Baada ya kuchunguza mbinu ya Mutakallimīn, inadhihirika kwamba ni mbinu isiyo sahihi, na kuitumia hakuongoi kwenye imani wala kuimarisha imani. Kuitumia hakuongoi hata kwenye kufikiri au kuimarisha kufikiri. Inaongoza tu kwenye maarifa tupu; na maarifa ni tofauti na imani, na ni tofauti na kufikiri. Kosa la mbinu hii linadhihirika kwa mambo kadhaa:

Upon surveying the methodology of the Mutakallimīn, it becomes evident that it is an incorrect methodology and that applying it does not lead to imān or the strengthening of imān. Applying it does not even lead to thinking or to the strengthening of thinking. It only leads to mere knowledge; and knowledge is different from imān and different from thinking. The error of this methodology is obvious from several aspects:

Kwanza: katika mbinu hii, wao huweka ushahidi wao juu ya msingi wa kimantiki, siyo juu ya msingi wa hisia. Hili ni kosa kwa sababu mbili. Sababu ya kwanza ni kwamba inamfanya Mwislamu ahitaji kujifunza elimu ya mantiki ili aweze kuthibitisha kuwepo kwa Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ; maana yake ni kwamba wale wasiofahamu mantiki hawawezi kuthibitisha usahihi wa ‘aqīdah (itikadi) yao; pia maana yake ni kwamba elimu ya mantiki inakuwa, kuhusiana na ‘Ilm al-Kalām, kama elimu ya nahau ya sarufi inavyohusiana na usomaji wa Kiarabu baada ya lugha ya Kiarabu kuharibika, ingawa elimu ya mantiki haihusiani na ‘aqīdah wala si sehemu ya uthibitisho. Hakika wakati Uislamu ulipoanza, Waislamu hawakuijua elimu ya mantiki; walibeba ujumbe na kuweka ushahidi wa uhakika kwa itikadi zao bila kutegemea elimu ya mantiki hata kidogo. Hii inathibitisha kwamba elimu ya mantiki haina nafasi katika utamaduni wa Kiislamu na kwamba hakuna haja yake katika uthibitisho wowote wa ‘aqīdah ya Kiislamu. Pili, msingi wa kimantiki unaweza kukosea tofauti na msingi wa hisia, ambao kuhusu kuwepo au kutokuwepo kwa vitu hauna makosa kabisa; kitu kinachoweza kukosea hakipaswi kuwa msingi wa imani.

Firstly: in this methodology, they base their proof on a logical basis not on the sensory basis. This is wrong because of two reasons. Firstly that it makes the Muslim in need of learning the science of logic in order for him to be able to prove the existence of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ; this means that those who are not acquainted with logic are incapable of proving the correctness of their ‘aqīdah (creed); it also means that the science of logic becomes, in relation to ‘Ilm al-Kalām, like the science of grammatical syntax in relation to the reading of Arabic after the Arabic tongue has deteriorated, although the science of logic is irrelevant to the ‘aqīdah and is irrelevant to proof. Indeed at the advent of Islam the Muslims did not know the science of logic; they carried the message and established definitive evidence to their creeds without relying on the science of logic whatsoever. This proves that the science of logic has no presence in the Islamic culture and that there is no need for it in any proof of the Islamic ‘aqīdah. Secondly, that the logical basis is susceptible to error unlike the sensory basis, which with regard to the existence or otherwise of things is absolutely infallible; what is susceptible to error should not be a basis for imān.

