除了瓦思勒·伊本·阿塔(Wāsil Ibn ‘Atā’,穆尔太齐赖派领袖)因对犯大罪者的裁定问题而退出哈桑·巴士里(al-Hasan al-Basrī)的讲学圈之外,我们几乎找不到任何一个伊斯兰教义学(‘Ilm al-Kalam)的问题不是源自希腊哲学家所讨论过的问题。"卡达与卡德尔"(al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar)这一名称及其所指的内容,曾被希腊哲学家讨论过,并且他们在此问题上存在分歧。此问题也被称为"卡达与卡德尔"、"决定论与选择论"(al-jabr wa‘l-khtiyār),以及"意志的自由"(hurriyat al-irādah),这些名称所指的是同一个内容,即:人所做的行为,他是自由地去做还是不做,抑或是被迫的?在希腊哲学被翻译之前,穆斯林的头脑中从未想到要去探究这一主题。是希腊哲学家探究了它并在其中产生了分歧。伊壁鸠鲁学派认为意志在选择上是自由的,人依据自己的意志和选择做出一切行为,没有任何强迫。至于斯多葛学派,他们认为意志被迫走上它所走的道路,无法偏离。依他们的看法,人并非依其意志而行动,而是被迫做他所做的一切,并且没有能力在做某件事与否之间作出选择。伊斯兰教兴起以及哲学思想渗入之后,其中一个重大问题便是真主(الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ)的公正属性。真主是公正的;由这一公正的前提便引出了惩罚与赏赐的问题,进而产生了仆人是否对其行为负有责任的问题,所有这些都按照他们探究问题及其一切衍生问题的方法而被探讨,并且受到了哲学家的探究所产生的影响。 …他们所研习的哲学思想，用以反驳他们所讨论的议题。其中最突出的是穆尔太齐赖派的论述，因为这是该问题最初的讨论；其他穆太卡里姆的论述，则只是为了反驳穆尔太齐赖派的观点而出现。因此，穆尔太齐赖派被视为讨论“前定与天命”（al-qadā’ wa ‘l-qadar）问题的先驱，甚至可以说是卡拉姆学（‘Ilm al-Kalam）所有议题的先驱。穆尔太齐赖派关于安拉公正的观点，是将安拉超越于不义之上。在赏罚问题上，他们所持的立场与安拉的超绝及其公正相一致。他们主张，若不肯定人的意志自由，不肯定人创造自己的行为，并且不肯定人有能力去做或不做，那么安拉的公正便毫无意义；因此，如果人出于自愿去做某事或出于自愿不去做，他所受的惩罚或奖赏便是可以理解且公正的。但是，如果安拉创造了人，并迫使他以某种方式行事，使顺从者趋于顺从、悖逆者趋于悖逆，然后再惩罚或奖赏他，那么这丝毫不公正。于是，他们以隐与显作类比，将安拉比作人。他们恰如希腊哲学家中的一派那样，把这个世界的法则套用在安拉身上。这样，他们便把人所设想的公正强加给了安拉。这一讨论的起点，是安拉对仆人行为的赏罚。 这一论题被称为"al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar"，或称"al-jabr wa‘l-ikhtiyār"，或"hurriyat al-irādah"。他们讨论这一问题的方法是希腊哲学家的方法：他们讨论意志（irādah）与行为的创造。关于意志问题，他们说：我们看到，欲求善的人自身就是善的，欲求恶的人就是恶的；欲求公正的人就是公正的，欲求不公正的人就是不公正的。因此，如果真主الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的意志与世界上一切善与恶相关联，那么善与恶就都是真主الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ所欲求的，于是欲求者就应当被冠以善与恶、公正与不公正的称谓，《伊斯兰人格》第1卷 41

