Hivyo ni akili ndiyo inayofahamu kuwepo kwa Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ, na ndiyo njia inayotumika kufikia imani. Kwa hiyo Uislamu uliwajibisha matumizi ya akili na kuifanya kuwa ndiyo ushahidi [hukm] kuhusu imani katika kuwepo kwa Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. Hivyo basi, dalili ya kuwepo kwa Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ ni ya kiakili.
Thus it is the intellect which comprehends the existence of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ and it is the means taken to arrive at imān. Hence Islam obligated the use of the intellect and deemed it the evidence [hakm] regarding imān in the existence of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. Thus the proof of the existence of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is rational.
Kwa wale wanaounga mkono dhana ya kwamba dunia haina mwanzo [qadm] na kwamba ni ya milele isiyo na mwanzo, na wale wanaodai kwamba maada ni ya milele, isiyo na mwanzo; wanasema kwamba dunia haitegemei kitu kingine isipokuwa yenyewe, bali inajitegemeza yenyewe kwa sababu vitu vyote vilivyopo duniani humu ni aina tofauti za maada; vyote ni maada. Kutegemeana kwa sehemu moja ya dunia kwa sehemu nyingine si utegemezi (kwa kweli). Pale kitu kinapotegemea chenyewe, hii si utegemezi bali ni kujitegemea kusikotegemea kitu kingine. Hivyo basi maada ni ya milele, isiyo na mwanzo, kwa kuwa inajitegemeza yenyewe; yaani, dunia ni ya milele, inajitegemeza na kujitegemea bila kutegemea kitu kingine.
As for those who advocate the timelessness [qadm] of the world and that it is eternal with no beginning, and those who claim that matter is eternal, having no beginning; they say that the 16 The Islamic ‘Aqīdah world is not dependent on other than itself but is self-sustained because all the things that exist in this world are (simply) different forms of matter; they are all matter. The dependence of some part of it upon another part is not (in reality) dependence. When something depends on itself this is not dependence but independence from other than itself. Thus matter is eternal, having no beginning, because it is self-sustained, that is, the world is eternal, self-sustained and independent of other than itself.
Jibu hili lina sehemu mbili: kwanza, vitu vilivyopo duniani havina uwezo wa kuumba au kuanzisha chochote kutokana na kutokuwepo kabisa, iwe kila kimoja peke yake au vyote kwa pamoja; "kitu" hakiwezi kuumba wala kuanzisha kutokana na kisichokuwepo. Ikiwa kitu kingine kinakisaidia katika jambo moja au zaidi, bado kitakuwa, pamoja na kitu hicho au vitu hivyo vingine, hakiwezi kuumba wala kuanzisha. Kutokuwa na uwezo huo wa kuumba au kuanzisha kutokana na kutokuwepo kunaonekana wazi. Hii ina maana kwamba hakiwezi kuwa cha milele, kwa kuwa kitu cha milele hakipaswi kuwa na sifa ya kutokuwa na uwezo; kinapaswa kuwa na sifa ya uwezo wa kuumba na kuanzisha kutokana na kutokuwepo, yaani, vitu vilivyoumbwa vinapaswa kumtegemea ili kiweze kuchukuliwa kuwa cha milele. Kwa hiyo, dunia si ya milele wala haipo nje ya wakati, kwa sababu haina uwezo wa kuumba au kuanzisha. Kutokuwa na uwezo wa kitu kuumba kutokana na kutokuwepo ni ushahidi wa wazi kwamba hakiko cha milele.
Pili, tulichothibitisha ni kwamba kitu kinategemea kiwango maalumu ambacho hakiwezi kukipita katika mchakato wa kukamilisha haja ya kingine. Maelezo yake ni haya. Ikiwa A anamtegemea B, B anamtegemea C, na C anamtegemea A, na kadhalika, utegemezi wao kwa kila mmoja ni ushahidi kwamba kila mmoja wao si wa milele; kukamilishana kwao au kutimiza haja ya mmoja kwa mwingine hakutokei kwa namna isiyo na mpangilio, bali kwa kadiri maalumu, yaani, kwa mpangilio maalumu. Ukweli kwamba haiwezi kutimiza ukamilishaji huu isipokuwa kwa mpangilio huu, na kwamba haiwezi kufanya kazi kinyume nao, unaonyesha kwamba kitu kinachokamilisha hakikamilishi peke yake, bali kinakamilisha kwa kufuata mpangilio uliowekwa juu yake na kulazimishwa kuufuata na kitu kingine kisicho chenyewe. Kwa hiyo, kile kinachokamilisha na kile kinachokamilishwa vyote viwili vinategemea kile kilichowawekea mpangilio maalum ambao kwao ukamilishaji hutokea. Vyote viwili havina uwezo wa kwenda kinyume na mpangilio huu, wala hitaji la kutimizwa haliwezi kutokea isipokuwa kulingana na mpangilio huu. Hivyo, kile kilichowawekea wote wawili mpangilio ndicho wanachokihitaji. Hivyo vitu kwa pamoja, ingawa vinakamilishana, bado vinahitaji kitu kingine zaidi ya venyewe, yaani, vinahitaji kile kilichovilazimisha kufuata mpangilio maalum.