Mantiki inakabiliwa na udanganyifu wa kuonekana kuwa ya kweli, na hitimisho zake zinaweza kuwa si sahihi. Ingawa inasisitiza kuwa usahihi wa majengo (premises) na uimara wa muundo wao ni sharti, ukweli kwamba inajumuisha kuunganisha jengo moja juu ya jingine unafanya usahihi wa hitimisho utegemee usahihi wa majengo hayo. Usahihi wa majengo hayo haujahakikishwa, kwa sababu hitimisho halijengwi moja kwa moja juu ya hisia, bali juu ya kuunganisha majengo, moja juu ya jingine, na hivyo usahihi wa hitimisho haujahakikishwa. Hii ni kwa sababu kinachotokea ndani yake ni kwamba majengo yanaunganishwa, moja juu ya jingine: mambo yanayoweza kufahamika kwa akili kuunganishwa na mambo ya aina hiyo, yakitoa matokeo yaleyale, na mambo yanayoweza kutambulika kwa hisia kuunganishwa na mambo ya aina hiyo, yakitoa matokeo yaleyale. Kuhusu kuunganisha mambo yanayofahamika kwa akili juu ya mambo yanayofahamika kwa akili, hilo huongoza kwenye kuteleza katika makosa na hitimisho zinazopingana, na huongoza kwenye kuingia katika mfululizo wa majengo na hitimisho ambazo ni za kimantiki kinadharia na kwa dhana, lakini si kwa kuzingatia uwepo wake katika uhalisia. Kiasi kwamba katika mifano mingi ya silojizimu hizo, matokeo ya mwisho ni ndoto tupu na upuuzi. Hivyo, kuthibitisha jambo kwa kuunganisha mambo yanayofahamika kwa akili juu ya mambo yanayofahamika kwa akili kunaweza kuteleza. Kwa mfano, kimantiki inasemwa: Qur’ān ni maneno ya Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ, na imeundwa na herufi zilizopangwa na kufuatana katika uhalisia, na kila usemi unaoundwa na herufi zilizopangwa na kufuatana katika uhalisia ni wa hivi karibuni; hitimisho: Qur’ān ni ya hivi karibuni na imeumbwa. Kuunganishwa huku kwa majengo kumetoa hitimisho ambalo liko nje ya uwezo wa hisia; hivyo akili haiwezi kuchunguza usahihi wake wala kulihukumu. Kwa hiyo, ni hukumu ya kudhania, si ya kihalisia, zaidi ya kuwa ni miongoni mwa masuala ambayo akili imekatazwa kuyajadili. Hii ni kwa sababu kujadili sifa za Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ ni kujadili Dhati Yake الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ, na si halali kabisa kujadili Dhati ya Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. Hata hivyo, inawezekana, kwa njia ya mantiki hiyo hiyo, kufikia hitimisho linalopingana na hili. Hivyo inasemwa: Qur'ani ni kauli ya Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ, na ni mojawapo ya sifa Zake, na kitu chochote ambacho ni sifa ya Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ ni cha milele; hitimisho: kwamba Qur'ani ni ya milele na si iliyoumbwa. Hivyo, mkinzano wa kimantiki unaonekana wazi katika pendekezo moja na lilelile. Vilevile, katika pendekezo nyingi za kimantiki zinazotokana na kulinganisha mambo yanayoeleweka kwa akili juu ya mambo yanayoeleweka kwa akili, mwanamantiki hufikia hitimisho ambalo linapingana kabisa na ni la ajabu kabisa. Kuhusu kulinganisha mambo yanayofikiwa kwa hisia juu ya mambo yanayofikiwa kwa hisia, ikiwa pendekezo za msingi zinaweza kurudishwa kwenye hisia na hitimisho nalo linaweza kurudishwa kwenye hisia, matokeo yatakuwa sahihi, kwa sababu yanategemea hisia katika pendekezo za msingi, na hitimisho halitegemei tu kulinganisha pendekezo. Lakini kinachotokea ni kwamba katika kufikia ukweli, hutegemewa kulinganisha pendekezo, na