With the exception of the issue of ruler regarding the perpetrator of a kabīrah (major sin) over which Wāsil Ibn ‘Atā’, the head of the Mu’tazilah, withdrew from the circle of al-Hasan al-Basrī, we can hardly find any issue from the issues of ‘Ilm al-Kalam which had not originated from an issue that was discussed by the Greek philosophers. The issue of al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar by this name and with the referent which they discussed had been discussed by Greek philosophers, and they had differed in it. This issue is referred to as the issue of al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar and as al-jabr wa‘l-khtiyār, and as hurriyat al-irādah, all of which have the same referent, namely: The actions that man does, is he free to do them or not, or is he compelled? It never occurred to the minds of the Muslims - before the translation of the Greek philosophy - to inquire into this subject matter. It was the Greek philosophers who inquired into it and differed in it. The Epicureans opined that the will is free in choice and that man does all of his actions according to his will and choice, without any compulsion. As for the Stoics, they opined that the will is compelled to take the path it takes, incapable of departing from it. Man, according to them, does nothing in accordance with his will; he is compelled to do whatever he does and does not have the ability to make a choice to undertake an action or not. After the advent of Islam and the infiltration of philosophical thoughts, one of the major issues was the attribute of justice with regards to Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is just; from the proposition of this justice follows the issue of punishment and reward, from which arises the issue of the servant’s commission of his actions, all of which were inquired into, in line with the method of inquiry which they adopted in inquring into an issue as well as into all its offshoots, and due to the influence of the inquisitions of the philosophers i.e the philosophical thoughts they had studied in relation to the topics they were refuting. The most prominent of these was the discussion by the Mu’tazilah, being the original discussion in this matter; the discussions of the other Mutakallimīn come only as a response to refute the views of the Mu’tazilah. Thus the Mu’tazilah are considered the pioneers in discussing the issue of al-qadā’ wa ‘l-qadar, nay in all the topics of ‘Ilm al-Kalam. The Mu’tazilah’s view of the justice of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ was one of subliming Him الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ above injustice. Regarding the issue of punishment and reward, they took a stance which was consistent with the subliming of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ and with his Justice. They postulated that the justice of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ would be meaningless without the affirmation of the freedom of the will of man and the affirmation that he creates his actions and that he is capable of doing or refraining from doing; thus if he does (an action) voluntarily or refrains from doing (it) voluntarily, his punishment or reward will be understandable and just. But if Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰcreates man and compels him to act in a certain way by compelling the obedient toward obedience and the disobedient toward disobedience and then punishes him and rewards him, this would not be just in the least. Thus they drew analogy between the unseen and the seen, comparing Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ to man. They subjected the laws of this world to Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ precisely as a group of the Greek philosophers had done. Thus they obligated justice upon Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ as it was envisaged by man. The origin of the discussion is the punishment and reward from Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ for the servant’s action. This is the subject matter of the discussion which was given the name ‘al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar’ or as ‘al-jabr wa‘l-ikhtiyār’ or ‘hurriyat al-irādah’. Their approach to the discussion was that of the Greek philosophers: they discussed volition [irādah] and the creation of acts. Regarding the issue of volition, they said: we see that the one who wills good is himself good and the one who wills evil is evil, the one who wills justice is just and one who wills injustice is unjust. Thus if the Will of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ were associated to all good and evil in the world, good and evil would be willed by Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ and thus the one who willed would merit the description of good and evil, just and unjust, and The Islamic Personality Vol.1 41

这是对安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ而言不可能成立的说法。他们还说：如果安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ欲使不信者不信、悖逆者悖逆，那么他就不会禁止他们不信和悖逆；安拉怎会欲使艾布·莱海卜不信，然后又命令他信仰、禁止他不信，这怎能想象？若受造者中有任何一人这样做，他必被视为愚蠢；安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ至高无上，远超于此。此外，如果不信者的不信和悖逆者的悖逆是安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ所欲的，他们便不应受到惩罚；他们的行为实际上就是顺从祂الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的意志……于是他们以逻辑命题展开论证，随后又以《古兰经》的文本作为证据，引用安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的话语，

this is an impossibility with regard to Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. They also said that if Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ had willed the kufr of the kāfir and the disobedience of the disobedient, he would not have prohibited them from kufr and disobedience, and how can it be thinkable that Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ willed for Abu Lahab that he be a kāfir and then ordered him to have imān and prohibited him from kufr? If any one of the creation did this, he certainly would be (deemed) foolish; Exalted is Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ high above such. Further, if the kufr of a kāfir and the disobedience of the disobedient were willed by Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ, they would not be deserving the punishment; their acts actually would be in obedience to his الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ Will… Thus they proceeded with logical propositions, and then they followed this up with textual proofs from the Noble Quran, citing the saying of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