Kwa mfano, ili maji yageuke kuwa barafu, yanahitaji joto. Wanasema kwamba maji ni dutu, joto ni dutu na barafu ni dutu; hivyo ili dutu igeuke kuwa umbo jingine, inahitaji dutu, yaani, inahitaji yenyewe na si kitu kingine zaidi yake. Hali halisi ni kinyume cha hili. Kwa kweli, ili maji yageuke kuwa barafu, yanahitaji joto la kiwango maalum, si joto tu. Joto ni jambo moja, na sifa ya maji kutobadilika isipokuwa kwenye kiwango fulani cha joto ni jambo jingine, tofauti na joto lenyewe. Yaani, ukubwa (wa joto linalohitajika) uliowekwa kwenye joto ili lifanye kazi na ili maji yaathiriwe hautokani na maji; vinginevyo maji yangechagua kuathiriwa kama yalivyotaka. Wala hautokani na joto; vinginevyo joto lingechagua athari yake kama lilivyotaka. Yaani, hautokani na dutu yenyewe; vinginevyo dutu ingechagua kufanya kazi na kuathiriwa kama ilivyotaka. Lazima utokane na kitu kingine zaidi ya dutu. Hivyo, dutu inahitaji kile kinachoiamulia ukubwa maalum inaohitaji ili kufanya kazi au kuathiriwa. Kinachoiamulia ukubwa huo ni kitu kingine zaidi yake. Kwa hiyo jambo (maada) linategemea mambo mengine zaidi ya nafsi yake, hivyo si la milele, kwa sababu kile kilicho cha milele na kisicho na mwanzo hakihitaji kitu kingine chochote isipokuwa nafsi yake: ni huru kwa wengine; vitu vyote vinamtegemea yeye. Kwa hiyo ukosefu wa uhuru wa jambo (maada) ni ushahidi wa wazi kwamba si la milele, na hivyo limeumbwa.
Al-Shakhsiyya al-Islamiyya, Juzuu ya 1, ukurasa wa 17
The answer to that is twofold: first, the things that exist in this world do not have the capability of creating or originating (anything) from nothing, whether individually or collectively; the ‘thing’ is incapable of creating or originating from nothing. If another thing complements it in one or more aspects, it will still be, together with the other thing or things, incapable of creating or originating. Its inability to create or originate from nothing is clearly perceivable. This means that it is not eternal, because an eternal (thing) must not be characterised with incapability; it must be characterised with ability to create and originate from nothing, that is, the effected things must depend on it in order for it to be deemed eternal. Consequently, the world is not eternal nor is it timeless because it is incapable of creating or originating. The inability of something to create from nothing is definite evidence that it is not eternal. Second, is what we have affirmed that a thing is dependent on a specific magnitude that it cannot surpass in the process of complementing the need of another. The explanation of this follows. If A is dependent on B and B is dependent on C and C is dependent on A and so forth, their dependence on one another is evidence that each one of them is not eternal; the complementing of one to the other or the satisfication of the need of another does not occur in an unregulated manner but in accordance with a specific proportion, that is, in accordance with a specific order. The fact that it cannot fulfill this complementation except in accordance with this order and that it is incapable of functioning against it indicates that the thing which complements does not complement solitarily but complements according to an order imposed on it and compelled to conform to it by other than itself. Thus the thing which complements and that which it complemented are both dependent on that which determined for them the specific order by which the complementation is to occur. Both of them are incapable of functioning against this order, nor can the satisfaction of the need occur except in accordance with this order. Hence, that which imposed the order on both of them is the one which they need. Thus things collectively, even though complementing each other, remain in need of other than themselves, that is, in need of that what compelled them to conform to the specific order. For example water in order for it to transform into ice, needs heat; so they say that water is matter, temperature is matter and ice is matter; thus in order for matter to transform into another form, it is in need of matter, that is, in need of itself and not other than