uangalizi wa hisia unawekewa mipaka kwa kile ambacho pendekezo huishia nacho. Inaweza kutokea kwamba pendekezo linadhaniwa kuwa kweli kwa uhalisia fulani lakini kwa kweli si hivyo. Inaweza pia kutokea kwamba pendekezo lililofafanuliwa kwa mipaka ya jumla litakuwa kweli kwa baadhi tu ya sehemu zake, na ukweli wa baadhi ya sehemu hizo utaleta hitimisho la kudanganya kwamba linatumika kwa sehemu zote. Inaweza pia kuwa katika pendekezo kuna ukweli wa dhahiri, lakini kwa uhalisia si sahihi, jambo ambalo kwa udanganyifu linamaanisha ukweli wa pendekezo hilo. Inaweza pia kuwa hitimisho ni sahihi lakini majengo yaliyotolewa hitimisho hilo ni ya uongo, hivyo ikawa inadhaniwa kwamba kwa kuwa hitimisho ni sahihi, basi majengo nayo ni sahihi… na kadhalika. Kwa mfano, imesemwa kuwa wakazi wa Uhispania si Waislamu, na kila nchi ambayo wakazi wake si Waislamu si Ardhi ya Kiislamu; hitimisho ni kwamba Uhispania si Ardhi ya Kiislamu. Hitimisho hili si sahihi. Kosa lake linatokana na kosa la jengo la pili: kauli kwamba kila nchi ambayo wakazi wake si Waislamu si Ardhi ya Kiislamu ni ya uongo, kwa sababu ardhi huhesabiwa kuwa ya Kiislamu ikiwa inatawaliwa kwa Uislamu au ikiwa wengi wa wakazi wake ni Waislamu. Ndiyo sababu hitimisho ni potofu; Uhispania kwa hakika ni Ardhi ya Kiislamu. Kwa mfano mwingine, imesemwa kuwa Marekani ni nchi yenye kiwango cha juu cha kiuchumi, na kila nchi yenye kiwango cha juu cha kiuchumi ni nchi iliyofufuka. Hitimisho ni kwamba Marekani ni nchi iliyofufuka. Hitimisho hili ni la kweli kuhusu Marekani, ingawa mojawapo ya majengo mawili ni la uongo: si kila nchi yenye kiwango cha juu cha kiuchumi ni nchi iliyofufuka; nchi iliyofufuka ni ile yenye kiwango cha juu cha kifikra. Hivyo, kanuni hii ya kimantiki (syllogism), ambayo hitimisho lake ni la kweli, inamdanganya mtu kudhani kwamba majengo yaliyopelekea hitimisho hilo pia ni sahihi. Pia inampelekea mtu kudhani kwamba kila moja ya Kuwait, Qatar na Saudi Arabia ni nchi iliyofufuka kwa sababu kila moja ina kiwango cha juu cha kiuchumi, ingawa ukweli ni kwamba hizi si nchi zilizofufuka. Kwa hiyo, usahihi wa hitimisho la kila kanuni ya kimantiki unategemea usahihi wa majengo yake. Ukweli wa majengo hauhakikishwi kwa sababu yanaweza kuwa na kasoro. Kwa hiyo, ni makosa kutegemea msingi wa kimantiki katika kuthibitisha hoja. Hii haimaanishi kwamba ukweli unaopatikana kwa njia ya mantiki ni wa uongo, wala kwamba kuthibitisha hoja kwa mantiki ni kosa, bali inamaanisha kwamba kutegemea mantiki kama msingi wa kuthibitisha ushahidi ni kosa, na kuchukua mantiki kama msingi wa kujenga hoja ni kosa. Hisi ndizo zinazopaswa kufanywa msingi wa uthibitisho na ushahidi. Kuhusu mantiki, ni sahihi kuitumia kuthibitisha usahihi wa pendekezo, na itakuwa sahihi ikiwa majengo yake yote ni kweli na ikiwa pamoja na hitimisho yanaweza kufuatiliwa hadi kwenye hisi. Usahihi wa hitimisho unatokana na kutokana kwake na majengo, si kitu kingine. Hata hivyo, uwezekano wake wa kuwa na makosa unafanya iwe lazimaisifanywe msingi wa kuthibitisha, kwa sababu kwa ujumla ni msingi usio na uhakika unaoweza kukosea, ingawa uthibitisho kwa baadhi ya aina zake unaweza kuwa wa hakika. Ni hisi ambazo lazima zifanywe msingi wa uthibitisho, kwa sababu kwa ujumla hili ni msingi wa hakika kuhusu kuwepo au kutokuwepo kwa mambo; haliwezi kabisa kukosea.