和

And

and His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

and His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

他们篡改了与其观点相矛盾的经文，例如真主 سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ 的这句话，

They manipulated the ayāt that contradicted their viewpoint, for example the saying of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

他们由此得出了他们所持和倡导的观点,即众所周知的看法:人拥有意志的自由,可以去做某件事,也可以不做。因此,如果他去做,那是出于他的意志;如果他不做,那同样是出于他的意志。至于行为的创造问题,穆尔太齐赖派认为,仆人的行为是由他们自己创造的,是他们自己所为,而不是安拉所为;他们能够做这些行为,也能够不做,而无需安拉的力量加以干预。其证据是人能感觉到自主运动与非自主运动之间的差别,例如一个人有意地移动自己的手,与一个颤抖者的移动之间的差别;又如一个人走上灯塔与另一个人从灯塔上坠落之间的差别。因此,自主的运动在人的能力范围之内:是他创造了它;而在非自主的运动中,他则没有作用。此外,如果人不是自己行为的创造者,那么塔克利夫(遵守伊斯兰教法的责任)必然失效,因为如果他没有去做或不去做的能力,那么要求他去做或不做就不合理,他也就不应受到赞扬、谴责、奖赏或惩罚。于是,他们通过逻辑命题来论证自己的这一观点,然后又附上经文的证据,引用了许多经文,例如安拉(SWT)的话:

They concluded from this the opinion that they held and advocated, namely their well-known view that man has the freedom of will to do an act or refrain from it. Thus if he acts, it is according to his will and if he refrains, it is also according to his will. As for the issue of the creation of acts, the Mu’tazilah said that the acts of the servants are created by them and are of their own doing not of Allah’sالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ; it is in their power to do these acts or refrain from them without any intervention of the power of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. The proof of this is the difference which man feels between the voluntary and the involuntary movement, such as the movement of a person who voluntarily moves his hand and the movement of a trembling person, and such as the difference between the movement of someone going up a lighthouse and another falling from it. Thus the voluntary movement is in the power of man: it is he who creates it; but he has no role in the involuntary movement. Also, if man was not the creator of his acts, the taklīf (obligation to comply with the Sharī’a) would certainly be invalidated, since if he was not capable of acting or refraining from acting, it would not be rational to ask him to act or to refrain from acting and this would not have been the subject of praise, reproach, reward or punishment. Thus, they proceeded with the proof of this opinion of theirs via logical propositions, and then they annexed to this textual proofs, citing many ayāt, like the saying of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

他们篡改了与其观点相矛盾的经文，比如真主سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的话语。

They manipulated the ayāt which contradicted this opinion of theirs, like the saying of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

他们最终得出了关于“行为的创造”这一问题的观点，即人自己创造自己的行为，并且有能力去做某事或放弃某事。在依照教义学家（Mutakallimīn）讨论此问题及其派生问题的研究方法时，“行为创造”问题的派生问题之一便是因果关系问题。穆尔太齐赖派确定人的行为由其自身创造之后，随之产生一个问题：由人的行为所引起的结果，是否也是由他创造的？还是由安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ创造的？例如，被击打者所感受到的疼痛，事物因人的行为而产生的味道，刀具造成的切割，快乐、健康、欲望、热、冷、湿润、坚硬、怯懦、勇敢、饥饿、满足等等。他们认为，所有这些都属于人的行为的一部分，因为正是人在实施其行为时引起了它们。因此，它们是由其行为产生的结果，所以也由他创造。