itself; the reality is contrary to this. Indeed for water to transform into ice, it needs a heat of a specific temperature not simply heat. Heat is one thing and the property of water that it does not change except at a certain level of heat is another, being different from heat itself. That is, the magnitude (of required temperature) imposed on heat in order to effect and for water to be affected does not come from water; otherwise it would have chosen to be affected as it wanted. It does not come from temperature either; otherwise it would have chosen its effect as it wanted. That is, it does not come from matter itself; otherwise it would have chosen to effect and be affected as it wanted. It has to come from something other than matter. Hence, matter needs that which determines for it the specific magnitude that it needs in order to effect or be affected. That which determines the magnitude for it is one other than it. So matter is dependent on other than itself, thus it is not eternal because that which is eternal and timeless does not need anything other than itself: it is independent of others; all things depend on it. Therefore the lack of independence of matter is definite evidence that it is not eternal and it is thus created. The Islamic Personality Vol.1 17
Mtu yeyote akitazama ulimwengu kwa mara moja tu atatambua kwamba uumbaji wa vitu, iwe ni vile vinavyochukua nafasi au vile vya aina ya nishati, hauwezi kutokea isipokuwa kutoka kwa vitu vinavyoweza kuonekana kwa hisia na kueleweka, na kwa mpangilio maalum kati ya vitu hivyo ili uumbaji utokee. Hakuna kitu duniani hiki kilichoumbwa kutoka kwenye hakuna, wala hakuna kitu kinachoumbwa bila kudhibitiwa na kiwango maalum [nasbah] na kwa kuendana nacho. Yaani, hakuna kitu duniani kinachoundwa kutoka kwenye hakuna au bila uwiano, yaani bila mpangilio maalum. Hivyo, vitu vinavyoumbwa na vinavyoumba duniani hivi si vya milele wala visivyo na mwisho. Kuhusu vitu vinavyoumba, hili liko wazi kwa kuwa vinaumbwa kutoka kwa vitu vinavyoweza kuonekana kwa hisia na kueleweka, na kwamba katika mchakato wa kuumbwa vilikuwa chini ya kiwango maalum kilichowekwa juu yake. Kuhusu vitu vinavyoumbwa, hili liko wazi katika kutoweza kwake kuumba kutoka kwenye hakuna, na pia katika kutii kwake, kinyume na mapenzi yake, mpangilio fulani uliowekwa juu yake. Mpangilio huu hautokani nao, kwani kama ungetokana nao wangeweza kuuacha na kutoutii; kwa hiyo unatokana na kitu kingine zaidi yao. Hivyo, kutoweza kwa vitu vinavyoonekana kwa hisia na kueleweka duniani, yaani kutoweza kwa ulimwengu kuumba (kuumba) kutoka kwenye hakuna na kutii kwao mpangilio maalum unaotokana na kitu kingine zaidi yao, ni ushahidi wa wazi kwamba ulimwengu si wa milele wala usio na mwisho, bali umeumbwa na Yule wa Milele na Asiyekuwa na wakati. Kwa wale wanaosema kwamba kuumba ni kupima na kupanga sawasawa, na hivyo kukana kuwepo kwa Muumba, (ambaye huumba) kutoka kwenye hakuna kitu, maana yake ni kwamba vitu vinavyoweza kuonekana kwa hisi na kueleweka, pamoja na mpangilio maalum unaowekwa juu yake, ndivyo vinavyoumba. Hii ni kwa sababu upimaji na upangaji hauwezi kutokea isipokuwa kwa kuwepo kwa kitu kinachoonekana kwa hisi na kueleweka, na mpangilio maalum unaotoka kwa mtu mwingine zaidi ya kitu hicho. Hili linamaanisha kwamba uumbaji unatokana na vitu hivi viwili: vitu vinavyoonekana kwa hisi na kueleweka, na mpangilio maalum, na hivyo ndivyo vinavyokuwa waumbaji. Hii ndiyo inayomaanishwa na kauli kwamba kuumba ni kupima na kupanga sawasawa; na hakika ni kauli ya uongo. Hii ni kwa sababu mpangilio maalum hautokani na vitu wala na nafsi zake, bali huwekwa juu ya vitu na kitu kingine zaidi ya vyenyewe, ambacho hakionekani kwa hisi. Hivyo basi, ni dhahiri kwamba upimaji na upangaji sawasawa si kuumba, kwa sababu haiwezekani uumbaji kukamilika kwa hayo peke yake. Badala yake, kuwepo kwa kitu ambacho hakionekani wala hakiguswi kwa hisi, kinachoweka mpangilio maalum kwa vitu vinavyoonekana kwa hisi na kueleweka, ni jambo lisiloepukika kwa uumbaji kutokea. Kutokana na hili inadhihirika kwamba upimaji na upangaji sawasawa si uumbaji, na kwamba haiwezekani uumbaji kutokea kwa hayo pekee.
