judge the things that he feels. And as for expression of the Qur'an by the word "the names", it metaphorically said the name and meant the named thing, as the reality denotes, because Aadam got to know the things but did not know the languages, so every essence that is able to be known and discloses a reality is subject to the teaching and the knowledge, and the language is only a means for the expression and not more than that, and the context of the Aayah denotes that the meaning of all the names …) is the named things, i.e. the realities and the qualities. saying His for As And among His Signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the variations in your languages …) 22 Surat Al-Roum, it means your languages, so there is no denotation in it that the languages are set by Allah, because the meaning of the Aayah: and from the evidences on the power of Allah the differences in your languages, and it does not mean that Allah had set different languages. So the Aayah, i.e. the daleel is differences between the languages, not that Allah had set different languages. And as for His Ta'ala saying: These are nothing but names which you have devised, you and your fathers, for which Allah has sent down no authority …) 23 Surat Al-Najm, Allah did not dispraise them for setting names, but He dispraised them for uttering the word lord for the idol and their belief that they are lords. Since the laat, the 'uzza, and manaat are proper nouns for idols, so the indication of their specialty in the dispraising without the other names is an evidence for it, so there is no denotation in these verses that the languages are revealed by Allah (tawqifiyah). And thus there is no shari'ahi daleel that the languages are (tawqifiyah) revealed by Allah Ta'ala, but the seen reality is that they are convention from the people, so they are set by the human, not from Allah Ta'ala.