They concluded with the opinion which they held regarding the issue of the creation of acts, namely the view that man creates his own actions by himself and that he is capable of doing an act or refraining from it. In pursuance of the methodology of inquiry of the Mutakallimīn in discussing the issue as well as its offshoots, one of the offshoots of the issue of the creation of acts was the issue of causality. After the Mu’tazilah had determined that the acts of man are created by him, a question arose from this: what about the acts that result from his action? Are they created by him as well? Or are they created by Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ? For example, the pain felt by a person who has been hit, the taste that a thing comes to have as a result of the action of man, the cutting that occurs from a knife, pleasure, health, lust, heat, cold, humidity, solidity, cowardice, courage, hunger, satisfaction, etc. They said that all these are part of the action of man because it is man who causes them when he performs his acts. Thus they are ensuing from his act and as a result are created by him.

这是关于 al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar（前定与天命）以及穆尔泰齐赖派对此所持观点的问题。其实质在于仆人行为的意愿（意志）问题，以及因人的行为而在事物上产生的属性问题。他们观点的实质是：仆人在其一切行为中拥有自由意志，是他自己创造了自己的行为，以及因其行为而在事物上产生的属性。

This is the issue of al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar and the view of the Mu’tazilah regarding it. The essence of it is that it is the issue of the volition of the act of the servant and the attributes that occur in things as a result of the action of man. The essence of their view is that the servant has free will in all of his actions and that it is he who creates his actions and the attributes that occur in things as a result of his action.

这种穆尔太齐赖派的观点激怒了穆斯林,而且是他们闻所未闻的观点;它是对宗教根基即“aqīdah”(信仰)的一种放肆的主张。因此他们驳斥这一观点,于是出现了一个名为“Jabriyyah”(宿命论派)的群体;其中最著名的是贾赫姆·本·萨夫万。他们说:人是被迫的,他没有自由意志,也没有创造自己行为的能力;他就像风中的一根羽毛,或像漂浮在波浪上的一块木头。实际上,真主سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ在人的手上创造了行为。他们说:如果我们说人是自己行为的创造者,那么就会导致对真主سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ能力的限制,以及(由此产生的推论)其能力不能涵盖万物:仆人成了真主سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ在世间万物创造中的合伙人。一件事物不可能同时受两种能力的影响。如果是真主سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的能力创造了它,那么人在其中就没有作用;如果是人的能力创造了它,那么真主سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ在其中就没有作用。不可能一部分是真主سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ能力的结果,另一部分是仆人能力的结果。因此,真主سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ是仆人行为的创造者,人做某件事是依照真主سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的意愿。他们认为,仆人的行为只通过真主سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的能力而发生,仆人在其中毫无任何影响;人仅仅是真主سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ在他手上所施行之事的承受者,他是完全被迫的。他与无生命之物相同,只是外表有所不同。他们就这样为自己的观点提供论证,引用《古兰经》的经文来支持,例如真主سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的话:

This view of the Mu’tazilah provoked the Muslims and it was a view unfamiliar to them; it was a impudent view in the prime basis of the deen i.e the ‘aqīdah. Thus they refuted it, a group called the Jabriyyah emerged; among the most famous of them was al-Jahm ibn Safwān. They said: man is compelled and he does not have free will, nor does he have the capability of creating his acts; he is just like a feather in the wind or like a piece of wood floating upon waves. Indeed, Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ creates the actions upon the hands of man. They said: if we say that man is the creator of his own acts, what follows is the limiting of Allah’s الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ capability and (the implication) that it does not cover all things: that the servant is a partner of Allah’s الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ in the formation of what is in this world. A single thing cannot be affected by two capabilities. If the capability of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ created it, then man has no role in it, and if the capability of man created it then Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ has no role in it. It is impossible that part of it is the result of the capability of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ and another part is the result of the capability of the servant. Thus Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is the Creator of the action of the servant, and it is according to His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ will that man performs an action. They opined that the acts of the servants occur only through Allah’s الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ capability and that the servant has no influence whatsoever in it; man is merely the subject of what Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰconducts at his hands, he is compelled absolutely. He and the inanimates are equals, differing only in appearance. Thus did they proceed in the proof of their view, citing ayāt of the Quran to support it, like the saying of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