One glance at the universe will make any human realise that the formation of things, whether they be of the type that occupy space or of the energy type, can only result from sensorially perceivable, comprehensible things and a specific order between these things in order for the formation to occur. There is no object in this world which was formed from nothing, nor is anything formed without being regulated by a specific magnitude [nasbah] and in conformity with it. That is, nothing in this world is formed out of nothing or without proportion, that is, without a specific order. Thus things that are formed and those that form in this world are not eternal or unending. As for the things which form then this is clear in that they are formed from sensorially perceivable comprehensible things and that in the process of being formed they were subject to a specific magnitide that was imposed on them. As for those things which are formed then this is clear in their inability to form from nothing and also in their submission against their will to a certain order that is imposed on them. This order does not come from them, otherwise they would be capable of departing from it and of not submitting to it; therefore it comes from other than them. Thus the inability of the sensorially perceivable comprehensible things in the world, that is, the inability of the world to form (create) from nothing and their submission to a specific order that comes from other than themselves is definite evidence that the world is not eternal or interminable but it is created by the Eternal and Timeless. As for those who say that creating is proportioning and conditioning and thus deny the existence of the Creator, (who creates) from nothing, then the meaning of this is that the sensorially perceivable, comprehensible things and the specific order that is imposed on them are the ones who create, because proportioning and conditioning cannot take place except in the presence of a tangible sensorially perceivable, comprehensible thing and a specific order that comes from someone other than this thing. This entails that creating comes from these two things: the sensorially perceivable, comprehensible things and the specific order, and thus they are the creators. This is what is entailed by the saying that creating is proportioning and conditioning; and it is definitely false. This is because the specific order does not come from the things or from itself, but it is imposed on the things by other than themselves, which is not sensorially perceivable. Thus it is clear that proportioning and conditioning is not creating, because it is not possible for formation to be completed/achieved solely by that: rather the existence of something which is not sensorially perceivable or tangible, which imposes a specific order for the sensorially perceivable, comprehensible things, is indispensable for creation to happen. From this it is apparent that proportioning and conditioning is not creation and that it is not possible for creation to take place with these only.
Ikiwa Muumba hakuumba vitu vinavyoweza kuonekana kwa hisia na kueleweka kutoka kwenye kutokuwepo, basi asingekuwa Muumba, kwa sababu angekosa uwezo wa kuumba vitu kwa mapenzi yake peke yake; badala yake angelazimika kuhitaji kitu pamoja naye ambacho kwacho angeviunda. Hivyo angekuwa mwenye upungufu wa uwezo na si wa milele, kwa sababu hawezi kuumba kwa nafsi yake, bali anahitaji msaada wa nje; na yule ambaye hana uwezo na anayehitaji kitu hawi wa milele. Zaidi ya hayo, kwa kweli maana ya 'Muumba' ni yule anayeumba kitu kutoka kwenye kutokuwepo. Maana ya kuwa Muumba ni kwamba vitu vinamtegemea yeye kwa kuwepo kwao, na yeye hamtegemei chochote. Kama hakuumba vitu kutoka kwenye kutokuwepo, au alikuwa hawezi kuumba wakati vitu hivyo havikuwepo, basi angekuwa anavitegemea vitu katika kuumba, na hivyo vitu visingemtegemea yeye peke yake. Hii ina maana kwamba yeye si Muumba pekee, na hivyo si Muumba kabisa. Kwa hiyo, Muumba lazima aumbe vitu kutoka kwenye kutokuwepo ili awe Muumba, na lazima awe na sifa ya uwezo na mapenzi, huru na kitu chochote; hapaswi kumtegemea chochote, na vitu vinapaswa kumtegemea yeye kwa kuwepo kwao. Hivyo basi, ili kuumba kuwe ni uumbaji, ni lazima kuwe ni kuumba kutoka kwenye kutokuwepo, na ili anayeunda awe Muumba, ni lazima aunde kutoka kwenye kutokuwepo.
If the Creator did not create the sensorially perceivable, comprehensible (things) from nothing, he would not be the Creator, because he would be incapable of creating things on the basis of his will alone; he would rather be subject to requiring some thing with him with which he can form (things). He would thus be incapable and not eternal, because he is incapable of creating (things) by himself, rather is needy of external support: and the one who is incapable and who needs (something) is not eternal. In addition, as a matter-of-fact, the meaning of the ‘Creator’ is the one who creates (something) from nothing. The meaning of being a Creator is that things rely on him for their existence, and that He does not rely on anything. If he did not create things from nothing, or was incapable of creating when (other) things did not exist, he would be dependent on things in creating (things), then the things would not be solely dependent on him. This means that he is not the sole Creator and thus not a Creator (at all). So, a Creator must create things from nothing in order for him to be a Creator and has to be characterised with capability and will, independent of any thing; He should not depend on anything, and things should depend on him for their existence. Hence, for formation to be creation it must be formation from nothing, and for the one who forms to be a Creator, he must form from nothing.
18 ‘Aqīdah ya Kiislamu
Kuhusu ushahidi wa imani kwa Malaika, ni wa kimaandiko. Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ anasema,
18 The Islamic ‘Aqīdah As for the evidence of imān in the angels, it is textual; Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ says,