Pili: Wanatheolojia (Mutakallimīn) waliondoka kwenye yale yanayoweza kufikiwa kwa hisi, wakavuka mpaka hadi kwenye yasiyoweza kufikiwa kwa hisi, wakachunguza mambo ya ghaibu: dhati ya Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ na sifa zake, pamoja na yale ambayo hisi haziwezi kuyatambua. Wakayahusisha haya na uchunguzi wa mambo yanayohusiana na yale yanayoweza kufikiwa kwa hisi. Walipindukia mipaka katika kulinganisha yasiyoonekana na yanayoonekana, yaani, kumlinganisha Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ na binadamu, hivyo wakalazimika The Islamic Personality Vol.1 37

Secondly: the Mutakallimīn departed from the sensorially accessible; they went beyond it to the sensorially inaccessible, and inquired into the supernatural: the essence of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ and His attributes, into that which the senses cannot perceive, and they connected this with inquiries into matters related to the sensorially accessible. They went into excess in drawing analogy of the unseen with the apparent, that is, drawing analogy of Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ with man, so they necessitated The Islamic Personality Vol.1 37

haki, kama inavyofikiriwa na binadamu katika maisha haya ya kidunia, ikiwekwa juu ya Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. Waliona ni lazima Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ afanye lile lililomo ndani yake kheri. Baadhi yao hata walimlazimisha Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ afanye lile ambalo ndilo bora kabisa, kwa sababu (kwa mujibu wao) Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ ni Mwenye hekima, na Yeye سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ hafanyi chochote isipokuwa kwa kusudi au hekima; kitendo kisicho na kusudi ni bure na batili; mwenye hekima hunufaisha nafsi yake au wengine, na kwa kuwa Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ ametukuka mno kuweza kunufaishwa, basi Yeye سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ hutenda tu ili kuwanufaisha wengine.

justice, as envisaged by man in this worldly life, upon Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. They deemed it necessary that Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ do that in which there is betterment. Some of them even necessitated upon Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ that he do that which is the best, because (according to them) Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is Wise and He الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ does not do anything except for a purpose or a wisdom; an action without a purpose is meaningless and futile; a wise (being) either benefits himself or others, and since Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is too sublime to be benefited, He الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ only acts to benefit others.