and His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

and His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

他们会对那些表明仆人拥有意志和自主行为的经文作出曲解。据此,他们说,由仆人的行为所产生的种种属性,比如快乐、饥饿、勇敢、切割、燃烧等,都是出自真主 الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ。

They would interpret away the ayāt indicating the free will of the servant and his creation of acts. Accordingly, they said that the attributes of things that result from the action of the servant such as pleasure, hunger, courage, cutting and burning etc. are from Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ.

艾哈勒·素奈·沃·吉玛尔尔（Ahl ul-Sunnah wa‘l-Jama’ah）也兴起，并致力于驳斥穆尔太齐赖派。艾哈勒·素奈认为，仆人的行为全都出于安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的意志与意愿。他们说，意志与意愿所指的是同一件事，即作为“永生者”（al-Hayy，即安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ）的一种永恒属性，它决定在两种可能之中选择其一在某一特定时刻发生，而能力对一切事物都是同等的。仆人的行为依照他的裁定（hukm）——当他الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ欲求某物时，他说“有！”，它便成有——以及他的定命（qadiyyah），即他的裁决（qadā’），这是对行为加上条件的一种指称。安拉الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ说：

Ahl ul-Sunnah wa‘l-Jama’ah (also) emerged and addressed themselves to refute the Mu’tazilah. Ahl ul-Sunnah said that the acts of the servants are all by the Will and Volition of Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. Will and volition, they said, mean the same thing, namely, an eternal attribute of al-Hayy (the Alive, i.e. Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ), which dictates the opting for the occurrence of one of two practicables at one specific time while the capability is uniform with regard to all. The acts of the servants are according to his ruling [hukm] - when He الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ Wills something He says ‘Be!’ and it is – and His qadiyyah, that is, His qadā’, which is a denotation of the act plus conditions; Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ says,

这里所说的“卡德奥”（qadā’），指的是受卡德奥影响的对象，而不是真主众属性中的一种属性。仆人的行为是依照真主（الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ）的定制（taqdīr）而发生的：即对每一被造之物的特定性质作出规定，包括其善与恶、益与害，以及容纳它的时间和地点，并由此产生相应的惩罚与奖赏。这里的用意在于确认真主的意志与能力具有普遍性，因为一切事物都是由真主创造的（这表明真主的能力与意志并不带有强迫或施加的成分）。 有人会说：若按你的观点，不信者在其不信中是被迫的，犯罪者在其罪行中是被迫的，那么要求他们信仰和顺从便不成立。我们的回答是：真主要求他们出于自身意愿而做出不信和罪行，因此并无强迫；这正如真主预知了他们自愿的不信和罪行一样，所以不可能之事的必然性并不成立。

The intent of qadā’ here being the subject affected by the qadā’ and not an attribute from amongst the attributes of Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. The act of the servant is according to the arrangement [taqdīr] of Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ: the characterisation of every created entity with its own specification as regards goodness, badness, usefulness, harmfulness and the time and place that contain it, and the consequent punishment and reward. The intention here is to affirm the generality of the Will and Capability of Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ because all (things) are created by Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ (This dictates the Capability and the Will (of Allah) for no compulsion or imposition.) They said: if it is said that according to your view a kāfir is compelled in his kufr and a fāsiq is compelled in his fisq and thus their obligation to have imān and be obedient would not be valid, our reply is that Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ wanted from them kufr and fisq according to their own volition, thus there is no compulsion; this is just as الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ foreknew their voluntary kufr and fisq, thus the incumbency of the impossible does not The Islamic Personality Vol.1 45

关于仆人的行为,他们在回应穆尔太齐赖派和哲卜里叶派时说:仆人有自主的行为,顺从时因之获得奖赏,违抗时因之受到惩罚。他们解释了为何称之为自主行为,同时又坚持安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ是行为唯一的创造者和施行者。因此他们说:仆人行为的创造者是安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ。仆人的能力和意志对某些行为有作用,例如击打的动作,但对另一些行为则没有作用,例如(非自主的)颤抖动作。至于认为安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ是万物的创造者,而仆人只是获得者(卡斯布)的观点,他们对此作了澄清并说:仆人将自己的能力和意志指向某一行为,这就是获得(卡斯布);此后安拉对该行为的影响,就是创造。同一个成果处于两种能力之下,但指向两个不同的方向:就影响而言,行为由安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ完成;就获得而言,行为由仆人完成。换言之,安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ一直是依照仆人的能力和意志而创造该行为,但并非通过仆人的能力和意志;这种结合就是获得。他们用哲卜里叶派引证以证明安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ创造行为并掌控行为的同样经文来佐证自己的观点,并以安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的这句话来证明仆人的获得:

follow. About the acts of the servants, they said in response to the Mu’tazilah and the Jabriyyah: the servants have voluntary acts for which they are rewarded in the case of obedience and are punished in the case of disobedience. They explained how they termed it voluntary whilst holding that Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is the sole creator and effector of acts; thus they said: the creator of the action of the servant is Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. The capability and will of the servant has a role in certain acts such as the movement of striking, but not in others, such as the movement of (involuntary) trembling; As for the thought that Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰis the Creator of all things and the servant is only an acquirer, they clarified this and said: the directing by the servant of his capability and will to the act is acquisition [kasb] and Allah’s affecting the action thereafter is creation. The same accomplishment is under the two capabilities but in two different directions. The act is accomplished by Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ in the direction of effecting and accomplished by the servant in the direction of acquisition. In other words, Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ has consistently created the act upon the capability and willing of the servant but not through the servant’s capability and will; this combination is acquisition. They evidenced their view with the same ayāt that the Jabriyyah cited to prove Allah’s الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ creation of acts and His control on them, and they evidenced acquisition by the servant by the saying of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

And His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ saying,

他们自认为已经摒弃了穆尔太齐赖派和哲卜利耶派的观点。实际上，他们的观点与哲卜利耶派的观点如出一辙。他们的“换取”（kasb）理论彻底失败了。它既不符合理智，因为没有理性的证据支持它；也不符合经文，因为在沙里尔的经文中找不到支持它的文本依据。它不过是调和穆尔太齐赖派与哲卜利耶派观点的一次失败尝试。 总而言之，“前定与天命”（al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar）问题是穆泰卡林（Mutakallimīn）之间的一个重大问题，他们所有人都把探究的重点放在仆人的行为以及由此产生的属性上，即仆人的行为在事物上所产生的属性。他们探究的基础是仆人的行为以及他因自身行为而影响到的属性：这些行为和属性是由安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ所创造，还是由仆人所创造？这种发生是通过安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的意志，还是通过仆人的意志？引发这一探究的原因，是穆尔太齐赖派从希腊哲学中采纳了“前定与天命”或“强迫与选择”或“意志自由”的问题，并依据他们认为与安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ所必须具有的公正属性相一致的视角来讨论它。这导致了哲卜利耶派和逊尼派的出现，以反驳穆尔太齐赖派的观点，而他们也是依照同样的原则、在同样的基础上进行的。他们所有人都是从安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的属性的角度来讨论这一问题，而不是仅从行为主体的角度。 他们把安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的意志和祂的能力，同时运用于仆人的行为，以及仆人在事物上所产生的属性；于是他们探讨的问题变成：这些究竟是通过安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的能力和意志而成，还是通过仆人的能力和意志而成？ 46 “卡达”与“嘎达尔”问题是如何出现的 因此，al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar（卡达与嘎达尔）指的是仆人的行为，以及人通过自身行动在事物上所产生的属性。所以，qadā’ 是仆人的行为，qadar 是事物的属性。 qadā’ 是仆人的行为，这一点从他们对此的讨论与分歧中可以看出：一派说仆人凭借自己的能力和意志完成行为；另一派反驳说，行为是由安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ的能力和意志所成就，而非仆人的能力和意志；还有一派反驳以上两派，认为仆人的行为是通过安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ在仆人具备能力和意志的时刻创造该行为而实现的，并非借助仆人自身的能力和意志。这表明 qadā’ 的含义就是仆人的行为。 qadar 是仆人在事物上所产生的属性，这一点同样从他们的讨论与分歧中可以看出：当他们讨论仆人行为的结果时，便讨论了他所产生的属性。于是他们说：如果我们把淀粉加入糖中一同煮，就得到布丁，那么布丁的味道和颜色是我们创造的，还是安拉سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ创造的？屠宰时灵魂（rūh）的离开、推石头时石头的移动、睁开眼睛时的视觉、跌倒时腿的折断、治疗后腿的康复等等，又是如何呢？ 这些都是我们的创造，还是安拉（سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ）的创造？