Hivyo wakavuka mipaka kwa kujadili mambo yasiyoonekana kwa hisia na masuala ambayo akili haiwezi kuyahukumu, na hivyo wakakosea. Hawakuzingatia kwamba kinachoonekana kwa hisia kinaeleweka, na kwamba dhati ya Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ haieleweki, kwa hiyo haiwezekani kufanya mfano wa kimoja kwa kingine. Hawakuzingatia kwamba Haki ya Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ haifanani na haki ya binadamu, na kwamba si sahihi kutumia sheria za dunia hii kwa Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ, ambaye ndiye Muumba wa dunia hii na ndiye anayeiongoza kwa mujibu wa sheria aliyoiweka. Tunaona kwamba mtazamo wa binadamu ni finyu; huelewa mambo kwa namna fulani, na mtazamo wake ukipanuka, mtazamo wake wa haki hubadilika na hukumu yake nayo hubadilika. Basi tutamlinganishaje (na sisi wenyewe) Bwana wa viumbe vyote الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ ambaye elimu yake inakizunguka kila kitu, na kumpa Yeye الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ haki maana ya haki ambayo sisi wenyewe tunaiona kuwa haki? Kuhusu wema na lililo bora, linahusiana na mtazamo wao wa haki; wanasema kuhusu hilo yale wanayosema kuhusu haki. Katika jambo hili inaonekana kwamba binadamu anaweza kuona jambo fulani kuwa jema, lakini mtazamo wake ukipanuka, mtazamo wake hubadilika. Kwa mfano, ulimwengu wa Kiislamu leo ni dar al-kufr kwa kuwa umeacha utawala wa Uislamu; kwa hiyo Waislamu wote huuona kuwa ulimwengu uliopotoka, na wengi wao husema kwamba unahitaji marekebisho. Lakini wenye ufahamu wanaona kuwa marekebisho maana yake ni kuondoa uovu katika hali iliyopo, na hilo ni kosa: ulimwengu wa Kiislamu unahitaji mabadiliko makubwa na ya kina yanayoondoa utawala wa kufuru na kutekeleza utawala wa Uislamu; marekebisho yoyote (ya kawaida) yanahusisha kuendeleza ufisadi. Hivyo ndivyo inavyoonekana jinsi mtazamo wa binadamu unavyobadilika kuelekea kile kilicho chema. Je, basi tunawezaje kumweka Mwenyezi Mungu الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ chini ya hukumu ya binadamu na kuona ni lazima kwake Yeye الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ kufanya kile tunachokiona kuwa chema au bora zaidi? Kama tungefanya akili yetu kuwa hakimu, tungeona kwamba Mwenyezi Mungu الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ alifanya mambo ambayo akili zetu haziona wema wowote ndani yake; kwa mfano, kuna wema gani katika kuumbwa kwa Iblisi na mashetani na kuwapa uwezo wa kuwapotosha wanadamu? Kwa nini Mwenyezi Mungu الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ alimpa Iblisi muhula hadi Siku ya Kiyama, na kwa nini aliruhusu Bwana wetu Muhammad ﷺ afariki? Je, haya yote ni bora kwa watu? Kwa nini Yeye الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ anaruhusu kuondolewa kwa utawala wa Kiislamu duniani na kuwezesha utawala wa kufuru kutawala, kuwadhalilisha Waislamu na kuwezesha maadui wao makafiri kutawala? Je, hili ni bora kwa waja Wake الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ? Kama tungeendelea kuhesabu maelfu ya matendo na kuyahukumu kwa akili zetu na uelewa wetu wa maana ya wema na bora zaidi, hatungeyaona kuwa mema. Kwa hiyo kulinganisha Mwenyezi Mungu الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ na binadamu si sahihi, na hakuna jambo lolote lenye lazima juu ya Mwenyezi Mungu الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ:

Thus they overstepped into discussions of the sensorially inaccessible and of issues which the intellect is incapable of judging, and so they blundered. They missed the point that the sensorially accessible is comprehensible and that the essence of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is incomprehensible, so it is not possible to draw analogy of one upon the other. They were inattentive to the fact that the Justice of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is incomparable to the justice of man, and that it is invalid to apply the laws of this world to Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ, who is the Creator of this world and the one who regulates it according the laws he set for it. When we do see that the perspective of man is narrow, he understands matters in a given way and that once his perspective widens, his view of justice changes and his judgement changes as well; how then do we compare (to ourselves) the lord of the worlds الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ whose knowledge encompasses everything and give His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ justice the meaning of justice that we ourselves see to be justice? As for betterment and that which is best, it is linked to their view of justice; they say about it what they say about justice. It is observed in this regard that man can view a given thing as good, but once his perspective widens his view changes. For example, the Muslim world today is dar al-kufr having abandoned the rule of Islam; so all Muslims view it as a corrupt world and most of them say that it is in need of reform. But the aware see that reform means the removal of corruption from the status quo, and this is erroneous: the Muslim world is in need of a radical and comprehensive change that removes the rule of kufr and implements the rule of Islam; any (mere) reform includes the prolongation of corruption. Thus it is seen how the view of man changes towards what is good. How do we then subject Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ to the judgement of man and deem it necessary for Him الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ to do what we see as good or better? If we made our mind the judge, we would see that Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ did things which our minds see no good whatsoever in; what good is there, for example, in the creation of Iblīs and the shayātīn and giving them the ability to misguide man; why did Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰgive Iblīs respite until the Day of Judgement and let our Master Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلم die? Is all this better for people? Why does he الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ allow removal of the rule of Islam from the Earth and enable the dominance of the rule of kufr, humiliate the Muslims and enable the dominance of their kafir enemies? Is this better for His الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ servants? If we proceeded in the enumeration of thousands of acts and judged them by our mind and our understanding of the meaning of good and better, we would not find them good. Therefore the comparison of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ to man is not correct, and nothing is incumbent upon Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ:

Kwa hakika, kilichowasukuma Mutakallimīn kuingia katika haya yote ni mbinu yao ya uchunguzi na kulinganisha kwao Allah سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ na mwanadamu.

Indeed, what made the Mutakallimīn slip into all this is their methodology of inquiry and their comparing Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ to man.

Tatu: Mbinu ya Mutakallimīn inampa akili uhuru wa kuchunguza kila kitu, yale yanayofikiwa kwa hisi na yale yasiyofikiwa kwa hisi. Hili kwa lazima huzaa akili kuchunguza mambo ambayo haiwezi kuyahukumu, na kuchunguza dhana na mawazo, na kuweka ushahidi wa kuthibitisha mawazo matupu ya vitu ambavyo huenda vipo au huenda visipo. Hili pia huruhusu uwezekano wa kukataa mambo ambayo yapo kwa hakika: mambo ambayo tulipewa habari zake na chanzo ambacho ukweli wa habari yake ni hakika kwetu, lakini akili haiyaelewi. Pia huruhusu uwezekano wa kuwa na imani kwa mambo ya kufikirika yasiyokuwepo, yaliyobuniwa na akili. Kwa mfano, Mutakallimīn walijadili dhati ya Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ na sifa zake: baadhi yao walisema kuwa sifa ni kitu kile kile na mbebaji wa sifa; wengine walisema kuwa sifa ni tofauti na mbebaji wa sifa. Walisema kuwa elimu ya Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ ni kufunuka kwa Kinachojulikana kama kilivyo, na kinachojulikana hubadilika kutoka wakati mmoja hadi mwingine: jani la mti huanguka baada ya kutokuanguka, na Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ anasema,

Thirdly: The methodology of the Mutakallimīn gives the intellect the freedom of inquiry into every thing, into the sensorially accessible and the sensorially inaccessible. This inevitably results in the intellect inquiring into matters that it is incapable of judging, and inquiring into suppositions and imaginations, and establishing evidence to support mere conceptions of things that may exist or may not exist. This allows for the possibility of the rejection of things which 38 The Error in the Methodology of the Mutakallimīn definitely exist: things of which we were informed by a (source) the truth of whose information is definite for us but the intellect does not comprehend them. It also allows for the possibility of having imān in fantasties having no existence, which have been conjured up by the mind. For example, the Mutakallimīn discussed the essence of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ and his attributes: some of them said that an attribute is one and the same as the attribute carrier; others said that the attribute is other than the attribute carrier. They said that the knowledge of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is the unfolding of the Known as it is, and the known changes from one time to another: the leaf of a tree falls after not having fallen, and Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ says,

Kwa ujuzi wa Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ jambo hujitokeza kama lilivyo; hivyo Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ anajua kwamba jambo litakuwepo kabla halijawepo, na anajua kwamba jambo lilikuwepo wakati lilipokuwepo, na anajua kwamba jambo halipo tena pale linapokoma kuwepo. Basi ujuzi wa Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ hubadilika vipi kwa mabadiliko ya mambo? Ujuzi unaobadilika kwa mabadiliko ya mambo mapya ni ujuzi mpya, na jambo jipya haliwezi kuwa ndani ya Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ kwa sababu kile ambacho jambo jipya limehusishwa nacho chenyewe ni jipya. Wengine miongoni mwa Mutakallimin wamejibu hili kwa kusema: ni dhahiri kwamba ujuzi wetu kwamba Zayd atatujia ni tofauti na ujuzi wetu kwamba amekwisha kuja kweli; tofauti hii inatokana na kufanywa upya kwa ujuzi; lakini hili linamhusu binadamu kwa sababu ni yeye ambaye ujuzi wake unafanywa upya, kwa kuwa chanzo cha ujuzi wake, yaani hisia na ufahamu, kinafanywa upya. Lakini kwa Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ hakuna tofauti kati ya kitu kilichokusudiwa kitakachokuwepo, kitu kilichotimia kilichokuwepo, kitu kilichokamilika kilichotokea, na kitu kilichotabiriwa kitakachotokea. Hakika taarifa kumhusu Yeye الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ ni ya hali moja. Wengine miongoni mwa Mutakallimin wamejibu: Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ kwa asili yake anajua yote yaliyokuwepo na yatakayokuwepo, taarifa zote anazijua kama ujuzi uleule, na tofauti kati ya kitakachokuwepo na kitakachokuwa inatokana na mabadiliko ya mambo, si katika ujuzi wa Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. Majadiliano haya yote yanahusu mambo yasiyofikiwa na hisia, ambayo akili haiwezi kuhukumu; hivyo hairuhusiwi kwa akili kuchunguza mambo hayo. Lakini wao waliyajadili na kufikia hitimisho hizi kulingana na mbinu yao inayoipa akili uhuru wa kuchunguza kila kitu. Walitengeneza dhana katika akili zao na kuzijadili. Kwa mfano, walidhani kuwa Mapenzi ya Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ yanahusishwa na kitendo cha mja (binadamu), kwamba mja akitaka kutenda kitendo fulani, Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ huumba kitendo hicho wakati mja huyo ana uwezo na yuko tayari, si kwa uwezo wa mja wala mapenzi yake.

With the knowledge of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ a thing unfolds as it is; thus Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ knows that a thing will be before it is and He الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ knows that a thing was when it was and He الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ knows that a thing no longer is when it no longer is. So how does the knowledge of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ change with the change in things? The knowledge that changes with the change of recent things is a recent knowledge and a recent thing does not lie in Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ because that with which the recent is associated is itself recent. Others amongst the Mutakallimin replied to this by saying: it is self-evident that our knowledge that Zayd will come to us is other than our knowledge that he has indeed come; this distinction is due to the renewal of the knowledge; but this is applicable to man because it is he whose knowledge is renewed because the source of his knowledge, sensation and comprehension, is renewed. But with Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ there is no distinction between something destined that will be, a realised thing that was, an accomplished thing that occurred and a predicted thing that will occur. Indeed, information with regards to Him الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is of one state. Other Mutakallimin replied: Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ inherently knows all that was and that will be, all information is known by him as the same knowledge, and the difference between what will be and what will stem from the change in things not in the knowledge of Allahالله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ. All this discussion deals with matters that are sensorially inaccessible, and upon which the intellect cannot judge; so it is not allowed for the intellect to inquire into them. But they discussed them and reached these conclusions in line with their methodology that gives the intellect the freedom to inquire into everything. They imagined things and discussed them. For example, they conceived that the Will of Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ is associated with the action of the servant (man), when the servant willed the action, that is, Allah الله سُبْحَانَهُۥ وَتَعَالَىٰ created the action when the servant was capable and willing, not with the servant’s capability and will.