They considered themselves as having repudiated the views of the Mu’tazilah and the Jabriyyah. In reality their view and that of the Jabriyyah is one and the same. Their notion of acquisition was a complete debacle. It is neither in accordance with the intellect since there is no rational proof for it, nor is it in accordance with the texts since there is no textual proof for it among the shar’i texts. It is no more that a failed attempt to reconcile the views of the Mu’tazilah and the Jabriyyah. In summation, the issue of al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar was a major issue amongst the Mutakallimīn, and all of them focused their inquiry on the act of the servant and the attributes resulting therefrom, that is, the attributes which the servant effects in things as result of his actions. Their basis for the inquiry was the act of the servant and the attributes which he affects as result of his action: is it Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ who created both (the act and the attributes) or it the servant, and does this occur via the will of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ or via the will of the servant? The cause which gave rise to this inquiry is the adoption of the issue of ‘al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar’ or ‘al-jabr wa‘l-ikhtiyār’ or ‘hurriyat al-irādah’ from the Greek philosophy by the Mu’tazilah, and their discussion of it from a perspective that they deemed consistent with the attribute of Justice neccisitated upon Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. This led to the emergence of the Jabriyyah and Ahl ul-Sunnah to refute the views of the Mu’tazilah, which they did according to the same precepts and on the same basis. All of them discussed the issue from the perspective of the attributes of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ not from the perspective of the subject alone. They applied the Will of Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ and His Capability to the act of the servant and to the attributes which the servant affects in things; their subject of inquiry became: are these through the capability and will of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰor are they via the capability and will of the servant? 46 How the Issue of al-Qadaa’ wa‘l-Qadar Emerged Al-qadā’ wa‘l-qadar is, thus, the acts of the servant and the attributes of things which man effects in things as a result of his action. Thus qadā’ is the act of the servants and qadar is the attributes of things. The fact that the qadā’ is the acts of the servants is evident from their discussion and divergence with regards to it, that is, their saying that the servant carries out the act through his own capability and will, and the saying of those who refuted them that the act is affected by the capability and will of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ, not the capability and will of the servant, and the saying of those who refuted both groups that the act of the servant is effected through the creation of the act by Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰat the time of the capability and will of the servant for the act, not by means of the capability and will of the servant. This indicates that the meaning of qadā’ is the acts of the servants. The fact the qadar is the attributes effected by the servant in things is evident from their discussion and divergence with regards to it: when they discussed what results from the acts of the servant, they discussed the attributes that he effects; thus they said: if we add starch to sugar and cook the twain, pudding results: is the taste and the colour of pudding of our creation or is it of the creation of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ? Is the exiting of the rūh upon slaughter, the movement of a stone upon pushing, our vision upon opening our eyes, the breakage of a leg upon falling down and it health upon healing etc.: are all these of our creation or of the creation of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ?